111!1 Tiu Colltclor of Cwtoms, M.adrtu v. N .ih.lla Sampalhu Cllltty AJ7an1ar ]. HMI S1Jltmber 25. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] Criminal Appoals No. 33 of 1959, No. 126 of 1959, No. 123 of 1959, Civil Appeal No. 5ll of
1960 and Writ Petition No. ll8 of 1958 were not heard on the merits and wo havo not oxamined the_f~cta of any of those cases. Those appeals and petitions should, therofore, be posted for hearing
in the usual oourse. Appeals ooa. 408 ond 40~ alloww. Appeal 110. 410 dism1'.ssed. RAKAL PAPERS (P) LTD., AND OTHERS v. THE UNIOX OF INDIA (B. P. SINHA, c. J., A.K. SARKAR, K.C.DASGUPTA,
N. RA.JAGOPAJ,A AYYA:<'OAR and J. R. MunHOLKAH, JJ.) Fundatnmtal Right-Fretdom of •puch-Statut. rti}ulating number of pag'8 in ntw•paper according to price charg<d- Go1 … titutio114lity of-N•w•paper (I'ri" and /'a~e) Act, 1956 (46 of 1966)-Daily New•paper (Priu and Page) Ord'", 1960-
Co …. tittition of India, Art. 19 (1) (a). The Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, empowered the Central Government to regulate the prices of newspapers in relation to their pagec; and sizes and to regulate the alloca- tion of space for advertising matter.
u~der this Act the Central Government marle the Daily Ncw,papers (Price and Page) Order, 1960, thereby fixing the maximum number of pages that might be published by a newspaper according to
the price charged and prescribing the number of >upplements that could be issued. The petitioner challenged the Act and the order as contravening Art. 1 q (1) (a) of the Constitu-
tion. 1/i/4, that the Act and the Order were void as they violated Art I 9(1) (a) of the Constitution and v.ere not saved by Art. 19(2). The freedom of speech and expression guaran- teed by Art. 19(1) (a) included the freedom of the prm. For • …..,_
propagating his ideas a citiz~n had the right to publish them, to di.5$emlnate them and to circulate them, either by word of mouth or by writing. The right extended not merely to the
matter which he was entitled to circulate but also to the 3 S.C.R. volume of circulation. The impugned Act and Order placed restraints on the latter aspect of the right. But its very object the Act was directed against circulation and thus interfered with the freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) did not permit the State to abridge this right in the interests of tho general public.
Brij Bhushan v. The Siate of Delhi, [! 950] S. C. R. 605 Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India, (!959j S. C. R. 12, Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras [1950] S.C.R. 594, State of Madras v. V. G. Row, [1952] S. C. R. 597,
Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur & Weaving Co.,Ltcl. [1954] S. C. R. 674, Virendra v. The State of Punjab, cl958J S. C.R. 308 and IIamdard Dawakhana (wakf) v. Union of India, [19601 2 S. C. R. 671, referred to.
Held, further, that the State could not make a law which directly restricted one guaranteed freedom for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. Freedom of speech could not be restricted for the purpose of regulating the com· mercial aspect of the activities of newspapers.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 331 of 1960 and 67-68 of 1961. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement c.f Fundamental Rights. G. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer, S. S. Shukla
and G. Gopalakrishnan for tbe petitioners. M. G, Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen, R.H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respon- dent. H.P. Nathwani, J. B. Jadachanji, S. N. Andley,
Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent No. 1. J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath andP. L. Vohra, for the interveners Nos. 2 and 6. K. R. Ghoudhri, for intervener No. 3.
S. T. Desai, TE. Udayarathnam andS. S. Shukla, for intervener No. 4. W. S. Barlingay and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for intervener No. 5. S. T. Desai, E. Udayarathnam and S.S. Shukla, for the petitioners (In petitions N cs. 67 and 68
of 1961). Sakal Papm (P} Ltd., v. Thi Unfon 6/ India 196/ SoAa/ Pope!!, (I)) /4d., v. Th~ L'nion oj /qfia Mlldlio/J.ar J, S·U SUPREME G'OC.:RT REPORTS [I Uu2) 1961. September 25. The Jmlgmcut of the
Comt was delivered Ly .'lkDHOLKAR, .J.-A matter of far-reaching impo!lancc affecting the freedom of the pre8s is raisl'd i11 these three petiti011s when·in the eonstitu· tionulity of the Ne\\'spaper (Price and Page) Act,
19iiu, and the Daily ~cwspapcr (Price and Page) Order, I UuO, is questioned. The first petition is Ly 1~ prirnte limit(•<l company eanying on businc"s inter alia uf publish- ing daily and \\'t'('kly newspapers in Marathi named
"Sakal" from Poona and by two p(•rHons who arc the only shar<'huld.,rs in that company. The second and third petitions are proferred by two readers of "Sakal" who also challenge the constitutionality of
the Act. CerLcin partic~ wNe allowed to intervene. They dupporte(I the l'nion of India, th(' rc8pondcnt, in all these pet itio11s and Bought to uphold tho validity of the A"t and the Order.
Jn vil·11· of the commo11 argum<'nt addu(·cd bl'fore us it would be conv<'nient to deal with the firtit pctiti"n only in full. The newspaper ":::iakal'' was started i11 the year JU:!2 and it iR dainwd that it has a net circula-
tion of 3~,000 copies on wcck <lays and Gu,000 copies on Sunclays in Maharnsht rn and Karnataka and as such plays a loading part i11 the diHBemination of news and vic11s and in moulrling public opinion in
m&ttcrH of public intcn•st. The daily ad<litio11 of the 11ewspapor contains sii: pages a day for five duye i11 a week and four pages on one day. This editio11 is priced at 7 nP. The S1111day edition consists of ten pages and is
priced at 12nP. Ahout .JU% of the space in thencws- papnr is taken up by advertisement matt.er and the rest is devoted to news, u rt icks, features, views et-0. It is claimed on behalf of the petiti• ·11ers that on~
of the special featuics of the newspaper is coverage of foreign 11e1\'ti anrl despatches "11 foreign affairs. It i~ claim ct! on lwh;df of th(' pcti1 ioncrs tlrnt this 3 S.C.H. paper is not aligned with any political party and
that upon controversial questions the public look up to it for impartial appraisemem of the issues involved and for guidance. Briefly stated the effect of the Act and of the impugned Order is to regulate the number of pages
according to the price charged, prescribe the number of supplements to be published and prohibit the publication and sale of newspapers in contravention of a11y Order made under s. :l of the Act.
The Act also provides for rngulating by an Order under s. 3, the siZPs and area of advertising matter in relation to the other matters contained in a newspaper. Penalties are also prescribed for contravention of
the provision of the Act or Order. We may mention here that in the year 1952 tho Government of India appointed a Press Commis- sion for enquiring into a large number of matters concerning the Press and one of the recommenda-
tions of the Commission was to enact a law such as the one impugned bet'ore us. This law is alleged by the rnspondent to have been made to give effect to that recommendation. Both the sides place
reliance upon the finding of the Press Commission and ha.ve invited us to accept these findings, though not necessarily the recommendations. The petitioners point out that since the total
number of pages which "Sakal'' gives to its reading public on six days in a. week is 34, and that as a result of the impugned Order they will either have to raise its price from 7 nP. to 8 nP. per day or
to reduce the total number of pages to 24. They further point out that while at present all news- papers can islue any number of supplements as and when they choose, under the Order they would be
prevented from doing so except with the permission of the Government. According to them the Order would have the effect of either compelling them to increase the price or to reduce the number of pages
of practically every newspaper in the country as Sakal Papm (P) Ltd., v. The Unicn of India Mudholkar J. SaAaJ Paptrs (I') L!d., v. Tht L'11io11 of lndi·1 M udholkrzr J. also of preventing them from publishing supple-
ments without extraneous restrictions, which they arc a.hie to do at present. It is the petitioners' case that the impugned Act a11d the impugned Order are pieces of legislation designed to curtail a.nd which would in
effect curt.ail the freedom of the press and as such arc violati\·e of the right guaranteed under Art..19( l )(a) of the Constitution. They point out that if they continue to give in their newspaper the same
number of pa.gos as at present, they would have to increasP itii selling price and that this will adversely aff~ct its circulation. If, on the other hand, they red nee the number of pages in order to conform to the
impugned order their right to disseminato news and vim\'S \\ill b<' dirrrtly inkrfored with. Thus in either l'V<•i.t. there will be 1m interference with their right under Art. I U( I )la) of the Constitution.
The petitioners point out that the impuguod Order resen·c~ tt> th<> Central GO\'t!l'ilment the power to permit i~su< of supplements, 1·xePpt those on January :!fl and August 15, and
th .. t the result of this would be to place them at tho mercy of the Government and thus interfere with their freedom of expn'8sion. They further puintout that the Act and the Ordor are violative of the provisions of Art. 14 of
the Collstitution inasmuch UM their avowed object is to promote arbitrarily the interests of some news- paper at the expcme of others. They contend that inequality i,; writ hrge in the provisions of tho
Aot and of the Order and that thorc is no reason- able classification or ba,i,is or auv mtional relation- ship between the restrictions ·imposed and tho objects sought to be achieved.
According to them, while thti established newspapers will be hardly affect<'d by these provisions those that are endeavouring to come up will be h~mpere<l in their progress. i 3 S.O.R.
On behalf of the respondent, the Union of India, in the Ministry of Information and Broad- casting, while it is admitted that the object of the Act is to regulate the prices charged for newspapers
in relation to their pages, it is pointed out that thia is bein" done to prevent unfair competition amongst ne;,spapers as also to prevent the rise of monopolistic combines so that newspapers may have
fair opportunities of freer discussion. The effect of the provisions of the Act is said to be to provide for the maximum matter which a newspaper could make available to the public at a certain price and
that this does not in any way restrict the rights of the petitioners to propagate their ideas. The respondent, while admitting that by the operation of the impugned Order a limitation is placed on the
space which a newspaper would be able to devote to the propagation of its ideas and to news, says that it would be open to those newspapers to increase the space by raising the price. According
to the respondent the circulation of a newspaper will not be adversely affected by raising its price. It is then contended that even if the circulation is adversely affected thereby the fundamental rights of
the newspaper propritors guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(a) of the Constitution will not be infringed. It is also contended that the legislation in question does not directly or indirectly deal with the subject of
freedom of speech and expression and that conse- quently no question of the violation of the provi- sions of Art. 19(l)(a) at all arises. The effect of the Act and the Order, according to the respondent,
would be to promote further the right of news- papers in gene.ral to exercise the freedom of speech and expression. Thus, according to the respondent, n?.ither the intention nor the effect of the operation
of the law is to take away or abridge the freedom of speech and expression of the petitioners. It is further pointed out that all newspapers publish advertisements and that this is a trading
activity. It is, therefore, necessary to differentiate Sakal P«p1rs (P1 Ltd. v. The Union of India .AJuihtJ,k,,r J. Sakal Papn:; (P} l.Jd .• v. 7 },, c.:mon of b.dia Mudholkar J. SUPRE:\lE COUHT REPORTS
[1962] between this activity and a.n activity which would fall under ArL. 19( I }(a). The impugned Act and tho Onler, according to the rospondent provide in the public intorcst for
rostrictions on the tradin" activity uf newspaµcrs. It is pointed out that tho spa.cc 1dlucatcd tu advertis1'11lcnts by newttpapers varil's from 4 u% to ii!i% and t.hat these advertise·
m(•lJb bring in a substantial re\·cnuc which enables the ncwopapers to lie sold at. a price lwlow the cost of pr<>rluction. Placing reli1mcc upon the statemrnt containt:d in the Ropurt of the Press CummiHsion it
is cuntcwled Pll behalf of the re~pondent that news- f'"lpern of long Htallding which ha\·e built up a large and stable ad n·rt iscment rev(·nue being in a more 1i(lva11tagPous position than newcomers in the fi<'ld
of journalism arc in a position to S<pwew out such ncw<·omcrs with the result that tlwv arc able to dc;troy tho frl·c·dom of l'Xpn·;;sinn ~f others. fr.,o press, it is said, cannot mean a press composed
of a few powl'rfnl com bin!'S and that in order to ensure freedom of press it is necessary to securo full scope for the full development of smaller nows- pa pcrs. It is furth('r pointPd out on behalf of tho
respondent that the diminution of advertisemont revl'nUP which "uulcl rrsult from the operation of the Price Page Sthedulc cannot be regarded as an infringement of the right under
Art. 19( I )(a). According to the respondent the economics of newspapers and the maximum number of pages that a paper can give with a reasonablo margin for advertisement space was worked out
by the Press CommisHion which al•o suggustc I a tentative Price Pago Schedule. In formulating the schedule the Pres~ Commission took into nccount various factors such as cost of (I) newR·
print, (2) composin!Z and printing, (3) distribution, (4) commission payable, (5) oditorial and ma.nag- crial oxpcnsns and (6) general overhead charges. Tile present Price Page Schedule is said to be based
upon the ono formulated by the Press Commission. _, • '. – .. liill 3 S.C.R. It is further stated that the present measures have been adopted upon the recommendation of the Press Commission which after stating that the proper
functioning of democracy requires that every individual should have equal opportunity to put forward his opinions suggested that measures should be adopted to reduce the differences duo to economic
advantages and other caust•s to enable newcomers to start with a fair ch1nce of success. It is with this end in view that the present rates are stated to have been prescribed. The respondent further
points out that the bulk of the Indian language newspapers priced at 7nP. will not find any difficulty whatsoever in conforming to the requirements of the order because they give five or less than five
pages on week days. Only· a few newspapers will be remotely affected by the order but in their case the issue of large number of pages is due to factors not connected with the functioning of the freedom
of speech and expression but for reasons connected with their business activities. Newsp:tpers, according to the respondent, are able to give more pages because of their large advertisement revenue
or because they belong to a group or chain of newspapers which do not entirely depend upon the individual income of each newspaper. It is said that the petitioners in particular are able to give additional number of pages because
they devote a larger volume of space to advertise- ments th'ln others and that this is not something done in the lawful exercise of their right of freedom of speech and expression or of the right of dissemina-
tion of news and views. It is, however, as already stated, admitted on behalf of the respondent that a newspaper is a product sold below the cost of production. The conclusion suggested hy the res-
pondent is that it is only by increasing the revenue from advertisement that a newspaper can increase the number of its pages. According to the respondent, the true purpose of the impugned legiolation being the prevention
Sakal PaptrJ (P} Ltd., v. The Union of India Jt.fudh1Jlkar J. Sakal PoJJm (P) Lid., The Urri~ of lr.dia II """/Jr" J. [1962] of unfair competition which has rPsulted in denying to others a right of propagation of idea.s by publish-
ing newspapers, this legislation cannot be said to infring" the right of freedom of expression of a newspaper but on the other hand said to bo one which promotes and encourages hcalhty journalism.
The impugned pro" tsions will, according to the rcspomlc·nt, affect only those dasHCS of newspapers which unfairly compete with the smaller onl'-a kind ',f competition which is considered by tho
Press Commi~sion ati unh"althy and against the interests of healthy journalism in a growing demo- cracy. It i8 then Haid that "it is necessary to aYoid unfair competition and even to promote
h('althy competition that papers have to ho put 011 a criteria of equality anrl that thi8 could only be domi by directly restricting the publication cif large• number of pages a; against tho price ch:uged."
Then it is contended that what is aimed at by the impugned legislation is the a.voidanco of concentra- tion of ownership without interfering with healthy competition between equals equally situated.
It is further stated that not univ was tho statute enacted on the recommendation of the Press Commission but that tho Price Pago Schedule itself was introduced in response to the demand
pressed by the Indian Language Newspapers Association. It is pointed out on behalf of the respondent that tho quantity of import of newsprint is based on tho average number of pages of news-
papers published in 1957 and that, therefore, 110 newspaper has tho unrestricted right to incnaso the number of pages over the I !J57 figure. It is also pointed out that the draft Price Pa.go Schedule
has been approved by the Indian Language News- papers Association and that this Association has recommended that the life of the Price Page Act and Order shcJUld bo extended by another five to
ten yea.rs. It is denird that the provisions of the Act infringe the rights conferred by Art. 14 of the Constitution. 3 S.C.R. We have already indicated earlier, briefly, the effect of the impugned Act and the Order. In
order to appreciate fully the contentions raised before us it would be usefnl to give in brief a summary of the provisions of the Act and of the impugned Order. First, there is the preamble which says that
the object of the Act is to secure to newspapers fuller opportunities of freedom of expression by preventing unfair competition. This is sought to be achieved by the regulation of prices charged
for newspapers in relation to their pages. In this manner the legislature expects to prevent unfair competition among newspapers. Sub·section 3 of s. 1 provides that the Act shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a
period of five years from its commencement except as reRpects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration. The Act came into force on September 7, 1956 and was thus du'l to expire
on September 6, 1961. The Attorney-General, however, told us that it was proposed to extend to the life of the Act by a further period of five years and we understand that its life has now been ex.
tended for an indefinite period. Section 2 defines "daily newspapr,r" and "newspaper". Section 3 is the most important provieion in the Act. It is this provision which empowers the
Central Government to regulate prices and pages of newspapers. Sub-section ( 1) of s. 3 empowers the Central Government to regulate the prices of nevrs- papers in relation to their pages and sizes if it is of
opinion that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of preventing unfair competition among newspapers and in particular those published in Indian languages. It also 'cmpowern the Government to
regulate the allocation of space to be allotted for advertising matter. Sub-section (2) of that section provides for an order under sub-s. (1) to be made in relation to newspapers generally or in relation to
Sakal Papm (P) Ltd., v. The Union of Iniia M udho!kar J. S1.kr.! /' •. ftn (P} Ltd, ffit [ 011fr11 <.J.f fnJi•I M 1u!f:.,,fL11 .I. [Hl62) any class of new8paperR and further provideR for
the making of diffor1·nt provbiom for daily ncws- p:tp1•rs and 11<'WSJlllJlPl'8 appParin~ at otlH'r pcrio11ical intvrvab aA "ell as for different dasA<'s of news- papern. ~uli R<'Ction (:l) provides that tlw CL'ntral
l;owrnment, in rnakin~ t.110 Order, shall have due n•gard t<> a rraHonalile flexil1ility with r1·:;pN:t to the fall of news and flow of a1lvertis1·m!'J1ts and other mattBrs eonnect• d with the normal working of
newspapers. Sub-section i4) makes it obligutory upon thn C1:ntral Goverment to consult asHoc:iations of pul.iJi,,Ju·rs and su .. h pu bli•hcrs as am likely to be affected by the Onkr as it may think fit with respect
to the action proposed to Im tak1•n. Section 4 prohibit~ publication or sale of newspapers in tbu territmie8 to whiPh the Act t'xtends in contraven- tion of <lllY of the provisions of an order made
undn s. :i. Section 6 provides for furnishing rPtnrns by newspapers to the Press Registrar. Sub-section ( l) of s. G proddes penalties for publication and salo of ne1n,papers in c<•ntravention of the provisions of
s. 4. Sub·section (2) of s. G provid1·s prnaltics for some oth"r contraventions with which we are not conccrnecl. Se<•tion 7, which is th!.' last section, prohibits the Court. from taking cognizance of
offences under the Act excopt upon a <·omplaiut in writing by tlw Pr<·ss Rcgi~trar or hy an officer anth•JriHed by him. It will thus be seen that tho Act c.an be brought into practical operation only after tho
Ccntr 1 I GovcrnmPnt has taken action under snb-s. (I) of R. 3 and made an order r1•g11htin,!! any of the matt.NB refPrre<I to in that section. On Octob1·r 24, J!)(lO in exercise of the powers
confrrrcd by s. 3 the Central Government, after consultation with t.hc Association of Newspapers and Publisher" likely to be affected thcreundn, made the Daily Newspapern (Price and Page) Order, I!HlO.
This Order came into forco on December 12, 1960. It contains a schedule to the Act which is in two _.,._ 38.C.R. Parts, Part I and Part II. Part I ap]Jlies to daily newspapers published on six days in a week and
Part II applies to weeklies. Paragraph 3 of the Order provides that where the price charged for daily newspapers is any of the prices specified in col. 1 of Part I of the Schedule the total number
of pages of all the issues of that newspaper publish- ed during six days in a week ~hall not exceed the maximum number of pages shown against that price in that part. Paragraph 4 deals with weekly
editions of daily newspapers. Paragraph 5 provides that the total num her of p~ges of all the issues of a daily newspaper published shall not exceed the maximum number of pages assigned under para-
graphs 3 and 4 or under paragraph 3, according as the newspaper is published on seven days in a wePk or on six days. Then there is a proviso to this paragraph which runs thus : "Provided that where there is a weekly
edition of any newspaper referred to in clause (b} and the price charged therefor is different from that charged on other days, the total number of pages of all the issues of that
newspaper published during a week shall not exceed the maximum number of pages assign- ed to such J\ewspapnr under paragraph 4 and five-8ixths of the maximu u number of pages assigned to it under paragraph 3."
Paragraph 6 permits the publication of additional number of pages during the week not, exceeding six. Paragraph 7 permits the publication of supplements on January 26 and August 15 eaeh year and also
once in every quarter on such special occasion as the publisher thinks fit. Paragraph 8 empowers the Central Government to permit the publication of additional supplem ,nts or special editions in
excess of those referred to in paragraph 7 and prescribes the number of pages which could be published. Paragraph 9 relaxes to a certain extent the rigour of the provisions of paragraphs 4 to 6,
Sakal Papers {P) Ltd, v. The Union of India ..\111dholkar J. SIA.I Papm (P) Lid., v. Th. L'm"on of India M uJhalkar J. (1962) in that it prO\'idcs that the daily newspaper shall not be rlcemed to havo contravened the provisions
of the Order unleso; the number of pages of all tho issues of that newspaper pu bli8hod during any period of twelve comccuti\·o weeks exceeds the quota assign<'d to such newspaper during that
period. A barn perusal of tho Act and the Order thus makes it abundantly clear that the right of a news- pa(ll·r to publish news and views and to utilise as many pages as it likes for that purpose is made to
depend upon thl' price charged to tho readers. Prior to the promulgation of the Order every news- paper was free to ~barge whatever price it chose, and thus had ii right unhampered hy State regula-
tion to publish news and views. This liberty is obviously interfered with by the Order which provides for tho maximum number of pages for tho partieular price cha,rged. The question is whether
this amounta to any abridgment of the right of a new&paper to freedom of expression. Our Constitu- tion rloe~ not expressly provide for the freedom of preS!' but it has been held by this Court that thie
freedom is included in "freedom of Hpeech and expression" guaranteed by cl. (!)(a) of Art. l!J, vitle Brij /ihushan v. The State of Delhi('). This freodom is not absolute for, cl. (2) of Art. Hl permits restric-
tions being placed upon it in certain circumstances. That clau~e runs thus : "Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (I) 1ball affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the Stato from making any law, in
so far aR such law imposes reasonable restric- tions on the exercise of the right conferred by the sairl sub-clause in tho interest& of the security of tho Stnto, friendly relations with
foreign State8, public order, decency or morali- ty, or in relation to contempt of court, defama- tion or incitc-ment to an offcnre." (I) [1950]S.C.R. 605,610, ,I • :i s.c.:B.. SUPR:liJME COURT REPOR'f'S
It is not claimed on behalf of the State that either the Act or the Order made thereunder can be justified by any of the circumstances set out in this clause. The right to propagate one's ideas is in-
herent in the conception of freedom of speech and expression. For the purpose of propagating his ideas every citizen has a right to publish them, to disseminate them and to circulate them. He is
entitled to do so either by word of mouth or by writing. The right g1nranteed thus extends, subject to any law competent under Art. 19(2), not merely to theimatter which he is entitled to circulate, but
also to the volume of circulation. In other words, the'; citizen is entitled to propagate his views and reach any class and number of readers as he choses subject of course to the limitations permissible
under a law competent under Art. 19(2). It cannot be gainsaid that the impugned order seeks to place a restraint on the latter aspect of the right by prescribing a price page schedule. We may add
that the fixation of a minimum price for the number of pages which a newspaper is entitled to publish is obviously not for ensuring a reasonable price to the buy,irs of newspapers but for expressly cutting
down the volume of circulation of some newspapers by making the price so unattractively high for a class of its readers as is likely to deter it from pur- chasing such newspapers.
It is not disputed that every newspaper evolves a plan of its own for carrying on its activi- ties. Bearing in mind factors such as the place of publication, the class of the reading public which
may be excepted to subscribe to the pqper, the conditions of labour, the price of material, the availability of advertisements and so on it decides upon its size, the proportion of different kinds of
matter published in the newspaper, such as news, comments, views. of readers, advertisements etc., and the price to be charged. The plan evolved by it is sought to be rudely shaken if not completely
upset by an order which it is open to the Central S•k•l Papers (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India Mudholkar J. 19Gl Salial Papm (I') u1. Tiu Union of India J/~d~olktu J. SUPREME COD.RT REPORTS
(l!l62) Government to mako under s. 3(1) with a view to curtailment of circulation of newspapers. No doubt, under s. 3( 4) the Government is required to consult assoriations of publishers. Apart from tho fact
that tho Government is not bound by the opinion of the associations, the mere circumstance that consultation with them is made obligatory, the action of the Government in formulating nn order
does not cease to be a direct interference with the freedom of speech and expression of 11 citizen. Aftor tho sclwdulo comes into force it will not be open to a newspaper proprietor to charge less
than a certain minimum prico if ho wants to give a particular number of pagos in his newspaper. If ho should contravene this ordor he will incur a penalty. Similurly he cannot publish supplements in excess
of four as and when ho chooses, except with the permission of Government. The Order doos not indicate the circumstances which would entitle a newspaper proprietor to secure tho special permis-
sion of Government. Apparently, whether to allow an additional supplement or not would bo dependent on tho sweet will and pkasure of tho Government and this would necessarily strike 11t tho root of tho
independence of the press. In Express Newspapers (Prit-ate) Ltd., v. The Union of India(') this Court has laid down that while there is no immunity to tho press from the operation of the general laws it would not be
legitimate to subject tho press to laws which take away ur abridge the freedom of speech and expres- sion or adopt measures calculated and intended to curtail circulation and thereby narrow the scope of
dissemination of information or fetter it.a freedom to chooso its means of exorcising tho right or would undermine its independence by driving it to soek Government aid. This Court further pointed out
that a law which lays upon the Press excessive and prohibitive burdens which would restrict the \I) il959] S. C.R. 14- 3 S.C.R. SUPR1l!ME COURT REPORTS circulation of a newspaper would not be saved by
IHI Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. Sa<aJ Pap.rs (P) It must be borne in mind that the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way and not in a narrow and pedantic sense. Certain rights have
been enshrined in our Constitution as fundamental and, therefore, while considering the nature and content of those rights the Court must not be too astute to interpret the language of the Constitution
in so literal a sense as to whittle them down. On the other hand the Courtmnst interpret the Consti- tution in a manner which would enable the citizen to enjoy the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest
measure subject, of course, to permissible restric- tions. Bearing this principle in mind it would be clear that the right to freedom of speech and ex- pression carries with it the right to publish and
circulate one's ideas, opinions and views with com- plete freedom and by resorting to any available me'lns of publication, subject again to such restric- tions as could be legitimately imposed under cl. (2)
of Art. 19. The first decision of this Court in which this was recognized is Rome8h Thapar v. State of' Madras('). There, this Court hold that freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propaga-
tion of ideas and that this freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation. In that case this Court has also pointed out that freedom of speech and expression are the foundation of all democratic
organisations and are essential for the proper functioning of the processes of democracy. There and in other cases this Court pointed out that very narrow and stringent limits have been set
to permissible legislative abridgment of the right of freedom of speech and expression. In State of Madras v. V. G. Row (') the question of the reasonableness of restrictions which could be
imposed upon a fundamental right has been con- sidered. This Court h&s pointed out that the nature (I} (1950] S.C.R. 594. (2) (1952] S.C.R. 597. Ltd. v. The Uni•n of Iml;a Mwi/wlkar ].
Sa}; al Paptrs (Pl ud. v. The Vniun of ln.Jia ,\fudho/Kar J. sts (19G2f of the right alleged to have been infringed, the un<lerlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, tho extent and scope of the evil sought to be remedied
thereby, the disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing crmditions at that time should all enter into tho judicial verdict. In Dwarkada~ Shrinfras v. 'l'he Slwlap1ir Spinning d: Weaving Co.,
Ltd. (') this Court has pointed out that in coustru- iug the ConJtitution it is the substance and the practicnl result of the act of the State that should be considered rather than its purely lt>gal nspect.
The correct approach in such cases should be to enquire as to what in su bstanco is the loss or injury caused to the citizen and not merely what manner and method ha.s bccu adopted by the State in plac-
ing the restriction. In Virendm v. 'l'he State of Punjab (') this Court has observed at p. 319 as follows : "It is certainly a serious <'ncroachmcnt on tho valuable and cherished right of freedom
of speech and expression if a newspaper is prevented from publishing its own or tho views of its correspondents relating to or concerning what may be the burning topic of the day".
The impugned order requires all newspapers to raise their prices if they want to maintain tho present number of pages. The effect of raising tho selling price of !JeWBpapcr has been considered by
the Press Commission. In Paragraph 1()4 of the Report it is observed: "The selling price of a paper would natural- ly havo an important effect on its circulation. In this connection we hnve examined the effect
of price-cuts adopted l1y two English papers at Bombay on the circulatir·n of thosP two papers as well as of tho leading paper which did not reduce its price. Prior to 27th October,
1952, Times of India which had the highcstcir- eulation at Bombay wns being sold at Rs.0-2-6 (I) [1954] S.C.11. 674. (2) [1958] S.C.R. 308. r r :i S.C.R1 S59 while Free Press Journal and National
Standard which rank next in circulation were being sold for Rs.0-2-0. On 27th October, 1952, Free Press Journal reduced its price to Rs. 0-1-0 and within a year had claimed to have doubl-
ed its circulation. On 1st July, 1953, the National Standard was converted into a Bom- bay edition of Indian Express wi~h a selling price of Rs. 0-1-6. Within six months it too claimed to have doubled its circulation … Dur-
ing this period the Times of India which did not reduce its selling price continued to retain its readership. Thus it would appear th'lt Free Press Journal and Indian Express by reducing their price have been able to tap
new readership which was latent in the market but which could not pay the higher prices prevailing earlier". Then in paragraph 165 it is observed : "There is another instance illustrating the
effect of selling price on the circulation. The two leading Tamil papers Swadesamitran and Dinamani in Madras, anticipating towards the end of 1950 a steep rise in the price of news-
print, came to an understanding and raised the price of their papers from Rs.0-1-0 to Rs 0-1-6. (These papers normally carried 30 to 36 pages per week). The increase in price from Rs. 0-1-0
per copy to Rs. 0-1-6 was [,rought into effect from 1st January, 1951. The result was a drastic fall in circulation in both their cases. Sub- sequently in view of this fall in ci1 culation
they agreed to reduce their prices to the old figure. While the original fall in circulation came about in three months duration one paper took more than 9 months to recover its old circulation, while the other had not done
so ……… It may be mentioned in this connec- tion that tho circulation of a competing paper, Tha.nthi ……… did not rise di.iring the thre~ Sakal Papers (P) Lid. v, The Union nf India
M ud/1.olkar J. 11111 s.t.J.J>.;as (P) l.Jd. TAJ U.t .. •/ l•<ii• M ""-llior J. sno [1962) months when tho two leading papers bqd increased the price ……… nor did it fall when
tho prices of the leading papers were lowered again. The conclusion, therefore, appears to be that over 33,000 readers had stopped tak- ing any papers because the price had been raised; ……… The period examined coincided
with an accentuation of draught conditions in Tamil Xad; a certain foll in oirculation all round can be attributed to these conditions. Keverthelcss, it cannot bo denied that a change in price <lid have a profound effect on
the circulation of those two papers'". Though the prices of newspapers appear to be on tho low side it is a fact that e'l"en so many people find it difficult to pay that small price.
This is what has been pointed out hy the Press Commission in paragraph 52 of its report. According to it the most common reason for people in not purchasing newspaper-. is the <·ost of
the newspaper and the inability of the household to spare the necessary amount. Thia conclusion is based upon the evi- dence of ave~· large number of individuals and representatives of Associations. We would, there-
fore, be justified in relying upon it and holding that raising the price of a newspaper IWl'n by a small amount such as one nP. in order that its present size be maintained would adversely affect itll circulation.
It is, howe\•or, said that it is not necessary for newspapers to rai;o their prices but that they could reduce their number of paCJes. For ono things, requiring newspapers to reduce their sizes would ho
compelling them to restrict the dissemination of nows and viows and thus directly affecting their right undor Art. Hl( l)(al. But it is said that tho object could be achieved bv reducing tho advertise-
ments. That is to say, tho newspapers would be able to devote tho same space which they are devot- ing today to the publication of news and views by reducing to the necessary extent the space allotted
~o ad vortisements. It is pointed out that newij· • …. 3 S.C.R. papers allot a disproportionately large space to advertisements. It is true that many newspapers do devote very large areas to advertisements.
But then the Act is intended to apply also to newspapers which may carry no or very few advertisements. Again, after the commencement of the Act and the coming into force of the Order a nev spaper which
has a right to publish any number of pages for carrying its news and views will be restrained from doing so except upon the condition that it raises the selling price as provided in the schedule to the
Order. This would be the direct and immediate effect of the Order and ?S such would be violative of the right of newspapers guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(a). Again, s. 3(1) of the Act in so far as it permits
the alloca.tion of space to advertisements also directly affects freedom of circulation. If the area for advertisements is curtailed the price or the newspaper will be forced up. If that happens, the
circulation will inevitably go down. This would be no remote, but a direct consequence of curtailment of advertisements. We would consider this matter in another way also. The advertisement revenue of a newspaper is
proportionate to it& circulation. Thus the higher the circulation of a newspaper the larger would be its adverti~ement revenue. So if a newspaper with a high circulation were to raise its
price i ta circulation would go down and this in turn would bring down also the advertisement revenue. That would force the newspaper either to close down or to raise its price. Raising the price
further would affect the circulation still more and thus a vicious cycle would set in which would ultimately end in the closure of the newspaper. If, on the other hand, the space for advertisement is
reduced the earnings of a newspaper would go down and it would eith'3r have to run at a loss or close down or raise its price. The object of the Act in regulating the s:p'lce for advertisements is stated tq
Sakal Papers (P} Ltd. The Union of India .lJ udholkar J. Sakal Pop," (P) LIJ, v. Thi Uniea tJj /Mia !ttu«M/ku J. SUPREJ.'11E COURT REPORTS [1962] be to prevant 'unfair' oompetition. It is thus
directed against circulation of a. newspaper. When a law is intended to bring about this result there would be a direct intcrferenco with tho right of freedom of speoch and expression guaranteed
under Art. 19(l)(a) Since tho very object of the impugned law is to affect t11e eirculation of certain newspapers which are said to bo practising unfair competition it is difficult to appr<>ciate
how it could be sustained. The right to freedom of speech and oxpression is an individual right guaranteed to cvory citizen by Art. HI( I )(a) of the Constitution. There is nothing in cl. (2)
of Art. which permits the State to abridge this right on the ground of confer- ring benefits upon tho public in general or upon a section of tho public. It is not open to tho State to
curtail or infringe the freedom of spocch of one for promoting the goncrnl wolfare of a section or a group of people unless its action could bo justified under a law competent under cl. (2) of Art.. l!l.
It is admitted that the impugned provisions cannot be justified on the grounds reforred to in the afore. said rlause. It was, however, contended on behalf of the State that there are two aspects of the ncth'ities of
newspapers-the dissemination of news and views and the commercial aspect. Thcso two aspects, it is mi.id •··are different from ono another and under cl. (6) of Art. 19 restrictions can be placed on the
Jattor right in the interest of the general public. So far as it is rcJc,·ant for the purpose of the argument cl. (6) read~ thus: "Nothing in ;;nb-elause (g) of tho said clause shall affect tho operation of any existing law in so
far as it imposes or prevent the State from making ar.y law imposing in tho interests of tho general public, reasonabfo restric~ions on the cxereiso of th~ right conferred by the said sub-clause …………. , … , . ·'4
•. '1!" 3S.C.R. It m11y well be within the power of the State to place, in the interest of the general public, restrictions upon the right of a citizen to carry on business but it is not open to the State to achieve
this object by directly and immediately curtailing any other free:lom of that citizen guaranteed by the Constitution and which is not susceptible of abridgement on the same grounds as are set out in
cl. (o) of Art. 19. Therefore, the right of freedom of speech cannot be taken a"·ay with the object of placing restrictions on the business aoti vi ties of a citizen. Freedom of speech can be
restricted only in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an
offence. It cannot, like the freedom to carry on business, be cu~tailed in the interest of the general public. If a law directly affecting it is challenged it is no answer that the restrictions enacted by it
are justifiable under els. (;3) to (6). For, the scheme of Art. l!J is to enumerate different freer!oms ~eparatcly and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and
the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and cl. (I) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning
of this clause. It follows from this that tho State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore
for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom. Viewing the question from this angle it would be _seen that the reference to the Press being a
busmess and to the restriction imposed by the impugned Act being referable or justified as a proper restriction on the right to carry on the blJsinese of publishing a newspaper wo]lld be
Sakal P>Pm (P} Ltd. v. The Union of India M udlwlkar ]. Sabi p~, (Pi Lid. v. T~ UniOt1 of India Mudlwlkat ]. [1002] who!Jy irrelevant for considering whether the impngncd Act infringes or docs
not infringe the fr.Jcdom guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(a). Tho only gncstion that would t.hon remain would be whether the impugned rnactmcnt dirertly impinges on tho guarantee of freedom of
speech and expression. It would directly impinge on this freedom either by placing restraint upon it or by placing restraint upon something which is an essential part of that frcodo'll. The freedom
of a newspaper to publish any number of p<iges or to circulate it to any number of persons is each an integral part of the freedom of speech and expression. A restraint placed upon either of
them woulrt be a direct infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expression. Perhaps an illustration wou Id make the point cloar. Let.us suppose that the enactment had said that newspaper
'A' or newspaper 'B' (ignoring for tho moment the objection to tho illustration based upon Art. 14 shall not h:we moro than a specified number of subscribers. Could such a law be valid
in the face of the gimrant•.~o under Art. l!J(l)(a)! Tho answer must unhesitatingly be no, because such a law would be recognized as directly imping- ing upon th!• freedom of exprcSilion
which encompasses freedom of circuhtion and to restrain the citizen from propagating his view.; to any other beyond the limit or number prescribed by the statute. If this were so, the fact that the
legislation achieves thn same result by moans of the schedule of rates makes no difference and tho impact on the freedom would still be direct notwith~tanding that it does not appear so on its
face. Hero the Act by enacting ss. 4 and 5 directly prohibits a newspBJ'l'l" from exercising that right, should the newspaper fail to comply with the re- quirement of an order made under s. 3. This is a
direct invasion of tho right under Art. 19(1Xal and not a.n incidental or problomatjc effect thereon M 3 S.C.R. was found in the Express Newspapers case('). In that case the challenge to certain provisions of the
Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 on the ground that it infringes the right guaranteed by Art. 19 ( l )(a) of the Constitution. That ch<11lenge failed
because the object of that enactment was to secure th~ amelioration of the condition of working journalists and also because the law did not have the effect of directly interfering with the right of
the newspaper proprietors guaranteed under Art. 19 (l)(a) of the Constitution. The distinction between direct and indirect effect of a la.w upon the freedom of press has been adverted to in that case. At
p. 135, Bhagwati, J., who spoke for the Court has said: "All the consequences which have been visualised in this behalf by the petitioners, viz., the tendency to curtail circulation and
thereby narrow the scope of dissemination of information, fetters on the petitioners' freedom to ob oose the means of l'Xercising the right, likelihood of the independence of the press
being undermined by having to seek govern- ment aid; ……… etc. would bfl remote and depend upon various factors which may or may not come into play. Unless these were the direct or inevitable consequences of the
measures enacted in the impugned Act, it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and opera- tion." 'fhat the impugned Act was intcuded to effect
circulation and thus directly affect the freedom of speech is discernible also from the preamble which we may here quote. It runs thus: "An Act to provide for the regulation of the prices charged for newspapers in relation
to their pages and of matters connected there- with for the purpose of preventing unfair 11) (1959) S.C.Jl, 12, Sekai'Pripers (P) Ltd. v. The Union of ff!iia MuJholkar J. SaJr,/ l:t.'' (P)
T1w U11ion of India Mut/Jioll:ar J. SUPREME COURT ltEPOR.TS [l!l62] competition among newspapers so that new!- pn.riers may have fuller opportunities of freedom of expression." Its object thus is to regulate something
which, as already stated, is directly related to tho circulation of a newspaper. Since circulation of a newspaper is a part of the right of freedom of speech the Aot must be regarded as one directed
against tho freedom of spoech. It has selected tho fact or thing which is an p.ssontial and basic attribute of the conception of the freedom of speech i·iz., tho right to circulato on(l's views to all whom
one can r<'ach or care to re~ch for the imposition of a restriction. It seeks to achieve its object of enabling what arc termf'cl the sm1iller newspapers to secure larger circulation by provisions which
without. disguise arc aimed at restricting the circulation of what arc termed the larger papers with better financial strength. Tho impugned law for from being our, which merely interferes with
the right of frecdnm of speech incidentally, docs so dirC'ctly though it seek~ to achieve the and hy purporting to r1·g11 late the busi11C'ss nspect of a newspaper. Such a course is not permissible and
the courts 1nust be eror vigilant in guarding perhaps the most precious of all t lw freedoms guarnnked bv uur Const.it ution. The reason for this is obvi;ms. The freedom of sprcch and
(IXpression of opinion is of parnmount importnnce under a democratic Constitution which envisages changes in t.hc composition of h•gishturps and government." and must Le prcscrv<'d.
Xo doubt, the l:iw in qucHtim1 was made upon the recommen- dation of the Press Commisf.ion but since its object is to affect <lirnctly the right of circulation of newspapers which would nccesrnrily undermine
their powor to influence public opinion it cannot but be rega.rded as a dangerous weapon which is capn.blc of being used against democracy itself. In these circumstances the Act and tho Order
cannot be sQllta.inod upon the ground that it merely 3S.C.R. s67 implements a recommendation of the Press Commission and was thus not made with an ulterior object. The decision in Harndard Dawakhana
(Wakf) v. Union of India (1 ) upon whi~h reliance was placed by the respondent m support of the contention that where an enact- ment is challenged on the ground of violation of fundamental rights it is legitimate to take into
consideration several factors including the purpose of the legislation, the mischief intended to be suppressed, tho remedy purposed by the legislature and the true reason for that remedy does not,
therefore, arise for consideration. Similarly, since the Act taken in conjunction with the order made thereunder operates as a restraint on the freedom of speech and expression of newspapers the mere
fact that its object was to suppress unfair practices by newspapers would not validate them. Carrying on unfair practices may be a matter for condem- nation. But that would be no ground for placing
restrictions on the right of circulation. It was argued that the object of the Act was to prevent monopolies and that monopolies are obnoxious. We will assume that monopolies are always against public interest and deserve to be
suppressed. Even so, upon the view we have taken that the intendment of the Act and the direct and immediate effect of the Act taken along with the impugned order was to interfere with the
freedom of circulation of newspapers the circum- stance that its object was to suppress monopolies and prevent unfair practices is of no assistance. The legitimacy of the result intended to be
achieved does not necessarily imply that every means to achieve it is permissible; for even if the end is desirable and permissible, the means employ- ed must not transgress the limits laid down by the
Constitution, if they directly impinge on any of the fundam!lntal rights guaranteed by the Consti- tution it is no answer when the constitutionality (l) [1960] 2 S. C.R. 671. l961
Sakal Papm (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India MudMlkar J. 1~1 S.MI Pap.rs (P) Lid. v. Thi Union of India M wlliclk"' J. [1962j of tho measure i8 challenged that apart from the fundamental right infringed the provi~ion is other-
wiso legal. Finally it was said that one of its objects is to give Rome kind of protection to small or newly started newspapers and, therefore, the Act is good. Such an object may be desirable but for attaining
it the Stato cannot make inroads on the right of other newspapers which Art. 19(1 )(a) guarantees to them. 'fherc may be other ways of helping them and it is for the Stat,c to search for them but
the one they have chosen falls foul of the Constitu- tion. 'l'o repeat, the only restrictions which may be imposed on th<> rights of an individual under Art. l!l( l)(a) are those which cl. (2) of Art. 19
permits and no other. Coming to Writ Petitions 67 and 68 of l!l61, considering that tho rcliof granted by us in the main petition will redress the grievance of the petitioners in these two petitions it will be only of
academic interest to decide whether they, as readers of newspapers, ca.n complain of an inter- ference with their right under Art. (19)(1) (a). We, therefore, refrain from making any Order on
their petitions. Upon the view we take it would follow that s. 3(1) of the Act, which is its pivotal provision, is unconstitutional and, therefore, the Daily news- paper (Price and Page) Order, 1960 made thereunder
is also unconstitutional. If s. 3(1) is struck down as bad, nothing remains in tho Act itself. Accordingly we allow this petition with costs. The petitionern in \V. Ps. 67 and 68 of
1961 as well as the intorvoners will bear their respective costs. Petition allowed.