ROSHAN LAL v. MADAN LAL September 18, 1975 [A. ALAGIRrSWAMl, P. K. GOSWAMI AND N. L. UNTWALIA, JJ.] Madhya Pr{.\desh Accon1111odatio11 Co111rol Act 1961-Sec. 12(1)(6)-Com- promise; decree in .a rent act-suit, wheiher a nullity-C.P.C. 0. 23 ru:e 3. 1"he .respondent landlord filed a suit for eviction against the appellant tenant on the ground of bona fide personal requirement and that he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own which is one of the grounds of eviction under the Madhya Pradush Accommodation Control Act. The appel·
]ant filed a Written Statement denying the claim oi' the respondent. After some evidence was recorded the parties entered into a con1promise and filed it in the Court. The compromise deed mentioned that "due to the necessity of the plaintiffs for their own business-opening grocery shop, \he decree for eject- ment may be granted to them against the defendant''. The Trial Court passed a decree in tern1s of the com.promise after coming to the conclusion that the compromise was legal.
The appe11ant was given 3 years' time to vacate the premises ·under the compromise. On the appellanfs failure to vacate after the expiry of three years, the respondent filed Execution Application. The appellant objected to the execution on the ground that the cornpromise decree was void and inexecutable as being against the provisions of the Act. 1 The Execution Court accepted the· appellant's objection and dismissed t1re Execution Case.
The Dis-trict Judge dismissed the appeal filed by the respon- dent. The High Court allowing the Second :rvtiscellaneous Appeal came to the concJusion that the decree was not a nullity and that it was executable. In an appeal by Special Leave the Appellant ·contended that the decre-e was nullity since the Court was not satisfied that the eviction was in accordance whh the provisions Of the Act. The counsel further contended that even if what is stated in the· compromise deed might be accepted as adm·ission, the admission is only about the bono fule requirement and that there is no admi53ivn about the landlord not having any other suitable ac-commodation. HELD : dismissing the appeal :
c 1. In order to get a decree or order for ev.iction against a tenant wh08e tenancy is governed by any Rent Restriction or Eviction Control Act the Suitor must make out a case. for eviction in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 'When the suit is contested the issue ~oes to trial. 'The Court passes a decree for eviction only if it is satisfied on eVIdence that a ground for passing; snch a decree in accordance with the requirement of the Statute has been
established. Even when the trial proceeds ex-parte, this is so. If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to uny reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigation, expenses. it is open to then1 to do so. The
Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the only thing to be ieen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without anything more. The compro- mise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have mcll a decree under the law. The case of K. K. Chari v. Po( M. Se.vhadri, followed. [882-A-D]
2. It is too late in the day to contend that the provisions of order 23 rule 3 of the Code of Ci'vil Procedure cannot ~pply to eviction suits governed by the special statutes. A compromise of suit ls permissible under the said pro-
visions of law. [882-E-Fl .B c ROSHAN LAL v. MADAN LAL (Untwalh1 J.) 87!) 3. If the compromi~ for the eviction of the tenant is found en the~ facts of a particular case to be in violation of a Rent Control Act, the Court would refuse to record the cempromise as ,U would not l?e a lawful agreement. lf the Court is satisfied on con!ideration of the terms of the compromise and if necessary by comidering them in the context! of the pleadings and other materials in the case· that the agreement is lawful as in any other suit so in an eviction suit the court is bound to record the compromise and pas91 a decree in accord- ance therewith. [882 F-Gl
4. The meaning of the term the bona fide ·requirement in the com.promise deed is clear and definite specially ,in the background of the pleadings of the parties and it makes out a case of eviction within the meaning of the Act. (883-CJ
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2473 of 1972. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 30th October 1972 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Second Appeal No. 33/72.
S. N. Andley, H. B. Mangal, Rameshwar Nath and R'ajinder Narain for the appellant. G. B. Pai, S. K. Bagga, Mrs. S. Bagga, R. K. Mehta, and V. C. Paras/ia;- for respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UNTWALIA, J. This appeal by special leave has been filed by the tenant-defendants. The plaintiff-respondents, the landlords, filed a suit against the appellants in the Court of Second Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior for a decree for eviction from the suit premises and for certain other reliefs.
The appellants' eviction was sought on state- ment of facts mentioned in paragraph 3 of the plaint which squarely fell within clause (f). of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The appellants filed a written statement and in para- graph 3, they denied the respondents' assertion in plaint, paragraph 3. It appears that the suit which was filed in the year 1966 proceeded to trial in October, 1967 and some evidence was adduced.
But even- tually, the parties entered into a compromise, filed a petition to that effect in the Trial Court which passed a decree for eviction and other reliefs in Januaro>, 1968 in accordance with the terms of the compro- mise.
Pursuant to the said compromise decree the appellants were to vacate the shop-the suit promises by-31-12-1970. On their failure to. do so, execution was levied by the respondents. The appel-
lants objected to the execution on the ground that the oompromise de- cree was void and inexecutable as being against the provisions of the Act. The execution court accepted the appellants', objection to the execution of the decree and dismissed the execution case.
A miscel- laneous appeal filed by the respondents was dismissed by the Third Additional District Judge,, Gwalior. They preferred a second miscellan- eons appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. A learned single Judge following the Bench decision of that Court in Smt.
Chandan Bai v. Sur;a,(n came to the conclusion that the d.ecree was not a nullity and was executable. Hence this appeal by the tenant-judg- ment-debtors. The point which fails for determination in thi~ app~al i~ not res- integra and has been the subject matter of cons1derat10n m. several decisions of this Court.
In Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Mum ~ubrat Dass & Anr.(') a decree for eviction based on an award without anything more was found to be a nullity as it .was held to have bee~ passed against the prohibitory mandate of secl!on 13 (1) of th~ Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. following ~he ~aid dec1s10n the compromise decree was also held to be a nullity m t~e case ~f
Kaushalya Devi & Ors. _v. (ihri K. !-· Bans~l.(1, 2 ) The earlier two de~1- .sions were followed again m Ferozi Lal Jam v. Man LaJ and Anr. ~ ) In all these three cases the decrees were found to have v10lated sect10n 13(1) of the Delhi Act of 1952.
The law was reviewed exhaustively by this Court in K. K. Chari v. R. M. Seshadri.( 4 ) Vaidialingam, J. delivering the judgment on his behalf as also on behalf of Dua, J. pointed out that under the terms of the compromise under consideration in that case the defen- dant had withdrawn all his defence to the application filed by the landlord and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally. The three earlier cases of this Court were distinguished and it was said at page 704.
"The true P<?Sition appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void". And. finally it was held "it is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the Court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim, if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant.
But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry". One of us (Alagiriswami, J.) while agreeing with Vaidialingam, J. added a few words of his own.
In the separate judgment it has been pointed out that the view taken by Grover, J. of the Punjab High Court in VlZl' Dev v. Milkhi Ram(') was exactly the position in K. K. Chan• s case. Sarkaria, J. delivering the judgment on behalf of the Court in Nagirrdas Ramdas v. Dalpatram lnchharam @ Brijram and Others(•) took pains to go into the matter elaborately once more and said at page 552 :
"From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the p;ssing of the decree, there was some material before the Court on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satis: !ied,, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, 1t will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis (1) [1969] 2 S. C.R. 4 32.
(3) A.T.R. 1970 S. C. 794. (5) A. I. R. 1960 Punjab 514. (2) [1969] 2 S. C. R. 1048. (4) [1973] 3 S. C. R. 6,91. (6) [1974] 2 S. C. R. 544. c " ' , c ROSHAN LAL v. MADAN L,AL (Untwalia, J.)
of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or,, it may partly or wholly be in the shape, of an ex- press or implied admission made in the compromise agree-
ment, its"1f." On facts of the case of Nagindas Ramdas was fonnd to fall in: line with that of K. K. Chari. Distinguishing the earlier cases, Chari's case was followed. Before we state the principles of law governing such a case we would like to point out that the language of Secticm 12 of the Act is , somewhat different from many similar State Statutes. Section 12(1) says:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil . Co\lft against· a tenant for his eviction from any accommo-. dation exceJ:l.t on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:" .
Thereafter grounds (a) to (p) have been enumerated. On a sup~r ficial reading of the provisk>n aforesaid it would appear that the m- hibition related to the filing of the suit only. No suit can be filed for eviction of a tenant except on one or more of the grounds enume- rated in Section 12(1). In sub-sections (2) to (11) of Section 12 certain conditions have been engrafted to show. under what circums- tances an order fo,r the eviction of tenant cannot be passed in relation to some of the grounds enumerated in sub-section ( 1). Reading the section as a wh(lle and remembering the beneficial object of the Act for the protection of a tenant based upon public policy, we do not find much difficulty in bringing the section at par with other similar State Statutes and holding as a matter of construction that no decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation can be passed except pn one or more of the gronnds mentined in Section 12(1). A Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt. Chandan Bai's case (supra) seems to have taken too literal a view of the section when in paragraph
5 of the judgment it says "There is nothing i1t Section 12 of the Act or any other provision which prevents the tenant in vacating the accommodation in spite of the fact that none of the grounds me!Jtioned in
Section 12 exists. Similarly, there is nothing in the Act which may prevent the tenant in agreeing to vacate the accommodation in future". It says further in paragraph 10 "Merely enumeration
of grounds ou which relief can be claimed does not either expressly or impliedly exclude the operation of Order 23, rule 3, because grounds for claiming relie~ are always limited whether the relief be claimed under the general law or a statute". A similar argument advanced in the case of Nagindas Ramdas (supra) with reference to the relevant provisions of Bombay Rent Act, 1947 was repelled at page 550 and the view taken by a Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Shah Rasiklal Chunilal v. Sindhi Shyamlal Mulchand,(I) "that in spite of the fact that there is no express provi- sions in the Bombay Rent" Act prohibiting contracting out, such a prohibition would have to be read by implication consistently with the public policy underlying this welfare measure" was approved. In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant whose tenanqy is governed by any Rent Restriction or Eviction Con- trol Act the suitor must make out a case for eviction in accordance IJ.
with the provisions of the Aci. When the suit is contested the issue goes to trial. The Court passes a decree for eviction only if it is satisfied on evidence that a ground for passing such a decree in accordance with the requirement of the Statute has been established. Even when the trial proceeds ex-parte, this is so.
If, however, parties choose to enter into a compromise due to any reason such as to avoid the risk of protracted litigating expenses, it is open to them to do so. The Court can pass a decree on the basis of the compromise. In such a situation the _only thing to be seen is whether the compromise is in violation of the requirement of the law. In other words, parties cannot be permitted to have a tenant's eviction merely by agreement without anything more.
The compromise must indicate either on its face or in the background of other materials in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to suffer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances,, is entitled to have such a decree under the Jaw.
It is too late in the day to contend that the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot apply to eviction suits governed by the special statutes. Undoubtedly, a
compromise of such suit is permissible un\:ler the said provision of law. The protec- tion of the tenant is inherent in the language of Order 23, l!.ule 3 when it says "Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted by any lawful agreement or compromise …. the Court shall -order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit". If the agreement or compromise for the tvic- tion of the tenant is found, on the' facts of a particular case, to be in violation of a particular Rent Restriction or Control Act, the Court would rduse to rec.ord the compromise as it will not be a lawful agree- ment. If on the other hand, the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of the compromise and, if necessary, by considering them in the context of the pleadings and other materials in the case, that the agreement is lawfnl, as in_ any other suit, so in an eviction suit,, the Court is bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith.
Passing a decree for eviction on adjudication of the requi" site facts on or their admission in a compromise, either express or implied, is not different. We now proceed to consider the facts of the case in hand.
The ground for eviction from the accommodation let for non-resid.ential purposes mentioned in clause (f) of section 12(1) of the Act is that the accommodation "is required bona fide by the landlord for the pur- pose of continuing or starting his business …….. and that the land- ,. (I) 12 Guj. Law Reporter, 1012.
c ROSHAN LAL v. MADAN L\>\L (Untwa/ia, l.) lor)l ………. lras no other reasonably suitable non-residential accom- modation of his own in ~ occupation in the city or town concerned". In paragraph 3 of the plaint the respondents' necessity was pleaded both in the positive and the negative aspects of clause (f). Both were denied in paragraph 3 of the written statement of the appellants. Paragraph 1 of. the compromise petition says : "That due t.a the necessity of the plaintiffs for their own business-opening grocery shop, decree for ejectment may be granted to them against
the defen- dants". In this case it is not necessary to refer to any piece of evi- dence adduced at the inconclusive trial. The meaning of paragraph 1 of the compromise petition is clear and definite especially in the back- ground of the pleadings of the parties and in our opinion it squarely makes out a case of eviction within the meaning of Section 12(1) (f) of the Act on admission of the appellants.
We reject the argument of Mr. Andley, learned counsel for the appellants, that paragraph 1 of the compromise petition was an admission iiJ! respect of only the first part, namely, the positive aspect of clause (f) and not of the second part, namely, that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable non- residential accommodation.
The admission, by necessary implication, was in respect of both. In the order recording the compromise the Court said : "On a perusal of the joint compromise it was found that the same is legal and is within the purview of the plaint. Therefore, plaint verification is accepted and the case is decreed in accordance with the conditions of the compro-
mise as under : 1. That the. defendants shall vacate the shop in dis- pute by 31-12-1970". The order so recorded in our judgment was in full compliance with the requirement of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court found that the compromise was legal, that. is to say, law- ful and was in accordance with the plaint.
The averment in the plaint was, therefore, accepted and the suit was decreed. It is regrettable that though the appellants got about three years' time to vacate the shop in dispute from the date of .the compromise decree, they were ill-advised to fight the litigation further and
thus cause delay in the vacating of the. shop by another five years. We have no doubt in our mind that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the compromise decree was clearlv valid and executable. We
uphold the decision of the High court but on a slightly different basis. For the reasons stated; above, the appeal fails an\1 is dismissed with C!OStS. P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.