ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER versus UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

15. We have heard Dr. Raj iv Dhawan and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel for the Union ofiudia and Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel along with Mr. Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel for the MCI.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the inspection that has been carried out by the MCI is a composite inspection for 2016- 2017 and2017-2018 and when the deficiencies are marginal and, in fact, it can be said there is really no deficiency, there is no justification to deny the LOP for 2017-2018. It is urged by them that the explanation offered by the petitioner-institution has really not been taken into consideration and had it been appositely appreciated, such an assessment could not have been made by the assessors. They have also highlighted that certain other institutions having more deficiencies have been extended the benefit of LOP for 2017-2018, but for no fathomable or acceptable reason, the institution in question has been deprived of the said benefit. D It is urged with vehemence that the order passed by the Central Government is not in consonance with the judgments rendered by this Court in G/oca/ Medical College (supra), IQ City Foundation and A11otlter v. Union of India & Ors3• That apart, it is contended that the inspection by the MCI was done during the Christmas and New Year, which is not permissible as per the Regulations and hence, the whole report deserves to be disregarded. Additionally. it is propounded that the status of the order passed by the Central Government still remains an unreasoned one and by stretch of reasoning, it can be conferred the distinction of a reasoned order. Dr. Raj iv Dhawan, pyramiding the aforesaid submissions along with Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, submits that the Court does not sit in appeal over such order and, therefore, when the order is absolutely perverse and arbitrary, it should be overturned in exercise of power of judicial review and the institution should be granted LOP for the academic year 2017-2018.

17. Mr. Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior counsel appearing for G the Union of India, per contra, would contend that the Oversight Committee had passed a conditional order and when the conditions were not fulfilled, the institution has to face the consequences and in such a situation it is extremely hollow on the part of the petitioner-institution to '(2017) 8 SCALE 369 ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] set forth unacceptable criticism pertaining to the order passed by the Central Government. He would further submit that the order dated 31" May, 2017, as this Court has already held, was not an order which reflected reason, but the order impugned is irrefragably a reasoned one because there is reference to the history of the institution, the chronology of events, the report of the Oversight Committee, the opinion of the Hearing B Committee and eventual expression of an opinion. According to him, if such an order is not given the stamp of a 'reasoned order', it will be granting premium to recalcitrant institutions, which are bent upon imparting medical education in an unscrupulous manner. According to Mr. Sinha, concept ofnegativc equality is not within the ambit ofAtiicle 14 of the Constitution of India and, in any case, this Court has issued notice to the other institutions and, therefore, the petitioners cannot claim parity. Additionally, he would put forth that in most of the matters, this Court has directed for consideration of the LOP forthe year 2018-2019 and the present fact situation does not exposit a different scenario and hence, this Court should not make any distinction in the present case.

18. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the MCI refuting the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, contends that ascribing of reasons by an administrative authority should not be equated to a judgment of the Court, for what is required is to see whether the reasons are discernible and whether there has been application of mind. Mr. Singh would further contend that the allegation made by the petitioner-institution that the Executive Coriimittee has not considered the explanation offered by the competent authority of the college shows an attitude of obstinacy and deviancy. Learned senior counsel would contend that the in IQ City Foundation (supra) when this Court remanded the matter and in Glocal Medical College (supra) when this Court granted the benefit on proper appreciation, it would be quite lucent, the role conferred on the MCI of India and the reason for extending the benefit to an institution for 2017-2018. That apart, propounds Mr. Singh, that the educational institutions cannot remain disobedient to the framework of the Regulations brought into existence under Section 33 of the Act and assert with stubbornness that they should be given the LOP. According to him, if such a situation is allowed to · prevail, the Act, the Regulations and Minimum Standard Requirement (MSR) for the MCI would be tenuous and ultimately come within the tentacles of unscrupulous institutions.

19. This Court in IQ City Foundation (supra), after referring to Dr. Ashish Raf!ian and Others v. Union of India and Others4 and Manohar Lal Sharma v. Medical Council of India and Others5, Medical Council of India v. Kalinga Institute of Medical Sciences (KIMS) and Others6 and Royal Medical Trust (Registered) and B Another v. Union oflndia and Another7 held thus:- c "On a reading of Section 10-A of the Act, Rules and the Regulations, as has been referred to in Mano/tar Lal Sharma (supra), and the view expressed in Royal Medical Trust (supra), it would be inapposite to restrict the power of the MCI by laying down as an absolute principle that once the Central Government sends back the matter to MCI for compliance verification and the Assessors visit the College they shall only verify the mentioned items and turn a Nelson's eye even if they perceive certain other deficiencies. It would be playing possum. The direction of the Central Government for compliance verification report should not be construed as a limited remand as is understood within the framework of Code of Civil Procedure or any other law. The distinction between the principles of open remand and limited remand, we arc disposed to think, is not attracted. Be it clearly stated, the said principle also does not flow from the authority in Royal Medical Trust (supra). In this context, the objectivity of the Hearing Committee and the role of the Central Government assume great significance. The real compliant institutions should not always be kept under the sword of Damocles. Stability can be brought by affirmative role played by the Central Government. And the stability and objectivity would be perceptible ifreasons are ascribed while expressing a view and absence of reasons makes the decision sensitively susceptible. Having said this, we are not inclined to close the matter. The petitioners have been running the College since 2013-14. We have been apprised that students who have been continuing their education shall continue for 2017-18. As we find the orderofthe Central Government is not a reasoned one. It is obligatory on its part to ascribe reasons. For the said purpose, we would like the • (2016) 11sec225 '(2013) 10 sec 60 • (2016) 11 sec 530 7 (2015)10SCCl9 . i ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF Ii.I·. INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI) C:entral Government to afford a further opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and also take the assistance of the newly constituted Oversight Committee as per the order dated July 18, · 20'17 passed by the Constitution Bench in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 408 of 2017 titled Amma Cha11dravati £ducatio11al and ·Charitable Trust a~d others v. U11io11 of l11dia a11d another and thereafter take a decision within two weeks. Needless to · say, the decision shall contain reasons. We repeat at' the cost of repetition that the decision must be an informed one."

20. Section 10-A of the Act deals with permission for establishment of new medical college, new course of study, etc. Sub-section (7) of C Section I 0-A reads as follows:- "(7) The Council, while making its recommendations under clause ; , , (b) of sub-section (3) an~ the, c_en.tral Government, whi1e passing ' an order, either appro,11ing or disapproving the scheme under sub- section ( 4), shall have due regard to the following factors, namely- (a) whether the proposed medical college ofthc existing medical :,,,1," , college seeking to open a new or higher course of study or ·• training, would be in a position to offer the minimum standards , , ·' , of medical education as prescribed by the Council under Section __ 19A or, as the case may be, under Section 20 in the case of E postgraduate medical education. , ,, . . .. • (b) whether the person seeking to establitih a medical college or the existing medical college seeking to open a new or higher course of study or training or to increase its admission capacity has adequate financial resources; _ · · . . .1 -( c) whether necessary faciiities in respcet of staff, equipment, .. 'accommodation, training.and other facilities to ensure proper ·functioning of the medical college or conductinkthe ne~ course or study or training or accommodating the increased admission capacity, have been provided or would be provided within the time-limit specified in the scheme; _. , . , ' ,. . , (d) whether adequate hospital facilities, having regard to the number of students likely to attend such medical college or course of study or training or as a result of the increased admission capacity, have been provided or would be provided within thetime-limit specified in the scheme; (e) whether any arrangement has been made or programme drawn to impart proper training to students likely to attend such medical college or course of study or training by persons having the recognised medical qualifications; (/) the requirement of manpower in the field of practice of medicine; and (g) any other factors as may be prescribed."

21. Section 3-B of Indian Medical Council (Amendment) Act, 20 I 0, which confers the powers on the Board of Governors, reads as follows:- "3-B. Certain modifications of the Act.-During the period when the Council stands superseded- (b) The Board of Governors shall- (i) exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the Council under this Act and for this purpose, the provisions of this Act shall have effect subject to the modification that references therein to the Council shall be construed as references to the Board of Governors; (ii) grant independently permission for establishment of new medical colleges or opening a new or higher course of study or training or increase in admission capacity in any course of study or training referred to in Section l OA or giving the person or college concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard as provided under Section I OA without prior permission of the Central Government under that section, including exercise of the power to finally approve or disapprove the same; and (iii) dispose of the matters pending with the Central Government under Section I OA upon receipt of the same from it."

22. In Mano/lar Lal Sharma (supra), Section 3-B was interpreted thus:- ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] "MCI, with the previous sanction by the Central Government, in exercise of its powers conferred by Sections l 0-A and 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, made the Regulations known as the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999. Regulation 8 of the 1999 Regulations deals with grant of permission for establishment of new college.Application/ Scheme submitted by the app.Jicants is evaluated and the verification takes place by conducting physical inspection by the team of inspectors of MCI. The Board of Governors may grant LoP to the applicant for making admissions in the first year ofMBBS course in the medical college and the permission is renewed every year subject to the college achieving the yearly target mentioned in "Minimum Standard Requirements for the Medical College for 150 Admissions Annually Regulations, 1999". Schedule I of the abovementioned Regulation provides for accommodation in the medical college and its teaching hospital. Schedule II deals with equipment required for various departments in the college and hospital. The requirements are statutorily prescribed and, therefore, the Board of Governors has no power to dilute the statutory requirements mentioned in the abovementioned Regulations."

23. In Royal Medical Trust (supra), the Court after due advcrtence to Section 10-A of the Act and the Regulations framed by the Medical Council oflndia, has ruled:- "MCI and the Central Government have been vested with monitoring powers under Section 1 OA and the Regulations. It is expected of these authorities to discharge their functions well within the statutory confines as well as in conformity with the Schedule to the Regulations. If there is inaction on their part or non-observance of the time schedule, it is bound to have adverse effect on all concerned. The affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India shows that though the number of seats had risen, obviously because of permissions granted for establishment of G new colleges, because of disapproval of renewal eases the resultant effe~twas net loss in terms of number of seats available for the academic year. It thus not only caused loss of opportunity to the students community but at the same time caused loss to c the society in terms of less number of doctors being available. MCI and the Central Government must therefore show due diligence right from the day when the applications are received. The Schedule giving various stages and time-limits must accommodate every possible eventuality and at the same time must comply with the requirements of observance of natural justice at various levels. In our view the Schedule must ideally take care of: (A) Initial assessment of the application at the first level should comprise of checking necessary requirements such as essentiality certificate, consent for affiliation and physical features like land and hospital requirement. If an applicant fails to fulfil these requirements, the application on the face of it, would be incomplete and be rejected. Those who fulfil the basic requirements would be considered at the next stage. (B) Inspection should then be conducted by the Inspectors of MCI. By very nature such inspection must have an element of surprise. Therefore sufficient time of about three to four months ought to be given to MCI to cause inspection at any time and such inspection should normally be undertaken latest by January. Sumrisc inspection would ensure that the required facilities and infrastructure are always in place and not borrowed or put in temporarily. (C) Intimation of the result or outcome of the inspection would then be communicated. If the infrastructure and facilities are in order, the medical college concerned should be given requisite permission/renewal. However, if there are any deficiencies or shortcomings, MCI must, after pointing out the deficiencies, grant to the college concerned sufficient time to report compliance. (D) If compliance is reported and the applicant states that the deficiencies stand removed, MCI must cause compliance verification. It is possible that such compliance could be accepted even without actual physical verification but that assessment be left entirely to the discretion of MCI and the Central Government. In cases where actual physical verification is required, MCI and the Central Government must cause such verification before the deadline. ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA; CJI] (E) The result of such verification if positive in favour of the medical college concerned, the applicant ought to be given requisite permission/renewal. But ifthe deficiencies still persist or had not been removed, the applicant will stand disentitled so far as that academic year is concerned." [Emphasis added]

24. On a perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear as crystal that the surprise inspection is permissible and the college is required to remain compliant. The thrust of the matter is whether the inspection is justified and the decision taken by the Central Government is correct or not. To appreciate the propriety and correctness of the inspection during . Christmas and New Year, it is necessary to refer to clause 8(3)(1)(d) of C the Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999. The said clause reads as follows:- "However, the office of the Council shall ensure that such inspections arc not carried out at least 2 days before and 2 days after important religious and festival holidays declared by the Central/State Govt."

25. In the case at hand, the assessors had gone for inspection on 28'" and 29'" December, 2016. In Shri Venkateshwara University Through its Registrar & A11otlter vs. Union of India and Another [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 445 of 2017) this Court has referred to the decision in Kanacllur Islamic Education Tr11.5t (R) vs. Union of India and Anotller9 and after reproducing few paragraphs has hcld:- "On a careful reading of the aforesaid judgment, we do not think that the clause has been interpreted as not to allow any inspection on a Sunday, but the Court have said in the factual matrix of the said case that the Institution was a minority institution and a major festival for the said community was scheduled on 121h December, 2016 and the day previous thereto i.e.11 '"December, 2016, was a Sunday and the said facts are not wholly irrelevant. The said analysis cannot be regarded as the construction of the clause. Having said that, we shall proceed.to analyze what the .. clause precisely conveys. On a careful reading of the same, it is quite clear and unambiguous that the obligation of the MCI is to 8 2017 SCC Online SC 1034 9 (2017) l 0 SCALE 321 c ensure that inspections are not to be carried out at least 2 days before and 2 days after an important religious and festival ho! idays declared by the Central/State Government. In the clause, the words which gain significance are "important religious and festival holidays". On J2th December, 2016, it was Milad-un-Nabi and it is the day of festival. The inspection was done on 9th December, 2016, which was a Friday. The amended clause of the notification state only covers 2 days before the festival declared as a holiday by the Central/State Government and 2 days thereafter. In the case at hand, the inspection team had gone for inspection on 9'" December, 2016, and they were deprived to carry out the inspection. It was not covered by the concept of two days of moratorium."

26. At this juncture, it is pertinent to understand and appreciate the ratio of Kanacltur Islamic Ed11catio11 Tr11st (R) (supra) because it is being highlighted in certain cases that there is no acceptability or D permissibility to have a second inspection in quite succession. The paragraph that has been highlighted from Ka11achur L5lamic Education Trust (R) (supra) reads thus:- "That against the inspections conductccl by the MCI, the petitioner's college/institution had submitted representations on 15.12.2016 and 16.l.2017 before the Central Government is a matter of record. That the report qua the inspection conducted on 17-18.11.2016 did not disclose any substantial deficiency warranting disapproval as observed by the Hearing Committee is also not in dispute. It is unambiguously clear that the inspection of the petitioner's college undertaken on 17-18.11.2016 did not divulge any substantial deficiency justifying disapproval of the LOP to it. The reason for the surprise inspection on 9-10.12.2016, i.e. within three weeks of the first exercise and that too in absence of any noticeable substantial deficiency, is convincingly not forthcoming."

27. On a careful reading of the said paragraph, it is limpid that is not the ratio of the decision that there cannot be a surprise inspection and every time reasons have to be recorded. Be it noted, the Court has also clarified the position at the end of the verdict stating thus:- "We make it clear that the decision rendered and the directions issued arc in the singular facts and circumstances of the case." ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

28. It is well settled in law that the ratio of a decision has to be understood regard being had to its context and factual exposition. The · ratiocination in an authority is basically founded on the interpretation of the statutory provision. If it is based on a particular fact or the decision of the Court is guided by specific nature of the case, it will not amount to the ratio of the judgment. Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem10 has • B " … every judgment mustbe read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the tlxpressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the pa1ticular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found."

29. A three-Judge Bench in Union of India and others v. Dhanwanti Deviand others11, while adverting to the concept of precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution, has opined thus:- "Before adverting to and considering whether solatium and interest would be payable under the Act, at the outset, we will dispose of the objection raised by Shri Vaidyanathan that Hari Krishan Khosla case12 is not a binding precedent nor does it operate as ratio decidendi to be followed as a precedent and is per sc per incuriam. It is not everything said by a Judge while givingjudgment that constitjltes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from itthe ratio decidendi. According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates-(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles oflaw applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows 10 1901 AC495 :(1900-03)ALLERRep I (HL) 11 (1996) 6 sec 44 " (1993) Supp (2) 149 c [2017] JO S.C.R. from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the pai1ies to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application oflaw to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi. Therefore, in order to understand and appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition oflaw. Law cannot afford to be static and therefore, Judges arc to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents.''

30. In Bussa Overseas a11d Properties Private Limited a11d Another vs. U11io11 of India and Another13, while dealing with the precedcntial value of the decision in Thu11gabhadra Industries Limited vs. State of A.P. 14, the two-Judge Bench held:- "(20l6J 4 sec 696 14 AIR 1964 SC 13 72 ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] "The aforesaid decision in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. case when properly appreciated clearly reveals that it pertains to the stage when objection is to be taken. It does not lay down that a special leave petition against a review petition is maintainable or not. The focus on the stage of taking objection is fact-centric but not principle-oriented. To elaborate, the said decision does not lay down as a principle that the Comi is bereft of power to hear on maintainability. Ifwe understand the view expressed therein, it can be said that the Court has been guided by the concept of propriety." [Emphasis supplied] 3 i. In Ro.val Medical Trust (supra), this Court has clearly held that there can be surprise inspection as that ensures that the required facilities and infrastructure are always in place and not borrowed or put in temporarily. c 32. In IQ City Foundation and Another (supra), after referring D to Royal Medical Trust (supra), the Court has held:- "Therefore, the emphasis is on the complaint institutions that can really educate doctors by imparting quality education so that they will have the inherent as well as cultivated attributes of excellence." 33. Thus, in our considered opinion what has been stated in Royal Medical Trust (supra) and IQ City Foundation (supra) has the preeedential value under Article 141 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in saying that the pronouncement in Kanachur Islamic Education Trust_(R) (supra) has to rest on its own facts. 34. Having said that, it is necessary to scrutinise the explanation offered by the Principal of the petitioner-institution. The Principal has justified the leave availed of by the faculty and the residents during the period of inspection of the assessors of the Medical Council oflndia. We think it appropriate to reproduce the said explanation:- "We would like to bring to your kind notice that few faculty and residents were on leave and half day leave on various reasons during the assessment conducted by MCI in Kerala Medical College, Palakkad on 28-12-2016. The details are mentioned below for your kind perusal. 1. Dr. Gurusiddana Gowda, Associate Professor of Radio Diagnosis. His father had expired two weeks back and he had gone to perform the rituals of his father as per Hindu religious custom. He is the elder son in the family. Form 16, salary statement from bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith. c 2. Dr. R. Balamurugan Ramdas, Associate Professor of Bio Chemistry. He had gone to his native Pondichery during Christmas Holidays taking leave till 01-01-2017 because of personal reasons. Form 16, salary statement from bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith-leave submission form. 3. Dr. MS Ramaiyah, Associate Professor of Medicine. He was on half day leave on 28-12-2016 and reported in the afternoon. He was presented before the inspectors but not accepted as he was not present at the time of taking attendance at 11 a.m. Form 16, salary statement from the bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith. 4. Dr. N. Natarajan, Associate Professor of Medicine. He was on half day leave on 28-12-2016 and reported in the afternoon. He was presented before the inspectors but not accepted as he was not present at the time of taking attendance at 11 a.m. · Form 16, salary statement from the bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith. 5. Dr. MS Dhananjaya, Professor ofOBG. His cousin brother had expired and the l 2tl• day ritual ceremony was on 28-12-2016 and he had been sanctioned leave. He is present on 29-12-2016 and presented before the assessors. Form 16, salary statement from the bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith. 6. Dr. Ravi Chandra, Associate Professor of Surgery. ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] He had gone to his native during Christmas holidays taking leave till 31-12.2016 because of personal reasons. Salary statement from bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith. 7. Dr. Asha S Jagtap, Professor of PSM She had gone to her native during Christmas holidays taking leave till 31-12-2016 because of personal reasons. Form 16, salary statement from the bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith. 8. Dr. Girist A, Senior Resi.dent in Medicine. He was on half day leave on 28-12-2016 and reported in the afternoon. He was presented before the inspectors but not accepted as he was not present at the time of taking attendance at 11 a.m. c Salary statement from the bank and attendance register copy is· enclosed herewith. 9. Dr. Basavantj SK, Senior resident of Medicine. He had gone to his native during Christmas holidays taking leave till 31-12-2016 because of personal reasons. Salary statement from bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith. 10. Dr. B. Ravindra Shivaji, Senior Resident ofRadio Diagnosis. He had gone to his native during Christmas holidays.taking leave till 31-12-2016 because of personal reasons. Salary statement from bank and attendance register copy is . enclosed herewith. 11. Dr. Harithakumari Landa, Senior Resident of pulmonary medicine. She had gone to his native dw·ing Christmas holidays taking leave till 31-12-2016 because of personal reasons. Salary statement from the bank and attendance register copy is enclosed herewith." [2017] IO S.C.R. 35. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners that the Medical Council of India as well as the Central Government should have accepted the leave position and, in any case, it was within the permissible limit. 36. In this regard, Mr. Vikas Singh learned senior counsel for the B MCI has drawn our attention to the extract of the Minutes of the c Executive Committee dated 21" August, 2014. It reads as follows:- "Regarding specifying the type of acceptable leave during inspection of medical colleges. Read: the matter with regard to regarding specifying the type of acceptable leave during inspection of medical colleges. The Executive Committee of the Council considered the report of the Sub Committee dt. 17.04.2014 as constituted by the Executive Committee at its meeting held on l 4'h March, 2014 and decided to accept the report with the following amendments:- (!) The faculty who is on leave due to the following reasons would be accepted; (a) For attending International/National conferences organized by the respective International/NationalAssoeiations or Societies; (b) For attending any work assigned by Medical Council of India, either at headquarters or for assessment of a medical college; (c) For conducting examination of the concerned subject in a medical college in Central/State University; ( d) For attending Courts; Provided that appropriate documents certifying the same which are countersigned by the dean are furnished. (2) The faculty who is on sanctioned Maternity leave would be accepted provided the appropriate leave sanction order issued by the sanctioning authority and countersigned by the Dean is furnished with all necessary certificates." 37. The said resolution is strenuously contested by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. It is urged with immense vehemence that the resolution smacks of gross arbitrariness and reveals a sense of H hidden base for use of power of an absolute tyrant and a despot. Mr. ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] Singh explaining the same would submit that a hospital to remain compliant has to have the requisite number of doctors and staff, and to run a medical college constant compliance is imperative. According to him, when a college is granted LOP for the first year, 5% margin with regard to absence is granted and that is __ why ce11ain categories ofleave have not been mentioned in the resolution, but that does not mean that the college can grant leave to the doctors at its whim and fancy. Be that as it may, the absence of faculty members which has been taken note of by the Medical Council of India and accepted by the Central Government cannot be allowed to pale into total insignificance. In this regard, a submission advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners requires to be noted. It is urged by them that the engagement of the faculty members arc to be believed as they are paid their salaries by the petitioners and it is shown in the necessary Income Tax form. 38. It needs no special emphasis to state that the said submission cannot be the guiding factor for our analysis. The issue is the deficiency c of the doctors and the absence of the doctors during the period of D inspection. We have already held that the period in which the assessors inspected cannot be said to be a period covered under the Regulations. That. apart, as is noticeable, the Hearing Committee which has been constituted on the basis of the decision in Amma Chandravati Educational and Charitable Trust (supra), has also held that the college is deficient in bed occupancy at the condi.ticinal LOP stage other · E facilities have to be specifically verified and in the absence of satisfaction, .the LOP ought not to be granted. 39. In the course of hearing, Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the petitioners has placed heavy reliance on Kris/ma Mohan Medical College and Hospital & Anr v. Union of India & Anr 15 (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 448 of2017 decided on 01.09.2017) and Dr. Jagat Narain Subltarti Cltaritable Trttsf & Anr v. Union of India & Ors. 16• 40. In Krishna Mohan Medi<:al College (supra), this Court has held:- " … as the Act and Regulations framed thereunder have been envisioned to attain the highest standards of medical education, we direct the Central Government/MCI to cause a fresh 15 2017 SCC Online SC I 032 16 (2017) 10 SCALE 308 c inspection of the petitioner college/institution to be made in accordance therewith for the academic year 2ffl 8-I 9 and lay the report in respect thereof before this Court within a period of eight weeks herefrom. A copy of the report, needless to state, would be furnished to the petitioner college/institution at the earliest so as to enable it to avail its remedies, if so advised, under the Act and the Regulations. The Central Government/MCI would not encash the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner college/ institution. For the present, the impugned order dated 10.8.2017 stands modified to this extent only. The direction for a writ, order or direction to the respondents to permit the petitioner college/ institution to admit students for the academic year 20 l 7-18, in the facts of the case, is declined." 41. In Dr. Jagat Narain Subltarti Charitable Trust (supra), the Court, while granting the benefit foracademic session2017-2018, opined:- "Thus, there has been substantial compliance of the said requirement by the petitioners. Assuming that the notification dated 16.10.2015 applied even to the proposal of the petitioners, suffice it to observe that failure to furnish information in the prescribed Form-5 cannot be held against the petitioners. In any case, that is not a deficiency relating to infrastructure or academic matters as such, which may require a different approach." 42. The aforesaid decisions speak for themselves and, therefore, reliance on the same by the petitioners is of no avail. 43. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan would submit that this Court should not exercise appellate j w·isdiction which is fundamentally called an error F jurisdiction or rectification of errors. We are absolutely conscious of the appellate jurisdiction and the jurisdiction this Court is required to exercise while determining the controversy in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 32 ofthc Constitution. The principle of judicial review by the constitutional courts have been lucidly stated in many an authority of G this Court. In Tata Cellular v. Union of lndia17, dealing with the concept of Judicial Review, the Court held:- "Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment proclaimed: 11 (1994) 6 sec 651 . ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] 'Judicial r1wiew' is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power." Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review ( 1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say: "If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical memberof the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalfofthe Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocmp Etp!oration Ltd. 18-3-1991." Observance of judicial restraint is currently the mood in England. The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court'.\· ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is. made, but the decision-making process itself." 44. After so stating, reference was made to the law enunciated in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans18 wherein, it has been ruled:- " Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a: review of the manner in which the decision was made.· Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power "(1982) 3 All ER 141 c .[2017] 10 S.C.R. of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty ofusurping power." 45. In the said case, the Court also referred to R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Me'rgers, ex. P. Datafi11 plc19 wherein Sir John B Donaldson, M.R. commented:- "An application for judicial review is not an appeal." 46. The three Judge Bench further held:- "The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question oflegality. c Its concern should be: 1. Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error oflaw, 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers." 4 7. The Court furtheropined that in the process of judicial review, it is only concerned with the manner in which the decisions have been E taken. The extent of the duty is to act fairly. It will vary from case to case. Explicating further, it ruled:- "Shortly put, the grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review can be classified as under: (i) Illegality: This means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give efiect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety. The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule out addition of further grounds in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord Diplock refers specifically to one development, 1' (1987) l All ER 564 ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF INDIA AND. ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] namely, the possible recognition of the principle of propo11ionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that. the court should, "consider whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree whfoh requires its intervention". 48. Thereafter, the Court referred to the authorities in R. v. Askew10 and Cou11cil of Civil Service U11io11s v. Minister for Civil B Service11 and further expressed:- "At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993, Vol. I, pp. 849-850, may be quoted: "4. Wednesbury principle.-A decision of a public authority. will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., per Lord Greene, M.R. )" We may hasten to add, though the decision was rendered in the context of justification of grant of contract but the principles set out as regards the judicial review are of extreme significance. 49. Discussing at length, the principle of judicial review in many a decision, the two Judge Bench in Reliance Telecom Ltd. & Another v. Union of India & A11otlter12, has held:- . "As we find, the decision taken by the Central Government is based upon certain norms and parameters. Though criticism has been advanced that it is perverse and irrational, yet we are disposed to think that it is a policy decision which subserves the · consumers' interest. It is extremely difficult to say that the decision to conduct the auction in such a manner ca;be considered to be mala fide or based on extraneous considerations." 50. Thus analysed, it is evincible that the exercise of power of judicial review and the extent to which it has to be done will vary from case to case. It is necessary to state with emphasis that it has its own complexity and would depend upon the factual projection. The broad "' (1768) 4 Burr 2186: 98 ER 139 "(1985) I AC374 :SJ984)3AllER935 :(1984) 3WLR 1174 22 (2017) 4 sec 269 A principles have been laid down in Tata Cellular (supra) and other decisions make it absolutely clear that judicial review, by no stretch of imagination, can be equated with the power of appeal, for while exercising the power under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution, the constitutional courts do not exercise such power. The process of adjudication on c merit by re-appreciation of the materials brought on record which is the duty of the appellate court is not permissible. 51. The duty of the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review to zealously guard the human rights, fundamental rights and the citizens' right oflife and liberty as also many non-statutory powers of governmental bodies as regards their control over property and assets of various kinds. (See : Union of India and Anr. v S.B. Vohra23) 52. What Dr. Dhawan submits basically is that as the order passed by the Central Government after the order passed by the High Court of Kerala does not really reflect any reason, this Court should axe the same treating it as arbitrary and grant the LOP and that would be within the power of judicial review. The order passed by the Central Government has to be appreciated in its entirety. We repeat at the cost of repetition that neither the Central Government nor the Hearing Committee is expected to pass a judgment as a Judge is expected to do. The order must reflect application of mind and should indicate reasons. We may reiterate that the order dated 31" May, 2017, was bereft of reason, but the order impugned, that is the order dated 141h August, 2017, cannot be said to be sans reason. Learned senior counsel would contend with all the vigour at his command that it is not a reasoned one and for the same our attention has been drawn to the penultimate paragraph of the order. 53. We are of the considered opinion that the order of the present nature has to be appreciated in entirety and when we peruse the entire order, we find that substantial reasons have been ascribed and, therefore, we are compelled to repel the submissions so assiduously and astutely advanced by Dr. Dhawan. 54. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we sum up our conclusions and directions, thus:- ( a) The petitioners are not entitled to Letter Of Permission (LOP) for the academic session 2017-2018. We direct that the order passed in the present writ petition shall be applicable hereafter for the academic session "(2004) 2 sec 1so ROYAL MEDICAL TRUST AND ANOTHER v. UNION OF' INDIA AND ANOTHER [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] 2017-2018 since the cut off date for admissions to MBBS ·course for academic session 2017-2018 is over and the academic session has commenced. No petition shall be entertained from any institution/col!\:ge/ society/trust or any party for grant ofI~OP for 2017-2018. We say so as the controversy for grant of LOP for the academic year 2017-2018 should come to an end and cannot become an event that defeats time. The students who arc continuing their studies on the basis of LOP granted for the academic year 2016-2017 should be allowed to continue their- studies in the college and they shall be permitted to continue till completion of the.course. (b) The applications submitted for 2017-2018 shall be treated as applications for 2018-2019 and the petitioners shall keep the bank guarantee deposited with the Medical Council of India alive and the MCI shall not encash the same. ( c) The Medical Council of India sh.all conduct a fresh inspection as per ·.' the Regulations within a period of two months. It shall apprise the petitioner-institution with regard to the deficiencies and afford an opportunity to comply with the same and, thereafter, proceed to act as contemplated. under the Act. (d) The inspection shall be carried out for the purpose of grant of LOP for the academic session 2018-2019. (e) After the Medical Council of India sends its recommendation to the Central Government, it shall take the final decision as per law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Needless to say, it shall take the assistance of the Hearing Committee as constituted by the Constitution Bench decision in Amma Chandravati Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) or other directions given in the said decision. 55. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Nidhi Jain Writ Petition disposed of.