40. The Supreme Court has been established under Article 124 of the Constitution of India and derives its jurisdiction and powers from Articles 131 to 145 thereof. There is no provision in the Constitution which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, from an order of a Tribunal constituted under any law enacted by a State Legislature.
41. Article 262(2) of the Indian Constitution which enables Parliament to enact law abrogating the power of the Supreme Court to adjudicate the disputes referred to in Article 262(1), and Article 348 of the Constitution of India in respect of parliamentary enactments relating to the language of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, referred to by the Learned Attorney General for India, are not really of relevance to the issue referred to this Bench for determination, except to demonstrate that all matters pertaining to the Supreme Court are exclusively within the legislative domain of Union Parliament.
42. Entry 18 of the State List enables the State Legislature to enact law with respect to land, including rights in and over land, land tenures including relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent. The State Legislature being clothed with power to enact law in respect of land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent, it had legislative competence to enact the Rent Control Act, in so far as the same regulates the relationship of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent.
43. Article 323B inserted in the Constitution of India, with effect from 3rd January, 1977, by the Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act 1976 empowers the appropriate legislature to enact law providing for adjudication and/or trial by Tribunals, of any disputes, offences or complaints with respect to all or any of the matters in Clause (2) of the said Article.
44. Clause (2) of Article 323B was amended by the Constitution (Seventy fifth Amendment) Act, with effect from 15th May, 1994 to inter alia insert clause (h), thereby enabling the appropriate legislature to make law, providing for adjudication or trial by Tribunals of any disputes, complaints or offences, in respect of issues relating to tenancy and rent, including regulation and control of rent.
45. The Explanation appended to Section 323B of the Constitution explains “appropriate legislature” in Article 323B to mean Parliament, or as the case may be, a State Legislature, competent to make laws with respect to the matter in accordance with the provisions of Part XI of the Constitution of India, which includes Articles 245 and 246.
46. On a conjoint reading of Article 323B and Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India with Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule, there can be no doubt that the State Legislature was competent to enact law to provide for adjudication and trial of all disputes, complaints and offences relating to tenancy and rent, by a Tribunal.
47. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature was thus competent to enact the Rent Control Act, to the extent that it provides for the adjudication of original disputes relating to tenancy and rent by the Rent Controller, and creates a Tribunal to decide appeals from orders of the Rent Controller, but subject to the exception, as discussed hereafter.
48. When the question of vires of any enactment is considered, it is to be seen, whether looking at the legislation as a whole, it can be said to be a legislation, substantially with respect to any of the matters, with regard to which the Legislature is competent to legislate, under RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.] any specific Article of the Constitution, or any of the Entries in the relevant List in the Seventh Schedule thereto. Once it is held that it is so, the legislative power conferred by that Entry is to extend to all ancillary matters, which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that arena, as held by the Federal Court in United Provinces vs. Atika Begum reported in AIR 1941 FC 16 (25) and reiterated by this Court in numerous judgments.
49. Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act, which provides for appellate adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy and rent by a Tribunal. In enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, the Chhattisgarh State Legislature has overtly transgressed the limits of its legislative power, as reiterated and discussed hereinafter.
50. While the widest amplitude should be given to the language used in one entry, every attempt has to be made to harmonize its contents with those of other Entries, so that the latter may not be rendered nugatory.
51. As observed above, both the Union legislature and the State Legislature derive their power to legislate from Article 245 of the Constitution of India. It is axiomatic that the legislature of a State may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. There is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to Article 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws with extra-territorial operation, enacted by Parliament. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature, thus, patently lacks competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh.
52. Entry 18 of the State List only enables the State Legislature to legislate with regard to landlord tenant relationship, collection of rents etc. This Entry does not enable the State Legislature to circumvent Entry 64 of the State List or Entry 46 of the Concurrent List which enable the State Legislature to enact laws with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts, except the Supreme Court, or to render otiose, Entry 77 of the Union List, which expressly confers law making power in respect of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, exclusively to Parliament.
53. Entry 18 of the State List, which only enables the State Legislature to legislate with regard to land, land tenures, landlord tenant relationship, collection of rents etc. does not enable the State Legislature to enact law conferring appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in respect of orders passed by an Appellate Rent Control Tribunal, constituted under a state law.
54. In view of Entry 77 of the Union List, only Parliament has the legislative competence to legislate with respect to the constitution, organization, jurisdiction or powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List enable the State Legislature to enact law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts except the Supreme Court. In other words, the said Entries expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
55. Article 323B (3)(d) provides that a law made under Article 323B (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said tribunals. Article 323B does not enable a State Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by enacting a provision for further statutory appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of an Appellate Tribunal.
56. The contention of Counsel for the appellant that Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act does not confer on the Supreme Court, jurisdiction it did not already possess, but is only incidental to and/or extension of its power under Article 136, is not sustainable in law.
57. Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not act as a regular court of appeal. The power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 is not to be confused with the appellate power ordinarily exercised by appellate courts and Tribunals under specific statutes.
58. Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party, but confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in appropriate cases. This power can be exercised in spite of other provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution, or any other law, as held in N. Natarajan vs. B. K. Subba Rao reported in (2003) 2 SCC 76. RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
59. Conclusiveness or finality given by a statute to decision of a Court or Tribunal, cannot deter the Supreme Court from exercising this jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court, inter alia, in Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal reported in AIR 1955 SC 65 and reiterated in numerous other decisions. appellate jurisdiction is not exercised when a statute gives finality to a decision of the Court or Tribunal.
60. Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court entertains appeals by special leave, where substantial questions of law or questions of public importance are involved. Where there is any uncertainty in the law, the Supreme Court, in its discretion, settles the law. The Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact under Article 136. If the concurrent findings are based on accepted oral or documentary evidence, there is no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.
61. While exercising power under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not re-appreciate evidence which has been appreciated by the Trial Court and the High Courts, unless extraordinary circumstances exist. It is only where the High Court has completely missed the real point requiring adjudication or has missed or ignored the relevant material, would the Supreme Court be justified in getting into evidence for the purpose of preventing grave injustice to a party.
62. An appeal, on the other hand, is a continuation of the original proceedings. Where there is a statutory appeal from an appellate order of the Tribunal, the appellate court is obliged to rehear the case, re- appreciate and re-analyze the evidence on record, adjudicate the correctness of the order impugned and correct errors both of fact and of law, that the Tribunal may have made.
63. Article 200 of the Constitution relating to the passage of Bills except money Bills, requires Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State, or in case of a State having a Legislative Council, a bill passed by both the houses of the Legislature of the State, to be presented to the Governor for assent. Such Bills become law on receipt of assent of the Governor.
64. The second proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution mandates the Governor not to assent, but reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill, which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which that Court is, by the Constitution, designed to fill.
65. Presidential assent is imperative in the case of law enacted by a State Legislature, which would derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which that Court is, by the Constitution, designed to fill.
66. Entry 65 of the State List read with Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, as stated above, enables the State Legislature to enact law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of all Courts, except the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters in those lists. The State Legislature may, therefore, be competent to enact law which affects the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court, except the jurisdiction and powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, held by a Constitution Bench of this Court, to be an inviolable basic feature of the Constitution in L Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125.
67. Counsel for the appellant is right in arguing that L Chandra Kumar (supra) pertains to the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The State Legislature has the power to enact law which abridges the powers of the High Court, except those powers, which constitute an inviolable basic feature of the Constitution, such as the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.
68. The second proviso to Article 200, of the Constitution prohibits the Governor from assenting to a Bill, which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which the High Court is, by the Constitution of India, design to fill. The Governor is obliged to reserve such bill for the consideration of the President.
69. The second proviso to Article 200 is not attracted in the case of Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, since it does not derogate from any power of the High Court. It is well settled that there is no inherent right of appeal. Right of appeal is conferred by Statute. A Statute is not invalid only because it has no provision of appeal to the High Court. RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
70. For the purpose of this reference, it is not necessary for us to go into the question of which curtailments of the power of the High Court would threaten the position which the High Court is required by the Constitution to fill.
71. The amplitude of power conferred by Clauses 1 and 2 of Article 246, makes the Parliament competent to make a law enlarging the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I and III, even though such enlargement may not be contemplated by the various Articles of Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution.
72. By virtue of the power conferred by Article 248 of the Constitution of India, the Parliament has, subject to Article 246 A of the Constitution, exclusive power to make any law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. The residuary power of legislation thus rests with Parliament.
73. Suffice it to note that in view of Entry 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, the State Legislature can enact law which affects the jurisdiction of all Courts, except the Supreme Court. In other words it can enact law which affects the jurisdiction of the High Court, except under Articles 226 and 227, but it cannot enact law which touches the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Rent Control Tribunal having been established under Article 323B of the Constitution, as observed above, the diminution, if any, of the jurisdiction of the High Court, except under Article 226 and 227, would be saved by Article 323B(3)(d) of the Constitution, but not the provision for statutory appeal to the Supreme Court.
74. The argument of Learned Counsel for the appellant that Article 138(1) and/or Entry 77 of the Union List only takes within its ambit, the Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and not its appellate jurisdiction, is fallacious and without basis. There is no reason to restrict the scope of Article 138(1) or of Entry 77 of the Union List in the Schedule to the Constitution artificially. Entry 77 of the Union List, going by its plain meaning, as also Article 138(1) should include both Original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
75. The proposition urged by Counsel for the appellant that when a State Law gets the assent of the President of India, that law prevails in the States, notwithstanding repugnancy with an earlier Union law, is unexceptionable.
76. However, Presidential assent makes no difference in case of legislative incompetence. Presidential assent cannot and does not validate an enactment in excess of the legislative powers of the State Legislature, nor validate a statutory provision, which would render express provisions of the Constitution otiose. Presidential assent cures repugnancy with an earlier Central Statute, provided the State Legislature is otherwise competent to enact the Statute.
77. In view of our finding that Presidential assent would not validate a statutory provision which the legislature was incompetent to enact, we need not go into the question of whether the President had occasion to consider the repugnancy of Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act with the provisions of the Constitution, including in particular, Entry 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List, which expressly exclude from the State Legislature, the competence and/or power to enact law affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
78. A law made under Article 323B (1) of the Constitution may exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 with respect to the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said Tribunals. However, as observed above, Article 323B (2) (d) or any other provision of the Constitution does not enable the State Legislature to enact law which provides for statutory appeals to the Supreme Court.
79. Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act purports to confer a right of statutory Second Appeal to the Supreme Court. Even in case of concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal, where no serious question of law were involved, an appeal would have to be entertained and decided. Such a provision which mandates the Supreme Court to consider an appeal is clearly beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature, as argued by the learned Attorney General. Article 200 as observed above does not and cannot validate an ultra vires enactment, which the concerned Legislature lacked competence to enact.
80. Article 138 (2) of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special agreement confer, if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court. RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
81. It is difficult to accept the submission of Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, that reservation of a Bill for Presidential assent and consequential grant of Presidential assent, tantamounts to special agreement between the Government of India and the State Government, because the President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
82. A special agreement, in our considered view means, an independent agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Government of a State through deliberations and negotiations and not just an approval of legislation by the President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
83. In any case, the Supreme Court may exercise further jurisdiction pursuant to a special agreement between the Government of India and the State Government on any particular issue, provided Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court. Parliament has not enacted any such law enabling the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction in respect of a subject matter agreed upon between the Government of India and the State Government. Article 138(2) is not attracted.
84. We are in full agreement with the judgment of this Court in H. S. Yadav (supra) declaring Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act ultra vires the Constitution and beyond the scope of the power of the State legislature.
85. It is true, that in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) this Court held that Tribunals constituted under Articles 323A and 323B of the Constitution were subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts, within whose jurisdiction they were located, as noted by this Court in H.S Yadav (supra).
86. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised “in the cloak of an appeal in disguise”.
87. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/ or judicial review under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re- assess or re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of law.
88. In L Chandrakumar (supra) the Supreme Court in effect held that the power of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, being an inviolable basic feature of the Constitution such power cannot be abrogated by statutory enactment or for that matter even by constitutional amendment. L Chandrakumar (supra) cannot be construed to enlarge the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227, to enable it to exercise appellate powers.
89. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act. We, therefore, declare Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void and of no effect. Ankit Gyan Referred question answered. RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]