Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
12. Given the general importance of the question involved, we had requested Mr. V.Giri, learned Senior Counsel, to assist us as amicus curiae and he very generously agreed to do so. F We have also heard Ms. Hemantika Wahi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
13. They contend that the period of six months had expired on 30th of June, 2C06 i.e. the date on which the cheque was presented. which is within six months from the date it was G drawn. They submit that as a general rule, in case of any amonguity. Section 9 of the Ger.era! Clauses Act, 1897 provides for exdusion of the first day and inclusion of the last day for the purpose of calculating commencement or termination of time. They submit that the date of issue of cheque, i.e. 31st of H December,2005 is to be excluded and the last day. i.e 30th RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1121 GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.] of June, 2006 is to be included for the purpose of calculating the period of six months under proviso (a) of Section 138 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, since the last day of the six months' period was 3oth of June,_2006 and the cheque was presented on that very same day, the complaint under Section 138 of the Act is not time barred.
14. We have given our most anxious consideration to the submissions advanced and we do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Ahmadi that the cheque was not presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which it was drawn and the judgments relied on go against him instead of supporting his contention.
15. The first question which calls for our answer is the meaning of the expression "month": whether it would mean only a period of 30 days and, consequently, whether six months would mean a period of 180 days. The word "month" has been defined under Section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act to mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar. Therefore we cannot ignore or eschew the word 'British calendar' while construing "month" under the Act. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the period of six months cannot be calculated on 30 days in a month basis. Therefore, both the modes of calculation suggested by Mr.Ahmadi do not deserve acceptance and are rejected accordingly.
16. The next question which calls for our answer is the date from which six months' period would commence. In case of ambiguity with reference to the date of commencement, Section 9 of the General Clauses Act can be pressed into service and the same reads as follows: "9. Commencement and termination of time.-(1) In any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from'', and, for the purpose of (2014] 1 S.C.R. including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "to".
17. From the judgment of this Court in the case of Sivakaumar (supra) and as quoted in the preceding paragraph B of this judgment, it is evident that this Court recorded its agreement to a limited extent that "in cases where there is an ambiguity or suspicion with reference to the date of commencement of period of limitation" "Section 9 of the General Clauses Act can be pressed into service." We would hasten to add that this Court in Sivakumar (supra) did not give C nod to the following proposition enunciated by the Kerala High Court in K. V.Muhammed Kunhi (supra). "3 …………. But in the instant case before me, Section 138 proviso (a) is involved which is so clear (as extracted above) that the date of limitation will commence only from the date found in the cheque or the instrument."
18. In the case of K. V. Muhammed Kunhi (supra) the cheque was dated 17.11.1994 and that was presented on E 17.5.1995, and in this background the Court observed as follows: "5 ….. When on the footing of the days covered by the British calendar month the period of limitation in the case on hand is calculated, the cheque ought to have been presented in the Bani< for collection on or before 16-5- 1995. But in this case, as pointed out above the cheque had been presented for collection only on 17-5-1995, which is clearly barred by limitation."
19. In this case, six months' period expired a day prior to the corresponding month. In the case in hand, no such day falls in the corresponding month and therefore the last day would be last date of the immediate previous month.
20. Mr. Ahmadi appeals to us that if we take the view that H the cheque was presented to the Bank before the expiry of six RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1123 GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.] months, it would be in the teeth of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sivakumar (supra) and therefore the matter shall be required to be referred to a larger Bench. From what we have observed above, we have not taken a view different than what has been held in Sivakumar (supra) and therefore we do not find any necessity to refer the case to a larger Bench. . 21. Proviso (a) to Section 138 of the Act uses the expression "six months from the date on which it is drawn". Once the word 'from' is used for the purpose of commencement of time, in view of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, the day on which the cheque is drawn has to be excluded. 22. This Court, relying on several English decisions, dealt with the issue of computation of time for the purpose of limitation extensively in Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 1 SCC 639 wherein Paragraph 5 states as follows: "5. These decisions show that courts have drawn a distinction bet.ween a term created within which an act may be done and a time limited for the doing of an act. The rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded, (see Goldsmiths Company v. The West Metropolitan Railway Co. (1904 KB 1 at 5). This rule.was followed in Cartwright v. Maccormack (1963) 1 All E.R. 11, where the expression "fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy" in a cover note issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren v. Dawson Bentley and Co. Ltd., (1961) 2 QB 135, a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for purposes of computing the period of limitation the date of the accident, being the· date of the cause of action, was excluded. (See also Stewart v. Chadman [1951] 2 KB 792 and In re North, Ex parte Wasluck [1895] 2 QB 264.) Thus. as a general rule the effect of defining a period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. [See Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed.) Vol.37, pp.92 and 95.] There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of construction followed consistently and for so long should not also be applied here." c (underlining ours) 23. This decision was quoted with approval in Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 1 in the following words: "7. The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Similar provision is made in sub-section (2) for appeal, revision or review. The same principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which, inter alia, provides that in any Central Act made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from" and for the purpose of including the last in a S€ries of days or any other period of time, to use the word "to". 8. Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in the aforesaid case which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act.. …………. " 24. The correctness of this judgment came up for H consideration before a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Econ RAMESHCHANDRA AMBALAL JOSHI v. STATE OF 1125 GUJARAT [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.] Antri Ltd. vs. Rom Industries Ltd. & Anr., AIR 2013 SC 3283 which approved the reasoning of this Court given in Saketh (supra) and Haru Das Gupta (supra) and held as under: "16. We have extensively referred to Saketh. The reasoning of this Court in Saketh based on the above English decisions and decision of this Court in Haru Das Gupta which aptly lay down and explain the principle that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act has to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded, commends itself to us as against the reasoning of this Court in SIL Import USA where there is no reference to the said decisions. xxx xxx xxx 22. In view of the above, it is not possible to hold that the word 'of occurring in Section 138(a) and 142(b) of the N.l.Act is to be interpreted differently as against the word 'from' occurring in Section 138(a) of the N.l.Act; and that for the purposes of Section 142(b), which prescribes that the complaint is to be filed within 30 days of the date on which the cause of action arises, the starting day on which the cause of action arises should be included for computing the period of 30 days. As held in Ex parte Fallon (1793) 5 Term Rep 283 the words 'of, 'from' and 'after' may, in a given case, mean really the same thing. As stated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Vol. 3 1953 Edition, Note (5), the word 'of is sometimes equivalent of 'after'. 25. At this stage, we would also like to refer to Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 37, 3rd Edn., Paragraph 143 at Pages 83-84 which provides for calculation of a calendar month: "143. Calendar month running from arbitrary date. When the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date the period expires with the day in the succeeding month immediately preceding the day [2014) 1 S.C.R. corresponding to the date upon which the period starts; save that, if the period starts at the end of a calendar month which contains more days than the next succeeding month, the period expires at the end of the latter month." 26. Drawing a conclusion from the above mentioned authorities, we are of the opinion that the use of word "from" in Section 138(a) requires exclusion of the first day on which the cheque was drawn and inclusion of the last day within which such act needs to be done. In other words, six months would expire one day prior to the date in the corresponding month and C in case no such day falls, the last day of the immediate previous month. Hence, for all purposes, the date on which the cheque was drawn, i.e., 31.12.2005 will be excluded and the period of six months will be reckoned from the next day i.e. from 1.1.2006; meaning thereby that according to the British D calendar, the period of six months will expire at the end of the 30th day of June, 2006. Since the cheque was presented on 30.6.2006, we are of the view that it was presented within the period prescribed. 27. Viewed from any angle, the prosecution is not time barred and therefore, cannot be scuttled at this stage on this ground. As the matter is pending since long, the learned Magistrate in seisin of the trial shall make endeavour to conclude it within six months from the date the appellant next F appears in the case. We direct the appellant to appear before the trial Judge on 3rd of March, 2014 and no notice is to be issued to him for his appearance. 28. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. R.P. Appeal dismissed.