ii. S.P. MITTAL ETC. ETC. v. UNION. OF INDIA AND OTHERS . November 8, 1982 (Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.,.p N. BHAGWATI, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI AND R.B. MISRA, JJ;) Right to freedom of religion and to manage religious affairs-Constitution of India, 1950 Articles 25 and 26-Shri Aurobindo's rtachings cannot ht said to be of a religious nature-Aurobindo Society and the Auroville township do not fall within the meaning of religious denomination so as to be violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
Words & Phrases-' Religion' and 'Religious denomination' explained. Aurovill• (Emergeucy Provisions) Act, 1980 (Act L1X of 1980) p,.ambl11- Par/iamentary competency to enact the Act–.Wh~ther inconsistent and in conflict with the provisions of the West.Belfga/ Societies Registration Act, 1961 (Act XXVI of 1961) Sections 22 & 23 containing in built self-contained proviSions for dealing with the management of the rtgistered societies-Constitution of India 1950 Article 245, Schedule Vil, List I Entry 32-Functions of the Lists, Explained. Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act. 1980 providing for taking over the management only of Aurovi/le toWnship and its activities for a limitid period is not violative either of Article 14, Articles 25 and 26 or Articles 29 and 30 ofthtt ConstiJution .
. Sri Aurobindo, one of the Indian sages and philosphers, after a brilliant academic and administrative career engaged himself for sometime in political aciivities and revolutionary literary efforts, but later on gave them uo to concen- trate himself with the life of medition and integral yoga at Pondicberry, in Tamil Nadu. Madam M. Alfassa a French Lady, wb~ came to be known as the Mother became a disciple of Sri Aurobindo. Very· soon more and ~o.re .
· dis~iples came to join him from various parts of India·- and abr~ad and tlius the Aurobindo Ashram came into being. The. disciples and devoted followers- of Sri Aurobindo and the Mothe"r, with a view to propagate and practise the ideals and beliCfs of Sri Aurobindo formed a Society called Sri Aurobindo Society in the year 1960, ~hich at all material times w·as 'and is still a society duly registered under the provisions of tb.e West Bea~al Societies Re~istratioq c
c SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [!983] I S.C.R. Act, 1961. This Society is completely distinct from Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicberry. The Society was established and registered for the purpose of carrying out in and out side India the several objects stated· in the memoran<lum of the Society.
The management of the Society vested in its Executive Committe~. Rulerand regulations have been duly framed for the management. of the Society and also for·safe cu~tody and protection of its assets, properties and funds. Sri Aurobindo Society preaches arid propagates the ideals and teachings of Sri Aurobind
10, inter alia, through its numerous centres scattered throughout India by way of weekly meetings of its me~bers. The Mother as the founder-president also coi;iceived of a project of setting up a cultural township known as 'Auroville' where people of different countries are expected to engage in cultural, educational and scientific and o1her pursuits aiming at human unity. The Society has been a channel of funds for setting up the cultural township known as Auroville.
At the initiative of the Government of India, .the United. Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation being of the opinion that the Auroville project would contribut~ to international understanding and
. promotion of peace sponsored the project by proposing a resolution to this effect at its General Conference in 1966. This resolution was unanimously ador•ted Rt this conference.' By a fllrther resoIUtion passed in 1968 the UNESCO invited its member States and intern"ational non-governmen_tal organisations to p3.rtici- pate in the development of Aur.oville as an international cultural township to bring together the values of different cultures and civilisations in harmonious environment with integrated living standards, which corresponds to man's physical and spiritual needs. In 1970 UNESCO had directed its Director·Genera1 to take such steps as may be feasible, wilhin the budgetary provisions to promote the development of Auroville as an important· international cultural program1ne. Sri Aurobindo Society received l~rge funds in the shape of grants from diffetent organist:tions in India atJd abroad for development or that towDsbip. The assistance included contributions from the State Go~·ernments of the valuf1 of Rs. 66.50 lakhs and the Central Government of the value of Rs. 26.14 lakhs. After the death of the Mother on 17th of November, 1973 a number of problems of varying nature affecting the smooth running of the project" cropped· · ~P· The Government of India on receiving complaints about mismanagement of the project and misuse of funds by Sri Aurobindo Society set up a cornmiltee under the chainnanship of the Governor of Pondicherry with representatives of the Government of Tamil Nadu anli of the Ministry of Home Affairs in ·the 'Central Government to look into the matter. The Committee made a detailed scrutiny of the accounts of Sri Aurobindo Society relating to Aurovilte and found instances of serious irregularities in the management of the Society, misutilisation of its funds and their diversion to other purposes. Further, xarious other serious difficulties had arisen plaguing the Management of Auroville ~µd rcnderin~ thereby any_ .furth~r _growth of the township almost ir:ppossible. "'"·
S.P. MITIAL V. UNION ' In the circumstances the taking over of the management of Auroville became imperative to ensure growth of tbe township in tu~e with its objectives. Keeping in view the international character of the project and considering the government's involvement in
actively sponsoring the project through UNESCO, the. growth and management of the project had become the primary responsibility of the ·oovernment of Illdia. The ideals: of the project.f9rmed India's highest aspirations, which could not be allowed to be defeated or frustrated. Sri Aurobindo society had lost complete control over the situatiOn and the members of the l\uroville approaCbed the Government of India to give prOtection against oppression and victimisatioil at the hands of the said Soci~ty. There were internal quarrels between the various factions of Sri Aurobirido Society. There have also been instances of law· and ordet situation. Financial management of the projects has not been sound and several instances of mis- manauement, diversion of funds have been revealed.
A large sum of monCy was given by Sri Aurobindo Society to AURO construction-an agency whoso· 'status is not at all defined, whose functions and capabilities for taking up large construction works alsO had not .been made known. The Government in the circum~tances could not be a silent spectator to the mismanagement of t~c project and internecine quilrrels amongst its meaibers, which if not checked could Iea:d to the destruction of the project so nobly conceived. The Govern- ment, therefore, <;tecided to issue a Presidential Ordinance, After the -filing of the writ, ·petition the ordinance ·has now been replaced by' the AuroVille (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980.
The constitutional validity of. the Act has "been cha11enged on four grounds : (i) Parliament has. no legislative competence to enact the impugned . IB statute; (ii) The impugned Act infringes
Articles 25~ 26, 29 and -30 of the Constitution; (iii) The impugned Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitu~ tion; and (iv) The Act was ma/a fide. Dismissing the petitions, the Court
HELD: (Per Misr_a, J.) 1:1. The Parliament had the legislative competence to enact the Auroville (Emergency Provisiofl') Act, 1980 (Act LIX) of 1980. [770 DJ 1 :2. The subject. matter of the impugned Act is not covered by Entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Even if the subject matter of the impugned ACt is not covered by any specific entry of List I or III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution it would in any case be covered by the resi~uary entry 97 · of List I. [770 C-D]
1:3. The function of the Lists in. the Seventh Sc~edule to the Constitution is not to confer powers. They merely demarcate the legislative fields. Tho Entries in the three Lists are only legislative l\~a<!s or fields of le~islation a~d th~ [1983) l S.C.ll,
power to l~gislate is given to appropriate legislature by Articles 245 to 248 of f~e Constitution. [766 H, 767 A] c 1 :4. The Auroville Act even incidentaly does not trench upon flle field covered by the West Bengal Societies Registration At:t, 1961 as it is in no way related to Constitution, regulation and winding up of the Society .. [770 BJ R.C. Cooptr v. Union of India [1970] 3 SCR 530@ 563, applied. Attorney General for Ontario v. Attorney General for the Dominion [1895] AC 348 @ 366-67; Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon [1972] 2 SCR 33 @ 45; Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College v. The State of Delhi at.id Others [1962] 1 Suf)p. SCR 156; Katra Education Society v. State of Uttfu a ..
Pradesh and Others [1966] 3 SCR 328, referred to. 2:1. The words "religious denomination" in· Article 26 of the Constit:J.- tion must take thefr colour from tbe word 'religion' and if this be so, the expression "religious denomination:• mµst also satisfy three conditions: (i) It must be a collection of individuals who has a system of beliefs or doctrine which they regard as conducive to their spiritual weH- being, that is, a common faith;
(ii) Common organ~.sation: and (iii) Designation by a distinctive name. [774 B-D] 2:2. The term 'religion• has been judicialJ.;i….considered in the Commission 1 ~r of Hindu Religious Endownments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiyor of Sri Shriur Mult [1954) SCR 1005 and the following propositions of law laid down therein haVe been consistently followed in later cases including TJ1t Durgah .Committee, Ajmer and Another v. Syed Hussain Ali & Others [1962] I SCR 383@410-11 :
(1) Religion means "a system of beliefs or do.:trines which are reSar .. ded bY. those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well being"; (2) A <tligion iS not merely an op1n1on, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression in acts as welt;
(3) Religion need not be theistic; (4) "Religious denominationu means a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name; ~5) A law which takCs away the rights of administration from the ~~~i:ids 9f !!- reli~io~s denomin~ti9n altoeethcr and vests in anothe.: .} —
_, . .., S.P. MITTAL v. UNION authority Would amount to violation of the right guar<iriteed-under · clause (d) of Article 26." (773 E·H, 774A] Per Majority [Misra, J for himself. P. N. "hagwati and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.
dissenting.] Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., and Chinnappa Reddy, J. 2:3. On the basis _of the materials the Memorandum of Association of the Society. the several applications made by the Society claiming exemption under s. 35 and s. 80 of the Income-tax Act, _the repeated ut~rings of Sri Auro- bindo and the Mother that the society and Auroville were not religious institu- tions and host of other documents there is no,room for doubt that neither the Society nor Auroville constitute a religious denomination and the teachings of Sri Aurobindo only represented his philosophy and not a religion. [793 D-E] Numerous Utterings by Sri Aurobindo or .the Mother .unmistakably show that the Ashram or Societ'y or Auroville is not a religious inst.itution. There can be no better proof than what Sri Aurobindo and the Mother themselves thought of their teachings and their institutions to find out· whether the teachings of Sri Aurobindo and his Integral Yoga constitute a religion of a philosophy . The Utterings made from time to time by Sri Aurobindo and the Mother hardly leave any doubt about the nature of the Institution. It was on the basis that it was not a religious institution, that the Society collected funds from the Central Government, the Governments _of Sta~es, other non-Governmental agencies. and from abroad. (792 B·D, 793 A]
Even assuming but not holding that the Society or the Auroville were a religious denomination, the in1pugned enactment is not hit t·y Articles 25 and'26 of the Constitution. The impugned enactmeilt does not curtail the freedom of conscience and the "right freely to profess, practise and prop8gate religio.n . Therefore, there is no question Of the enactment being hit by Article 25. [793 E-F] 2:4. The impugned enactment does not stand in the way of the Society establishing and maintaining institutions for religious and charitable purposes, It also does not stand in the way of the Society io ·manage its affairs in matters of religion. [794- A-Bl
2:5. Even assuming that the society or Auroville was a religious denomi .. nation, clauSe {b) of Art. 26 guarantees to a religious denomination a right to manage its oWn affairs in matters of religion. Besides t~he right to manage its own aff~irs in matters of religion, which ·is given by clause (b), the next two clauses of Art. 26 guarantee to a .religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer suCh property in accordance with law. The administration of its property by a religious· denomination haS thus been placed on a different footing from the right to ·manage its own affairs in the .matt~Ts of religion. The latter is_,@ fundamental right which no legislature can take away, wbeiyas the former can be regulated ~Y laws which the legislature can take away, SUPREME COOllt RBPOllTS
[1983) I S.C.F·'" whereas the former can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validily impose. Jt i:s clear, therefore, that question merely relating to a religions group c
or institution are not matters of religion to which clause o.f article applies. ~ '- (800 H, 801 A·B) 2:6. The impugned Act had not taken away the right of management in matters of religion or a religious denomination. if the Society or Auroville is a religious denomination at all, rather it has taken away the right of management of the property of Auroville. Thus the impugned Act neither violates Article 25, nor Article 26 of the Constitution. [801 C·Dl
The Commissioner of . H. R. & C. E. Madras v. Lakshmlndra Tirtha Swamljar of Sri Slrur Mutt [1954] S.C.R. 1005; Th• Durgah Committ .. Ajmer and Another v. Syed Hussain Ali [1962] 1 S.C.R, 383; Tilkyat Shri Govlnd/alji Maharaj v. Stale of Ra}a~than & Oth•rs [1964) 1 S.C.R. 561; Sastri Yagnapurushadrl & Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Vysya & Another [1966] 3 S.C.R. 242; Divyadassan Rajendra Ramdassjl &_ Another v. Stal• of Andhra Pradesh [1970] 1 S.C.R. 103; Na/aw RaN1alingayya v. The Commi81ioner of Charitable and Hindu &/igious · Institutions and Endownments Hyderabad A.I,R. 1971 (AP) 320; T. Krlthnan v. G.D.M. Committee A.I.R, 1978 Kerala 681 applied.
3. On an analysis of Articles 29 and 30 and the decided cases it is eviderit that the Auroville Act does not seek to curtail the right of any section of citizen to conserve its own language, script or culture conferred by Article 29. The benefit of Art. 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on proving that it is a religious or linguistic minority and that the institution was established by It. Since Auroville or the Societ;v. is not a religious denomination, Articles 29 and 30 would not be attached and, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be held to be violative of Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution. (805 A·C] In re : The Kera/a Education Bill [1959] SCR 9951 Reverend Sltl~aibhal Serbhai and Others v. State of Bombay and Another. [1963] 3 SCR 837 @ 856; Stat< of Kuala v. Mother Provincial [1971] 1 SCR 734; applied. 4. The Auroville Take over Act cannot be said to be violative of Article J4 of the Constitution, which action was taken after full consideration of various aspects of the problem, for the reasons namely~ (i) it has not been pointed out which were 1he other institutions where similar situations were prevailing; and (ii) there is a uniqueness with this institution inasmuch as the Government is also involved. Even a s.ingle institution may be taken as a class. The situation prevailing in the Auroville had converted the dream of the Mother into a night· mare. There had arisen acute law and .order situation in the Auroville, numerous cases were pending against various foreigners, the funds meant for the Auroville had been diverted towards other purposes and the ·atmosphere was getting out of hand. In the circumstances the Government intervened and promul. gated the'Ordinance and later on substituted it by the impugned enactment. (814 B-DJ
S.P. MITTAL v. UNiON Budhan Choudhary v: The State of Bihar [1955] I SCR "1045: Shri " Rama~rishna Daf!nia v. Sri iust!ce S.~ Tandolka;. and Others [1959] SCR 279; Raja B/rakishore v" The Sate ofOrlssa [1964] 7 SCR 32, followed. Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Another v. Stale of Bihar and Others [1953] SCR 1129; distioguished.
5:1. Whether the remedies provided under the Societies Registration Act \.11'.Cre sufficient to meet the exigencies of the situation is not for ihe Court to deC:ide' but it is for the Government and if the Government thought that the con- ditions prevailing in the AurovHle and the Society can be amelJora!ed not by resorting to the provisiOns of the SocietieS Registration Act but by· a special en"actnlerit, that is an area of the GOvemoie.nt and not .of the Court. [818 E-F] 5:2 .. It is not correct to say that the facts stated in the preamble of the Act were non est. Obviou'Sly there were serious irregularities in the m.anagement of the said society: There has beon misutilisation of Junds and iheir ·diversion t? other purposes. This is evident from the audit report. There was no ·material change in the situation -on the date of the impugned ordinance or the Act, rathCr the situation had grown fronl bad. to worse and. the-· Sordid situation pfevailing. in the Auroville so
poini'Cd Out by . the pafties fully justified the 'promutgation of the ordinance~ and the passing ·Of the ·enactment. Of course, each party tried to apportion the blame on the other. Who so ever be· responsible, the fact remains that the prevailing sittiation -in the Auroville was far from satisfactory. The amount donated for the COnstfuction of the cultural township Aufovil1e and other institutions was to the tune of. Rs. 3 crores. It was the responsibility of the Government to see that the amount was not mis· utilised and the management was _properly carried out. On a perusal of the audit report, which is a voluminous one, all that can be said is 1hat on th~ facts found by the audit committee, the repor1 is rather a mild one. There seems to ·be serious irregularities in the accounts. A substantial amount received by way. of donations had not been properly spent, there being mis·utilisation and diversion of the funds. [819 B-FJ
5:3. Even assuming that the facts brought to the notice of the legisla· ture were wrong, it will not be open to the Court to hold that Act to be bad on . that account. _The Court would not do so even in case of a litigation which has become final on the ground that the facts or the evidence produced in the case were not correct. The Parliament had tO apply its mind on the facts before it. [819 F-H]
We can normally assume th~t the 'Government would certainly appoint a· re'Sponsible person as an administraior especially when there 'is a heavy stake in which the 'oovemmenl of India is also involved in as much as at the instance of the GoVernment the UNESCO gave financial support to the institution. [820 F-0]
c 6. The contention that the report of th!! ~ommittee was tainted as Shri Kulkarni the Cbair'man and Secretary were parties, .is Without any foundation. TliC allegation of the impugne Act being· malafide is £equally devoid Or force. · c
· [ 1983 i i s.c.il. Kiriti Joshi cannot be said to have bis own axe to grind in the matter or was instrumental in getting tbe impugned Ordinance and the Act passed. Allegations about mala fides are more easily made than made out. Merely because he made a complaint ab.Jut tho situation prevailing in the management of Auroville · and the Society, it cannot be said that the impugned enactment was passed at his behest. [820 H, 821 B-C]
PerjChinnappa Reddy, J. (Dissenting) 1:1. Shri _Aurobindo )ruly ~was a religious teacher and taught and was understood to have taught new religious doctrine and practice. Therefore, Aurobindoism, can certainly be classified if not as a new religion, as a new sect of Hinduism and the followers of Sri Aurobindo can be termed a religious denomination.
Sri Aurobindo of course, disclaimed tbat be was founding a religion. No great religious teacher ever claimed that be was founding a new religion or a new school of religious thought. The question is not whether Sri Aurobindo refused to claim or- denied that he was founding a new religion or ·a new school of religious thought but ~whether his discipes and the community thought so. There is no doubt that they did not only his disciples and followers, but religious leaders all the world over and of all faiths. Therefore, Aurobindo Society is a sect of a religious determination within the meaning of the expression in Article 26 of the Constitution. [754 G-H, 755 A-B, F·G] 1:2. The word 'religion' does not occur in the Preamble to the constitution, but the Preamble does ·promise to
secure to its citizens "Liberty of thought, expression, beJief faith and worship". The freedom of con- science and the Right to profess, propagate and practise religion guaranteed ·in Article 25 flow out of the idCa so expressed in Preamble. Freedom of conscience is not to be separated frtm the Right to pi'ofess, pr8.ctise and propogate religion. They go together and together they form part of the Right to Freedom of Reli- gion. It is clear from Article 25 that secul~r activity may be associated with Reli- gion. though the guarantee of the article does not extend to such activity, Article 26 guarantees that every reiigious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right, subject to public order, mora1ity and health, to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own .affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire movable and immovable pr6perty and to administer such property in accordance with law. Several provisions of the constitution where the expression 'religion' and 'religious denomination' are used are either those which are concerned with equality and equal opportu'nity or th0se which are concerned with freedom -of religion.
[742 D, F, G-H, 743 A, CJ 1:3. Reading Art. 25 in the background of the proclamation regarding Liberty in the Preamble to the constitution, it is clear that (I) the constitution views religion as comprising thought, expression, belief, faith or worship, as involving 1he consci'ence and as something which may be ptof~ssed, practised and propagated and which is any man's attribute in the same manner as race, sex, language, residence etc: (ii) 'economic, financial, political or other secular_ activity may be associated with religious practice though such activity is not covered bY the gu_arantee of freedom of conscience and the right freely t~ S.P. MITTAL V. UNION
profess, practise arid propagate,.religion; and so Religion is a matter of thought, expression; belief, faith and worship, a ·matter involving_ the conscience and a matter which may be.professed, practised and propagated by anyone and which may even have some secular activity associated with it. (7.44 F-H, 745 A] 1:4. Religion undefined by the constitution, is incapable of precise judicia definition either: In the Oackground of the provisions of the constitution and the ught shed by judicial precedent, it can at best be said that religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of belief ·and doctrine. · It concerns the conscience i.e. the spirit of man. It must be capable of overt expressions in work and ~eed, such as worship or ritual. So religion is a matter of belief arid doctrine con- cernii:ig the human spirit expressed overtly in the form of ritual and worship. Some religions are easily identifiable as religious; ·some are easily identifiable as not religious. There are many in the· penumbfal re8:ion which instinctively appear to~some as religion ani::I to others as·not religions. There is no formula. of general application. There is no knife-edge test. Primarily, it is a question of the consciousness of the community, how does the fraternity, or sodality (if it is permissible to use the Word without confining it to Roman Catholic Groups) regard itself, how do others regard the fraternity or sodality. A host of other circumstances may have to be considered; such as, the ·origin and the history of the community. the rituals observed by the .community, what the founder, if any, taught, what the founder was understood by his followers to have taught, etc. In origin, the founder may not have intended to found any religion at· all. He may have merely protested· against some rituals and observances, he may have disagreed with the interpretation of
so~e earlier reli8ious tCnCts. . What he said, what he preached and what he taught. his protest, his distent, his disagree– meat might have developed "into a religion in the course of time, even during his life-time. He may be again~t religion itself, Yet, history and the perception of the community may make a religion out of what was not intended to be a religion and he may be hailed as the founder of a new religion. (750 B~_G] And, whatever the ordinary features of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not of equal im-pOrtance and surely the common faith .of the religious body is more important than the other fe;tures. (751 CJ
The CommisSioire· of 1IR and C.E.,_ Madras v. Lakshmindra Tirtha · Swamiyar of Sri Shirur Mutt .[1954] S .. C.R. 1005; Ratildl Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay [1954] S.C.R. 1055; Durgah Committee of A/mer v. Sayed Hussain Ali & B'ors. [1962] 1 S.C.R. 383; Ti/kayat-Sh'ri Govind/alji Maharaj v. The State of Raja"sthan and Others [t964J 1 S.C.R. 561; Raja Virakishore v. State of Orissa [1964] 7 S.C.R. 32; Sasti Yagnapurushadji and Others v. Muldas Bhudardas Yaisnya and Another [1966) 3 S.C.R. 242; referred to.
l:S. Judidial definitions are- not statutory definitions; they are mere exp1anations, every word of which is not to .be weighed in golden scales. Law bas a tendency to harden with the passage of time and judicial pronouncements are made to assume the form of statutory pronouocemen_ts: So soon as a word or expression occuring in the statute is judicially defined, the tendency is to rry to interpret the language employed by the judges in the judicial definition. That is wrong. Always words and expressions to be interpreted are those employed in c
e I B c (19831 1 s.c.a. the statute and not those used by judges definition is explanatory and not definitive. for felicitous explanation, Judici.al [751 C·B] 1:6. Religious denomination has not to .owe allegiance to any parent religion. The entire foilowing of a religion may be no more than the religious denomination. This may particularly be so in the case of small religious groups or 'developing• religions, that is, religions in the formative stage. So Aura· bindoism can be termed as a religious denomination. The world and India treated and respected Shri Aurobindo as a religious teacher and the founder of a new religion. [751 B-G]
2:1. Aui'oville (EmergenCy Provisions) Act. 1980 did not take away or purport to take away the manag_ement of the Shri Aurobindo Society. ~ Parlia- ment concerned itself with the management of Auroville only and with no other activity. of the Shri Aurobindo Society, including 'it$ affairs in matters of religion'. In fact, section 4(2) makes it explicit that, except for matters re18.ting to the management of Aurovple, the provisions of the West Bengal Societies Regisiration Act, 1961, under which the Society was registered, shall continue to apply to the Society in the same manner as before. (755 G·H, 757 C-D] 2:2. The · n_ianagernent of the International, cultural
township of AuI'oville cannot be said to be a matter of religion. Auroville is a township, and not a place of the worship. It is a toW11ship dedicated, not to tho practice and the propagation of any religious doctrine but to promote international utiderstanding and world peace, surely, a secular and not a religious activity. The highest that can be sakl' in favour of AUroville being a religious institution or its management being a religious matter, is that it was conceived by the Mother and shaped and sculpted by Sbri Aurobindo's disciples and followers in the pursuit of one of the ideas. and ideals of Sbri Aurobindo, a great religious teacher. On tbe Other hand, the ideal itself, that is, the promotion of iDter~ national understanding and world peace is by no means a religious ideal and it was because of the nature of the ideal that the Government of India an.d the UNESCO adopted the project. Shri Aurobindo himself was not a mere religious teacher~ He was a visionary, a humanist and·a nationalist ;who bad blossomed into an internationalist. Theiefore; Auroville, 'thoUgh the child of the Mother' and though nurtured by the devotees of Shri Aurobindo, ·_has an individuality, distinctly secular of its own.
Hence, Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act which p·rovides for the taking over the management of Aurovillc for a limited period does not offend the rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 ~f the Constitution. [757 B·B, 758 C]
2:3. The rights guaranteed by Articies 29 and 30 cannot be said to have been infringed by the Auroville Emergency provisions Act. No section of citizens having a culture and no religious minority has been denied the right to establish and administer an educational institution of its choice. [758 DwE] S.P. MITTAL •• UNION (Chinnappa k.eddy, J.)
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 5879 of 1980. _A (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) AND Writ Petition No. 587'7 of 1980. (Under Ar_ticle 32 of the Constitution of India)
. AND Transfered Cas¢ No. 29 of 1981. (Calcutta High Court Writ Petition No. 11508 of 1981) With Civil Appeal No. 2819of1980. (Appeal by special leave from the judgn'ient and order dated 21st November, 1980 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in F.M.A.T. No. 3408 of 1980)
So/i J. Sorabji, K.K. Venugopa/, S. Rangarajan, S. Bdlakrishnan, M.K.D. Namboodiry, P. Radhakdshnan, N.A. Subrahmaniam, C.S. Vaidyanathan, M.N. Krishna Mani and Vinnet. Ku111ar for the Peti- tioners and Appellant.
/ L.N. Sinha, Attorney General, K. Parasaran, Solicitor General, M.K. Banerji, Additional Solicitor General, Govind Swaminadh'ln, for R. 3, N. Nettar and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondents Nos. 1 to 4.
T.S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer and Raju Ramchandran for Respon- dent No. 5. F.S. Nariinan, Anil B. Divan, P.H. Parekh, Mrs. Vineeta Sengupta, Gautam Philip and Sanjeev · Agarwal for Respondent Nos. 6 to 240 in WPs. & CA.
P.P. Rao, P.C. Kapur and R. Venkataramani for interveners 1-88. c c SUPREME COURT R~PORTS FOR APPLICANT/INTERVENERS _ A.B. Patel.; Indra Sen: R.B! Datar N.M. Kshatriya, B.R.l Aggarwala,
(1983] I s.C.R Catholic Bishop Con- P.A. 1Francis, J. 8. Dadachanji and ference of India : , D.N. Mishra The following Judgments were delivered CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. I have the 1, good fortune of having
before me the scholarly judgment of my', brother' Misra· J., I agree with my brother Misra, J. that the Writ ~etitions must fail. With much· that he has said, also, I agree. But ·,with a little, to my own
lasting regret, I do not agree. It is, therefore, proper for ine to explain the points of my disagreement. Quite a considerable part of the hearing of the petitions was devoted to a debate on the question, what
1 is Religion ? Religion : Everyone has a religion, or at least,' a view or a window on religion, be he a bigot or .simple believer, philosopher or pedes- trian, atheist or agnostic.
Religion, like 'democracy' and 'equality' is an elusive expression, which everyone uhderstands according to his p~e-conceptions. What is religion to sbme is pure dogma to others and what is religion to others is pure superstition to some others. Karl Marx in .bis contribution to !he Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law described religion as the '•Opium of the people'. He said further "Basically religion is a very convenient sanctuary ~ for bourgeois thought to flee to in times of s1ress.
Bertrand Russell, in his essay 'Why I am not Christian', saidl "Religion is based, I think, primarily and mainly upon fear." It is partly the terror of the unknown and partly, as I have said, the wishi to feel· that _you have a kind of elder brother, who will stand by yoti in all your troubles· and disputes.
Fear is the basis ·of the whole thing-fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of death. Eear is the parent of cruelty, and, therefore, it is no wonder if' cruelty and religion have gone .hand in hand.
As a worshipper at the alter of peace, I· find it difficult to reconcile myself to religion, ,which throughout the ages, bas justified war calling it a Dbarma Uddha, a Jehad or a S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
Crusade. I believe that by getting mixed up with religion, ethics has lost 'much of its point, much of its purpose and a .major portion of its spontaneity'. I apprehend I share the views of those who· have neither faith nor belief in religion and who consider religion as entirely unscientific and irrational. Chanting of prayer appears to me · to be mere jingoism ·and observance of ritual, plain superstition. But my views about religion. my prejudices and my predilections, if they be such, are entirely irrelevant. So are – the views of the . credulous, the fanatic, the bigot and the zealot. So also the views of the faithful, the devout, the ·Acharya, the Moulvi, tile Padre and the Bhikshu each of whom may claim his as the only true or revealed religion. For our present purpose, we are concerned with what the people of the Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic of India, who have given each of its citizens Freedom of conscience and the' right to freely profess, practise. and propogate religion and who have given every religious denomination the right to freely manage its religious affairs, mean by the expressions 'religion' and 'religious . denomination'. We are concerned with what these expressions are designed to mean in Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Any Freedom or Right involving the conscience must naturally receive a wide interpretation and the· expression 'religion' and -!religious denomination' must therefore, be interpreted in no narrow, stifling sense but is a liberal, expansive way.
Etymology is of no avail. Religion is derived from 'religare' which means "to bind''. Etymologically, therefore, every bond betw,een two people is a religion, but that is not true. To say so is only to indulge in etymological de'ception. ·Quite obviously' , religion is· much more than a mere-bond uniting people.
Quite obviously, again, religion is not to be confined to the tr~ditional, established, well-known or popular religions like Hinduism, · Mahomedan_ism, Buddhism and Christianity. There
may be and, indeed, there are, in this vast country, several religions, less known or even unknown except in the remote corners or in the small pockets of the land where they may be practised. A religio.n may . not_ be ~wide-spread. It may have little following. It may
not have even a _ .name, as indeed . most tribal reli- gions do not have. We inay only describe them by adding the suffix 'ism' to the name of the founder-teacher, the tribe, the area or the deity. The nomenclature is not of the essence. Again, a band of persons, large or small, may not by said to be c
SUPRPME COURT REPORTS (1983) I S.C.R. adherents of a religion merely because they share some common beliefs and common interests and practise common rites and cere- moni~s; nor can pietistic recitation and solemn 1 ritual combine to produce religion, on that account only. Secret societies dedicated to secular tasks and indulging in queer oaths and observances, guilds and groups of persons who meet but to dine and wine but who subject their members to extravagant initiation cer.emonies, village and tribal sorcerers and coven of witches who chant, rant and dance in the most weird way possible are all far removed from religion. They appear to lack the, 'spiritual connection'. But, all this is unsatisfactory. We are not arriving at any definition of religion. We are only making periphereal journeys and not getting any nearer to the core of the problem presented to us.
Let us ·examine the relevant provisions of the Constitution for such light as they may throw on the meaning of the expressions 'religion' and ·religious denominat.ion'. They are not defined. The
word 'religion' does not occur in the Preamble to the Constitution, but the Preamble ·does promise to secure to its citizens "Liberty of thought, expression, belief, falth and worship". The Freedom of conscience and the Right to profess, propagate and practice religion, flow out of the idea so expressed in the Preamble,
In Part-III of the Constitution, under the bead "Right to Freedom of Religion", there are four Artiqles. Art. 25(i) guarantees to all persons, sµbject to public order,.morality and health and to the other provisions of Part-III of the Constitution, freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
Freedom of con- science is not to be separated from the Right to profess, practice and propagate religion. They go together and together they form part of'the Right to Freedom of Religion.
Clause ( 1) of Art. 25, however, stipulates that the freedom and the right guaranteed by . cl. (I) shall not prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting, any economic, financial, political or other secular · activity which may be associated with religious practice. or to pro- vide for social welfare and reform or to throw open ·Hindu religious institutions o(a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. So, the Article makes it clear that secular activity may be associated with Religion, though the guarantee o.f the article does not extend to such activity,
Art. 26 guarantees that every religious denomioa- tion or any section thereof shall have the right, subject to public . prder, morality and health, •to establish and maintain institutions for '–,,
j .•'– ;'"\ s.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) religious and charitable purposes,. to manage its own affairs in ' matters of religion, to own and acquire movable , and immovable property anci to administer ·such property in accordance with law. Art. 27 prohibits compulsion for payment of taxes for promotion of any particular, religion. Art. 28 bars religious instruction in any institution wholly maintained out of State funds and prevents com· p11lsion to attend any. religious instruction or religious worship in educational institutions tecognised by the State or receiving aid out · of State funds.
Apart from Articles 25 t<) 28, the word 'religion' occurs in Arts .. 15(1), 15(2), 16(2), 16(5), 23(2), 29(2) and 30 of the Constitu· ti on. Art. 15(1) prescribes that the State shall n\)t
~iscrlminate . against any ,citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Art. I 5(2) provides, ill particular, that no citizen shall, on ground only of re/iglo~, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, ·public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or the . use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or ·dedicated to the use of the general public.
Art. 16(2) guarantees that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible'for, or discriminated against in respect of, any· employment .or office under the State. Art. 16(5) exempts from the right guaranteed under Art. 16 the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shalf be a .person professing a · particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination. Art. 23(2), while enabling the. State to impose compulsory service for public purposes, prohibits the State from making any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.
c [1983) I S.C.R. Art. 29(2) provides that no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
Art. 30(1) guarantees to all minorities, whether based on religion or language the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. Art. 30(2) further provides that the State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discri· minate against any educational institutions on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or lan,guage.
It is readily seen that the several provisions of the Constitution where the expressions 'religion' and 'religious denomination' are used are either those which are concerned with equality and equal opportunity or those which are concerned with freedom of religion, Art. 15(1), Art. 16(2), Art. 23(2), Art. 29(2) are the several equality and equal
opportunity clauses of the Constitution which bar discrimination on the ground of religion, and they place religion in equation with race, caste, sex, place of birth, residence and language for the purposes o! the various aspe.cts of equality dealt with by them.
Art. 30 recognises the existence of minority groups based on religion along with minority groups based on language. Arts. 25 to 28 deal with the Right to Freedom· of Religion which, as we said earli~r is traceable to the idea . of "Liberty of Thought, Expression, Belief, Faith and Worship" in the Pream.ble to the Constitution.· ·Art. 25 guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion, but saves ·laws regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be a'8ociated with religious practice. Reading Art. 25 in the background of the proclamation regarding Liberty in the Preamble to the Constitution, we may safely conclude that the Constitution views religion, as comprising thought, expression, belief, faith or worship, as invol.ving the conscience and as something which may be professed, practised and propagated and which is any man's attribute in the sarne ma:nner a!) race, sex language, resideQce etc.
We also see that economic, financial, political or other secular activity may be. associated with religious practice though such activity is not covered by the guarantee of freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
So, the Constitution considers Religion as a J11atter of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, a matter S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Chinnuppa Reddy, J.) involving the conscience and a matter which may be professed, · practised and propagaied by anyone and which m_ay even have some . secular activity associated .with it.' We 1 have already s'aid that any Freed~m or Right involving the conscience must' naturally receive a wide interpretation and the expressions 'Religion' and 'Religious Denomination' must, therefore, be interpreted in nci narrow, stifling sense but in a liberal, expansive way.
How has the Court looked at the expression 'religion and · 'religious denominatio11' and how has the Court attempted to define them.? We begin with the ·well-known' Shirzir Mutt case where
Mukherjea J., speaking for himself and six of his colleagues, examin- ed the question in some detail and, of course, with great erudition. We must first notice that the Court, there, was considering the question of the vires of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1951 which was sought to be -made applicable to the institution, known as Shirur Mutt, one of the eight Mutts situated at Udipi and reputed to have been founded by Shri Madhwa Charya, the renowned exponent of 'dualistic thesim' in the Hindu Religion. The trustees and the beneficiaries of the Mutt, it was claim· and established, were the follo_wers of Shri Madhwa Charya. The question arose whether the spiritual fraternity constituted by the followers of Shri Madhwa Charya could be said to be a 'religious denomination' within the meaning of Art. 26, entitling them to manage tbei~own affairs in 'matters of reiigion'. The Court noticed · that while cl. (bl of Art. 26'guaranteed to a religious de'nomination the ·right to manage its own affairs in matters. of religion, other clauses of the Article dealt with the right of a religious denomination to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law.
The administration of its properly by a religious denominatia'n having thus been 1>laced on. a different footing from the right to manage its :own affairs in matters of religion, the Court said:
"The latter is a Fundamental Right whicli no legis- lature can take away, whereas, the fJrmer can be regulated by laws which the legislature can validly impose. It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to adminis- c
tration ·or properties belo'nging to a religious group or ff institution are not matters of religioq \q w.hi~h ~lause (b) o( the Article applies." ~tJPREMil COURT REPORTS (1983] I S.C.P.
Mukberjea, J., then proceeded to consider what ·were matters of religion "? H.e noticed that 'religfon' was a term which was hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. He rejected the definition given in Davis v. Benson as neither precise nor adequate and went on to say,
c "Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Buddhism .and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any
Intelligent First Cause. A 'religion undoubtedly ha' its basis.in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as COl)ducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief.
A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it ·might prescribe rituals and obser- vances, ceremonies and modes of worship .which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and
dress:" Mukherjea, J., accepted the following observations of Latham, CJ in Vide Adelaide Company .v. The Commonwealth('), as fully applicable to the protection of religion as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution-:
"It is sometimes suggested in discussions on the subject of freedom of religion that, though the civil Govern· men! should not interfere with religious opinions,. it never- theless may deal as it pleases with any acts which are done in pursuance of religious belief without infringing the princi- ple of freedom of religion. It appears to me to be difficult to mainta\n this distinction as relevant to the interpretation of section 116.
The section refers in express terms to the exercise of religion, and, therefore, it is intended to protect from the operation of any Commonwealth laws acts which are done in the exercise of religion.
Thus the section goes far beyond protecting' liberty of opinion. It protects also acts done in purs.uance of religious belief as part of religion." , (I) 67 CLR 116, 127. S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)
Mukherjea, J., thereafter, pointed out that freedom of religion under the India~ Constitution also- was not confined to' religious beliefs only, it extended to religious practices as well subject to the restric· .. tions which the Constitution itself had laid down.
Under Art. 26(b) he said, a religious denomiobtion or organisation enjoyed complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and cere, monies were. essential according· to the tenets of their religion they held and no _ouiside authority had any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.
But, he said, the scale of expenses to be incurred. in connection with the religious observances would be a matter of administration of property belonging to the religious .denomination and to be ~ontrolled by secular authorities in accordance with any law laid down_ by a compet_ent legislature. He added,
"It should be noticed, however, that under Art. 26 (d), it is the Fundamental Right of a religious denomination or its representative to administer its properties in accordance · with the law ; and the law, therefore, must leave the right of administration to the religious denomination itself, subject to such restrictions and regulations as it might choose to impose a law.which takes away the right of administration
from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vests it in any other authority, would amount-to a violation of fhe right guaranteed under cl. D of Art. 26". Mukherjea, J also considered the question whether the followers of Madhwacharya could be considered a _religious denomination and whether Sivalli Brahm ins constituted a section of that religious deno- mination. The meaning of the word denomination »"as- culled out from the Oxford Dictionary where it has been defined to mean "a collection of individuals classed together under the same name. a religious sect .or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name". Reference was then made to "a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded/ the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India at th~ present day"_. lt was emphatically stated that each one of such se:ts or sub,sects could certainly be called a religious deno- mination as it was designated by a distinctive name-in many· cases it was the name of the founde,.::__and had a· common faith·and common spiritual organisation. It was observed," the followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnobas, un· douhtedly constitute a religious
i;!eqo01iq~tion ; and SCI do th~ c r SUPRJ)MB COURT REPORTS [1983} J s.c: .. followers of Madhwacharya and oth.er[religious teachers. It is a fact well-estabiished by tradition that the eight Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the bene- ficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The
High Court has found that the Math in question is in charge of Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a section of the followers of · B Madhwacharya. As Art. 26 contemplates not merely a religious
denomination, but also a section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this article.". c · . So, iu the Shi~ur Mutt case, Mukherjea J expressed difficulty in defining the term 'religion' with exactitude, but explained it as some- thing founded upon beliefs or doctrines, regarded by those professing the religion as conductive to their spiritual well-being and attended by oractices and observances viewed by the religious ·community as integral to the religion.
Mukherjea J, however, found less difficulty in defining 'religious denomination· in the same terms as in the Oxford Dictionary. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The Stale of Bombay and 'Ors.(') was decided by five of the Learned Judges who constituted the Bench which decided the Shirur Mutt case.
What was said in the Shirur Mutt was reiterated and it was. again emphasised that religion was not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief and that it bad its outward expression in acts as well.
The following observations of Davar J, in Jamshedjee v. Sunnaba/(2) were approver\: "If this is the belief of the community, and it is proved undoubtedly to be the belief of the Zoroastrian community, -a secular judge is bound.to aecept that belief-it is not for.him to sit in judgment on that. belief, be is not right to interfere with the conscience of a donor who makes a gift in. favour of what he believes to be tbe advancement of his religio~ and. the welfare of bis community or mankind". I have stated almost at the outset :bat judges' faith or lack of faith in religion is irrelevant in deciding what .are matters of religion.
In the Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali & others(') the Court reiterated the position that the freedom guaranteed by Art: 25(1) was not oply the right to entertain such religious beliefs as (I) (I 954] SCR 1055.
°<2) ILR 33 Bombay 122. m [1962) 1 s:c.R. 383. s.t>. MiITAL v. uNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.i my appeal to .his conscience but also afforded him the right to exhibit. his belief in his conduct by such outward acts. as may appear to him proper in order io spread his ideas for the benefit of others. A note of caution was, however, struck and it was said that practices in order to qualify as matters of religion should be regarded . oy the said religion as its essential and integral par!. Otherwise; it. was pointed out, even purely secular practices which were not an essential or an integral part of religion were apt to be clothed. with a religious . form and stake a claim for treatment as religious practices • . , Mukherjea J's definition of 'religious denomination' in the Shirur Mutt case was also accepted and·the case was permitted to be argued on the broad and general groui;id that the Chishtia Soofies constituted either a religious denomination or a section of a religious denomi- nation.
In Tilkayat Shri Govindla/ji Maharaj v: The State of Rajasthan and prs.(1) the question .was whether the famous Nath Dwara Tempje was a public temple? It was held'that it was a public temple. It was a.ssumed that the followers of Vallabha constituted a religio.us denomination.
Jn Raja Virakishore v. State of Orissa('}-one of the arguments sought to be advanced before the Supreme Cour_t was that the wor· shippers of Lord Jagan J':lath constituted a religious denomination · and that the Shri Jagan Nath Temple Act, which took away the right of management from the denomination, contravened the Fundamen- ·tal Right guaranteed by Art. 26(d) of the Constitution. The answer of the State was that the temple did .not pertain to any particular sect, cult or creed of Hindus, but was a public temple above all sects; . cults and creeds and, therefore, it was not the temple of any parti· cular denomination. The Court however, did not permit the worship, pers to raise. the argument as the state cif pleadings were found to be defective.
In Sasti Yagnapurushad ji and Ors. v . .Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya and Anr.(') the question ·arose whether the Swa·minarayan sect followed a religion distinct and separate from the Hindu religion and whether, consequently, the temple belonging to the. sei:t was out· side the ambit of Bombay Hindu Places of Public Worships . (Entry (J) [1964] l S.C.R. 561.
<2l [196411 s.c:R. 32. (3) [1966] 3 SCR 242. c $UPIUlME CO!Jllt RliPOR'l'S [19831 I s.C.R. 'Ai1tborisation) Act? · Gajendragadkar, · CJ, on an exhaustive consi- 'deration of various Hindu Texts and th~ texts and history of the Swaminarayan sect, came to the conclusion that the Swaminarayan ·sect was not a religion, distinct and separate from the 'Hindu 'Religion.
'H It is obvious that religion, undefined by the Constitution, is ·incapable of precise judicial definition either. In the background of the provisions of the Constitution and the lig~t shed by judicial precedent, we may say religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of belief and doctrine. It concerns the conscience i.e. the spirit of man. It must be capable of overt expression in word and deed, such as, worship ·or ritual.
So, religion is a matter of belief and doctrine, concerning the human spirit, expressed overtly in the form of ritual and worship. Some religions are easily identifiable as religions, some are easily identifiable as not religions. There are many in the penumbra! region which instinctively appear to some as religion and . io others as not religicins.
There is no formula of general ap.plication. There 'is no knife-edge test. Primarily, it is a question of the consciousness of the community, how does the fraternity or sodality (if.it is permissible to use .the word without confining it to Roman ·Catholic groups) regard itself, how do others regard
the fraternity or sodality. A host of other circumstances may have to be considered, such as, the origin and .the history of the community, the beliefs and the doctrines pro· ·f~ssed by the community, the rituals observed by the community, what the founder, if any, taught, what the founder was , understood by-his followers to have taught, etc. In origin, the founder ~ay not have intended to found any religion at all. He may have merely protested against some rituals and observances; he may have dis- ,. agreed with the interpretation of some earlier religious tenets. What he said, what he preached and what he taught, his protest, his dis· sent, bis disagreement might have developed into a religion in the course of time, even during his life-time. He may be against religion iiself, yet, history and the perception of the community may make a religion out of what was not intended to be a religion and he may be hailed .as the founder of a new religion.
There are the obvious examples of Buddhism and Jainism and for that matter Christianity itself. Neither Buddha nor Mahavira, nor Christ ever thought of founding a new religion, yet three gr~at religions bear their names. Jf the word 'religion' is once explained, though with some difficulty, the expression 'religious. denomination' may be defined ·r
S.I'. MittAL v, UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) '/Si with less·difficulty. As we mentioned earlier Mukherjea J, borrowed . the meaning of the word-· denomination from the Oxford' Dictionary and adopted it to define religious denomination as "a collection of individuals classed together. under the same name, a religious sect cir body having a common faith and ·organisation and designated by a distinctive name". The followers. of Ramanilja, . the followers of · Madhwacharya, the followers of Vallabba, the Cbisbtia Soofies have been found -or assumed by the Court to be religious denominations. It will be noticed that these sects possessed no distinctive name except that of their founder-teacher and had no special organisatibn except a vague, loose-un·knit one. The really . distinctive· feature about.each one of these sects was a shared-belief in the tenets taught by.the teacher-founder.
We take care to mention.here that whatever the ordinary features of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not of equal importance and s'urely the common faith of the religious body is more imporiant than the other featu~es. It is, perhaps, necessary to say that judicial definitions are not statutory definitions, they are mere expla.nations, every word of which is not to be weighed in golden scales. Law has a tendency to harden with the passage of time and judicial pronouncements are made to assume the form of statutory pronouncements.·, So soon as a word or expression occur in the statute is judicially, defined, the tendency is to try .to interpret the language employed by the judges in the judicial .deli-·- . nition as if it bas been transformed into a statutory definition. That .is 'wrong;
Always, words and ~expressions to be· interprete·d. are Ill those employed in,tbe statute and .no.I those used by judges for . fel,icitous ,explanation,. Judicial definition, we repeat, is explanatory and not .definitive. One re.mark req~lres to be added here. _Religious ,·denomination.has not to '?we allegiance to any parent religion. The entire following of a religion may be no more than the religious denomination. This may particularly b~ so in the case of 'small · religious groups or .'developing' religions, that is, religions in the formative· stage.
We may now consider whether Aurobindoism-:if one may be excused for using the w<>rd 'Aurobindoism' to describe what Shri Aurobindo taught and practised arid-what he was understood\ by his .followers to have·taught and practised-was a religion and whether the followers of Shri Aurobindo could be cailed a religious denomi- nation.
Sbri Aurobindo was a poet, a savant, a -philosopher and a mystic. Was he or was be not a religious teacher ? '752 SUPREME cotJilt REPORTS [i983i I S.C.k. The Encyclopaedia Brittanica (1978 Edition) describes him as "seer, poet and Indian nationalist who originated the philosophy of cosmic salvation through spiritual evolution, a divine existence that will appear through the development of the "agnostic man" to usher in a transcendant spiritual age in which man and the universe are destined to become divine". The Encyclopaedia goes on to say, "he devoted himself for the rest of his life solely to the development,of his unique philosophy.
There (at Pondicherry) he founded an ashrama (retreat) as an international culturai centre for spiritual development, attracting students from all over the world. · The only requirement for entrance was a sincere ·wish to develop spiri- tually."
"According to Aurobindo's theory of cosmic salvation, the paths to. union with Brahman are two-way stree!s, or channels, Enlightment comes to man from above, while. the spirital mind (supermind) of man strives through yogic il!umination to reach up· ward from below.
When these two forces blend in an individual, agnostic man is created. This yogic illumination transcends both reason and intuition and eventually leads to the freeing of the indivi· dual from the bonds of individuality and, by extension all mankind will eventually .achiev~ mukti (liberation)".
"Thus, Aurobindo created a dialectic mode of salvation ·,not only for the individual but for all mankind. Energy of sacbidananda C'existence, thought, joy") comes down from Brahman (thesis) to meet energy frnm the supermind of man striving upward toward spirituality (antithesis) and melds in man to create a new spiritual . F
superman (synthesis).. From these evolved divine beings, a dMne universe also evolved." Ji . ·' Under the bead 'History of Hinduism'. Encyclopaedia Brittanica again refers to Au~obindo and says :
"Another modern teacher whose doctrines have had some influence outside India was Sri Aurobindo, who began his career as a revolutionary. He withdrew from politics, however, and settled in Pondicherry, then a French possession.
There he established an ashrama (a retreat) and achieved a high reputation as a sage. His followers looked on him as the first incarnate manifestation of super· beings whose evolution he prophesied, and apprently he did not discourage this belief.
After his death, the leadership of the Aurobindo Ashram was taken over by "the Mother", Mme Mira S.l•. MITTAL.v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) Richard, a F.rench-woman who ~ad ,beet; one of his leading dis-
ciples." The Encyclopaedia Brittanica refers to Aurobindo again under the head 'Idealism' and says : "Aurobindo, reinterpreting the Indian Idealistic heritage in the light of his own Western education, rejected the maya doctrine of illusion, replacing it with the concept of evolution, · aguring that the, . "illumination of individuals will lead to the emergence of a divine community", Aurobindo founded
the influential Pondicherry Ashram, a religious and philosophical community, and headed it until his death." The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1972 Edition) says, "Shri Aurobindo was an India!! metaphysician and
founder of new religious movement with head-quarters at Pondicherry-The religious movement associated with him has increased its following in India, and has made some converts in the West. …… · .. God muft 'descent' into human experience. , This illumination or-individual . will · 1ead to the emergence of a divinised community ………. · … Aurobindo produced a synthesis between , older Indian religious ideas and the world affirming attitudes.of Christian theism,"· _ The Dictionary of Comparative Religion says of Aurol:>indo : "According to Aurobindo, there is a progr~ssive evolu-
tion of the divine being through matter to higher spiritual forms, and the Aurobindo movement is l!eld to represent vanguard of this evolutionary process in our own times. Aurobindo practised and taught an 'integral yoga' in which meditative and spiritual exercises are integrated.., with physi- cal, cultural'and intellectual pursuits."
c Frederic Spiegelberg, in his book 'Living Religions of the World' refers to Shri Aurobindo : "We pass beyond specific religions to a synthetic vision of the religious impulse itself, a vision ,designed to
embrace all previous and future history all previous and future paths. · Sb.ri Aurobindo is a ma!1 worshipped by hundreds of thousands arid . respected . by c '?54 SiJPl!.aME COURt REMRTS
[1983] I S.C.k. millions ………… Jn his retreat at Pondicberry he is less the philosopher of Hinduism than the philosopher of religion in general, the voice of that which comparative religion leaves undisputed."
On the topic Religion, the Gazetteer of India, published by the Govt. of India, has this to say : "Sbri Aurobindo gave new interpretations of the vedas and The Vedanta, and in his Essays on the Gita, he expoun- ded what be called "the integral view of life". His great
work, the Life Divine, is a summing up of his philosophy of "the Descent of the Divine into Matter,:•. The importance of Sri Aurobindo's mission lies in his attempt to explain the true methods of Yoga."
It is clear from these extracts that the world and India treated and respected Shri Aurobindo as a religious teacher and the founder of a new religious movement whose principal thesis was the evolution or transformation of humanity into di_vinity through the practice of Integral Yoga. One may or may not accept Sbri Aurobindo's thesis or teaching, but, without doubt, it was unique ; without do.obi, it was novel ; without doubt, it bad never been so taught before. Shri Aurobindo first conceived the iheory of Ascent and Descent, invo- lution and evolution. He was the first expositor of the Integral Yoga. He expressly professed to depart from the Yoga of the _Gita and dissented from the Maya Vada.
Pedestrian minds like ours may not understand the niceties of the metaphysical exercises involved. we' do not desire to enter into any polemics over Shri Aurobindo's teachings as it is not within the judicial province 10 do so except to the limited exteni of finding out whether his teachings have the necessary spiritual content. to qualify as religious doctrine. and how his , followers understood those. teach.ings. So, we refrain from quoting Shri Aurobindo. But this fact s_tands out prominently that whatever else he was, he truly was a religious teacher and taught and was understood to have taught new religious doctrine and practice. I fail to see why 'Aurobindoism' cannot be classified, if not as a new religion, as a new sect of Hinduism and why the followers of Shri Aurobindo cannot be termed a religious denomination.
~···· . s.p. MITTAL v. UNION (Chinnappa-Reddy, J.) Sbri Aurobindo, of course, disclaimed that he was founding a · religion. No great religious teacher ever claimed that he was founding a new religion or a new school of religious thought. The question is not whether Shri Aurobindo refused to claim or denied that be was founding a new religion or. a new school of religious thought but whetherlbis disciples and the community thought so.
There is no doubt that they did, not only his disciples and followers, but religious leaders all the world over and of all faiths. If the .followers of Shri Aurobindo constitute a 'religious denomination', as, to my mind, they undoubtedly do, the members of Shri Aurobindo Society are certainly a distinct and identifiable • C .
section of the 'religious denomination'. The members of the society are followers and disciples of Shri Aurobindo.· The society was formed to preach and propagate the beliefs and ideals of Shri Aurobindo. The primary object or'the society was ··:ro mak~ known to the members of the public in general the aims and ideals of Shri Aurobind<i and the Moth.er,. their system of Integral Yoga and to work for its fulfilment in all possible ways and for the attainment of a spiritualised society as envisaged by' Sbri Aurobindo." It is nobody's case that this is not the principal. object of the society or that it is only a facade· for ·other activities. ·However, it was argued thai the Society had represented itself as, 'a non-political, non- religious organisation' and claimed exemption from income tax .on the ground that it was engaged in educational, cultural and scientific research: If the society consists of the disciples and followers of · Sri Aurobindo, if its primary object is to _profess, practise and propagat~ the sy.stem of Integral Yoga, and, if, therefore, it is a section of a religious denomination, the circumstance .that it is engaged in several secular activities and has represented itself to be a non: religious organisation for certail!. purposes cannot detract from the fact that it is a section of a religious denomination within the meaning of Art. 26
Therefore, we must bold, the Aurobindo __, Society is a section of a religious denomination within the meaning of the expression in Art. 26 of the .Constitution; But, the question is bas the Fundamental Right guaranteed
by Art. 26 been infringed by the Aurovi!le (Emergency Provisions) . Act, 1980. We have to notice straight away that the Act did not take away or purport to take away the management of the Shri Aurobindo Society. What ii did or purported to do was "to provide for the c
SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [l 983 l 1 s.c.i!.. taking over, in the public interest, of the management of Auroville for a limited period and for matters connected therewiih or incidental thereto." The Imig preamble says,
· "Whereas Shri. Aurobindo Society; a non-governmental organisation had· been a channel of funds· for the setting up of a cultural township known as Auroville, where people of different countries arc expected to live together in ·
harmony in one community and are expected to engage in cultural, educational, scientific and other pursuits aiming at human unity." x x x "AND W:HEREAS Auroville was developed as a
cultural township with the aid of funds received from different organisations in. and outside India as also from the substantial grants received from the Central and State Governments ;
AND WHEREAS pursuant to the complaints received with regard to the misuse of funds by Sri Aurobindo Society, a committee was set up under the chairmaoship of the Lieutenant-·Governor of Pondicherry with represen-
tatives of the Government of Tamil Nadu and of the Ministry of ·Home Affairs in the Central Government, and- the said committees had, after a detailed scrutiny, of the accounts of Shri Aurobindo Society, found
instances of serious irregularities in the management of the said~ Society, misutilisation of its funds and their diversion to other purposes ; AND WHEREAS in view of the serious difficulties
. which have arisen with regard to the management of Auroville, it is necessary to take over, for a limited period, the management, thereof and any delay in taking over the management of Auroville would be highly detrimental to
the interests and objectives of Auroville; The long preamble itself explains what , Auroville is. S. 3(c) of the . Act defines Auroville' as meaning "so much of the under- takings as form part of, or are relatablc to, the township which is known as Auroville and the charter of which proclaimed by the 'Mother' on the 23rd day of February, 1968".
ll ;, . S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) Now, the 'idea of Auroville was conceived by Madame M. Alfasse, affectionately and ·respectfully known to the dis.ciples and followers of Shri Aurobindo as the Mother. The idea of a cultural township which would promote internatipnal understanding .. and world peace had great appeal to the Government of India and-the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation · and they extended their support to the projecJ.
But, things ·turned out to be not so smooth-sailing after all. There was dissension among the membess of the Shri Aurobindo' Society. Things came to such a pass that the impugned Act was necessitated.
Misra J. has narrated t_he facts leading to the intervention of parliament. Parliament concerned itself with the managemeni of Auroville only ·and with no other activity of the Shrf Aurovindo Society, including 'its affairs in matters of religion'.
In fact, section 4(2) makes.it. explicit that, except for matters. relating to the management ·of Auroville, the provisions. of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, J.961, under which the Society was registered, shall continue to apply to the Society in the same manner as before.
Since the only activity of the Society which was touched by the Act was the management of Auroville, the question arises whether Auroville is an institution established and maintaine,i for religious and charitable purposes. and whether its management of Aurovilie is 'a matter of religion'. Auroville is a township and not a place of worship. It is a township dedicated, not io _the practice and propagation of any religi- ous doctrine but to promote internatio~al understanding and world peace, surely, a secular and not ·a religious activity. The highest that can be.said in favour of Auroville being a religious institution or its management being a· religious matter, is that it was conceived ·by the Mother and shaped and sculpted by Shri
Aurobindo's disciples and·followers in. the pursuit of one of the ideas and ideals of Shri Aurobindo, a great.religious teacher. On the other hand, the ideal itseif, that is, the promotion of internatfon~I undersianding and world peace is by no means a religious ideal and it was because of the nature of the ideal that the Government of India and the UNESCO adopted the project. Shri Aurobindo himself was not a mere religious teacher.
He was a visionary, a humanist and a nationali~t who bad blossomed into an internatfonalist. It appears, . therefore, that Auroville, though the child of the Mother and though nurtured by the devotees of Shri Aurobindo, bas an indivi- duality, d1Stinctly secular, of its own. The ~anagement of the International, cultural township of A_uroville is not, in our opinion,. a maller of religion.
We have mentioned earlier that laws regula- ting or restricting any economic, financial,· political or other secular c c i1983] I s.c.R. . activity which may be assoCiated with religious practice are excluded from the guarantee of freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
We have also pointed out that the administration of the property of a religious denomina- tion is different from the right of the religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion and that laws may be made which regulate the right to administer the property of a religious denomination. Questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or. institution are not matters of religion to which clause (b) of Art. 26 applies. It has been so decided in the Shirur Mutt case as well as other cases following it.
We are, therefore, of the view that the Auroville Emergency Provisions Act which provides for the taking over the management of Auroville for a limited period does . not offend the rights guaranteed by Arts. 25 and 2§ of the Constitution.
A passing reference was also made in the .co:irse of argument • to Arts. 29 ond 30 of the Constitution, and ii' was said that the rights guaranteed by those Articles were also infringed. We are entirely at a loss to understand how the, rights guaranteed by Arts.' 29 and 30 can be said to have
been infringed by the Auroville Emergency Provisions Act. No section of citizens having a culture of its owQ has been denied the right to conserve that culture and no religious minority has been denied the right to establish and to administer an educational institution of its choice.
On the several other questions ar,iued before us I accept the conclusion of Misra J. The Writ Petitions are accordingly dismi;sed but in the circumstances there will be no order regarding costs.
MISRA J. The first two petitions under Article 3 2 of the Cons- titution of India. filed in this Court and the third under Article 226 of the Constitution filed in the Calcutta High Court and later on transfeired to this Court, seek to challenge the vires of the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Or~inance, 1980 (Ordinance No. 19 of 1980); later on replaced by the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980 (Act No. 59 of 1980).
The fourth is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 21st of November, 1980 vacating the interim order passed by a Single Judge in the writ peiition.
All these cases raise common questions of constitutional importance and, therefore, they were posted before the Constitution Bench. S.P. MiTTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) Man as a rational being, endo~ed with a sense of freedom and responsibility, does not remain satisfied with bis materi.al existence. He wants to know and realise the meaning of his life. It is this perennial urge in man that inspires him to indulge in great creative activities.
He creates great cultures and civilisations and tries to realise the meaning and value of life in and through them, To the biologist life is indefinable. It cannot be defined in terms of any things. The biologists have, however, explained and illustra- ted characteristics of life.
But no formulation of the nature and characteristics of life has won general acceptance. It!means that the insignia of life have not as yet been comprehended fully. Life has not been viewed in its proper perspective. It still seems to be a riddle, a mystery.
Life appears' to be a 'mystery- not only to the scientists but also to the philosophers. Philosophers may be said to be rather more conscious of the difficulties that the concept of life involves than the scientists. A philosopher is also aware of the fact that unless one is able to fathom the depths of life and has ·a full comprehension of it.s nature, one canno,t understand and determine the .nature of huinan personality·and its destiny.
Similar other deeper and ultimate problems of life have been agitating the mind of seers and philosophers viz., Where did the world come from ? Was i.t created or evolved? Is there any unity
in i:liversity ? Each thinker tried to solve the ultimate problems in his own way. By and large they believed there is a real creative force behind the process of the world. Some called it as God, the . others as ultimate truth, the conscience.
According to some the objects, if left to themselves, would remain motionless and for their initial movement they must have required some external agency wbicli might have set tbe·universal ball rolling.
In early ages when man knew little about ·the laws of nature, he attributed all changes in nature to certain agencies, which due partly to. bis egocentric way of viewing things and partly to his conscious or sub-conscious awareness of the supremacy of man in the whole hierarchy of things in nature, were conceived after the image of man. Later on, in view of the supremacy of kings in all walks of iife and their services to society, these unseen migqty agencies were fashi~ned · specifically after them.
Since God was conceived to be the supreme among such agencies. He naturally was sought to be represented by the supreme among kin{ls. Thus anthropomorphism, i.e. the idea of c [1983 j 1 S.C.il.,
God in terms of human figure is partly due to ignorance and partly due to the influence of uncommon persons in the society. During 18th and 19th centuries the entire scientific thought sought to explain the universe mechanically and strived to do away with God completely. If it allowed anythiog like God to enter its universe at all, it did so only after transforming Him into a mechani- cal principle.
c Later on with the formulation of the theory of relativity this isolationist view of things has given way to one of mutual related· ness of each object to every one else. Recognition of the immense
potentiality of dynamism inherent in the mutual relatedness of objects in the universe has precluded the necessity of an extra-cosmic or metaphysical principle, such as the God of Aristotle who was supposed to have existed prior to the beginning of the world, and given it the first stroke of movement resulting in continuous motion ever since.
Thus, the idea of God has led to more or less its adjustment to fresh acquisition of knowledge in each epoch. A view of God which fails to do that tends to become discarded in favour of a new one. If it fails to keep pace with the expanding horizon of knowledge, it begins to lose its ground and shrink into a mere c'ult of only histori- cal importance, it becomes fossilised and is liable to crumble at the vital touch of the present.
Our scriptures proclaimed from the very start that there is only one reality in the world which is described in different ways ; One of such Indian sages and philosophers was Sri Aurohindo. He was born on August 15, 1872 in Calcutta.. When he was barely seven years old he was taken to England for education. In view of his amazing ability in learning languages he was offered scholarship to join Kings College, Cambridge. There he distinguished himself by his extraordinary abi)ity to compose Greek and Latin verses. He
is said to have won all the prizes for the year in Kings College_ for Greek and Lati11 verses. He sailed for lndia.i11 1893 and settled down'at Baroda., He se~ved in several capacities in Baroda State, sometimes as an administrator and at others as Professor of French, and Engli~h. During his stay there he learnt Sanskrit
.. J.. S.P: MITT AL. v. UNION {Misra, J.) The years from 1902 to 1910 w~re ~tormy ones for Sri Aurobindo as he embarked on a course of accion to free India from British rule. ·As a result of his political activities and revolutionary literary efforts he was sent to jail in 1908. Two years -later he fled from British India to refuge in the French Mandate of Pondicherry (modern Pondicherry) in· South-East India.
He took a decision to give up all polit.ical activities so as to concentrate himself with the life of meditation and yoga at Pondicherry. Madam M. Alfassa; a French Lady, who came to be known as
'The Mother' became a disciple of Sri Aurobindo .. Very soon more and more disciples came to join him from various parts of India and abr.oad and thus 'the Ashram' came into being. The disciples and devoted followers of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother with a view to propagate and practise the ideals and beliefs of Sri Aurobindo form- ed a Society called Sri Aurobindo Society in the year 1960. ·The petitioner Society at aJl material. times was and is still a Society duly registered under the provisions of the West Bengal Societies Regis- tration Act, 19.61. This Society is completely distinct from Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicherry .. The Society was established and registered for the purpose of carrying out inter alia the following objects in and outside India :
(i) To make known to the members of the public in gene- ral the aims and ideals of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, their systeiJ of integral yoga and to work for its fulfilment in · all possible ways and for the attain-
ment of a spiritualised · society as envisaged by Sri Aurobindo; (ii) To Train selected students and teachers from all over . the world in the integral system or education i.e., spiri- tual, psychic, inental, vital and physical ;
(iii) To help in cash and/or kind by way of donations, c gifts, subsidies and in also other ways in the all round ~evelopment of Sri· Aurobindo International Centre of Education and to help.similar centres of education ;
.(iv) To establish study groups, libraries, Ashrams and other institutions, centres, branches and. societies for study and practice of integral yoga of Sri Aurobilido a~d the. Mother and to help th~ ~l(i~tin~ ones·;
c SlJPRBME COURT REPORTS (1983] I S.C.R •. (v) To establish cen)res of physical culture, sports ·and volunteer organisations for inculcating and promoting the spirit of discipline, co-operation and service to
others and to undertake activities for promotion of health and bodily perfection : (vi) To organise, encourage, promote and assist in the study, research and pursuit of science, literature and
· fine arts ; (vii) To' enquire, purchase, build, construct or take on lease or in exchange or .hire any movable or immovable pro- perty, or gifts' or privileges ; and (viii) Generally to do all other acts, deeds and things neces- sary, conductive, suitable or incidental to or for the
attain.men! of the above objects or any of of them or· part of them. The management of the Society vested in its Executive Com- mittee. Rules and regulations have been duly framed for the manageinent of the Society and .also for safe custody and protection of its assets, properties and funds.
Sri Autobindo Society (hereinafter referred to as 'the Society') preaches and propagates the ideals and teachings of Sri Aurobindo inter alia through its numerous centres. scattered throughoui India by way of weekly meetings of its members.
The Mother as the founder-president also conceived of a pro- ject of setting up a cultural township known as 'Auroville' where. people of different countries are expected to engage in cultural, educational and scientific and other pursuits aiming at human unity. The Society has been .a channel of funds for setting up the cultural township known as A.uroville.
At lhe initiative of the Government of India, the United· Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation being of the opinion that the Auroville project would contribute· to internatiqnal understanding and promotion of peace sponsored the .project by proposing a resolution to this effect at its General Conference in .. 1966. · This resolution was
unanimously adopted ~at this Conference. !3y a further resolution passed 'in 1961 the UNESCO .····~ ·s.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.). invited it/m~mber S;ates and international non-governmental organi~ sations to ·participate in the development of Auroville ·as an inter.- national cultural township to bring together the values of different cultures and civilisations in a harmonious environment with integ- rated living standards whiCh correspond to man's physical anJ spiritual needs.
1970 UNESCO had directed its Director-Geoeral to take such steps as may be feasible, within tile budgetary provisions to promote the development ·of Auroville as an important international cultural programme. Sri Aurobindo Society received large funds in the shape of grants from different organisations in India and abroad for development of the township. The assistance included contribu- tions from the State Governments of the value of Rs 66.50 lakhs and the Central Government of the value of Rs. 26:14 lakhs. After the death of the Mother: on 17th of. November 1973 a number of problems of varying nature affecting the smooth running of the project cropped up. 'The Government. of India on recdving complaints about mismanagement of the project and misuse of funds by Sri Aurobindo . Society set up a committee under the chairman· ship of the Governor/ of Pondiche~ry with representatives· of the Government of Tamil •Nadu and of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Central Government to look into the matter. The committee made ·a detailed scrutiny of the accounts of Sri Aurobindo Society relating to Auroville and found instances of serious irregularities in. the. manegement of the Society, misutilisation of _its funds and their diversion to other purposes.
Further, various other serious difficul- ·ties had arisen plaguing the management of Auroville and rendering . thereby any further growt_h of the township almost impossible in the circumstanc~s that taking over the management of Auroville became imperative to ensure growth of the township
in tune with its objectives. 'Keeping· in view the international character of the project arid considering. the government's .involvement in actively sponsoring the project through UNESCO, ·the growth and management of the pro- ject had become the primary responsibility of the Government of India.
The ideals of the project formed India's highest aspirations, which could not be allowed to be defeated or frustrated. Sri Aurobindo Society had lost complete control over the situation and the members of the Auroville ap·proached the Government of India to give protection against oppression and victimisation at tho hands of the said Society. There were internal quarrels between the various factions of Sri Aurobindo Society.
There have also been instances SU.PREME COU.RT REPORTS (1983) I S.C.R. of law and order situation. Financial management til'tbe pro.iect bas not been sound arid several instances of mismanagement,
diversion of funds have been revealed. A large sum of money was given by Sri Aurobindo Society to A URO Construction-an agency whose status is not at all defined, whose functions and capabilities for taking up large construction works also had not been made known. The Government in the circumstances could not be a · silent spectator to the mismanagement of the project and interecine quarrels amongst its members, which if riot checked could lead to the destruction of the project so nobly -conceived. The Government, therefore, decided to issue a Presidential Ordinance. After the filing of the writ petition the ordinance has now been replaced by the Auroville ~Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980.·
The constitutional validity of the Act has been challenged on four grounds : I. Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the impugned statute. 2. The impugned Act infringes Articles 25, 26, 29 and 30
of the Constitution. 3. The impugned Act is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution ; and 4. The Act was ma/a fide. We take up the first ground first. According to Mr. Soli Sorabj.e, counsel for petitioners, the Auroville (Emergency Pro- visions) Act, !980, hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act, is a law relating to. a ·matter in the State Legislative List and is; therefore, beyond the legislative competence of Parliament, hence, unconstitutional and void.
The impugned Act, according to him, provides for taking over the management of Auroville for a limited period from the Society. The management of Aurovillc was prior to the impugned Act vested in the Governing Body/Board of
Trustees of the Society under the Provisions of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act and memorandum and rules and regula- tions of the Society, as is evident from section 5(5) of the impugned Act itself.
The society was registered under the Societies Registra- tion Act, 1860 but after the enforcement of the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 the Society was deemed to be s.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.)
765. registered under that Act. The West Bengal Societies Registration Act (for short 'the West Bengal Act') contains specific provisions to deal with' the Society adequately. Sections 22 and 23 of the West Bengal Act empower the Registrar of the Societies to call for an information or explanation relating to the management of the affairs of any society registered thereunder and also to investigate into the affairs of the society, if there were circumstances suggesting that the so~iety was guilty of mismanagement of its affairs or of any unlawful·fact. The ·Registrar has also the power to prosecute and punish those persons found guilty of mismanagement. Under section 26 of the Act a society is also liable to be dissolved by the order of the Registrar on the ground inter. a/ia of mismanagement. Obviously, therefore, the West Bengal Act contains inbuilt self- contained provisions for dealing with the mismanagement of the registered societies.
The' West Bengal Act is .a legislation exclusively relatable to Entry 32 of List II of Seventh Schedule. The provisions of the West Bengal Act apply to the Society as is eviderit from section 2(f)' and (g) of the impugned Act.
Section 4(2) of the impugned Act, however, excludes the application of certain provisions of the West Bengal Act to the Society and decl11;res that the provisions of the West Bengal Act will. continue to .apply to the Society subject -h?wever, to such exclusions.
Section 8(2) provides that on relinquishment of management by the Central Government the management of the property of the Society forming part or relatable to Auroville shall vest. in· the o·overning Body of the Society and shall,be carried on in· accordance with the provisions 0fthe West Bengal Act.
Section ·!I of the impugned Act gives over-riding . effect to the impugned ·Act over all other Acts (including the West Bengal Act) and instruments• thereunder. Therefore, the object and purpose of the impugned ·Act . is to take away the management of Auroville from the Society and to bring it ·under the management of the Central Government under the provisions of the impugned . Act.
This process necessarily involves during the_ takeover .Period. the suspension of the provisions of the West Bengal Act and the memorandum and rules in · so· far ·as they are applicable to the management of the Auroville by the Society. Consequently, the impugned Act for a limited period abrogates, suspends or temporarily repeals certain provisions of the West Bengal Act or in other words the State Act is pro tanto overborne by the Central Act. Therefore, the question arises whether Parliament has legislative competence to repeal, permanently or temporarily, cany provisions of the West c
SUPRllME COUllT REPORTS [ 1983 J I s.c.i!. Bengal Act which is a law made by the State Legislature in the exercise of its exclusive legislative competence under Entry 32 of the State Legislative List.
c It was contended for the petitioners that the legislature has no authority to repeal statutes which it could not directly enact. The power to repeal or alter_ the statute is co-extensive with ·the power of direct legislation of a legislative body. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision in Attorney General for 0!_llario v. Attorney General for the Dominion('). The Parliament has no competence to enact the West Bengal Act, and therefore it had no power to repeal the provisions of the West Bengal Act by the impugned Act. Inasmuch as the Parliament has sought to repeal or override certain provisions of the West.Bengal Act which are referable to Entry 32 _in List II, and are exclusively within the competence of the State Legislature, the impugned Act by Parliament is without legislative competence and hence void. It was further contended for the petitioners that the proper . approach to the question is to see if the impugned legislation·is covered by any of the entries in list II of the Seventh Schedule. It is not at all necessary to probe into the question as to whether the impugned legislation can be covered by any of the entries of List I or List Ill of the Seventh Schedule. Reliance was placed on the Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon(') wherein the following propoaition was laid down :
"It seems to us that the best way of dealing with the question of the validity '!f tile impugned Act and with the contentions of (he parties is to ask ourselves two questions, first, is the imp~ned Act legislation with respect to entry 49 List II ? and secondly, if it ,is not, it is ·beyond the legislative competence of Parliament ?
The positive case of the petitioners is that the subject matter of the impugned Act is covered by entry 32, List II of the Seventh Scbed.ule. The Solicitor General for .the Union of India, however, tried to bring the impugned Act within the four comers of item 44, List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
It may be pointed out at the· very outset that the function of the Lists is not to confer powers. They merely demarcate the (!) [1896) I A.C. 348@ 366-67. (2l (1972] 2 SCR 33@45. S.P. MI1TAL 1'. UNION (Misra, J.)
legislative fields. The entries in the three Lists are only'. legislative heads or fields of legislation ana the power to legislate is. giv.en to aporopriate legislature ,by Articles 245 and 248 of the Constitution. It would be appropriate at this stage to read· entry 32, Lilt ·n and entry 44, List I of the Seventh Schedule:
Entry 32, List II "Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corpora~ lions, other than those specified ih List I, and universities ; \ unincorporated' trading, literary, scientific, religious and other socie.ties and associations ; co-operative societies."· Entry 44, List I :
"Incorporation, regulation and winding up . of corporations, whether ·trading or not, with objects not confined to one State, but not including universities." For tne petitioners, however, it was urged that th~ registration of the Society under the West Bengal Act does not make· it a corporation. – Halsbury's Laws of England,· 3rd Edn., Vol. 9; p. <I, ·deals with corporations in .. the folio.wing term~ :
"A corporation aggregate has been defined as a collec- . tion of individuals ·united into on·e body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the law with
the capacity of acting in several respects . as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations and of suing and being sued, of enjoying . privileges and immunities in common;. and of exercising
a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of the instituiion or the powers conferred upon it, either at the tim~ of the creation or at any subsequent period o( its existence."
A corporation has, therefore; only one capacity, namely, the corporate capacity~ On an analysis it would appear that the essential elements in the legal ·concept of a corporation are: (I) a_ continuous identity, i.e., the original member or members or his or their successors are one, (2) the persons . to be incorporated, (3) the name by which the persons are incorporated, (4) a piace, and c·
SUPREME cOURT RBPO\l.TS (1983] 1 S.C,R. (5) words sufficient in law to show incorporation. In law the indi· vidual !ncorporators are members of which it is · composed or something wholly different from the corporation itself, for a corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual. A corprJration aggregate can express its will by deed under a common seal.
The Society was registered, as stated earlier, under the Societies Registration Act and later on was deemed to be registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961. Whether such a regis· tered society can be held to be a corporation in the light of the functions of a corporation quoted above ? In the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College v. The Stale of Delhi and Ors.(') it was held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act may have the characteristics which are analogous to some of the characteristics of a corporation but is not a corporation. As it is not incorporated and remains an unincorporated society, therefore, it must come under the second part of entry 32 of List II. Reliance was placed in this case on Taj]' Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Servants.(') The petitioners also rely on Katra Educational Society v. State 'of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.(') In that case also the appellant was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 21 bf 1860, which conducts an educational institution styled 'Dwarka .• Prasad Girls Intermediate College' at Allahabad. The management of the affairs of the society was· entrusted by the memorandum of . association to an executive committee whose membership was con· fin~d to the members of the society .. The I~termediate Education Act was subsequently passed by the State Legislature. Section 8 of the Act authorised the State Government to promulgate regulations in respect of matters covered. by sections 16A to 161 of the Act. The Regional Inspector of Girls Schools called upon the society to submit and get approved a scheme of administration of the institution managed by it. The sections were later on modified by subsequent . . amendment. The society challenged the Act on the ground that It was beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature inasmuch as in substance it sought to substitute'lhe provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a field of legislation which was exclusively wifhin the competence of Parliament and in any case the Act in so far as it affected the powers of the trustees of charitable institutions (I) [1962] Suppl.I SCR 156.
(2) [1900) AC 426. (3J '(1966] 3 SCR 328, _ __.. i. $.P. MITIAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) could not be enacfed without conforming to the requirements of Article 254. The contention was repelled and ·it was held by this Court, relying on the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College v. The State of Delhi (supra) that by registration under the Societies Registration Act a .society does not acquire corporate status. It cannot also be said that the pith and substance of the Act relates to charities or charitable institutions or to trusts or trustees. It was further held that the true nature and character of the Act falls within ·the express legislative power conferred by. entry 11 of List II and mer~ly because it ·incidentally trenches upon ·or affect_s a charitable institution or the powers of the trustees of the institution, it will . not on that account be beyond the legislative authority of the Siate Legislature.
As the Society is an unincorporated society, says the coun~I for petitioners, the impugned Act does not and cannot fall un!er entry 44 of List I 6f the Seventh Schedule and it would fall ui<!er entry' 32 of List II ·of the Seventh . Schedule and once it is coverel by entry 32 of List Il,.it is not at all necessary to examine whet~r it may or it may not fall in other 'two lists of the schedule. On the other hand, the stand of the Union of India a~ . .veil as of the interveners, . is that the first p.frt of entry 32 of Listfl is not attracted as the subject matter of the impugned Act is not ~corpora tion, regulation or winding up of a corporation. It has . .Oly taken over the management of Auroville from the Society ,for a short period In respect 'or the property .. Auroville, of which ne manage- ment has been taken over by the Central Governmnt under the impugMd Act means so much of the undertaking as folli. part of or relatable to the cultural township which is known a•Auroville and the charter of which was proclaimed by the Mother rJ 25th day of February, 1968 .. The property of Auroville is sitttted not in West Bengal but in Pon di cherry in Tamil Nadu. The foo1that the Society, which Was registered under the West Bengal Act, lw .been a channel of funds for the setting up of the cultural townsbP of Auroville and has been managiqg some aspects of Aurovill. does not bring Auroville under the domain of the West Benp'I Act. The right of management of property is itself a property ri11i. '
The Solicitor General also tried to brio the subject matter of the impugned legislation under various otherintries of List I or List III of the Seventh Schedule viz., entries 10, p, 41 and 42 of List Ill and en!fy 10 of List I. But it is not nec~ary for us to examine c
SUPREMB COURT REPORTS (1983) I s.C.1<. whether the subject matter of the impugned. legislation falls under any of the entries of List I or List III if once we hold · that the·· sub· ject matter does not fall within the ambit of any of the entries of .List II. Even if the subject matter of the impugned legislation is not· covered by any specific entry of List .I or List }II, it will be covered by the residuary entry 97 of List I.
In our ·opinion the impugned Act even incidentally· does not trench upon the field covered by.the West Bengal Act as it is in n·o. way related to constitution, regulation and ·winding up of the Society In R. C •. Cooper v. Union(') it was laid down that a law relating fo the business of a corporation is not a Jaw with respect to regulation of a corporation.
. Having heard the··counsel for the parties, .our considered opinion is that the subject matter of the impugned Act is not covered . by entry 32 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. · Even if the· subject matter of the impugned Act is not covered by any specific· entry of .. List I or III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution it would in any case be covered by" the residuary entry 97 of List I. The_· · Parliament, ~herefore, had the legislative competence to enact the · impugned Act.
\. – This leads us to the. second' ground· of attack, namely, the impugned Act is violative of Articles 25, 26; 29 and 30 of the Cons- – titution. Article 25( I) confers freedom· of conscience and the right freely ·to profess, practise and propagate religion.
Of course, this right is F •.. subject to'public order, morality and health and to the other Articles ···of Part III of the Constitution. Sub-clause (2) of this Article, however, provides that nothing in this Article snail affect the opera- tion·. of'any existing law or preve1a the State from :making any law-'
I G I (a) ~egu!a"ti~g "or restricting any efonomic·, fln~ncial, politi· cal or other secular activity which may be associated '·with religiouS practice ; 1: H . (b} providing for socia1 welfare ancl reform or "the throw·. · ing .. open of Hindu religious' institutions of a public. character to all classes and sections ·or Hindus.
—— . U) [1970)3 SCR S30 ((!) S63. ……. – ….. . S.P. MITIAL v. uNiON (Misra, J.) 77i Article 26 confers on every religious denomination or•·any section thereof, subject to public order, morality and health, the right-
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;. (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion ; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property ;
· and . (d) to administer such property in accordance with law . … -… _ In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is 'necessary to know the implication of the words 'religion·-·and 'reli- gious denomination'. – The word 'religion' has not been defined in the Constitution and indeed it is' a term which is hardly susceptible of any~ rigid definition.
In repljr to a question on Dharma by Yaksha, Dharmaraja Yudhisthira said thus : <l'!>lssrftr<e, ~ f!ff'1""!T il<F! 'll:f~ 1la' srirr"l'{ · 1 "Tli~ m<i f~a' ~t 'l~l!T itll '10: ij' <RT 11
Mahabbarta-Aranyakaparvan 313: 117. (Formal logic is vascillating; Srntis are -contradictory. .There is no single rishi whose opinion is final. The principle o(Dharma is hidden in a cave. The path of_Jhe virtuous
persons is the only proper course.) The expression 'Religion' has, however, been sought to be defined in the 'Words and Phrases', Permanent Edn., 36 A, p. 461 onwards, as given below :
"Religion is morality, with a sanction drawn from a · future state of rewards and punishments . The term .'religion' and 'religious' in ordinary usage are not rigid concepts. c ?72
c SUPRBM B COURT REPORTS {1983] f s.c.a. 'Religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of re- verence for his being and character, and of obedience to bis· will.
The word 'religion' in the primary sense (from 'religare, to rebind-bind back), imports, as applied to moral ques- tions, only a recognition of a conscious duty to obey restraining principles of conduct. In such sense we suppose there is no one who will admit that he is without religion. 'Religion' is bond uniting man to God, and . virtue
whose purpose is to render God worship due him as source of all being and principle of all government of things. 'Religion' has reference to man's relation to divinity ; fo the moral obligation of reverence and worship, obedience and submission, It is the recognition of God as an object
of worship, love and obedience ; right feeling toward .God, as highly apprehended. 'Religion' means the services and adoration of God or a god as expressed in forms oJ worship ; an apprehension,
awareness, or conviction of the existence of_ a Supreme · Beirig ; any system of faith, doctrine and worship, as the Christian religion, the religions of the Orient ; a particular system of faith or worship.
The term 'religion' as used in tax exemption law, simply includes : (I) a belief, not necessarily referring to supernatural powers ; (2) a cult, involving a gregarious association openly expressing the belief; (3) a sysiem of
moral practice directly resulting from an adherence to the belief ; and ( 4) an organization within the cult designed to observe the tenets or belief, the content of such belief being of no moment.
While ~religion' in its broadest sense includes all forms of belief in the existence of superior beings capable of exer- cising power over the human race, as commonly accepted it means the formal
recognition of God, as members of societies and associations, arid the term, ·a religious pur- pose', as used in the constitutional provision exempting from taxation property used for religious purposes, means
. •· t ' -………::_. S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) the use of property by a religious society or body of persons as a place for public worship. 'Religion' is squaring human life with superhuman life.
Belief in a superhuman power and such an adjustment of human activities to the requirements of that power as may enable the individual believer to exist more happily is com-· mon to all 'religions'. The term 'religion' has reference to one's views on bis relations to his creator, and to. the obli- gations they impose of reverence for his being and character and obdience to his will.
The term. 'religion' has reference to one's views of bis relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. With man's relations to his Maker and the
obligations he may think they impose, and the manner in. which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with.''
These terms have also been judicially considered in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Muit(') where in the following proposition of law have been laid down :
·(I) Religion means "a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as con- ducive to their spirituaI·well-!'eing". (2) A religion is not merely ·an opinion, doctrine or ·belief. It has its outward expression in acts as well.
(3) Religion need not be theistic. c ,D ( 4) "Religious denomination" means a religious sect or body having a common faith and organisation and designated by a distinctive name. (5) A law which takes ·away the rights of admfoistration
from the hands of a religious denomination altogether (1) [1954] SCR 1005. c SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1983] i s.c.R. and vests in another authority would amount to violation of the right guaranteed under clause (d) of
Art. 26." The aforesaid propositions have been consistently followed in later cases including The Durgah Committee, Ajmer cl Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali & Ors.(') and can be regarded as well settled. The words "religious denomination" iii Article 26 of the
Constituiion must take their colour from the word 'religion' and if this be so, the expression "religious denomination" must also satisfy three conditions : (1) It must be a collection of individuals who have a
'system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their· spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith ; '(2) common organisation ; and (3) ·designation by a distinctive name.
Jn view· of the propositions laid down by the Court in the aforesaid reported cases we have to examine the teachings of Sri Aurobindo to ·see whether they constitute a ·religion. It will be appropriate at this stage to succintly deal with the teaching of Sri Aurobindo.
According to Sri Aurobfodo there is a divine consciousness pervading the .whole universe. A portion of this consciouness by a process of involution through various planes has finally resulted in the formation of tlie physical world, namely the stars, the planets, the earth and. so on. Then came the reverse process of. evolution i.e., from stone to plant, from plant to animal, from animal to man or in other words from matter to life, from life to mind and so on. . This evoluti0n will not stop with man who is only a transitional species. The evolution would· go further transforming man into superman and the mind into supermind.
The superman according to Sri Aurobindo would be totally different from man as man from animal and animal from plant. In this transformation back to all prevading divine consCiousness in which man would become super- . man, man woµld lose his present character of body, vital and mind. His body would become a body of light, his vital a vital.of light and his mind a. mind of light.
(I) [1962] 1 SCR 383, 410-11, • …. r • ' ._ s.P. Ml1TAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) This transformatio_n, or evolution of man into superman is bound to take· place but in the course of thousands of years, This process, however, according to Sri Aurobindo can be accelerated by the practice of ··integral yoga. His theory of this transformation consists of two aspects :
(a) An inner ascent of the consciousness to the Divine. (b) A descent of Divine consciousness in the mind, vital and body . The distinctive feature of Sri Aurobindo's yoga is that it is universal. Any one born in any part of the world, born of parents professing any religion can accept his yoga.
In short, he originated the philosophy of· cosmic salvation .through spiritual evolution. Divine existence that will appear through the development . of the agnostic man will usher into a transcendental spiritual age in which man and universe are destined to become divi~e.
. Thus, according to Sri Aurobindo's theory of cosmic salvation the paths of union with Brahman are .two way streets or channels. Enlightenment comes to man from above while the spiritual. mind (supermind), of man strives through yogic illumination to reach up, wards from below.
When these two forces blend in an individual agnostic man i.s created. This yogic ·illumination tran'scends both reason and intuition and eventually leads to the fre~ing. of the individual from the hands of individuality and by exclusion of all mankind, will eventually achieve Mukti or liberation. Sri Aurobindo created a dialectic mode of salvation not only for individual but for all ~ankind. Energy or Sachidananda (existence, consciousness and joy) comes down from Brahma to meet energy from the supermind of man striving upwards towards his spirituality (antithesis) and -melts in man to create a new spiritual superman (synthesis). From
ihese divine _beings a divine u·niverse is also evolved. The Divine, though One, has two aspects-oiie is static and the other dynamic. The dynamic side of the Divjne is the ·energy· or the creative side.
People in the past ·realised only the static aspect of the DiVine and did not know much of the dynamic side as it is much more difficult to realise it. For this reason, the purpose of the
creation was not understood by them.and they declared the world to be futile and deceptive. That means eithe.r the., Divine was unable to make a perfect world and He had no purpose iii the creation or c
_e 'A c [1983] I s.c.R. man has not been able to understand the same. Sri Aurobindo's yoga gives the full experience of both the aspects of the Divine, that is why he calls his Yoga the Integral Yoga or the Perfect Yoga. Sri Aurobindo says the Divine is real and 'His creation is bound to be real. He has shown to the world the purpose of the creation and has declared that the world is still in an imperfect condition passing through the transitory period towards its perfection.
Man is a creature of this world and he cannot know much of things other than this world. He has, however, a capacity in himself to develop to the next stage of evolution because Nature cannot stop with imperfect results and the present humanity must evolve further_ till the final perfection is obtained.
We look at things and happenings from· the outer surface, having no knowledge whatsoever of the real causes and effects, the different forces and influences of the s_ubtle worlds working behind them. We can see and· feel 'only the results on the material plane and nothing more. Our senses have a very limited scope and they can give· us the knowledge of the things which can only materialise. But in fact that is not all that we are. We have another part in ourselves which is veiled by the external consciousness and we call that as our soul- the spark of divinity within ; which is one everywhere-the true self. As our sense give us the knowledg~ of the external things by directing our consciousness outwardly, in the same way if we can direct our consciousness inwardly and rise into the inner conscious- ness, we can know the things of the higher worlds and go beyond the limitation of our physical sense, then only can we have the true ·knowledge of this .world and the worlds beyond and that practice is called 'Yoga'.
The meaning of the word 'Yoga' is to join-join our external consciousness with our true self. According to Sri Aurobindo, lrumanity is under the sway of dark and ignorant forces and that is the reason for human sufferings, disease and death-all the signs of imperfection. It is cl•ar that man has to progress towards a Light which brings knowledge, power, happiness, love, beauty and even physical immortality. The Divine is the essence of the whole universe and to realise and possess Him should_ be the supreme aim of human life. To acquire all the qualities of the Divil)e is
IQ~ final purpose of Nature's evolution . .r S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) The soul progresses by gathering experience in the ordinary life but it is a very long, slow and devious process from birth to birth. Yoga hastens the·soul's development. The progress that can be made in many lives is made in a few years by the help of Yoga.
The Yoga of Sri Aurobindo is called. the 'Integral Yoga' or 'the 'Supermental Yoga'. The Yogas· of the past were only of ascent to the Spirit. Sri Aurobindo's Yoga is bot~ of ascent and descent. · One can realise
the Divine. in consciousness'by the old Yogas ·but cannot establish the Divine on earth in a collective no Jess than in ·an individual . physical life.· In the old Yogas the world was considered either an illusion or a transitional phase : it had no prospect of having all the terms of its existence fulfilled.
Sri 'Aurobindo on -the other hand says that the world is a real creation of the Divine and life in it can be completely divinised down to the very cells of the body. The kingdom of God on. earth. can be brought about in the most literal' sense by a total transformation of collective man.
To put it in• Sri Aurobindo'swords : . "Here and not elsewhere the highest God head has. to be. found, the soul's ·divine nature developed out of the imperfect physical human nature and through unity with
God and man and universe the whole la•ge truth of being ·discovered a.nd lived and made visibly wonderful. That completes the long cycle P,f our becoming and admits us to a ~upreme.result ; that is~ opportunity given to the soul
by the humun birth and until ·that is accomplished, it can- not cease." For this transformation a new power called the ··supermind' which was sealed to this earth till now is needed.
Shri Soli Sorabjee, for the petitioners, has pontended that the followers of Sri Aurobindo satisfy the aforesaid three conditions and, therefore, they constitute a religious . denomination. Sttong reliance . . was placed on The Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowments,. ·Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra). In that case the followers of Ramanuja, the followers of Madhwacharya and the followers ·or other religious teachers were held. to he the religious denomination. On the strength of this case it was contended that Sri Aurobindo was also a religious teacher and, therefore, .there is no reason on principle which compels the conclusion that the followers ofAurobindo who share common faith .and organisation and have a
di~!ip~t!v~ i:mme do not constitute a, c – .D c (1983] I S.C.R. religious,denomination. A similar view was taken in Na/am Rama- lingayya [v. The Commissioner of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments, Hyderabad('). Dealing with the expres- sion ·'religious denomination', a Division Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court relying on Sri Lakshmindra' s case (supra) observed as follows : "To hold that , there exists a religious denomination, there must exist a religious sect or a body having a
common faith and organisation and designated by a distinc- tive name … Of course, any eect or sub-sect professing certain religious cult having a common faith and common spiritual organisation, such as Vaishnavites, Madhvites,
Saivites may be termed as religious denomination but certainly not any caste, sub-caste or sect of Hindu religion, who worship mainly a particular deity or god." It was further contended that the words 'religion' and 'religious denomination' must not be construed in· the narrow, restrictive and orthodox or traditional sense but must be given a broad meaning. It may be observed that in the case of The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra -Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (supra) different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion founded by various religious teachers were called a religious denomination on the ground that they being- part of Hindu religion would also be designated as a religious denomination if.the followers .,_ ..
·of Hindu religion constituted a religious denomination as the part must bear the impress of the whole. This observation was in this context. The, other case taking a similar view
viz. Na/am Ramatingayya v. The Commissioner of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments, Hyderabad (supra) is also based on the ,,–.J' same ground. FM the petitioners it was further submitted that Sri Aurobindo and the Mother were adverse to 'religion' as 'Religiosity" and
"Religionism" but not to "True Religion". Reference was made to various writings of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother : Sri Aurobindo "In order to exceed our Nature and become divine, we
must first get God, for we are the lower imperfect term of (j) J,L.R. 197) AP. 320. S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Mis1a, J.) our being. He is its higher perfect term. The ·finite tQ become infinite, must know, have and touch infinity; the
symbol being in· order to become its own reality, must know, love and preceive that Reality. This necessarily is the imperative justification of religion ; not of a church, creed or theology-for all
these · things are religiosity, not religion…,-but that personal and intimate religious temper and spirit which moves men to worship, · to aspire to or to pant after his own idea of the supreme."
. (SABCV 17, p. 54-55) "It is true in a . sense that Religion should be the dominant thing in life …. When it identifies with a creed or cult or system of ceremonial acts it may well become a
retarding force .. There are two aspects of religion. Spiritual Religion and Religionism. True Religion is spiritual – Religion, which seeks to live in spirit in what is beyond the intellect … Religiooism on the other hand entrenches itself in some na.rrow· pietistic exaltation of the lower members. It lays exclusive stress on intellectual dogmas, forms and ~eremomes …
(SABCV 15, p. 166-67) The Mother "We give the name· of religion to ·any concept of the world or the universe which is presented as the exclusive Truth in which one must have an absolute faith, generally
because lhis Truth is declared to be the result of a revelation. ·Most religions affirm the existence of a God and the rules to be followed to obey him, but there are somi: Godless religions, such as socio,political
organisations which, in the name of an Ideal or tbe State, claim the same right to be obeyed." (MCV No. 13, p. 212-13) ''The first and principal aiticle of these established and formal religions runs always "Mine is the supreme, the only truth, all others are in falsehood or inferior." For without · this fundamental dogma, established religions could not
· .have existed .. if you do 1191 l:>elieve imd proclaim that ya11 c c [1983] I S.C.F. alone possess the one or the highest truth, you will not be able to impress people and make them flock to you."
(MCV No. 3, p. 77) "He who has-a spiritual experience and faith, formu- lates it in the mos! appropriate words for himself, But if he is convif!ced that this expression is the only correct and true one for .this experience and faith, be becomes dogmatic and tends to create a religion."
(MCV No. 13, p. 22) "Imagine someone who, in some way or other has heard of something like the Divine or has a personal feeling that something of the kind exists. and begins to make all
sorts of efforts, efforts of will, of discipline, efforts of concentr~tion, all sorts of efforts to find this Divine, to discover what he is, to become acquainted with Him and unite with Him. Then this person is doing Yoga.
Now if this person has noted down all the processes be has used and constructs a fixed system, and sets up all that be bas discovered as absolute laws~for example he says, the Divine is like this, to find the Divine you must do this,
make this particular gesture, take this attitude, perform. this ceremcny and you must admit that this is the truth, you must say "I accept that this is the Truth and I fully adhere to it ; and your method is the only right one, the . only one which exists" -if all that is
written down, organised arranged into fixed laws and ceremonies, it becomes a religion.'' (MCV No. 8, p. 147) Sri Aurobindo "You express your faith in Sri Aurohindo with certain words, which are for you the best expression of this faith; this is quite all righ,t.
But if you are convinced that these very words are the only correct ones to express what Sri Aurobindo is, then you become dogmatic and are ready to create a religion." (Sri Aurobindo Circle 21 No. 1965)
"That is why religions always blunder, always for they want to standardise the expression of an experience and impose it on all as an irrefutable truth. The experience was S.P. MITTAL V.'UNION (Misra, J.)
781 · true, complete in itself, co.nvincing-for him who bad .it. The formulae be has made of it is excellent-for him ; but to want to impose it on others is a gross error which has. altogether disasterous consequences-always and which
.always tak.es away, far away from.the Truth." "That is why all religions, however fine they may be have always led men_ fo the· worst excesses. All crimes, all horrors that have been prepetrated in the name of religion . are among the darkest spots in huma!' history."
(Bulletin No. 1968, p. 129-31) "You see, this is what I have learned : the failure -of the religions. It is because they were _divided: . They wanted people to be religious to the exclusion of the other religions ……. And what the new consciousness wants is: no more divisions.
…to find t~e meeting point." (MCV No. 13, p. 293·94) . "There is no word so plilstic and uncertain in its mean- ing as the word religion. The word is European and, there- fore, it is as well to know first what the E~ropeans mean by it.
In this matter we find them …… divided in opinion. c Sometimes they use it as equivalent to a set of beliefs, some- times as equivalent to morality coupled with a belief in God, sometimes _as equivalent to a. set of pietistic actions and emotions. Faith, works and pious observances, these
·are the three recognised elements of European religion … Religion in India· is a still more plastic term and may mean anything from the heights of Yoga io strangling your fellowman and relieving him of the wordly goods he may
happen to be carrying with him. It wo.uld, therefore, take too long to enumerate everything that can be included in Indian religion." -Sri Aurobindo (Glossary of Terms in Sri Aurobindo's
Writings, p. 132) Emphasis was also laid upon the opinion of the authoritative sources in support of the co1_1tention that the . teachings of Sri Aurobindo constitute a religion and the Socjety a religious denomi- nation. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1972 ed.; Vol. I, pp. ?82 .
SUPlBME COlJRt- REPORTS · j (1983) l s.C,ll. 208-9) observes·: c .F says : "Sri Aurobindo was an Indian metaphysician· and founder of a new religious movement with headqu~rters at
Pondichery-·The religious movement .associated with him has increased its following in India, and has made some converts in the West ……… God.must 'descend' into human experience.
This illuminatiOI\ of individual will lead to the emergence of a divinised community …. Aurobindo produced a synthesis between older Indian religious ideas and the world affirming attitudes of Christian theism."
The Encyclopaedia Brittanica talking about Sri Aurobindo "Sri Aurobindo devoted himself to discover the way by which the Universe might be made divine … Sri Aurobindo has been acclaimed as the prophet of the Superman, as the
hierophant of the 'new age'. .. He has called his stand point that of a spiritual religion of humanity." The Dictionary of Comparative Religion (1970 ed., p. 117) men- tions : "According to Aurobindo, there is a progressive evolu·
tion of the divine Being thro"ugh matter no higher spiritual forms, and the Aurobindo movement is held to represent vanguard of this evolutionary process in our own times. Aurobindo practised and taught an, 'integral yoga' in which meditative and spiritual exercises are integrated with physi- · cal, cultural and intellectual pursuits."
Encyclop~edia Americana (1966 Vol. 12, p. 634) states: "He (Sri Aurobindo) abandoned politics to. found a religious school ( 191 O) at Pondicberry. A practising Yoga philosopher, he wrote numerous spiritual and mystical
works." The Gazetteer of India, published by the Government of India, Vol. I, Country and People, Chapter 8, Religion, pp. 413-500, Section on Sri Aurobindo, states : "Sri Aurobindo gave new interpretations of the vedas
and the Vedanta, and in his Essays on the Gita he cxpoun- .,,, r · SJ'. MITTAL v., UNION (Misra, 1.) ded what he called "the integral view of life". His great work, The Life Divine, is a summing up of hls philosophy
of"the Descent of the Divine into Matter". The impor- tance of Sri Aurobindo's mission lies in. his attempt to explain the true methods of Yoga." 7&3 In the Newsweek (Nov. 20, 1972) the.International Weekly, its 'religion' Editor, Woodward, writes:
'.'The Next Religion" : Some students of oriental, thought believe th&t Sri Aurobindo's spiritual vision and discipline may blossom into the first new religion of global ·scope since the rise of Islam thirteeffcenturies ago …….. Sri . Aurohindo left behind a nucleus ,of disciples in Pondicherry where the· Master's work is carried on by 1800 devotees
who live in India's largest Ashram or spiritual commu- nity." ·· Reference was also made to the opinions of the philosophers and professors of religion about the teachings of Sri Au•obindo. Frederic Spiegelberg, in bis book 'Living Religions of the World', p. 190-205, writes that in Sri Aurobindo :
"We pass beyond specilfo religions to a synthetic vision of the religious impulse itself, a vision designed to embrace all previous and future history all previous and future paths ..
Sri Aurobindo is a man worshipped by hundreds of thousands and respected by millions: ……… In his retreat at Pondicherry he is less the philosopher of Hinduism than the philosopher of religion in general, the voice of that which . comparative religion leaves undisputed."
Mr. Robert Neil Minor, Professor of Religion, University of Kansas, writes .: "On the level of Mind, then Aurobindo's system can· not be falsified. It therefore cannotbe verified on the level of Mind. Iiut as a religion it is a total package. Aurobindo did not offer a religious view of which one could accept and rejecl parts. He offered an integral system based upon. an integral vision.
He offered. as well, the vision itself." (Sri Aurobindo : The Perfect and the Good, 177) c [1983} J s.c.~. And, the opinions of similar other professors of religion and philoso · phers have been quoted to show that the teachings of Sri Auro- bindo have been treated as religion by theologians and by professors and by important news agencies.
The interpretations of the term 'religion' used in different Acts were also referred to but it is not necessary to refer to them as we are to interpret the term 'religion' and 'religious denomination, with references to 'Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
Mr. S. Rangarajiin appearing for the petitioners in one of the other writ petitions substantially adopted the contentions raised by Mr. Soli Sorabjee and further supplemented the same by raising the following points.
According to him the ingredients of religion are; (!) A spiritual ideal; (2) A sot of concepts or precepts on God·Man relationship underlying the ideal : (3) A methodology given or evolved by the founder or foilo- wers of the religion lo achieve the ideal ; and
(4) A definite following of persons having common faith in the precepts and concepts ; and in order to constitute a 'religious denomination' two further ingredients are needed : (5) The followers should have a common organisation ;
(6) They should be designated and designable by a distinct name-This may usually be the name of the founder him- self. Th.e counsel contends that the ideal _in Sri Aurobindo's religion is a 'Divine Life in a Divine Body' by Divinising Man and by trans- forming bis mind, vital and physical.-
According to Sri Aurobindo, in the beginning the whole universe was full of all-pervading Divine consciouness. He called the dynamic portion of the Divine ·as · 'Supermind'. The Divine-the Supermind-according to him, wanted to see its manifestation even in matter.
By a process of involution t·he Divine which is the subtlest became grosser and grosser giving . ,; S.P. MITTAL v. UNION l Misra, J.) 785 . rise t9 yarious planes of consciousness. This was· achieved through Involution-Evolution and Divinisation of· Man: The methodology for achieving the ideal was the 'Jntegr.al Yoga' which only means using affthe methods-Bhakthi, knowledge, work meditation, con- centration, attaining perfection to derive optimum benefits of each one of the·m, by .total. surrender to the Divine and by becoming the instrument of the Divine.
Sri Aurobindo has a definite following. In the beginning, this consisted of a few disciples. Slowly their nu.mber increased ·and an Ashram grew. Then there are definite organisations, Ashrams, Sri Aurobindo Society with more than 300 centres the world over. The devotees of Sri . Aurobindo are also referred to as Aurobindq: nians.
There are certain other attributes which indicate that the followers of Sri Aurobindo constitute a religious denomination, for example, chanting of Mantras, speqially prepared by Sri Aurobindo, a particular symbol also used for identification, -place. of pilgri~age is the Samadhi of Sri Arirobindo and the Mother, provision for meditation at the Samadhi. Flowers are offered at the Samadhi by the devotees.
The uniqneness of his philosophy and his teachiiigs according to Mr. Rangarajan constitute•religion and the special features in his philosophy also make the Society a religious denomination. : Thus, · all the ingredients of religion and religious denomination are satisfied and there is no reason why' his teachings be not taken to be religious and the institution; viz., the Society and the Auroville be not taken to be a religious denomination within ihe meaning of Articles 25 and 26 of the Consiitution.
The Solicitor-General for the Union of India and Mr. F.S. Narimail, counsel for the respondents Nos. 6 to 238, on the other· hand contended that the teachings of Sri Aurobindo do not cons: titute religion nor is the Society and the Auroville a religious denomination, and in any case there is no violation of Article 26 of the Constitution inasmuch as the impugned Act has taken. over · only the management of Auroville ;from the Society and does not interfere with the freedom contemplated· by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
Reference was made to rui'e 9 of the Rules and Regulations of c c SUPREME cotJRT REPORTS [1983] I S.C.K. Sri Aurobindo Society, which deals with membership. of the Society and provides :
"9.. Any person o·r institution or organisation either "in India or abroad who subscribes to the aims and objects of the Society, and whose applic.ation for member- ship is approved by the Executive Committee, will be
member of the Society. The membership is open to people everywhere without any distinction of nationality, religio_n, caste, creed or sex." The only condition for membership is that the person seeking the membership of the Society must subscribe to the aims and objects of the Society. It was further urged that what is universal cannot be a religious denomination. In order to constitute a separate denomination, there must be something distinct from another. denomination, argues the counsel, is one which is different from the other and if ·the Society was a religious denomination, then the person seeking admission to the institution would lose his previous religion
He cannot be a member of two religions at one and the same time. But this is not the position in becoming a member of the society and Auroville. A religious denomination must necessarily be a new and one new methodology must be
provided for· a religion. Substantially, the view taken by Sri Aurobindo remains a part of the Hindu philosophy. There may be certain innovations in his philosophy but that would not make it a religion on that account.
In support or' his contention the Solicitor-General placed reliance on Hirala/ Mallick v. State of Bihar('). Dealing with meditation this Court observed : "Modern scientific studies have validated ancient vedic
insights a bequeathing to makind new meditational, yogic and other therapeutics, at once secular, empirically tested and transreligious. The psychological, physiological .'and socio- logical experiments conducted on the effects of Trans-
cendental Meditation (TM, for short) have proved thta this science of creative intelligence, in its meditational applications, tranquillizes the tense inside, helps meet stress (I) [1978] I SCR 301.
… . . s.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) without distress, overcome inactivities and instabilities and by holistic healing normalises the fevered ·and fatiqued man. Rehabilitation of psychiatric patients, restoration
of juvenile offenders, augmentation of moral tone and temper and, more importantly, – improvement of social behaviour of prisoners .are among the proven findings recorded by researchers. Extensive studies of TM ·in many
prisons in the U.S.A., Can·!!da,. Germany· and ,other countries are reported to have yielded results of improved creativity, higher responsibility and better behaviour. Indeed, a few trial courts in the United States have actually prescribed TM as a recipe for rehabilitation.· As Dr.· M.P. Pali, Principal of the Kasturba Medical College, Mangalore, ·has put down :
"Meditation is a science and this should be learnt under guidance and.cannot be just .picked up from books. Objective studies on the effects of meditation on human. body and mind is a mo~ern observation and bas been
studied by various investigation at MERU-Mabarishi European Research University. Its tranquillising effect on body and mind, ultimately leading to the greater goal of Cosmic Consciousnes.s or universal awareness, . has been
studied by using over .a hundred parameters. Transcendental Meditation practised for 15 minutes in the morning and evening every day brings about a host of beneficial effects. To name only a few :
Body and mind get into a state of deep relaxation. 2. B.M.R. drops, less oxygen is consumed. 3. E.E.G. shows brain wave coherence with 'alpha' wave preponderance; 4. Automatic stability increases.
5. Normalisation of high blood pressure. 6. Reduced use of alcohol and tobacco. 7. Reduced stress, hence decreased plasma cortisol and blood lactate. 8. Slowing of the heart etc."
c c IE [1983) I. S.C.R. This Court dealing with punishment in a criminal case in Giasuddin v. A.P .. State(') again observed : . "There is a spiritual dimension to the first page of
our Constitution which projects into penology. Indian courts may draw inspiration from Patanja/i sutra even as .they derive punitive patterns from the Penal Code (most of Indian meditational · therapy is based on. the. sutras of
Patanjali) . . On the strength of these authorities it is contended for the Union of India tliat the integral yoga propounded by Sri Aurobindo ·is only a science and not a religion.
The Society itself treated Auroville not as a religious institu- tion. Auroville is a township which was conceived,' planned and developed as a centre of i,nternational culture for the promotion of the ideals which are central to the United-Nations 'Educational. ,Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). These ideals have been explained and proclaimed extensively in the writings of Sri. Aurobindo aod the Mother. · In the year 1966, Sri Aurobindo Society, devoted as it was to the teachings of Sri Aurobindo and guided by the Mother, proposed this cultural township to U.NESCO for the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the UNESCO. The Union of India took up the matter with UNESCO and it did so on the explicit understanding that Auroville as proposed was in full consonance and conformity with lndia'.s highest ide~ls and aspirations and that would help Auroville promote the aims 1and ·objects of UNESCO. Accordingly, at the Fourteenth Session of the General Conference of the UNESCO held in Paris in 1966, a resolution was passed noting that the proposal made by Sri Aurobindo ·society to set up Auroville as a cultural township where people of the different countries will Hve together in harmony in one community and engage in cultural, eductional, scientific and other pursuits and that th_e township will represent cultures of the world not only intellectually but also presenting different schools of ~rchitecture, ~aintings, soulpture, music etc. as a part of living, bringing together the values and ideals of civilisations and cultures, commended'the project to those interested in UNESCO's ideals as the project would. contribute to international understanding and pro!"otion of peace .
. (1) [1978] 1SCR153@ 164. S.P. MITTAL V. UNION (Misra, .J.) -7g9 The said resolution of the UNESCO was followed by two otber resolutions-one at the 15th Session in 1968 and the other at tbe 16th Session in 1970. ·In the second resolution the UNESCO had noted that the Society had taken steps to establish Aurovilli: as an international cultural iownship which would fulfil the ideas of the UNESCO. The UNESCO invited the member :States and non- governmental organisations to participate in the development of Auroviile as an international cultural township designed to bring together
the values of different cultures and civilisations in harmonious environment. The foundation stone of Auroville was · laid on 28 Febeuary 1968 with the participation of youth or many nations, representing the coming together of all Nations in a spirit of human unity. 'The UNESCO conceived Auroville ·township as an instrument of education, promoting mutual respect and understand- ing between people in keeping with the spirit of Universal Declara- tion of Human Rights and Universal Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Cooperation.
c · The Govetnment . of India took active· part in making the UNESCO interested in the project and take decision as aforesaid for the development of Auroville as an international cultural town– ship with the participation of countries who are members of the · UNESCO.
Sri Aurobindo Society had brought the proposal of Auroville to the.Government of India and explained that Auro.ville was to be an international cultural township. This fact is evident from the
brocl:!ure submitted by Sri Aurobindo_Society to the Government of India The Charter of Auroville given by the Mother also indicates that it is not a religipus institution, as is evident from _the following : "!. Auroville belongs to nobody in particular. Auroville
belongs to humanity as a whole. But to live fn Auroville one must be the willing servitor·of the Divine's consciousness. 2. Auroville will be the place 'of an unending education~ of constant progress, and a youth that never ages.
3. Auroville want• to be th~ bridge between the past and the future. Taking advantage of all discoveries from without and from within, Auroville will boldly spring towards future realis~tions.
c ( 1983) 1 s.C.R. 4. Auroville will be the site of material and spiritual research for a li,ving embodiment of an actual human unity." On the own admission of the General Secretary of Sfi
Aurobindo Society, Pondicberry, Auroville ·was to be a symbol of international cooperation, an effort to promote international under- standing by bringing together in close juxtaposition the values and ideals of different civilisations and cultures.
The cultures of different regions of the earth will be represented in Auroville in such a way as to be acessible to all not merely intellectually in ideas, theories, principles and languages, but also in habits and customs ; art in all forms-paintings, sculpture, music, architecture, decor,. dance ; as well as physically through natural scenery, dress, games, sports and 'diet. It will be'a representation in a concrete and living manner ; it will have a museum, an art gallery, a library of books, recorded music etc. It will also have other objects which will express its intellectual, scientific and artistic genious, spiritual tendencies and national characteristics.
While participati.ng in UNESCO meeting "Design for Integrat- ed Living Programme in Auroville" was presented and that also goes a Jong way to show that it was only a cultural township and not a religious institution.
Numerous utterings by Sri Aurobindo or the Mother un- mistakably show that the Ashram or Society or Auroville is not a religious institution. In Sri Aurobindo's own words (The Teaching and the Ashram of Sri Aurobindo, 1934, p. 6) :
"The Ashram is not a religious association. Those who are here come from all religions and some are of no religion. There is no creed or set of dogmll.s, no governing religious body ; there are only the
teachings of Sri Aurobindo and certain psychological practices of concen- · tration and meditation, etc., for the enlarging of the consciousness, receptivity to ·the Truth, mastery over the desires, the discovery of, the divine self and consciousness concealed within each human being, a higher evolution of
tµCf :p;attJ.re ~' ' -' . S.P. MiTTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) Sri Aurobindo himself said(') : "I may say tliat it is far from my purpose to propagate any religion, new _or old." Sri Aurobindo says again(') :
"We are not a party or a· church or religion~" Sri Aurobindo exposes(') : "Churches · and creeds have, for example, stood violently in the way of phHosophy and .science, burned a Giordano Bruno, imprisoned a Galileo, and so generally
misco11ducted themselves. in this matter that philosophy and science had a self-defence to turn upon Religion and rend her to pieces in order to get a free field .for their legitimate development."
The Mother said on 19.3.1973 : "Here we do not ~ave religion." Sri Aurobindo says again(') : "Yogic methods have some thing of the same relation t<Hhe customary psychological workings of man as has to
scientific handling of the. natural force of electricity or of. steam to the normal operations of steam and of electricity. And;the, too are formed upon a kn.owledge developed and
confirmed by regular experiment, a practical analysis and constant results. . .. All methods grouped under the common name of Yoga are special psychological processes founded on a fixed truth of nature and developing, out of normal
functions, powers and results which were always latent but which her ordinary movements do not easily. or do not often manifest." (I) Centenary Edn. vol. 22, p. 139. (2) Centenary Edn., vol. 23, p. 855.
(3) Centena<y Edn., vol. IS, p. 165. (4) Collected Works of Sri Aurobindo, vol. 20, p. 3, c [1983] I s.C.R. It is pertineflt to quote Mother's answer to a question(1) : c .H · "Q. Sweet Mother, what is the difference between Yoga
and religion : Mother's Ans : Ah! My child .. .It is as though you were asking me the difference between a dog and a cat." There can.be no better proof than what Sri Aurobindo and
the Mother themselves thought of their teachings and their institu- tions to find 9ut whether the teachings of Sri Aurobindo and his Iiitegral Yoga constitute a religion or a philosophy. The above utterings from time to time by Sri Aurobind'o and the Mother hardly leave any doubt about the nature of the institution. It was on ihe basis that it was not a religions instisution that. the Society collected funds from the Central Government and the Governments of States and from abroad and the other non-governmental agencies. Mr. F:S. Nariman appearing for respondents Nos. 6 to 238
adopted the arguments advanced by the Solicitor General Mr. K. Parasaran, and supplemented the same. He submitted that the Society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and a purely ;eligious society could not have been registered under the Societies Registration Act. Section 20 of the Societies Registra- tion Act provides .what kind of Societies can be registered under ., the Act,
It does not talk of religious institutions. Of course, it includes a society with charitable purposes. Section 2 of the Charit- able Endowments Act, however, excludes charity as a religious purpose. It was further cont~nded that the nature of tlie institution ca·n be judged by the Memorandum of Association. The Memo- randum of Association does not talk of any religkm. The purpose of the Society was to make known to the members and the people in general the aims and ideals of Sri Aurobindo and ·the Mother; their system of Integral Yoga and to work for its fulfilment in all possible ways ; to train selected sfudents and teacher> from all over the. world in the Integral System of Education, i.e., the spiritual, psychic, mental, vita! and physical; to help in cash or in kind ~by way of donations etc. ; to organise·, encourage, promote and assist in the study, research, and pursuit of science literature and fine arts etc. Nowhere it talks of propagating religion.
This is the , surest · (1) Collected Works of the Moth~r, ~ntenary EdQ,, p . .147. S.P, MIITAL ''· UNION (Misra, J.). · index· to know whether the Auroville or the Society was a religious institution.
It was further contended that a religious denomination must be professed by that body but from the very beginning the Society has eschewed the word 'religion' in its c.onstitution. The Society professed to be a scientific research organisation to the donors and got income-tax exemption on the footing that it was not -a religions institution. The Society has· claimed exemption from income-tax under s: 80 for tile donors and under s. 35 for itself on that ground; Ashram Trust was different from Auroville Ashram. The Ashram Trust also applied for income-tax exemption and got it on that very ground. So also. Aurobindo Society claimed exemption on the footing· that it was not a religious institution and got it. They
professed to the Government also that they were not a religious institution i~ their application for financial assistance under the . . Central Scheme of Assistance to voluntary Hindu organisations. On the, basis of the materials placed before us 'viz., the · Mem.orandum of Association of the .Society, the several applications ;nade by the.Society claiming exempt.ion under s. 35 and s. 80 of the Income-tax Act, the repeated utterings, of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother that the Society and Auroville were n·ot religious institutions and host .of other documents there is no room for doubt that neither the Sqciety nor Auroville constitute a religious ,denomination and the teachings of Sri Aurobindo only represented his philosophy and not a religion.·
Even assuming but not ·holding that· the Society or the Auroville were a religious denomination, the impugned enactment is not hit by Article 25 or 26 of the Constitution. The -impugned enactment does not curtail the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess practise and propagate religion. Therefore, there is no question of the enactment being hit by Article 25.
– ·Article. 26 as stated earlier confers freedom to the religious denomination : (a) to establish and ma.intain institutions for religious. and charitable purposes ; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters or'religion ;
(c) to own and acquire mova.ble and immovable property ; and c c SUPREMB COURT RBPORTS [1983] I s.c.R. (d) to administer such property in accordance with law. The impugned enactment does not stand in the way of the
Society establishing and maintaing institutions for religious and charitable purposes. It also does not stand in the way of the Society to manage its affairs in matters of religion.
It bas only taken over the management of the Auroville by the Society in respect of the secular matters. The position before the present Constitution came into force was ·that the State did not interfere in matters of religion in its doctrinal and ritualistic aspects treating it as a private purpose, but it did exercise control over the administra- tion of property endowed for religious institutions (dedicated to the public) treating it as a public purpose, and this .i:>osition bas not changed even under th.e present Constitution.(').
. The scope and extent of the rights conferred by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution are now well-settled by the decision of this Court. To start with, in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endow- ments Madras v. ·Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt(') dealing with various aspects of Article 26 of the Constitu- tion this Court observed as follows :
"The other thing that Jemains to be considered in regard to article 26 is, what is the scope of clause (bl of the article which· speaks of management of its own affairs in matters of religion ?"jThe language undoubtedly suggests that there could be other affairs of a religious denomina- tion or a section thereof which are not matters of religion and to which the guarantee given by this clause would not
apply. ·'· It will be seen that besides the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, which is given by clause (b), the next two clauses of article 26 guarntee to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own pr9-
perty and to administer such property in accordance with law. The administration of its property by a religious denomination ha~ thus been placed on a different footing (I) A.I.R. 1955 Madras 356.
(2) [1954]lSCR IQ05, S.P. Ml1TAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) from the right to manage its . ovrn affairs in matters of religion. The latter is a fundamental right which no legis- lature can take away, whereas the former can be regulated
by laws which the legislature can validly impose. It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to adminis-· tration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution are not matters of religion to which clause (b) of the article applies ….
. . . . . freedom oflr~ligion in our Constitution is not confined to religious beliefs only ;. it extends to religious · practices as well subject to the restrictions which ·the Constitution itself has laid down.
Under article 26(b), therefore, a· religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according .to the
t~nets of the religion· they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in __ such matters. Of course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observations would be a
matter of administration of property belonging to the religious denomination and can be controlled by secular· authorities in accordance with any law. laid down by a competent legislature ; for it could not· be · the injunction of any religion· to destory the institution and its endow- ments by incurring wasteful expenditure on . rites and
· ceremonies. It should be noticed, however, that under article 26(b) it · is the fundamental right of a religious denomination orits representative to administer its pro- perties in accordance with law; and the law, therefore,
must leave the right of administration to the religious denomination itself subject to such restrictions and regula- . lions as it might choos_e to impose. A law whfoh ·takes away . the right of administration from .the hands of a
religious denomination altogether and vests it in any other authority would .amount to a violation of the right guaranteed under clause (d) of Article 26." · · The same principle was reiterated by this Court in The Durgah Committee, Ajmer and Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali and-ors.('). In Tilkyat Shri Govind/a/j/ Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan c
and Ors.(') it was held that the right tQ manage the ·properties of 0) (1962] 1 S.C.R 383 – 410-11. (2) [1964] 1 S.C R. 561. [1983) I s.c.R. a temple was a purely secular matter and could not be regarded as a religious practice under Art. 25(1) or as amounting to affairs in matters of religion under Art. 26(b) consequently, the Nathdwara Temple Act in so far as it provided for the management of the properties of the Nathdwara Temple under the provisions of the. Act did not contravane Arts. 25(1) and 26(b) of the Constitution. In Sastri Yagnapurushadji and Ors. v.
Muldas Bhudardas. Vaishya and Anr.(') the appellants who were the followers of the .. Swaminarayan sect and known as satsangis, filed a representative suit for a declaration that the relevant provisions of the Bombay Harijan Temple Entry Act, 1947 (as amended by Act 77of 1948) did not apply to their temples because, the religion of the Swaminarayan sect was distinct and different from Hindu religion and because, the relevant provisions of the Act were ultra vires.
Dealing with . the question this Court observed as will.appear from the headnote: "The Indian mind has . consistently through the ages . been exercised over the problem of the nature of godhead, the problem that faces the spirit at the end of life. and the interrelation between the individual and the universal soul. According to Hindu religion the ultimate·goal of humanity
is release and freedom from the unceasing cycle of births and rebirths and a state of ab.sorption and assimilation of the indvidual soul with the infinits. On the means to attain this and there is a great divergence of views; some
emphasise the importance of dyana, while others extol the virtue of Bhakti or devotion, yet others insist upon the paramount importance of the performance of duties with a heart full of devotion and in mind inspired by knowiedge.
Naturally it was realised by Hindu religion from the very beginning of its career that truth was many-sided and different views contained different aspects of truth which. no one could fully express.
This knowledge inevitably bread a spirit of tolerance and wil)ingness to understand and appreciate -the opponent's ·point of view. Because of this broad ·sweep · of Hindu philosophic
concept under Hindu philosophy; there is no scope for ex- communicating any notion or principle· as bertical and rejecting it as such. The development of Hindu religion and philosophy shows that from time to time mints and
(1) [1966] ~ S.C.R. ;!42, ·~ -" —- J.· – ·-·- S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) nligious reformers· attempted to remove from Hindu thought and practices, elements of co;ruption and supers-
tition, and ·revolted against the dominance of ·rituals and the power of the priestly class. with which it came to be associated;· and that led to the formation of different sects. In the teaching of'these saints and religious reformers is noticeable a certain amount of divergance in their respec- tive views; but underneath that divergence lie certain broad · concepts which can be treated as basic and there is a kirid of subtle indescribable unity which keeps them within the. sweep of broad and progressive Hindu religion. The first
among these basic concepts is the acceptance of the Vedas as the highest authority in religious and philosophic matters. This cencept necessarily implie& that all the systems claim to have drawn iheir principles from a common re- .
servoir of thought enshrined in the Vedas. Unlike other religions in the world, the Hindu religion does not claim any one prophet; it does .not worship any one God; it does not subscribe to any one dogma, it does not believe in any one philosophic concept ; it. does not follow any one
set of religious rites of performances; in fact, it d(les not satisfy the traditional features of a. religion or creed. It is a way of life and nothing more. The Consjitution- makers were fully conscious of the broad and comprehen-
sive character of Hindu religion ;· 'and while guaranteeing the fundamental right to freedom of religion made it clear that reference to Hin<lus shall be construed as· including a . reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or· Budhist religion.
. Philosophically, Swaminarayan was a follower · of Ramanuja and the essence of his teachings is acceptance of . the Vedas with reverance, recognition of the fact that the path of Bhakti or devotion leads to Moksha, insistence or
devotion to· Lord Krishna and a deiermination. to remove corrupt practices and restore Hindu religion to its original glory and purity. This shows unambiguously· and unequi- vocally that Swaminarayan was a Hindu saint. Further,
the facts that foitiation is necessary to become a. Satsangi, that persons of other religions could join the sect-by initia- tion without any process of proselytising on such occasions, and that Swaminarayan himself is treated as a God, are
not inconsistent with the basic Hindu religious and philosophic theory." c c SUPREME COURT RBPORTs [19831 I s.c.ll. In Digyadarsan Rajendra Ramdassji Varu v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.(1) dealing with Articles 25 and 26 of the Consti- tution this Court on the facts and circumstances of the case held : "It has nowhere been established that the . petitioner
bas been prohibited or debarred from professing practising and propagating his religion. A good deal material has been placed ·on the record to show that the entire math is being guarded by police constables but that does not inean that the petitioner cannot be allowed to enter the math
premises and exercise the fundamental right conferred by Art. 25(1) of the.Constitution. As regards the. contraven, tion of clause (b) and (d) of Art. 26 there is nothing in ss. 46 and 47 which empowers the Commissioner to interfere with the autonomy of the religious denomination in the
matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion the denomi- nation professes or practises nor has it been shown that , any such order has been made by the Commissioner or that
the Assistant Commissioner who has been put in charge of the day-to-day affairs is interfering in such matters." On these observations the impugned Act in that case was upheld by the Court.
In J. Krishnan v. G.D.M. Committee(') a full Bench of the Kerala High Court dealing with Arts. 25 and 26 observed : · " … the real purpose and intendment of Articles 25 and 26 is to guarantee especially to the religious minorities
in this country the freedom lei profess, practise and . . propagate their religion, to establish and maintain institu- tions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, to own and acquire
properties and to administer such properties in accordance with law subject only to the limitations and restrictions indicated in those Articles. No doubt, the freedom guaranteed by these two Articles applied not merely to
religious minorities but to all persons (Article 25) and all (I) [1970] I SCR 103 . . (2) A.l.R. 1978 Ker. 68, ":_.(– …. S.P. MITTA~ • UNION (Mi&ra, J.) religious denominations or sections thereof (Article 26).
But, in interpreting the scope and content .of the g·uarantee contained in the two Articles the Court will always have to keep in mi~d the real purpos.e underlying the incorporation of these provisions in the fundamental rights chapter.
When. a challenge is raised before a court against the validity or any statute as contravening the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 25 and 26 it is from the above perspective that the court will approach the question· and the tests to be applied for · adjadging the validity of the statutes will be the same irrespective of whether the
person or denomination complaining about the infringement of the said fundamental right, belongs to a religious minority or not." In Ramalingayya v. The Commissioner of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions &
Endowments(') dealing with 'religious denomination' the Andhra Pradesh High Court lfeld : "Thus )t is the distinct common faith and common spiritual organisation and the belief in a· particular religious teacher of philosophy on which the religious denomination
is founded or based, that is the essence of the matter, but not any caste, or sub.caste or a particular deity worship by a particular caste or community." In United States v. Danial Andrew Seegar(2) the U.S. Supreme Court had to construe the provisfons of· s. 6(j) of the Universal· Military Training and Service Act of 1948 which, as a prerequisite of exempting a conscientious objector from military service, requires his .belief in a relation to a Supreme .Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation. Defendant's claim to exemption as conscienti<ins objector was denied after he, professing religious belief and faith and not disavowing, although not clearly demonstrating, any belief in a relation to a Supreme Being, stated that "the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence" and decried the tremendous '.'spiritual" pric_e man must pay for his .willingness to destroy human life. The expression 'Supreme Bei.ng' was liberally epnstrued.
ti) A.I.R. 1971 A.P. 320. (2) 13 L. eel 2d 733. 8. c c SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS . [198311 s.c.a. The Court dealing with the idea of God quoted from various religious teachers thus : "The community. of all peoples is one.. One is their
origin for God made the entire human race live on all the face of the earth. One, too, is their ,Jtimate end, God. Men expect from the various religions answers ·to the riddles of the. human condition : What is man ? What is
the meanin!l and purpose of our lives.? What is the moral good and what is sin ? What are death, judgment, and retribution after death?.. …. Ever since· primordial. days, numerous peoples have
bad a certain perception of that bidden power which hovers over the course of .things and over the events that make up the lives of man·; some have even come to know of a Supreme Being and Father.
Religions in an advanced culture have been able to use more refined concepts and a more developed language in their struggle for an answer to man's religious questions …… The proper question to ask, therefore, is not the futile · one. Do you believe in God ? But rather, What kind of
God do you believe in ? Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither prove nor disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human experience. Ii is anthropocentric, not
theocentric. Religion, for all the various definitions that have been given of it, must surely mean the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive. And that ideal is a community of spirits in which the latent moral
potentialities of men shall have been. elicited by their reciprocal endeavours to. cultivate the best in their fellow men. What ultimate reality is we do not know ; but we have the faith that it expresses itself ill the human world as the power which inspires in men moral purpose."
On an-analysis of the aforesaid cases it is evident that even as.suming that the .Society or A~roville was a religious. denomination, clause (b) of Art. 26 guarantees to a religious denomination a right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. It will be seen that besides the -right to manage its own affairs in matters of S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.)
SOI religion, which is given by clause (b), the next two clauses of A.rt. 26 guarantee to a religious denomination the right to acquife and own· property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The administration of its property ·by a religious denomination has thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters ,of religion. The latter is a fundamental right which no legislature can .take away, whereas, the former can be regulated by laws which the legislatu.re can validly impose. It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to a religious group or institution are not matters of religion to which clause· (b) of ihe article applies. The impugned Act had not taken away the right of management ·in matters of religion of a religious denomination, if the Society or Auroville is a religious denomination •at all, rather it bas taken away the right of~ management of the property of Auroville.
– Thus. the impugned Act neither violaies Article 25, 26 of the Constitution. nor Article The impugned' Act was also feebly sought to be challenged as violating Aris. 29 and 30 of the Constitution. We are at a loss to understand how these two articles have any bearing on the impugned Act.
These two articles confer four distinct rights : (i) Right of any section of citizens to conserve iis own language, script or culture (Art. 29(1)). (ii) Right of all religious or linguistic minorities .to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice
(Art. 30( !)). (iii) Right of an educational institution not to be dis- criminated against in matter of state aid on the ground that it is under the management of a· minority (Art. 30(2)).
(iv) Right of a citizen not to be denied admission into a state maintained or state aided educational institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste,· language . (Art. 29(2)).
The impugned Act d.oes not seek to curtail the rights ·of any section of citizens to conserve its own language, script or. cutiure c c -sUPRBMB COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.C.R. conferred by Art. 29. In order to claim the 'benefit of Art. 30(1) the community must show : (a) that it is a religious or linguistic minority, (b) that the institution was -established by it. Without satisfying th_ese two conditions it caenot claim the guaranteed· rights tci administer it.
In re The Kera/a Education Bill(!) Article 30(1) of the Consti· tution which deals with the right of minorities to establish and administer education institutions, came for consideration. The
– Kerala Educational Bill, 1957, which had' been passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly was reserved by the Governor for consideration by the President. The contention of the State of Kerala was that the minority communities may exercise their fundamental right under Article 30(1) by establishing educational institutions of their choice wherever tlfey like ~nd administer the same in their own way and need not seek recognition from the Government, but that if the minority communities desire to have state recognition they must submit to the terms impo~ed, as conditions precedent to recogniiion, on every educational institution. "The claim of the educational -institutions of the_ minority communities, on the other hand was that their funda- mental right under Art. 30(1) is absolute and could not be subjected to any restriction whatever. This Court, however, did not accept the extreme views propounded by the parties – on either side but tried to reconcile the two. It observed :
Article 29(1) gives protection to any sectien of citizens residing in the territory of India having a distinct language, script or culture of its own right to conserve the same …… the distin~t languages, script or culture _of a minority
community can best be conserved by and through educa- ·tional institutions, for it is by education that their culture can be inculcated into the impressionable mind of the children of· their community. It is through educational
institutions that the language and s9ript _of the minority community can be preserved, improved and strengthened. It is, therefore, that Art. 30(1) confers on all -minorities, whether based on religion or language, the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
(1) [1~59) SCR 995. s.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) The· minorities, quite understandably, regard it as essential that the education of their chiidren should be in accordance with the teachings of their religion, and they
hold, quite honestly, · that · such an education cannot be obtained in ordinary schools ·designed for all tlie members of the public but can only be s,ecured in ·schools conducted under the influence and guidance of people well versed in
the tenets of their religion and in ' the traditions of their culture. The minorities evidently desire· that education should be imparted to the children of their community in an atmosphere congenial to the. growth of their culture. Our Constitution makers recognised the validity of their
. claim and to allay their fears conferred on them the •fundamental rights referred to above. But the conservation of the dist.inct languages, . script or culture is not the only object of choice of the minority communities. They also.
desire that scholars of their educational institutions should 1 go out in the world well and sufficiently · equipped with the qualifications necessary for a useful career in life. But
according to the Education Code now in operation to which it is permissible to· refer for ascertaining the effect of the impugned provisions on existing state of affairs, the scholars of unrecognised schools are not permitted to
avail themselves of the cipportunities for higher education in the University and are not eligible for entering the public services. Without recognition; therefore, the educational institutions established or to be established by the minority communities cannot fulfill the teal objects
of their choice and the rights under Art. 30(1) cannot be effectively exercised:,. The right to establish educational institutions of their choice . must, therefore, rnean the right to establish real institutions which will effectively serve the needs of t~eir community and the scholars who. resort
to their educational institutions.'' c In Rev. Sidhaibhai Sabhai and Ors. v. State of Bombay and Anr.(1) dealing with article 30(1) of the Constitution, this Conrt held: "The right established by Art. 30(1) is a fundamental
right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fnndamental (I) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 837@ 856. c ao4 [ t 983) l s.c.&. freedom guaranteed by Art. 19, it is not subject to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of _setting up of educ.tional institutions of their own choice.
The right is intended to be effective and is not _to be whittled down by so·called regulative measures . conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institutions, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order
which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational insti- tution,_ the• right guaranteed · by Art. 30(1) will be but a "teasing illusion", a promise of unreality. RegulatiollS
which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative ot executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution. while retaining – its character as a minority
institution effective an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test-the test of reasonableness; and the test that it is r~gulative of the educa\ional character of the
institution and is conducive to making · the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it." In State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial(') the provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1969 which' was passed to reorganise the University ·of Kerala with a view to establishing a· teaching, residential and affiliating University for the southern distrfcts of the State of Kerala, were challenged. Same of the provisions effected private colleges,_particularly those founded by minority communities in the State. Their constitutional validity was challenged by some members of those communities on various grounds in writ petitions filed in the High Court. This Court held :
"The minority institutions cannot be allowed to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to folloy.; the' general
pattern. While the management must be left to them, they· may be compelled to keep i_n step with others." (1) [t971] l SCR '134. … \- S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J) On an analysis of the two articles, Art. 29 at;id Art. 30 and the three cases referred to above, ·it is . evident that the impugned Act does not seek to curtail the right of any section of citizens to · conserve .its own liinguage, script or· culture conferred by Art. 29. The benefit of Art. 30(1) can be claimed by the community only on proving that it is a religious or linguistic minority and that the · institution was established by it.
In the view that we have taken that Al!l'oville or the ·Society is not a religious denomination, Articles 29 and 30 would not be attracted and, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be held to be violatiye of Articles 29 and 30 ,of the Constitution.
This leads us to the third ground, namely, the impugned Act . C being violative of Article l'I of the Constitution inasmuch as Sri Anrobindo Society has been singled qut for ho;tile treatment, and the legislation is against this partfoular institution. In order to appreciate this argument it would be necessary to refer to the circumstances which led to the passing of the impugned Act. Sri Aurobindo Society is a ·society registered under the West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961.. The inaio objective· of the Society is inter alia t~ make known to · the member· and people in general· the aims and .ideals .of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother ;· their system of Integral Yoga and to work .for its fulfiiment in all P.ossible ways and for the adoption. of a spiritualised society as envisaged by Sri Aurobindo. The Society was engaged right from its inception in collecting funds for the promotion of works of Sri Aurobiiido and the Mother. The Society contributes funds to Sri Aurobindo Ashram and its international Centre of Education, Auroville.
As the work of the Society began to grow it needed larger and larger funds for the sustenance of its. own activities. In due course the ·Society opened several centres· all over India, particularly at Calcutta. Bombay, New Delhi and Madras. It has. centres also in U.S.A., Zurich, Osaka and Nairobi. Sri Aurobiodo Society bas two registered offices, one at Calcutta and another at Pondicberry,. _Io order to facilitate the work of Sri
Aurobindo Society to collect funds, on a representation 'made. by the Society . the Income·tax Department of the Government of I,ndia gave exemption lo the Society from income-tax under section 35(l)(iii) of the Income Tax Act.
Income-tax exemption was claimed by the Society on the ground !hat it is engaged in educational, ,cultural and scientific activities and social sc.iences research. It was on this under- standing that the exemption from income-tax was granted to the [ 1983) I s.c.a.
Society and it is through this exemption that the Society had collect- c ed a huge amount.from the public. For the first few years the development of Auroville showed a remarkable progress and development and things were growin.g at a rapid pace.
A number of Indians and foreigners settled down in Auroville and .devoted themselves to various activities of planning, designing, agriculture, education, construction and other works such as those of hand-made paper and other crafts and industries. A remarkable harmony among members of Auroville was visible and this gave a promise to the Government of India of an early fulfil- ment of the ideals for which Auroville was established and encourag· ed,by UNESCO and other international organisations of tile world, After the passing away of.the .Mother in 1973, however, the situation changed and the Government received information that the affairs of the Society were not being properly managed, that there was mismanagement of the funds of the Society and diversion of the funds meant for Auroville to other purposes. ·
The accounts of Sri Aurobindo Society were audited upto the . year ending 31st December, 1974. For the years 1960 to 1971 the audit was conducted by late Sri Satinath Chattopadhyaya, Chartered · Accountant and for the years 1972 to 1974 by Sri T. R. Thulsi.ram, Chartered Accountant and Internal. Auditor of the Society. The letter addressed by him to the President; Sri Aurobindo Society dated May 26, 1976 relating to the affairs of Bharat Niwas as on 31st .March, 1976 is revealing one and the relevant portion is extracted below : "Thus we have an unutilised deficit of about IO lakhs
at the end of 31.12.74 and -Or about 12 lakhs at the end of 1975 or upto 31.3.76. The situation has not improv~d uptil now. The activities of construction have almost come to a – close after 31.12 74.
Further, there are heavy bank over· drafts apart from the reduction in q, D. facilities and freez- ing of the money in 0. D. account. Therefore, in these cir· cumstances it is clearly seen that government monies
received for the specific purpose of Bharat Niwas have been diverted for other purposes and there are no more free liquid resources either as cash or in bank accounts. So we cannot explain saying that monies are immediately available for construction · and that the construction activities are .\ ….
S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) • being continued without stop. Thineally is a serious matter that calls for the proper solution. ', Therefore, in the above Circumstances it is absolutely
necessary that earlier steps be taken to correct the situation before serious audit objections are raised by the Government Auditors. We are afraid to say that we ourselves .would be constrained to make a qualified report of audit, if the state of affairs does not get corrected immediately."
· The situation in Auroville became so acute that at the instance of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, an enquiry was conducted in 1976 by the Chief Secretary, Pondichery, into certain aspects of the functioning of Sri Aurohindo Society. The report of the Chief Secretary mentioned instances of serious irregularies in the manageme\}t of the Society, suspected misuse of funds and auditors' comments ·about the misuiilisation of funds and its diversion, andJt was suggested that a further probe in the financfal matters of the Society and organisations 'connected with the Auroville Project may be· made by a team of competent auditors.
Considering the special position of Auroville as a cultural . township of international importance, the substantial' grants of the order of more than Rs. 90 lakhs given by the Government of India and the State Governments towards the fulfilment of the ideals of Auroville, the presence of a large number of- foreigners in Auroville who had left their hearth and home for Auroville whicli had received sponsorship from Indian· Government and UNESCO, the continued groupism and infighting which was bringing bad name to Auroville · c
and the special responsibility of t,he Government of India in regard to the foundation and development of Auroville, the Government of India decided to set' up a committee under the Chairmanship of the Lt. Governor of Pondichery with the Chief Secretary of the Tamil Nadu and Additional Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs as members by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs Government of India, dated 21st December,· 1976.
The above Committee got a quick audit made of the funds of the Society and the grants given to the Society for Auroville through a team of competent auditors. An important finding of this Committee was that the earlier appr~hensio_n about instances of serious irregularities in the manage· ·A
c !J983J 1 s.c.~. men! of the Society, misutilisation of the funds, and the diversion was confirmed. This Committee also submitted to the Government of India two.volumes _of the audit report. Some of the other impor- tant 'findings of the_ Committee based on audit reports were as follows :
"The professional services required from Architects for the construction of ·Phase I of Bharat Ni was were not rendered by them and still full payment was made to these architects.
Rs. 13.30 lacs sanctioned by various State Governments for construction of pavillions of their respective States were . diverted and utilised towards construction in Bharat Niwas for common zone facilities-this was without the approval
,of the State Government. Whilst the books of Bharat Niwas show that there was an unutilised balance of Rs. 22.64 lacs the Project was without any liquid resources-thus showing that moneys
received out of Govt. grants were diverted for other activi- ties notwitstanding that this position was brought to the notice of the Society by their statutory ·auditor in its letter dated 26.5.76.
Although there was no fresh receipt of_ steel in Bharat Niwas Phase 2 the stock was purportely revalued at a higher rate of Rs. 2000 per metric ton _against the earlier rate of Rs. 1700 per metric ton adopted on 31.12.73. This resulted in an over-statement of the value of stock to the amount of Rs. 42,000/-.
There was a transfer of materials· of stock worth Rs. 2.30 lacs to Auro Stores by ajournal entry on 31.12.1975 Auro Stores is a concern of Navjattas. The audit team concluded that as a re,ult of this there was an unreal expen- diture which bad not resulted in outflow of resources and
resulted in overstatement of expenditure on Bharat Niwas. An undischarged amount of Rs. 1.45 lacs payable to the contfactors Messrs E.C.C. Ltd. towards the construc- tion of Bharat Ni was stood included in· the total expendi- ture as on 31.12.74-the utilisation certificates furnished . S.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.)
with regard to total expenditure were held to be incorrect to that extent. Although materials pur chased out of Govt. grants could not be hypothecated wit bout. the approval of the
Government the Society hypothecated sieel from Auro Stores and obtained a loan of Rs. 6. 88 lacs from the State Bank of India-resulting in an expenditure of interest charge of Rs. 9561.40 which was held to be inadmissible and an
irregularit}. Aithough the Society completed ccnstruction of Health Centre in Dec. 1973 at a total cost of over Rs. 2 lacs and the Health Centre started functioning from Dec. 1973
the Society had not furnished the utilisation certificates in the prescribed form nor was the completion report· duly certified by the PWD authorities. · Rs: one lac was stated to have been received for the
'"Project of World University"-and the money .was stated to be utilised. There is no such World University in · Auroville. A difference of Rs. 1,29,848/-was noticed in the case of the value of a piece of land purchased-the value of the land said to have been purchased and not entered in the
register was Rs. 88,526/-and the amount said to have been paid in excess of the value for the 18'ld . actually purchased was Rs. 31,322 .. The operation of purchase of lands was through indi-
viduals who were given huge sums of money as advances. It was noticed tha1 in one ·transaction an amount of Rs. 43,250/-representing the balanqe out of advance paid. to one V.·Sunderamurthy was adjusted as being the cost of
stamp papers used during 1971. The said individual had already :taken into account the cost of stamp papers whilst adjusting all other advances.during 1971. The voucher for this amount also did not give the details of the document
numbers in respect of which stamp papers worth Rs. 43,250/ were used. c c SUPRllMB COURT REPORTS (1983] l S.C.R In 1975· 76 land to the extent of 23.86 acres was purchased at the cost of Rs. 91,496 but was registered in
the names of four individuals and the value of the lands so registered in individual names were treated as advances. to these individuals. The names of these individuals were "Maggi", "Kali", "Shyamala" and uRavindra .Reddy".
The audit team found that assets and liabilities of the project were overstated to the extent of Rs. 5,10,670. The balance·sheet of Auroville project has been so framed that the assets side does not throw any light as to whether the 'corresponding assets from donations have been acquired and the problem is aggravated .by the fact that a register of assets is not maintained.
There was a complete lack of financial control which was. the .most serious ·drawback of the system and this want of financial control was revealed in a number of established and conventional procedure which would have serious
implications. It was not possible for the Audit Team to establish' nor the Society could establish that moneys paid were really exchanged with certain materials or goods of corresponding value.
The Jack of adequate scrutiny resulted in the fact that· in most of the ·cases the bills were not supported by adequate details of materials having been passed. The expenditure of Auroville project working out to
nearly 3 crores, there was no system of control of expendi- ture-no rules and regulations or procedures according to which a particular individual or office bearer could incur an expenditure only upto a particular limit and not above that. Persons who were authorised to operate bank accounts had
full authority to draw as much as tbay wanted and there was no system of reporting or feed-back. In view bf the large scale construction activities, large ,amounts of stores materials of various descriptions were
.being bandied by the project. We have not come across proper records of stores and stock accounts being main- tained by the project. This indeed was a serious drawback ··–4 S.P. MJ1TAL v. UNION (Misra, J.)
since in the absence of such a system it was not possible to verify from the records that the moneys which were shown as having been spent for purchase of materials were really paid in exchange of the materials of the required quantity and quality and whether the material purchased was actually received by the project, whether the quantity which was
shown as having been utilised for the construction has been actually so utilised and the balance of stores which repre- sented by the value was the real balance representing the various stock items.
Huge amounts of ,cash were being handled by persons operating t.he main account and the number of individuals . . who were given advances-there was no system under which cash could be verified at any interval. ·
Even apart from the audit report, one ~ery important point may be mentioned.. The Society has been claiming that they have been holding more than Rs. 20 lacs in reserve in the account of Aurobindo Society to meet their obliga-
tions with regard to Auroville. And yet the Society bas incurred heavy debts in the name of Auroville and allocated huge accumulation of interest to the extent of Rs. 20 lacs~" The Committee ca·me to the conclusion that the time was ripe for taking recourse two either of the following two alternatives : (a) Incorporation of Sri Auroville Society by a statute as a society of national importance and bringing it under Entry 63 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution ; (b) Take.over of the management of Auroville project by the Government for.a limited period by legislation under Art. 31 A(.I )(b) of the Cons.titution. There was an intensive examination of the Committee's repc,rt as also of the audit report.
All kinds of possibilities were explored by the Government of India for remedying the situation including, . several discussions with the managers of the Sri Aurobindo Society. At the same time, it was apparent that the Government grants which were given for the construction works remainecj unutilised an<! c
fl SUPREME ~OURT REPORTS (1983] 1 S.C.R, diverted. The const~uction work itself was stagnant. The Auroville township bad been conceived to be spread over 10 sq. miles (minimum) for about 50,000 people. Considering the multi-dimen-. sional task, the work which was accomplished by 1976 was not even marginal. It became obvious that the work had already come to a standstill and that there was not much prospect of further growth of ·B
A uroville. c ff' On a close examination of th.e audit report certain clarifications were sought from those at the helm of the affairs in the Sri Aurobindo Society. on various points which had come to light through the audit report. An extensive correspondence on this sub- ject was, therefore, undertaken. The Government oflndia received from the Sri Aurobindo Society answers which were often evasive and which only confirmed the findings of the Committee's report and audit report.
It may also be mentioned that the atmos_phere in Auroville became so bad that it gave rise to law and order problem. The Government of Tamil Nadu was "obliged several times to promulgate orders under s. 144 Cr. P. C.
Even so, the situation remained so bad that there were about three instances in which residents of Au'roville sustained injuries because of fighting between groups. The Government of India examined the charges and counter-
charges in detail. Union Education Minister also paid a visit to Auroville towards the end of October, 1980. Thus after full consi- deration of various aspects of the problem, the Government of India decided to take recourse to the promulgation of an ordinance, Accordingly, the impugned ordinance was promulgated on 10th November, 1980.
Mr. _K. -K. Venugopal, appearing for the petitioners, however, referred to the decision of the respective Ministries on the audit report. During October- November, 1979, he contended the . Ministry of Education and·the Ministry of Home Affairs took decision on six. major points. One of the points on which decision was taken was · that there were no legal grounds for takeover of Auroville and neither the Government was interested. This decision, among others was later on endorsed by the respective Union Ministers. The report submitted by Mr. P. P. Srivastava, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Home Affair~, iyho yjsited Pondiche~~ and Aurov!Ile on a fact finding S.1'. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.)
mission from 8th to 10th October, 1980, contained the following observations : "All along tbe view of the Ministry of Home Affairs has been that there is no case cif takeover of the adminis- tration of Auroville. This is an internal matter and the
Government need not interfere. The Government of Tamil Nadu should be asked to depute two officers to help the Shri Aurobindo Society for administering the finances· and the administration."
The contention of Mr. Venugopal is that the audit report had once been considered and the Government did not choose to take any further steps on assurance given on the behalf of the Society that the irregulatities pointed out by the audit report will be rectified and· proper management would be carried out in future. There was absolutely no reason for Government to have come forward with the proposal of the impugned Ordinance or the impugned Act taking over the management of_,the. Aurovil1e from the Society. The circumstances obtaining on the date of the _impugned Ordinance or the impugned Act were the . relevant consitlerations for the enactment. ·And the earlier report of the audit which bad already been considered by the Government and the irregularities having beeri condoned, tliey cannot be made ihe basis' for the impugned Ordinance or the Act.
For the respondents, however, it is contended that despite the assurance given by the office bearers Of the Society nothing tangible. had been done and the condition of the institution was go.ing froai bad to worse.
c —…. .The Government was involved in this case inasmuch as it was at the instance of the Government that the UNESCO and other members of UNESCO had generously donated for the construction of Auroville, the cultural township to tbe tune of crores of rupees. It was, therefore, a matter of vital concern for the Government of India to see tha\ the donations so generously received from Governmen_t of India and from other States as also from abroad were properly utilised to carry out the mission ·of Shri Autobindo . and the Mother.
In view of the prevailing situation in the Auroville and the ff Society the only way to put the management on the wheels was to take over the management of the institution. c SUPREME COURT RBPoRTS
[1983) 1 s.C.il. It was further contended by Mr. Venugopal that if the management of the institution had been taken over by the· Govern- ment on the .ground of mis-management, there could be other institutions where similar situation might be
prevailing. There should ·have been a general legislation rather than singling out Shri Aurobindo Society for hostile treatment. The argument cannot ·he accepted for two reasons. Firstly, because it has not been pointed out which were the other institutions where similar situations were prevailing. Besides, there is a unique- ness with this institµtion
inasmuch as the Government is also "· · involved. Even a single institution may be taken as a class. The situation prevailing in the Auroville had converted the dream of the Mother into a nightmare. There had arisen acute law and order situation in the Auroville, numerous cases were. pending against various foreigners, the funds meant for the Auroville had been diverted towards ·other purposes and the atmosphere was getting out of hand. In the circumstances the Government intervened and promulgated the Ordinance and later onsubstituted it by the impugned enactment. It cannot be said that it is violative of Article 14 on that account. · We get support for our view from the following decisions.
In Budhan Chow.dhury v. The State of Bihat(1) a Constitution Bench of seven Judges of this Court explained the true meaning and scope of Article 14 as follows : r • "It is now well established that while article 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must· be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia' which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others
left out of the group and, (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to
objects or occupation or the like, What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classifica- tion and the object of the Act u'nder consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that. (I) [1955] I S.C.R. 1045.
s.P. MITIAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substan- tive law but also by a law of procedure." 81~ These observations were quoted with approval by this Court in Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors.(') In this case the Court further laid down :
"(a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account' of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be
treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been
a clear transgression onhe constitutional principles ; (c) that it must be presumed that the legislature under- stands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems. made
manifest by ·experience and that its discriminations ·are based on adequate grounds ; (d) that the legislature is free to'recognise degrees of harm and l°ay confine its restrictions to. those cases where
the need is deemed to be the clearest ; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of consti- tutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, m~tters of c
ommon report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation ; and (f) that while good faith and . knowledge of the existing
conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the .surrounding circumstances brought to the . notice of the court on which .the classification Jllay
reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of (I) [19S9) S.C.R. 279. c c (1983) 1 S.C.R. always holding that there must be some undisclosed
and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation." In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahl and Anr. v. The State of Bihar and Ors.(') the Court of Wards had granted to the appellant a large area of land belonging to the Bettiah Raj which was then under the management of the Court of Wards, on the recommendation of the Board of Revenue, at half the usual rates. The Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restora- tion) Act, 1950 which declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for ·the time being in force the settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void and that no party to the settlement or his successors in interest shall be deemed to · have acquired any right or incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore the lands. The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Act under Article 226. This Court held :
"The· dispute between the appellants and the State was really a private dispute and a matter to be determined ·by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law applicable to the case, and, as the Legislature had, in passing the
impugned enactment singled out the appellants and deprived them of their right to have this dispute adjudicated upon by a duly constituted Court, the enactment c°ontravened the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution which
guarantees to every citizen the equal protection of the laws, and was void. Legislation which singles .out a particular individual from the fallow subjects and visits him with a disability
which is not imposed upon the others and against which even the right of complaint is taken away is highly dis- criminatory." The facts of this case are· distinguishable from the case in hand. In that case. the legislation. was made only for a particular person. .. ··-4
,,.._, Jn the cases in hand on account of the uniqueness of the institution and on account of the involvement of the Govcrnmeni and the fl) [1953] SCR 1129. s.P. MITTAL v. UNION (Misra, J.)
stake being a high one about public funds, Parliament could take a particular institution as. a class by itself. In Ram Chandra' Deb v. The State of Orissa(1) Sri Jagannath Te_mple Act, 1955 was sought to be challenged being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as the legislature bad made a separate Act for a particular temple alone and· there. were adequate provisions iii the Orissa Religious Endowments Act, 1951 which ·was the general· Act applicaple to all public temples and religi<)us institutions and contained adequate provisions to meet all situations. A s.imilar contention ;is raised in the present cases was raised in that case that a particular temple bad been· singled out for hostile discrimination. It was contended that the· Gommissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments bad ample .powers under tlie Act to
frame a scheme for the 'proper management of the temple also and the legislature _by enacting' a separate piece of legislation for the temple alone, ign9ring the other temples· of Orissa such as those at Bhubaneswar where alsci there might be similar administration, bad contravened Article 14. This· argument was, however, repelled by the Orissa High Court with the following observations :
"The principles underlying Art. 14 of the Constitution have been reiterated in ·Several decisions of the Supreme Court and it is unnecessary to repeat . them in detail. All ,,, that that article prohibits is class legislation and not reason' able classification for .the pnrpose of legislation so iong as such classification is not arbitrary and. "bears a rational relation to the object sought t;, be achieved by the statutes · in question" …… .ln Charanjit Lal v . .Union of India (1950 SCR 869) a separate law enacted for one cpmpany was held
not to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution .on ,the ground that ·there were special reasons for passing legislation for that company." c When that case came up in appeal to this Court at ·the instance . of the son of the petitioner, in Raja Birakishore v. The State of Orissaf) this Court held :
"There is no violati.on of Art 14 of the Constl·t~tion. ·The Jagannath Temple occupies a un.ique position in the State of O~issa and is a temple of national importance and (I) AIR 1959 Orissa 5.
(2) [1964] 7 SCR 32. c SUPREME COURT REPOllTS [1983] 1 s.c.k. no other temple in that State can compare with it. It· stands in a class by itself and considering the fact· that it attracts pilgrims from all over India, in large numbers, it could' be the subject of special consideration by the State Government. A law may be constitutional even though it related to a
single individual if on account of special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by him- self."
It was next contended that there were provisions in the Societies Registration Act itself to meet the situation arising in Auroville. There was to necessity for the impugned Ordinance or the enactment. Shri Venugopal referred to the various provisions of the Societies Registration Act to show that it was open to the Registrar to call for an explanation from the Society for any illegality or irregularity committed by them or if there· was . a mis-appropria- tion of funds, inasmuch as the Act was a self-contained Code and there was. absolutely no
justification for any ordinance or the enactment. The law and order situation also could be controlled by resorting to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whether the remedies provided under the Societies Registration Act were sufficient to meet the exigencies of the situation is not for the Court to decide but it is for the Governmeni and if the Govern- ment thought that the conditions prevailiog·in the Auroville and the Society can be ameliorated not by- resorting to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act but by a special enactment, that is an area of the Government and not of the Court.
Para 6 of the P!eamble of the Act. gives the reasons for the enactment. It reads : "AND whereas pursuant to the complaints received with regard to mis-use of funds by Shri Aurobindo Society, a
· ComllJitlee was set up under the Chairmanship of the Lt. Governor of Pondicherry with representatives of the Government of Tamil Nadu and of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the Central Government, and the said Committee
had after detailed scrutiny of the accounts of Sri Aurobindo Society found instances of serious irregularities in the management of the said Society, mis-utilisation of its funds and their diversion to other purposes."
…. t s.:I>. MlTTA(; v. UNION (Misra, I.) . S19 On the basis of para 6 of the preamble it is argued that the grounds given were non-existant at the time of the impugned Ordinance or the enactment and, therefore, the law made on that basis itself is bad.
We are afraid the argument has no substance. Obviously, there were serious irregularities in the management of the said Society as· has been pointed out in the earlier part of the judgment. There has been misutilisation of funds and their diversion to other purposes. This is evident from the audit report. There was rio material change in the situation on the date of the impugned ordi- nance ·or the Act; rather the situation had grown from bad to worse and the sordid situation p~evailing iu the Auro~ille so pointed out by the parties fuily justified the promulgation of the Ordinance and· the passing of the enactment. Of course, each party tried to apportion the blame on the other. Whosoever be responsible, the fact remaips that the prevailing situation in the Auroville was far from satisfac· tory. The amount donated for the construction of the cultural township Auroville and other institutions was to the tune of Rs. 3 crores. It was the responsibility of the Government to see that the amount was not mis·utilised and the. management was properly carried out. So, the basis of.the argument that the facts as pointed out in the preamble were no~ est is not correct.
Mr. Venugopal tried to explain the various adverse remarks made by the aud_iiors. On a perusal of the audit report, which. is a voluminous one, all we can say is that on the facts found by the audit committee, the report is rather a mild one.
There seems to be serious irregularities in the accounts. A substantial amount received by way of donation.s bad not been pr\iperly spent, there being mis· utilisation and diversion of the funds.
The Attorney·General appearing for the Union of India con· tended that even assuming for the sake of argument, but not con· ceding thattbe facts brought to the notice of the legislature were c
wrong, it will not be open to the Court to hold the Act to be bad on. that account. We ·find considerable force in this contention. The Court would' not do so even in case of a litigation which has become final on the ground that the facis or the evidence produced in the case were not correct. The Parliament had to apply its mind on _the facts before it.
c ~20 : SUPREME rotni.t RB~Ol!.ts (198~] I s.<:.!l. The Attorney-General also raised a sort of preliminary objec- tion on behalf of the Union of India, thai-in view of Art. 31A the petitioners could not challenge the Act on the ground of contraven· tion of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
In so far as it is material for the purposes of this case, Art. 3 lA reads : "3IA. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no Jaw providing for- (a) ……………………………………………….. ' .. (b) the taking over of the management of any property by
the State for a limit~d period either in the public interest or in order to assure the proper management of the property, (c) ………………………………………………. . (d) ……………………………. .
(e) …………………………………………………………… .. shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsis- tent with, ·or takes away or abridges any of the rights
conferrea by article 14 or article 19." We find this argument to be plansible but instead of expressing any concluded opinion on this point we preferred to deal with the various contentions raised by Mr. Venugopal on Art. 14 of the. Constitution in view of the importance of the _question involved in this case.
A subsidiary point was further submitted by Mr .. Venugopal that no qualifications have been prescribed and, iherefore any person could be appointed as an Administrator. We can normally assume
that the Government would certainly appoint a responsible person as an administrator especially when there is a heavy stake in which the Government of India is also involved inasmuch as at the instance of the Government the UNESCO gave financial support to the institution.
It was further submitted that the report of the Commiitee was a tainted one as the Chairman, Kulkarni and the Secretary were parties. There is no foundation ·for this submission. / j.
S.P, MIITAL v. UNION (Misra, J.) We, therefore,. hold that the impqgned Ordinance. or the impugned Act is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Now we tum to the last but not the least important ground of . ma/a fides.
The Act is sought to be challenged on the ground that it is 'rriala fide. This argument is on the basis. that Kirit Joshi, who had his own axe to grind in the matter, was instrumental in getting the imp.ugned Ordinance and the Act passed. Th.is argument bas been advanced only fo be rejected.
Allegations about ma/a fides are more easily made than made out. It will be too much to contend · that Kirit Joshi, who was only an Educational Adviser to the Government of India, . Ministry of Education and Culture (Depart· ment of Educatio'!), was responsible for the impugned enactment. The impugned enactment was passed following the due procedure and merely because he made a complaint about the situatfon pre- vailing in the management of Auroville .and the Society, it cannot be said that the impugned enactment .was passed at his behest. For the reasons given above all the writ petitions must fail. In view of the final decision on the writ P.etitions themselves, it is. not necessary to pass any specific order in the appeal filed agafost the interim order in one of the writ petitions. The' parties in the . · ·circumstances of the case are left to bear their own costs. S.R.
Petitions dismissed. c