Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
8. A bare perusal of Section 6 (1-A) and 6(2) would show that the property cannot be requisitioned permanently and that the maximum period fixed by the Amendment Act of 1970 is 17 years from that date and that Section 6 (2) further provides that E unless the requisitioned property is acquired under Section 7 within the period of 17 years aforesaid, it shall be released to ,. t its owner and as far as practicable, be given to the person from whom the possession had been taken at the time of the requisition or to the successor in interest of such person. Concededly, the appellant herein is the successor in interest of the owner from whom the property had been requisitioned in the year 1942. It is, therefore, obvious that the requisition could not have been continued beyond the year 1987 unless the property had been acquired, which is concededly not the case -….( before us. ……
9. Mr. Dholakia has, however, emphasized that the status inter se the parties was that of landlord and tenant, the appellant being the landlord, and as the appellant had been accepting rent and had also sought and received an enhancement thereof H A on severaLoccasions , the suit could not be dismissed on the · ground that the civil court's jurisdiction was barred. We are of the opinion, however, that the payment of rent in such matters would not change the legal position with regard to the rights and obligations of the requisitioning authority and the person B from whom the property had been requisitioned. It is impossible to accept the plea that if the appellant whose property has been requisitioned in desperation seeks an enhancement of the rent, that would ipso-facto create a tenancy so as to preclude the obligations imposed on the Central Government under the Act. C While repelling a similar submission in H.D. Vora's case this is what this Court had to say: "There was also one other contention urged on behalf of the appellant in a desperate attempt to protect his possession of the flat and that contention was, since he had paid rent of the flat to Rukmanibai and such rent was accepted by her, he had become a direct tenant of Rukmanibai and the order of requisition had become totally irrelevant so far as his possession of the flat is concerned. This contention is, in our opinion, wholly unfounded. The appellant admittedly came into occupation of the flat as an allottee under the order of requisition passed by the State Government and even if any rent was paid by the appellant to Rukmanibai and such rent was accepted by her, it did not have the effect of putting an end to the order or requisition. The appellant was an allottee of the flat under the order of requisition and he was liable to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the flat to the State Government and the State Government was in its turn liable to pay compensation to Rukmanibai for the requisitioning of the flat and if, therefore, instead of the appellant paying compensation to the State Government and the State Government making payment of an identical amount to Rukmanibai, the appellant paid directly to Rukmanibai with the express or any event implied assent of the State Government, the order of requisition could not ROY ESTATE V STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] cease to be valid and effective. It did not matter at all A whether the appellant described the amount paid by him to Rukkanibai as rent, because whatever was done by him was under the order of requisition and so long as the order of requisition stood, his possession of the flat was attributable only to the order of requisition and no payment of an amount described as rent could possibly alter the · nature of his occupation of the flat or make him a tenant of Rukmanibai in respect of the flat". Some of the observations in H.D. Vora's case were. modified on some other matters in Grahak Sanstha Manch case C (Supra) but the observation in paragraph 7 afore-quoted were duly affirmed.
10. To our mind there exists yet another circumstance which militates against the case of Respondent No. 3 with regard to D the creation of a tenancy vis-a-vis the appellant. Admittedly, Respondent No.3 had been inducted into Katras House under the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 30th April 1958, under Section 11 (2) of the Rent Act This provision reads as under: "(2) (a) Where a servant of the Government in possession of any building as a tenant intends to vacate such building, he shall give fifteen day's previous notice in writing of his inteAtion to do· so to the landlord, and to the District Magistrate who shall under intimation to the landlord, within a week of the receipt of the notice either allot building to any other servant of the Government whom the District Magistrate thinks suitable, subject to the payment of rent, and the observance of the conditions of the tenancy by such servant of the Government, or direct that the landlord G shall be put in possession of the building: Provided that when no such order is passed by the District Magistrate, the landlord shall be deemed to have been put in possession of the building. (a] xxx xxx xxx xxx (b) Where a building is vacated by a servant of the Government, any person occupying such building other than the persons referred to in clause (a) shall be liable to be evicted by the District Magistrate in such manner as may be prescribed : Provided that, after a landlord has been or is deemed to have been put in possession of such building, he may let it to any person".
11. It would be clear from a bare perusal of Section 11 (2) (a) that it postulates several conditions for the transfer of a building already in possession of a Servant of the Government to any other servant of the Government, but it does not authorize the transfer of such a building to any other person. It has been D conceded before us that respondent No.3, the Ranchi Women's College, is not run or controlled by the Government but is a private college under private management. To our mind, therefore, the very order of allotment made on 30 h April, 1958 was completely unauthorized. Concededly also Katras House was under E requisition with the Union of India for purpose of the Union and there is no provision under the Act for transfer of such a property to any other person. Even assuming for a moment, the Act did authorize such a transfer, the condition of transfer visualized under section 11 (2)(a) did not exist and the transfer was thus, F bad at the very outset.
12. In this background, the question now arises is as to whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred and whether the appellant should undergo a trial on facts which are admitted. Section 19 of the Act is reproduced hereunder: "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil ·,…_. court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the competent authority or arbitrator is empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any ROY ESTATE V. STATE OF JHARKHAND & ORS. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI, J.] action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power A. conferred by or under this Act".
13. A bare perusal of this provision would show that it is only the Competent Authority (read Deputy Commissioner) who would have jurisdiction in respect of any matter under the Act, and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was explicitly barred. We also find that in the suit filed in the year 1995, Respondent No.3 had taken a specific plea that it was only the Competent Authority under the Act who could make an order of de-requisition sought by the owner and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred. Mr. Dholakia has, however, (and rightly), pointed out that c Appellant too had been taken a vacillating stand in a different set of proceedings. We find that both appellant and the respondent have been equally ambivalent with respect to their relationship and rights inter-se with the sole purpose of defeating the other party's rights by whatever means possible. -le_ To our mind, this ambivalence would not be determinative of the legal issues that have been raised on the basis of admitted facts. It is the admitted fact that the property had been requisitioned in the year 1942 for Army purposes under Rule 75 A of the Defence of India Rules which would be deemed to be a requisition under Section 3 of the Acl The maximum period for requisition in such cases is 17 years and ought to have ended ~- t in the year 1987, but has in fact continued for almost 22 years thereafter. The creation of the so called tenancy in favour of a _ respondent of a requisitioned property is not visualized under F the Act and even otherwise the conditions for the creation of such a tenancy by virtue of Section 11 (2) of the Rent Act do not exist. The Competent Authority under the Act was, therefore, under an obligation imposed under Section 6(2) to return it to its owner. To our mind, therefore, the observations of the Munsif G and High Court, that the appellant must have his remedies in -.,r…( the Civil Court is adding insult to injury in a situation where almost none of the material facts are in dispute.
14. Mr. Venugopal has also raised a plea of estoppel based on the conflicting stand on the question of jurisdiction A taken by respondent no.3 from time to time. In view of the fact ;… that the appellant has been equally guilty of a similar stand and our findings on the other issues, we are disinclined to go into this aspect.
15. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Order 8 of the Division Bench and direct that Katras House and the entire requisitioned property shall be released in favour of the appellant by the end of this year. The respondentis directed to pay all the arrears of rent due as of now and the rent upto December and also files an undertaking to vacate the premises as ordered C within a period of two months ffom today. Should such an undertaking not be filed, we issue a direction to the Competent Authority, that is the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi to take steps to evict the respondent and hand over the property to the appellant forthwith. The appellant will also have its costs from D Respondent No.3 which we determine at Rs. One lakh . N.J. .. Appeal allowed.