Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. In Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 1 SCC'463 it was observed as follows: "16. A legal fiction has been crJated in the said provision to the effect that in the event it is established that soon before the death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of his relatives; for or in connection with any demand of dowry, such death shall be called ''dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Parliament has also inserted Section 113-8 of the Evidence Act by Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 1-5-1986 which reads as under: "113-8. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has .committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-8 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
11. The scope and ambit of Section 304-8 IPC was RAMAN KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB …. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] y examined by this Court in Kaliyaperumal and Anr. v. State of A Tamil Nadu (2004 (9) SCC 157).
12. Section 304-B IPC deals with dowry death which reads as follows: "304-B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any c demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, -i.- 'dowry' shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."
13. The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304-B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows: (i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage. .. _ (iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment …… by her husband or any relative of her husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.
14. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B c of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows: "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry ..j – death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." 1- …
15. The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its Twenty-first Report dated 10-8-1988 on "Dowry Deaths and Law Reform". Keeping in view the impediment in the pre- G existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry-related deaths, the legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to .,.. presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is …… in this background that presumptive Section 113-B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of "dowry death" in Section 304-B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential RAMAN KUMAR v. STATE OF PUNJAB [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] ,,!" ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand for dowry". Presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the c accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304- B IPC.) (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by -].. her husband or his relatives. (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. . (4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.
16. A conjoint reading of Section 113:.s of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material -t to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the "death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to G show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or -f harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be A laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence.
It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The B expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before" used in Section C 114 Illustration (a} of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can 0 come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case.
Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link E between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence."
17. The High Court's judgment is not only sketchy but also devoid of reasons. Various factors highlighted above would go to show that the prosecution has squarely failed to establish the accusations so far as the appellant is concerned. Therefore, G the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. The appellant is to be set at liberty forthwith unless to be required in connection with any other tase. N.J. Appeal allowed.