Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
8. The petitioner lastly submitted that in any event, the A. complainant after serving notice under Section 80 of the Civil – >– Procedure Code had issued a notice on 12th June, 1999, indicating that if sanction was not given, the complainant would be compelled to file a suit for damages against the Government. The petitioner submitted that it was obviously an J3 attempt to pressurize the Government into ;granting sanction for prosecution of the petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner submitted that both the complaints filed on 1st July, 1999 and 29th September, 2003, without the sanction under Section 19 of the j c Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were not maintainable, particularly when the earlier complaint on the same cause of action had been dismissed.
9. The petitioner also urged that .sin~e under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the learned Additional …. D Sessions Judge was not competent to recall and/or review his earlier order, he was not competent to entertain the second . .,, complaint on the same set of facts and between the same parties. In support of his submissions, the petitioner relied on the decision of this Court in Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P. E (1962 Supp. (2) SCR 817), which dealt with the provisions of Sections 369 and 424 of the 1898 Code which is pari materia with the provisions of Section 362 of the present Code. The petitioner submitted that this Court had specifically observed that inherent powers of the Court could not. be exercised to do F something which the Code specifically prohibited the Court from . -l doing.
10. Appearing for the complainant, Smt. Ved Wati, Mr. S.S. Sangwan, learned Advocate, submitted that while a Magistrate G could not exercise any inherent jurisdiction to restore a case after the discharge or acquittal of an accused, a second complaint could be entertained if the same could be tried within the limitations imposed by this Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra). Relying on the decision of this Court in Maj. Gen. A.S. Gauraya & Anr. v. S.N. Thakur & Anr. [AIR RANVIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] 1986 SC 1440], Mr. Sangwan submitted that it had been held _…, · in the said decision that filing of a second complaint is nof the same thing as reviving a dismissed complaint after recalling the earlier order of dismissal. Mr. Sangwan, therefore, urged that there was no legal bar to a second complaint being entertained by the Magistrate if it could be brought within the parameters of the exceptions culled out in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra).
11. On behalf of the State, it was sobmitted by Mr. Gautam Awasthi, learned Advocate, that apart from the various decisions mentioned hereinabove regarding the competence of the learned Magistrate to entertain the second complaint, right from the decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra), any doubt as to whether a second complaint could be __.,. entertained by the Magistrate if an earlier complaint was . >– dismissed not on merits but on account of default on the part ~ . of the complainant, had been dispelled by the decision of this Court in Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur [2001 (2) SCC 570], wherein while considering the earlier decisions, including the decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra), this Court spelt out the distinction between Sections 202 and 203 Cr.P.C. in arriving at a finding that dismissal of a complaint on grounds of default was no bar for a fresh complaint being filed on the same set of facts.
This Court held that under Section 202 of 't the Code a :Magistrate conducts an inquiry before issuing process, for the purposes of determining whether there. was sufficient ground for proceeding, whereas Section 203 of the Code empowered him to dismiss a complaint after holding such inquiry, if he was of the view that there was no sufficient ground of proceeding. In such an event, the Magistrate was required to record reasons as to why there was no sufficient ground. for proceeding though an elaborate order was not required to be given. But, there is mo provision in the Code ~1 which debars a complainant from preferring a second complaint on the same allegations if the first complaint did not A result in the conviction or acquittal or even discharge. This Court observed further that if the dismissal of the complaint was not ~)… on merit but on default of the complainant to be present, there could be no bar in the complainant moving the Magistrate again with the second complaint on the same facts.
However, 1this B Court made a distinction in respect of a dismissal under Section 203 of the Code on merits on the basis ~\an inquiry conducted under Section 202 thereof. Relying on the observations made in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra), y it was held that in such a case the second complaint on the t • c same facts cannot be made unless very exceptional circumstances existed.
12. Mr. Awasthi submitted that since a prima facie case had been made out for issuance of process in the first complaint in which process was issued on 19th August, 1999, the High "'""' Court had rightly rejected the petitioner's prayer for quashing the same. Even with regard to the subsequent complaint in which process was issued by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, on 8th January, 2004, there was no bar to the filing of a second complaint when the earlier complaint had not E resulted in either conviction, acquittal or discharge.
13. The main quest!on which emerges for decision in these special leave petitions is whether a second complaint on the same cause of action and between the same parties would F lie, when· an earlier application had been dismissed. In the instant case, the question is narrowed down further as to whether such a second complaint would be maintainable when the earlier one had not been dismissed on merits, but for the failure of the complainant to put iii process fees for effecting · G service.
14. The answer has been provided firstly in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra), wherein this Court had held that even .r: if a complaint was dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C., a second complaint would still lie under exceptional RANVIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] circumstances, indicated herein-before. The said view has been …4 .. consistently upheld in subsequent decisions of this Court. Of course, the question of making a prayer for recalling the order of dismissal would not be maintainable before the learned Magistrate in view of Section 362 Cr.P.C., but such is not the case in these special leave petitions. In these cases, neither B have the complaints been dismissed on merit nor have they been dismissed at the stage of Section 203 Cr.P.C. On the l' other hand, only on being satisfied of a prima facie case, the learned Magistrate had issued process on the complaint. The said situation is mainly covered by the decision of this Court c in Jatinder Singh's case (supra), wherein the decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra) was also taken into consideration and it was categorically observed that in the absence of any provision in the Code barring a second complaint being filed on the same allegation, there would be D no bar to a second complaint being filed on the same facts if 't the first complaint did not result in the conviction or acquittal or even discharge of the accused, and if the dismissal was not on merit but on account of a default on the part of the complainant.
15. As far as the first complaint under Section 420/341.P.C. is concerned, the petitioner has not seriously questioned the t order of the High Court rejecting the petitioner's prayer for quashing the same. The petitioner confined his case mainly to .> . the complaint wherein the learned Sessions Judge took F cognizance and issued process under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, despite an earlier complaint on the same ground and on the same set of facts having been dismissed earlier for non-filing of process fees .
16. We are unable to appreciate the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, since the law with regard to the filing of a second complaint is now crystalised. It is well-settled that such a complaint is maintainable in different circumstances as enumerated in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case and Jatinder H A Singh's case (supra). We, therefore, have no hesitation in dismissing both the Special Leave Petitions, since we are of the view that both the complaints are maintainable and the impugned judgment of the High Court does not warrant any _interference.
17. The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. K.K.T. Special Leave Petitions dismissed.