Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
16. Suffice it to observe that the cross-examination of Bishan Singh (PW-1) does not take the matter any further for the appellants, as is rightly held by the two Courts below. Same is the position with regard to the evidence of Baljit Singh (PW-2). Even he has plainly mentioned about the manner in which Mohar Pal was stopped by all the accused persons when he was riding his motorcycle and immediately thereafter Rohtas (Accused No.1) and Surender Singh (Accused No.2) inflicted knife blows on his stomach one after the other. The fact that similar role has been ascribed to Roop Chand (Accused No.4) and Dev Kumar (Accused No.6) but the High Court acquitted them by giving benefit of doubt cannot be the basis to undermine the quality of evidence which has already come on record. We are not dilating on the correctness of the view so taken by the High Court qua those accused as neither the State nor the complainant has assailed the finding recorded by the High Court in that regard. That does not mean that a wrong relief given to co-accused should also be given to the appellants against whom clinching evidence has come on record about the manner in which the offence was committed by them. ROHTAS & ANR. v. THE STATE OF HARYANA [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
17. Reverting to the exposition of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Moti Ram & Ors.6, it turns on the facts of that case. That case was an appeal against acquittal and the quality of evidence was not reassuring and warranting a finding of guilt against the acquitted accused. Even in the case of Balaka Singh & Ors. vs. The State of Punjab7, this Court was dealing with evidence against the appellants and four accused named along with the appellants therein, which was so inextricably mixed up that it was not possible to separate one from the other.
18. In the present case, however, the evidence of Bishan Singh (PW-1) and Baljit Singh (PW-2), who are the eye witnesses, has mentioned about the events as unfolded. First, all the accused persons obstructed Mohar Pal who was riding a motorcycle. Immediately after he was stopped, both the appellants inflicted knife blows on the stomach of Mohar Pal one after the other. This role of the appellants is distinct. Thereafter Mohar Pal attempted to flee away from the spot when he was stopped by the other accused persons and two of them inflicted knife blows one after the other. The events, therefore, can be segregated.
19. So far as the second event is concerned, the Trial Court and the High Court gave benefit of doubt to the concerned accused. In that sense, the appellants are not concerned with that part of the event. As aforementioned, even if we do not agree with the approach of the High Court in absolving Accused Nos.4 and 6, we refrain from dilating on the said approach of the High Court as neither the State nor the complainant has assailed the acquittal of those accused. In any case, wrong benefit given to those accused cannot enure to the advantage of the appellants against whom clear, truthful and unassailable evidence is forthcoming. For, neither the presence of Bishan Singh (PW-1) and Baljit Singh (PW-2) can be doubted nor their evidence can be discarded on the specious ground that they are related to the deceased Mohar Pal, and are therefore interested witnesses.
20. Indubitably, just because the witnesses are related cannot be the basis to discard their evidence, if it is otherwise natural and truthful. Their evidence has commended to the Trial Court as well as the High Court as truthful and we see no reason to deviate from that concurrent 6 (1990) 4 SCC 389 7 (1975) 4 SCC 511 view taken by the Courts below. It is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff and then to arrive at a finding of guilt of an accused or otherwise, notwithstanding the fact that evidence is found to be deficient qua another accused named in the same offence. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. This has been restated in Rizan & Anr. vs. State of Chhattisgarh8. In paragraph 12 of the said decision, the Court observed, thus :- “12. Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non- acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out the entire prosecution case. In essence, prayer is to apply the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if a major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other co- accused persons his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v. State of U.P.) Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as 8 (2003) 2 SCC 661 ROHTAS & ANR. v. THE STATE OF HARYANA [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab.) The doctrine is a dangerous one, specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a deadstop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well.
The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar.) An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because the grain and the chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. and Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab.) As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there, however honest and truthful a witness may be.
Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category into which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa. Accusations have been clearly established against the accused-appellants in the case at hand. The courts below have categorically indicated the distinguishing features in evidence so far as the acquitted and convicted accused are concerned.” (emphasis supplied)
21. In another decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Kumar & Ors.9, it is held that minor discrepancies in the statement of witnesses of trivial nature cannot be a ground to reject evidence as a whole. The Court relied upon the exposition of Brahm Swaroop & Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh10. In paragraph 32 of the said decision, the Court observed, thus :- “32. It is a settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not affect the core of the prosecution’s case, may not prompt the court to reject the evidence in its entirety. “Irrelevant details which do not in any way corrode the credibility of a witness cannot be labelled as omissions or contradictions.” Difference in some minor details, which does not otherwise affect the core of the prosecution case, even if present, would not itself prompt the court to reject the evidence on minor variations and discrepancies. After exercising care and caution and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from untruth, exaggeration and improvements, the court comes to a conclusion as to whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an undue importance should not be attached to omissions, contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the prosecution witness. As the mental capabilities of a human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb all the details, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the statements of witnesses. (See State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash, State v. Saravanan and Prithu v. State of H.P.)” 9 (2017) 14 SCC 614 10 (2011) 6 SCC 288 ROHTAS & ANR. v. THE STATE OF HARYANA [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]
22. The so-called deficiencies pointed out by the appellants in the investigation or the prosecution case, in our opinion, are insignificant and trivial and cannot be the basis to reject the whole evidence of Bishan Singh (PW-1) and Baljit Singh (PW-2) which is corroborated by the other evidence in the form of medical reports and recovery of human blood stained soil from the spot near the hospital where Mohar Pal was assaulted by the accused. The fact that the blood group of the human blood stained soil cannot be ascertained, can be no basis to discard that piece of evidence. Even the recovery of weapon used by Rohtas (Accused No.1) during the commission of the offence reinforces the role and involvement of the appellants in the commission of the crime. The quality substantive evidence on record clearly establishes the guilt of the appellants.
23. In a recent decision in Dilawar Singh & Ors. vs. State of Haryana11, the Court restated that while analysing the evidence of eye witnesses, it must be borne in mind that there is bound to be variations and difference in the behaviour of the witnesses or their reactions from situation to situation and individual to individual. There cannot be uniformity in the reaction of witnesses. The Court must not decipher the evidence on unrealistic basis. There can be no hard and fast rule about the uniformity in human reaction. The difference in the statements of the prosecution witnesses about the conditions of Mohar Pal when he was admitted in the hospital, therefore, does not take the matter any further especially when the medical reports clearly indicate that he was admitted in the hospital in semi-conscious state and was declared dead by the doctor only thereafter.
24. As regards, the delay in registration of FIR, that aspect has also been considered by the Trial Court and the finding recorded by the Trial Court rejecting that defence plea found favour with the High Court. We see no reason to deviate from the conclusion so recorded that there was no delay in registration of FIR in the facts of the present case. The significance of registration of FIR without loss of time need not be underscored. This Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. M. Madhusudhan Rao12, while dealing with similar arguments, observed in paragraph 30 as follows :- 11 (2015) 1 SCC 737 12 (2008) 15 SCC 582 “30. Time and again, the object and importance of prompt lodging of the first information report has been highlighted. Delay in lodging the first information report, more often than not, results in embellishment and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. A delayed report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, the danger of the introduction of a coloured version, an exaggerated account of the incident or a concocted story as a result of deliberations and consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on its veracity. Therefore, it is essential that the delay in lodging the report should be satisfactorily explained.”
25. In the present case, there has been no delay as is evident from the contemporaneous record. Mohar Pal was admitted in hospital immediately after the incident and was examined by Dr. Ramesh. Mohar Pal was declared dead at 11.00 p.m. The City Police Station was informed by the doctor at 11.30 p.m. Thereafter, Bishan Singh (PW-1) complained to ASI Gian Singh (PW-5) near hospital building and finally the FIR was registered at 0015 hrs. on the night between 25th and 26th April, 1998. In Kishan Singh (Dead) Through LRs vs. Gurpal Singh & Ors.13, This Court had observed as follows :- “22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the civil court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with 13 (2010) 8 SCC 775 ROHTAS & ANR. v. THE STATE OF HARYANA [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.; and Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P.)”
26. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in upholding the view taken by the Trial Court that there was no delay in registration of the FIR in the fact situation of the present case.
27. We are also in agreement with the view taken by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court that the defence had taken self- contradictory stand. First, it was asserted that Mohar Pal sustained injuries in the first incident which had occurred at 6.30 p.m. on the same evening. However, no evidence in support of that plea was forthcoming. Then, the alternative plea taken by the defence was that Mohar Pal was, in fact, injured at some other place near Anaj Mandi and was brought in a three-wheeler to the hospital. Even this plea of the accused has been held to be figment of imagination and without any evidence in support thereof. On the other hand, the prosecution has produced evidence in the form of human blood soiled mud from the spot near the hospital where the incident in question had occurred as stated by Bishan Singh (PW-1) and Baljit Singh (PW-2).
28. Even the fact that the accused have been acquitted in the cross-cases filed with regard to the first incident which took place at 6.30 p.m. on the same evening will not take the matter any further for the appellants. That was an independent incident whereas the finding of guilt recorded against the appellants is concerning the incident which had taken place at 8.30 p.m. near the Government Hospital, Palwal as proved by the prosecution witnesses. In fact, the incident at 8.30 p.m. was the counter blast of the fight which had taken place between two groups at 6.30 p.m. and the previous enmity between them. The fact that there is no evidence about the previous enmity and that no evidence is produced by the prosecution in that regard, in our view, cannot be the basis to reverse the concurrent view taken by two Courts below – recording finding of guilt against the appellants for commission of offence to assault Mohar Pal near the Government Hospital, Palwal at around 8.30 p.m. on 25th April, 1998.
29. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, no interference is warranted in this appeal and we are disposed to dismiss the same. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. The bail bonds of the appellants stand cancelled. The appellants shall surrender within four weeks from today failing which, the local police station must take necessary action against the appellants in accordance with law. Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed. ROHTAS & ANR. v. THE STATE OF HARYANA [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]