Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
1. That the grounds furnished to the petitioner indicate that · G they relate to maintenance of law and order and not the public order and therefore it could not be made the basis of the order of detention .
2. T?at. the ord~r of detention is vitiated as it is based on mcrdents which are not proximate.
3. That the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security ii Act _h~ve been used. as a convenient substitute for the .pr~vrsrons of th~ ordmary lawfor detaining the petitioner. Thrs argument rs based on the following circumstances : (a) that hi~ discharge wa~ asked for _on the. ground that he was gomg to be detamed under M.I.S.A.; c (1975] SUPP. S.C.R. (b) that the grounds of detention state that the petitioner had to be discharged in the criminal cases due to want of evidence for successful prosecution, while the order of discharge passed by the Magistrate states that it was made as prayed for in the application of the Police ; ( c) that the cases mentioned in the two FIRs are such that the petitioner could have been easily prosecuted nnder the laws of the land ; and ( d) that the petitioner is continued in detention even though Bibhuti Dutta and Saktipada Dutta, who had been ~rrestcd in connection with the same cases as the peti- tioner and who had been served with identical grounds of detention, had been released on the advice of the Advisory Board.
4. That the detaining authority had not applied its mind to the petitioner's case is shown by the fact that the grounds of detention show that the petitioner had to be discharged from the cases due to want of sufficient evidence for suc- cessful prosecution, whereas he was discharged because he was going to be detained, and that the grounds of deten- tion refer to allegations which do not find a place in the FIRs.
5. That the grounds of detention are vague.
6. That the Government had failed to periodically review the case of the petitioner and that has rendered his continued detention illegal.
7. That this is a case where section 15 of the Act should have been applied and the petitioner released, and
8. That in any event the petitioner is entitled to a direction for consideration of his second representation dated 1-7-1974. Before we proceed to deal with these points it may be useful _;, and necessary to refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Hpradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal('). It was observed : "The power of preventive detention. is qualitatively. different from punitive detention. The power of preventive deten- tion is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. ,It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detent.ion may .be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anti- cipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pen- dency of pro~ecuiion is no bar. to an order of preventive ——~- {l) AIR 1974 SC 2154. j SAMIR CHATTERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Alagiriswami, J.) detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. ·Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The authorities are different. The nature of proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for fofer- ence about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu . . . . . . . The principles which can be broadly stated are these. .First mere\y .. because a detenu . is liable to be tried 1 iii a trim'inai Cburi for ·th·e co\Jmilssion of a crimi- nal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from. committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his deten- tion under ·the Act. Second, the fact that the Police ar- rests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and ini- tiates steps to prosecute ·him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information _report may be no bar against the District Magistrate iSsuing an order tinder the ·preventive detention. Third, where the con- cerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an _order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to content! that. there could be no satisfaction on the part of the det_aining authority as to the likelihood c of such a person indulging . in , activities which would jeopardise the security of the State Q_r the public order. F\mrth, the mere circumstance . that a ·detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fiftb, ·the Qrdcr of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prog- nosis of the future liehaviour cif a persbn based' pn" bis. past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances. • In the case of Madan Lal Agarwala, it is submitted that the detention order was for a collatei:_al purpose because he was released on_ 26th March, f973, and the detention order was- of the same day. I_t was _also said that onr., incident was said to be the ground in the order of detention· and one incident should not suffice for an order of de- . H tention. The ground given in Madan Lal Agarwal's <:ase is that he in collusion with his father bad hoarded quintals 84 kg. of rice, 2 quintals 88 kg. of flour, and 1 -quintal 96 kg. of suji and further that be had no· licence as 10 SC/75-3 . c -H (1975] SUPP. S.C.R. require~ by Sec. 4 of the West Bengal Essential Food- stuffs Anti-Hoarding Oi'der, 1966. The detaining autho- rity said in the grounds : '.'It is apparent in the afore- said facts thai you in collusion with your father are likely to withhold or impede supply of foodstuffs or ,rationed article : essential to the community". The future be- haviour of Madan Lal Agarwal based on his past conduct in the light of surrounding circumstances is the real – ground of detention. It is needless to stress the obvious that Madan Lal Agarwal'sacts are gravely prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the commu- nity. It was staid In the case of Haradhan Saha that he was re- leased on 25th July, 1973 and he was arrested on 7th August, 1973, pursuant to ·a detention order dated 31st Jtily, 1973. It is, therefore, said that the detention order was passed for collateral purposes. The grounds in the detention order are that on 19th June, 1973, Haradhan Saha with his associates was smuggling 115 bags of rice weighing 93 -quintals 80 kgs. to Calcutta covered by coal by engaging lorry without any valid per- mit or authority. Haradhan Saha violated the provisions of West Bengal. Rice and Paddy (Restriction on Move- ment. by Night) Order, 1969, and West Bengal Rice and Paddy_ (Licensing and Control) Orger, 1967, and tried to frustrate the food and procurement policy of the Gov· ernment. These grounds concluded by stating that Hara- dhan Saha acted in a manner prejudicial to the main- tenance of supplies and services essential to the com- munity. This again illustrates as to how these detention orders came to be passed to prevent the likelihood of such acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies es- sential to the community." It appears to us that many of the decisions relied upon by the petitioner have not appreciated the implications of this decision. For instance ·decisions which hold that where there is a possibility of prosecutfog a person he should be prosecuted rather thau dealt with under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act fall under that. category (Sri/al SHaw v. State of W.B.( 1) In the case before the Constitution Bench Madan Lal had no licence as reauired by section 4 of the West Bengal Essential Foodstuffs Anti-Hoarding Order, 1966. So it would have been easy to prosecute him. In the case of H aradhan Saha ( 2 ) he also violated the provisions of West Bengal Rice and Paddy (Restriction on Movement by Night) Order, 1969 and West Bengal Rice and Paddy (Licensing and Con- trol) Order, 1967 because· he was smuggling rice without any valid permit or autliority. (1) !1975J sec 336. ,(2) A.I-R 1974 SC 2154. SAMIR CHATTERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Alagiriswami, !.) In Sadhu Roy v. The State of Bengal('), it was observed: "There · are two social implications of dropping prosecutions and resorting to substitutive detentions which deserve to be remembered. Where a grievous crime against the. community has been committed, the culprit must be sub- jected to condign punishment so that the penal law may strike a stern blow where it should. Detention is a softer treatment than stringent sentence and there is no reason why a dangerous criminal should get away with it by enjoying an unfree but unpaid holiday. Secondly, if the man is innocent, the process of the law should give him a fair chance and that should not be scuttled by indiscriminate resort to easy but unreal orders of deten- tion unbound by precise time. That is a negation of the correctional humanism of our system and breeds bitterness, alienation and hostility within the case." lt is not always possible for a Court dealing .with an habeas corpus petition in the case of a person detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act to say whether in a case where a criminal case has been registered against a person and then it is withdrawn and he is detained under the provisions of the Act, that is proper or not. The Court is not in possession of all the evidence tci be able to decide for itself whether the prosecution would have been successful or not and without those materials being available it is not possible for the Court to say that the Pl)nitive action ~hould have been taken and not detention. It is the authority conducting the prosecution that would be in a position to decide whether evidence is available which could establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt before the criminal court. Where the authority is not sure that such material is available it mav not like to face the prospect of the prosecution failing and being charged with vindic- tiveness or ma/a fides if thereafter the accused is detained preven- tively. The Court should be slow towards the conclusion that the detenu could have been snccessfully prosecuted in the absence of all the material before it and then going on to criticise the detaining authority for not contintiing the prosecution but detaining him. At this point we may conveniently consider point 3 because it logically comes in here. Point 3 c There is no substance in any one of the contentions in this point. The applicati.on for discharge was made by the Police and it is the Commissioner of Police thaf bad to be satisfied that there · were sufficient grounds for the d.e!entiori of the petitioner. That would not in any way vitiate the grounds of detention or show that the Commissioner had no sufficient material before him to be satisfied that the petitioner· ought to be detained in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order. Want of evidence (1) W.P. No. 429 /74 decided on 22 January; 1975. • –0"'– ~ 26 c •·. · .. $DPREME .CPURT REPORTS for successful prosecution is a matter which can be legitimately taken into account by an authority competent to pass an order of detention under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act for deciding whether he should pass an order of detention against a particular person. lh the grounds it is said that the petitioner had to be discharged from the criminal cases due to want of evidence for successful prosecution. A criminal case needs evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that such evidence was not available does not mean that the detaining authority had not before him evidence on which he can be satisfied. This would not show that in asking for discharge of the petitioner from the criminal cases the authorities were taking !he easier course of preventive detention rather than prosecuting him under t!)e ordinary law of the land. It is the Police who were· prosecuting the petitioner that had to decide whether there was sufficient evidence for a successful prosecution. The detaining authority when he comes to know \hat the petitioner was going to be discharged from the criminal cases for want of suffi- cient evidence for successful prosecution can very well take the view that it was necessary for the purpose of preventing the petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public o.rder that he should be detained and if he is satisfied on the evidence available his subjective satisfaction cannot be questioned by this Court. There is. no material to show on what grounds the Ad- visory Board held that in the case of Bibhuti Dutta and Saktipada Dutta there was not snflicient cause for their continued detention. Merely on the ground that in their case there was not suflic.ient cause it · could not be assumed that there is no sufficient cause for detention of the petitioner. Point 1 ··We think that this contention is without substance-. The incident mentioned in the 1st ground took place at 61 Garden Reach Road, Calcutta. The factory where this incident took·place has 5000 workers working in it. The petitioner and his associat·es as weU as 25 others ass\l!jllblcd and formed a violent mob outside the walls of the work- shop an.d ·continued· to pelt · brickbats ·for over two hours. 'Apart from the l~rge nqmber of workers working in that factory the inci,dent very clearly took place in a public place. The factory has a. door. number in Garden Reach Road. So it must be a public place wilh members of the public passing to and fro and this incident would have cansed fear and alarm not merely to the persons working in the fa:ctory but also to people passing along the road. In the second ir.cident the petitioner and others were armed with pistol and bombs, exploded the bombs with a view to terrorising the local people as well as the workers and widespread panic and confusion was· created in the above area. Both these incidents, therefore, clearly relate to public order. In respect of (he 1st inddcnt it could not be said. that it related to only a single factory and therefore it does not ·relate to public . order because, as we have . shown' above, it would. have created panic and co11fusion an;ong the _passers-by in. the road in wh~~h .SAMIR CHATTERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (Alagiriswami, J.) the factory wa< situate; nor can we agree that alarm caused to 5000 . . A workers in which three members of the security staff were also injured docs not relate td public order. It is not necessary to refer to the deci- sions which distinguish between incidents which relate to. law . and order and incidents which relate · to public order; These incidents clearly relate to public order. · Point 2 The appellant was arrested and produced before the Magistrate on 23-7-1973 and was in confinement till he was released on 24-4-1974, the date on which the order of detention was passed·against '.Q· him. He was therefore incapable of any activity . during that . perio(I. · • ., There is therefore no substance in the argument' that 'as· the.inCidents relied upon relate to 9-5~ 73 and 24-5-73 th.ere .coul,d)iave;: been no apprehension on 24-4-74• that. he was' likely'-to·,att -.fu :it' manrier pre- jiidicial to public ord;r; · •• · . , · . ' · " : · ~: • ~ · , • , . . . .,_. ,. • > … ..,. .~ .• – ….. Point 4 · ,;ti . . , . It is contended that tlie. deta.ining auth~ifty 'had not applied liis mind to the petitioner's case as shown by the fact that· the· petitioner had. to be discharged frOil\ the criminal cases due to want <if sufficient :evidence for successful prosecution . .whereas. the order~ of discharge shows 1hat he was discharged because he was going to be detained, iihd 1he ~,rounds of detention' refer to allegations which do not fi.nd a place in. the FIR. It cannot be said that when the Commissioner of Police stated that the petitioner had to be disc'harged from the criminal cases_ due to want of sufficient evidence for·a succs;Jful pro- secution that was one of the grounds for petitioner's detent10n. The grounds fo~ detention are the two incidents mentioned., The lack of evidence for successful prosecution is not the. :,!;fOund for detention. As has been held by this Court again and again, ·wliereas criminal prosecution is punitive preventive detention is r.esorted tc:>:jn order to prevent a person from acting in a manner p~ejuaicjal to public · . order in future. If the detaining authority is satisfi?<J (hat on the two grounds, mentioned it is" necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting in. a manner prejudicial to public order that satisfaction cannot be questioned by the Court. Poin1 ,5 — •… _ '\V~ '.ar~ noi able to see h~w 'ihe :grounds ian ii~ ~al~ 'to be vague because the name of. the petitioner doe~•not ·figure· iu. tM Fl.R. and he .was-detaitl.ed for nearly a year after he was arrested on criiniriai' charges. :II It is statep in the counter-affidavit filed by .the Commissioner of Police that' it'was during the Course of the in\'estigation of:the·cases that it .came to be _kl)o.Wn that the petitioner "'..a~ .01'.e of the persims who took part in bath the incidents, and the petitioner's . .Jl1'1e.11.t_ion_ for. a_year after he was arrested on criminal charges has nbthi11g ·i!J do 1with 'the grounds being vagu~— f ·-~·-~:' ·- :' ·· ·.: ''· c Points 6, 7 and 8 The decision in Sai/esh Dutta v. State of W.B.(') was relied upon in support of point 6 to urge that the petitioner's case should have been reviewed periodically. Such a review was not considered by the Court as a legal obligation on the part of the Government nor the failure tc do so as making the detention illegal. We also agree that it would be better if the Government periodically reviews the cases of the detenus. In support of point 7 the following observations of a Bench of this Court in Bab1ilal Das v. Sta'e of W.B.( 2 ) arc relied upon: "While discharging the rule issued and dismissing the petition, we wish to emphasize that Section 15 is often lost sight of by the Government in such situations, as long term preventive detention can be scH-defeating or criminally counter-productive. Section 15 reads : 15. TEMPORARY RELEASE OF PERSONS DETAINED (1) The appropriate Government may, at any time, direct that any person detained in pursuance of a detention order may be released for any specified period either without conditions or upon such conditions specified in the direction as that person accepts, and may, at any time, cancel his release. (2) In directing the release of any person under sub-section ( 1), the appropriate Government may require him to enter into a bond with or without sureties for the due observance of the conditions specified in the direction. (3) Any person released under sub-section (1) shall surrender himself at the time and place, and to the authority, speci- fied in the order directing his release or cancelling his release as the case may be. ( 4) If any person fails without sufficient cause to surrender himself in the manner specified in sub-section ( 3), be shall be punishable witb imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. (5) If any person released under sub-section (!) fails to fulfil any of the conditions imposed upon him m1der the said sub-section or in the bond entered into by him, the bond shall be declared to be forfeited and any person bound thereby shall be liable to pay the penalty thereof. (I) A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 1816 (') [1975] 1 s.c.c. 311. SAMIR CHATTERJEE v. WEST BENGAL (A/agiriswami, J.) We consider that it is fair that persons kept incarcerated and embittered without trial should be given some chance to reform themselves by reasonable recourse to the parole power under section 15. Calculated risks, by release for short periods may, perhaps, be a social gain, the beneficent jurisdiction being wisely exercised." We fail to see that these observations lay down any principle of law. Section 15 mereiy confers a power on the Government. The power and duty of this Court is to decide cases coming before it according to law. In so doing. it may take various considerations into account. But to advise the Government as to how they should exercise tJieir . C functions or powers conferred on them by statute is not one of this Court's functions. Where the Court is able to give affect to its views in the form of a valid and binding order that is a different matter. Fmthermorc, section 15 deals with release ort parole and l)lere is nothing to show that the petitioner applied for to be released on parole for any specific purpose. As far as we are able to sec, release on parole is made only on the request of the party and for a specific purpose. We also hope that• in the case of the petitioner his representation made on l-7-1974 would be considered by the Government. It has been pointed out by this Court in its decision in Ram Bali Rajbhar v. State of West Bengal(') that the Government has got the power to . place the representation before the Advisory Board and therefore we direct the Government of West Bengal to consider and take an early decision on the pending fresh representation of the petitioner in accord- "!nce with the requirements of law and justice even as was done in tha\ case. Subject to this direction the petition is dismissed. P.B.R. Petition dismissed. (1) W.P. No.332 of 1974 decided o~ 20th Docember 1974.