c ·900 SANT RAM v. RAJINDER LAL AND ORS. September 22, 1978 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER, D. A. DESAI AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] East Puniab .Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Sec. 13(2) (ii) (b), as applied to Himachal Pradesh, construction of-Words & Phrases-"Used the building … for a purpose other than that for which it was leased".
The appellant, a harija-n by birth and a cobbler by vocation was the lessee of a portion of a shop in Ram Bazaar Simla, since 1963, on an annual rent of Rs. 300/-. On the landlord's petition for eviction of the appellant a tenant under section !3(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applied to Himachal Pradesh on the ground that the premises were being used for a purpose other than the one for which they ~·ere let out, the Rent Controller held in favour of the landlord. The appellate authority having reversed it, the landlord went in revision before the High Court. The High Court set aside the appellate decision and restored the Rent Controller's Order, inferenti:illy inter- preting the lease deed that the lease being of ai shop the purpose must have been· commercial. In appeal by special leave, the appellant reiterated his contentions viz. that (a) there was no specific commercial purpose inscribed in the demise and therr-efore it was not poosible to pootulate a drersion of purpose and (b)
even assuming that the letting was for a commercial purpose, the fact that the appellant had cocked his food or stayed at night in the rear portion of the small shop did not offend against S. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.
Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD : 1. While interpreting deeds and statutes two rules must be remember- ed. The first one is "in drafting it is not enough to gain a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith can understand, but it is necessary to attain if possible to a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith cannot misunderstand".
The second more important one· for the Third World countries is that statutory construction, so long as law is at the service of life, cannot be divorced from the social setting. Welfare legislation must be interpreted in a Third World perspective. [903ErGJ
The law itself is intended to protect tenants from unreasonable eviction and is, therefore, worded a little in favour of that class of benefli.~inries. \Vhen ihter- preting the text of such provisions-and this holds good in reading the meaning of documents regulating the relations between the weaker and the stronger con- tracting parties-the Court should remember that
"v:here doubts arise the Gandhian talisman becomes a tool of interpretation; "whenever you are in doubt ……. apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him." [903G·H, 904A·B]
Moti Ram and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1979] I SCR 335, applied. r SANT RAM v. RAJINDER LAL (Krishna Iyer, J.) 2. The provisioo. of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 has notlboen attracted. Even the legislature by a later amendment of the definition of "non-residential building'' in its realism, has veered round expressly to approve de jure what is the de facto situation prevailina: in the urban &reas of Himacbal Pradesh. [905B, F-0]
3. The life slyle of the people shapes the profile of the law and not vice i·ersa. Law, not being an abstraction but a pragmatic exercise, the legal inference to be drawn from a lease deed is conditioned by the prevailing circumstances. The intention of parties from which courts spell out the purpose of the lease is to be garnered from the social milieu. Thus viewed it is difficult to hold, especially when the lease has not spelt it out precisely, that the purpose was exclusively commercial and incompatible with any residential u<;e,
ev¢n o: a portion. [903D-li] In the instant case, it is impossible to hold that if a tenant who takes out petty premises for carrying on a small trade also stays in the rear portion, cooks anQ eats, he so disastrously perverts the purpose of the lease. A different 'pur- pose' in the context is not minor _variations but majuscule in mode of enjoyment. This is not a case of a man switching over to a canteen business or closing down the cobbler shop and converting the place into a residential accommcxlation, On the other hand, the common case is that the cobbler continued to be cobbler and stayed in the shop at night on days when he was running his sh0p but left for his home on shop holidays.
A sense of proportion in social assessment is of the judicial essence. (9040-H, 905A-B] [The Court directed the restitution into possession by the trial court under section 144 C.P.C. within one month ignoring the fact that some other tenant was inducted by the landlord.]
CIVIL APPELLATE JRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1526 of 1978. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment aad Order dated 9-8-1977 of the Himachal PradeSh High Court i.n Civil Revision No. 68 of 1976.
R. K. Bhatt and Mrs. Krishna Bhatt for the Appellant. Hanlev Singh for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J .. A small event may mark a great portent as this tiny proceeding for eviction, from a mini-shop, of a little man, will prese'ntly disclose.
The appellant, a harijan by birth and a cobbler by vocation, was a petty tenant of the eastern half of a shop in Ram Bazar, Simla. The original landlord passed away and his sons, the respondents, stepped into his shoes as legal representatives.
He filed a petition for eviction of the appellant-tenant under S.13(2) (ii) (b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applied to Himachal Pradesh on the ground that the premises were being used for a purpose other than the one for which they were let out. The Rent Controller having held in 5-699SCI 178
c c [1979] l s.c.R. favour of the land-lord, an eviction order ensued. The appellate authority reversed this fi.."lding and dismissed the petition for eviction. The High Court, in revision, reversed tho:: appellate decision and re- stored the Rent Contro:ler's order. The cobbler-appellant, in the last lap of litigation, has landed in this Court. The poverty of the appd- Iant is reflected in the chequered career of the case in this Court where it was dismissed more than once for default i'n payment hut ultimately, thanks to the persiste-.ace of the appellant, he got this Court's order to pay the balance amount extended. He complied with that direction and thus could not be prio"d out of the justice market, if we may use that expression.
The short point for adjudication is as to whether the respondent land-lord made ont the statutory ground for eviction, of having diverted the building for a use radically ditlerent from tho~ one for which it was let, without his ccrasent. There is no case of written consent put forward by the tenant.
But he contested the land-lord's claim by asserting that there was no specific commercial purpose inscribed i'n the demise and, therefore, it was not poosible to postulate a diversion of purpose.
Secondly, he urged that, even assuming that the letting was for a commercial purpose, the fact that he had cooked his food or stayed at night in the rear portion of !he small shop did not offead against S. 13(2) (ii) (b) of the Act.
S.13(2) (ii) (b) reads: "used the bui<ding . . . . for a purpose other than that for Which it was loosed" The factual matrix may be shortly projected; for as Mr. Justice Cardozo luminously stated.
"More and more we lawyers are awaking to a perception of the truth that what divides and distracts ns in the solution of a legal problem is not so much uncertainty about the law as uncertainty about the facts-the facts which generate the law.
L~t the facts be k'1own as they are, and the law will sprout from the seed and turn its branches toward the light."(') A cobbler-the appellant-was the lessee of a portion of a shop in Ram Bazar, Simla, since 1963, on an annual rent of Rs. 300/- (i.e. Rs. 25/- per month). Ex. P. 1, the lease deed, disclosed no purpose; but inferentially it has been held by the High Court that the lease being of a shop the purpose must have been commercial.
Possible; ~10t (1) Benjamin Nathan Cardozo "What Mctficine can do for Law" address befor the New York Academy of Medicine Nov. l, 1928-Readings in Law and Psychiatry. r SANT RAM v. RAJJNDER LAL (Krishna Iyer, J.)
necessarily sure. The actual life-situations and urban conditions of India, especially where poor tradesmen like cobblers, candle-stick makers, cycle repairers and tanduri bakers, take out small spaces oh rent, do not warrant an irresistible inference that if the lease is of a shop the purpose of the lease must be commercial.
It is comma::t know;edge that in the small towns-why, even in the big cities-little men plying little crafts and possessing little resources take on lease little work places to trade ahd to live, the two being interlaced for the lower, larger bracket of Indian humanity.
You struggle to make a small income and work late into the night from early in the mom and, during intervals, rest your bones in the same place, drawing down the shutters of the shop for a while.
The primary purpose is to ply a petty trade, the secondary but necessary incideht ii; to sleep in the same place since you can hardly afford anythihg but a pavement for the creature needs of cooking food, washing yourself, sleeping for a time and the like.
The life style of the people shapes the profile of the law and not vice-versa. Law, not being an abstraction but a pragmatic exercise, the legal inference to be drawn from a lease deed is conditional by the prevailing circumstahces. The intention of parties from which we 1>pell out the purpose of the lease is to be garnered from the social milieu. Tlius viewed, it is difficult to bold, especially when the lease has not spelt it out precisely, that the purpose was exclusively com- mercial and incompatible with any residential use, even of a portio:i. Two rules must be remembered while interpreting deeds and sta- tutes.
The first one is : "In drafting it is not enough to gain a degree of precisioh which a person reading in good faith can U':Jderstand, but it is necessary to attain if possible to a degree of precision which a person reading in bad faith
cannot misunder- stand."(') The second ooe is more important for the Third World countries. Statutory construction, so long as law is at the service of lire, cahnot be divorced from the social setting.
That is why, welfare legislation like the one with which we are now concerned, must be interpreted in a Third World perspective. We are not on the Fifth Avenue or Westend of London. We are i:i a hilly region of an Ihdian town with indigents struggling to live and huddling for want of accommodation. The law itself is intended to protect tenants from unreasonable eviction and is, therefore, worded a little in favour of that class of beneficiaries. When interpreting the text of such provisions-and thii; holds good in reading I) L·n G!ntium Lex-Then and Now 1799, p. 7.
c c [1979 j I s.c.R. the meaning of documents regulating the r"lations between the weaker and the stronger contracting parties-we m·1st remember what is an earlier decision of this Court, has beeh obsen,,,d : C)
"Where doubts arise the Gandhia;~ talisman becomes a tool of interpretation; "Wh.,,never yon are in doubt …. apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself,
if the step yon con~"mplate is going to be of a·ny use to him." If we remember these two rules, the conclusion is easy that there is no exclusiveness of purpose that can be sp,lt out of the lease deed. That knocks at the bottom of the case of the Ja·~.d-lord.
The circumstances are clearer as wo proceed further. For \Wll over a decade the tenant have been in occupation, cobbling and sleep- ing, in the same place on working days, but going home on days when the shop is closed.
Indeed, the pathetic genesis of the residential user ca-:mot be lost sight of. The cobbler's wife became mentally deranged and he could not leave her at hom" lest she should prove a danger to herself and to others around.
Being a harijan cobbler he could not hire servants and so, in despair, he took his insane wife to the pbce whore he was toiling on leather. He worked in the shop, cooked food for his wife, slept there at night and thus managed to survive although she died.a little later. "A bed by night a:ad i chest of drawers by day" is not nnnsnal even in England, as those who have read Goldsmith know.
Th•" dual uses of accommodation are common ehongh and, in this case, the land-lord himself appears to have understood it that way .. The evidence shows that the sympathetic father of the respondents had not objected to the petitimer living in the premises and had even provided a sink in tile shop to facilitate such user. Not that oral per- mission to divert the user to a different purpose is sufficient i'n the face of the statutory requirement of written consent but that circumstance of the land-lord's acquiescence over a long stretch of time reinforces the case of the tenant tllat the purpose was two-fold.
The common experie':lce of life lends credence to tllis case and none but those who live in ivory towers can refuse to look at the raw realities of life while administering justice. We are in the field of Poverty Jurisprudence. It is impossible to hold tllat if a tenant who takes out petty pre- mises for carrying on a small trade also stays in tile rear portion, cooks and eats, he so disastrously perverts the purpose of the lease. A differ- ent 'purpose' in tile context is not minor variations but majnscule i':1 mode of enjoyment. This is not a case of a man switching over to a (1) Moti Ram & Ors. v. State of M. P., [1979] I SCR 335.
/ y _/ SANT RAM v. RAJINDER LAL (Krishna Iyer, J.) canteen business or closing down the cobbler shop and converting the place bto a resid•ontial accommodation. On the other ha'nd, the
common case is that the cobbler continued to be cobbler and stayed in the shop at night on days when he was running his shop but left for his home on shop holidays. A sense of proportion in social assess- me'nt is of the judicial essence.
The irresistible inference, despite the i':1genious argument to the contrary, is that the provision of S.13(2) (ii) has not been attracted. We aro comforted in the thought that our conclusion is a realistic one, as is apparent from a subsequent amendment to the definition of 'non- residential buildi·:ig which reads thus :
" ( d) "non-residential building" means a building being U5ed,- (i) mainly for the purpo&~ of business or trade; or (ii) partly for the purpose of business or trade a'nd partly for the purpose of residence, subject to
th·~ condition that the person who carries on business or trade in the building resides there; Provided that if a building is let out for residential and non-residential purpose separately to more than one
porso·n, the portion thereof let out. for the purpose of c residence shall not be treated as a non-re.idential building. Explanation.-Whcre a building is used mai-:tly for the pur- pose of business or trade, it shall be deemed to be a
non-residential building even though a small portion thereof is used for the purpose of residence." Shri Bhatt raised an argume'nt that this provision was applicable to pending proceedings. We do not have to investigate bto that ques- tion in the view we have already taken and note the amendment only to indicate that the legislature, in its realism, has veered round express- ly to approve de jure what is the de facto situation prevailing in the · urba':l areas of Himachal Pradesh.
In this view, the appeal is allowed with costs. The tenant shall not be ejected. If he has been, as in this case it is stated he has been, the tenant shall be restituted into possession by the trial court under S. 144, C.P.C. within one month ignoring the fact that some other tenant is inducted by the landlord.
S.R. Appeal allowed.