Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
26. With regard to the delay of about 6 days in presenting the complaint to the SHO, this Court is of the view that the same has been duly explained. In a tradition-bound non-permissive society in India, it would be extremely reluctant to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect upon chastity of a woman had occurred, being conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down by the c c society. In the instant case, the victim-Ms. Ruchika not informing about the incident to the parents under the circumstances that the appellant- accused; who being a very senior police officer of the State, was reasonable and it would not have been an easy decision for her to speak out. In the normal course of human conduct, this unmarried minor girl, would not like to give publicity to the traumatic experience she has undergone and felt terribly embarrassed in relation to the incident to narrate it to her parents and others overpowered by a feeling of shame and her natural inclination would be to avoid talking about it to anyone, lest the family name and honour is brought into controversy. After informing the incident to her parents, the follow up action was immediately taken by the residents and the fellow players and a Memorandum containing allegations against the appellant-accused was prepared and submitted before the then Secretary (Home). Therefore, giving a due consideration to the appellant-accused, once the victim and her family members got assurance of justice from the superior authorities, they lodged a formal complaint against the appellant-accused.
27. With regard to the contention ofleamed senior counsel for the appellant-accused that the signature of Ms. Ruchika on the Memorandum was forged though she signed the same in front of Shri Anand Prakash, Shri S.C. Girhotra, Ms. Aradhana and Mrs. Madhu Prakash and they have admitted the same, we are of the opinion that expert evidence as to handwriting is only opinion evidence and it can never be conclusive. Acting on the evidence ofany expert, it is usually to see ifthat evidence is corroborated either by clear, direct or circumstantial evidence. The sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not normally sufficient for recording a definite finding about the writing being of a certain person or not. A court is competent to compare the disputed writing of a person with others which are admitted or proved to be his writings. It may not be safe for a court to record a finding about a person's writing in a certain document merely on the basis of expert comparison, but a court can itself compare the writings in order to appreciate properly the other evidence produced before it in that regard. The opinion of a handwriting expert is also relevant in view of Section 45 of the Evidence Act, but that too is not conclusive. It has also been held by this Court in a catena of cases that the sole evidence of a handwriting expert is not normally sufficient for recording a definite finding about the writing being of a certain person or not. It follows that it is not essential that the handwriting expert must be examined in a case to prove or disprove the disputed S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. [R. K. AGRAWAL, J.] writing. It is opinion evidence and it can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated either by clear, direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
28. In Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. Tile State of Bombay AIR 1957 SC 857, this Court has held as under:- "! I. …. Learned counsel objected to this approach on a question of proof. We are, however, unable to see any objection. The proof of the genuineness of a document is proof of the authorship of the document and is proof of a fact like that of any other fact. The evidence relating thereto may be direct or circumstantial. It may consist of direct evidence of a person who saw the document being written or the signature being affixed. It may be proof of the handwriting of the contents, or of the signature, by one of the modes provided in Sections45 and 47 of the Indian Evidence Act. It may also be proved by internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document. This last mode of proof by the contents may be of considerable value where the disputed document purports to be a link in a chain of correspondence, some links in which are proved to the satisfaction of the court. In such a situation the person who is the recipient of the document, be iteither a letter or a telegram, would be in a reasonably good position both with reference to his prior knowledge of the writing or the signature of the alleged sender limited though it may be, as also his knowledge of the subject matter of the chain of correspondence, to speak to its authorship. In an appropriate case the court may also be in a position to judge whether the document constitutes a genuine link in the chain of correspondence and thus to determine its authorship. We are unable, therefore, to say that the approach adopted by the courts below in arriving at the conclusion that the letters are genuine is open to any serious legal objection. The question, if any, can only be as to the adequacy of the material on which the conclusion as to the genuineness of the letters is arrived at. That however is a matter which we cannot permit to be canvassed before us.
29. In Smt. Bliagwan Kaur vs. Sllri Maharaj Krislian Sliarma And Otliers ( 1973) 4 SCC 46, this Court held as under:- c "26. It is no doubt true that the prosecution led evidence of c handwriting expert to show the similarity of handwriting between (PW I/ A) and other admitted writings of the deceased, but in this respect, we are of the opinion that in view of the main essential features of the case, not much value can be attached to the expert evidence. The evidence of a handwriting expert, uni ike that of a fingerprint expert, is generally of a frail character and its fallibilities have been quite often noticed The courts should, therefore, be wary to give too much weight to the evidence of handwriting expert. In Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat this Court observed that conclusions based upon mere comparison of handwriting must at best be indecisive and yield to the positive evidence in the case."
30. It is thus clear that uncorroborated evidence of a hand writing expert is an extremely weak type of evidence and the same should not be relied upon either for the conviction or for acquittal. The courts, should, therefore, be wary to give too much weight to the evidence of handwriting expert. It can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated either by clear, direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
31. It is the claim of learned senior counsel for the appellant- accused that the present case is fabricated and a result of the rivalry between HLTA and HTA. Further, Shri Anand Prakash has derived professional benefit from this exercise besides venting his longstanding grudge against the appellant-accused. It does not stand to logic that having regard to the Indian social set up, any father would let his daughter's honour and reputation be damaged merely because one of his associate has his own agenda against the appellant-accused. However, each case has to be determined on the touchstone of the factual matrix thereof. In the instant case, there is nothing on record on the basis of which it can be said that the tender age of the victim was exploited for the benefit of Shri Anand Prakash (PW-I)
32. With regard to the contention of learned senior counsel that non-exam_ination of two important site witnesses viz., Shri Paltoo-the ball picker and Shri T.Thomas-the Coach draws adverse inference against the prosecution, the High Court has rightly held that adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. We are also of the opinion that they were not in any way connected with the ,_ S. P. S. RATHORE v. C.B.I. & ANR. [R. K. AGRAWAL, J.] actual commission of offence and even in their absence, the commission of the offence of molestation by the appellant-accused stands well proved by the unimpeachable testimony of the eye witness (PW-13) to the incident.
33. No particular number of witnesses is required for proving a certain fact. It is the quality and not the quantity of the witnesses that matters. Evidence is weighed and not counted. Evidence of even a single eye witness, truthful, consistent and inspiring confidence is sufficient for maintaining conviction. It is not necessary that all those persons who were present at the spot must be examined by the prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused. Having examined all the witnesses, even if other persons present nearby not examined, the evidence of eye- witness cannot be discarded.
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that Ms. Aradhana (PW-13) withstood her testimony from beginning till the end and her deposition was found reliable and corroborative with other prosecution witnesses and both the courts below were right in upholding the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 354 of the IPC.
35. With regard to sentence of the appellant-accused, learned senior counsel on his behalf has pointed out certain mitigating factors which are – old age of the appellant-accused, health ailments, responsibility of looking after the unmarried daughter suffering from congenital heart disease, past meritorious service and prolonged trial. Keeping in view the aforementioned factors especially the old age and physical condition of the appellant-accused, we do not think it expedient to put him back in jail. While we uphold the findings as to the guilt of the appellant-accused, we are.of the opinion that the cause of justice would be best sub-served when the sentence of the appellant-accused would be altered to the period already undergone. We, therefore, reduce the sentence of the appellant to the period already undergone by him as a special case considering his very advanced age.
36. In view of the foregoing discussion, we confirm the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 354 of the IPC while modifying the sentence to the period already undergone. The appeal is disposed of with the above terms. Devika Gujral Appeal disposed of. c