S.C.R. SANTOSH KUMAR JAIN THE STATE. UNION OF INDIA-Intervener. [SHRI HARILAL KANIA C.J., PATANJALI SASTRI, and DAs JJ.] Emntial Supplies (TemP<miry Powers) Act (XXlV ·of 1946), s. 3-Power to "provide for regulating or prohibiting production, supply 11nd Ji11ribution" of goods-W heiher
includes power to issue directions 111!d orden to particular persons to do specific acts-Order to se11rch 11nd seize goods held by particular company -V11lidity-Scope -0/ Sflb-ss. (1) & (2) of s. 3-Generality of powers conferred· by sub-s. (!)-Obstruction to officers carr.ying out .. order for s_eizure-Con11iction
under s. 186, l.P.C.-Legality-lndian Penal Code, 1860, s. 186-0ffence under, essentials of. Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, provided as follows :
( 1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies cif an essential commodity, or for securing their equitable distri-
bution and availability at fair , prices, may be notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof, and trade and commerce therein.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers con- ferred by sub-s. ( 1) an order made thereunder may provide ….. . (j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the . entering, and search of premises, vehicles, vessels
and aircraft, the seizure by a person authorised to make sucht search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to liclieve that a contravention has been, is .being, or is about to be committed …… "
In exercise of the powers conferred on the Central Govern- ment by cl. (j) of sub-s. (2) of s. (3) of the above said Act, which had been delegated to the Provincial Government in relation to
foodstuff!, the Governor of Bihar made an order authorising the District Magistrate, Patna, and the Special Officer in charge of rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by a company of which the appellant was the General Manager and directing the seizure of 5.000 maunds of sugar held in stock by the said company, on the ground that the company was about to commit a contravention of an order of the Chief Controller of Prices and Supplies made
under the Sugar aud Sugar Products CQ!ltrol 6–2 S. C. India/68 ~iuch ~. Santosh Kamat Jain v. The State (1951) Order, 1947. The appellant obstructed the officers who went to search and seize the goods and was convicted under s. 186, Indian Penal Code.
Held, (i) the power "to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, supply and distribution" conferred by the Act on the Central Government included the power tO regulate or
prohibit by issuing directions to a particular producer or dealer or by requiring any specific act to be done or foreborne in regard to production, etc., and the order of the Governor was not there-
fore invalid on the ground that it was not a rule or regulation of general application but an order concerning a pa1ticular company alone; (ii) sub-section ( 2) of s. 3 conferred no further
or other powers than What were conferred by sub-s. (1) and· the enumera· tion of certain matters in !llUb-s. (2) was merely illustrative, as such enumeration was "without prejudice to
the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. (!)"; (iii) seizure of an article being within the purview of sub-s. ( l) of s. 3 it was therefore competent to the Central Government,
and its delegate the Provincial Government, to make an order for. seizure under sub-s. ( 1) apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any other order as contemplated in cl. (j) of sub-section (2);
(iv) even assuming that the order of the Chief Controller of Prices .under the Sugar Control Order was incomplete and inoperative and there could be no question of its contravention, the rc::fereni;::e to that order in the
order made by the Governor would be a mere redundancy and would not affect the validity of the latter order, and the appellant was rightly convicted under s. 186; Penal Code. Quaere : Whether for an offence under s. 186, Penal Code, it i.s
necessary that the act which was obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful. King Emperor v. Sibnath Baneri« [1945] F.C.R. 195 applied. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Appeal (Cri-
minal Appeal No. 3 of 1950) from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing a petition to revise an order of the Sessions Judge, Patna, convicting the appellant for an offence under s.
186, Indian Penal Code : The facts of the case appear in \he judgment. N. C. Chatterjee (Rameshwar Nath, with him) for the appellant. S. K. Mitra (K. Daval, with him) for the respondant.
S. M. _Sikri for the Intervener. S.C.R. 305: 1951. March 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATANJALI SASTRI J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patna
dismissing a revision petition against the conviction of the appellant for an offence under s. 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was at all material times the General Manager
of the Jagdishpur Zamindary Company (hereinafter reterred to as the company) whc were the lessees of ·a sugar factory referred to in -these proceed- ings as the Bhita Sugar Factory.
He was prosecuted for obstructing the then District Magistrate and the Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to
the factory on 6th December, 1947, to remove 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the company pursuant to an order of the Gov- ernment of Bihar, dated 5th December, 1947. The case
for the prosecution was as follows : The company had deliberately failed to comply with the orders for . supply of sugar issued from time to time under the provisions of the Sugar and Sugar ·Products Control Order, 1947,
by officers of the Government duly authorised in that behalf, and in consequence, the Government made the following order on 5th December, 1947 :- "In exercise of the powers conferred on the Central
Government by cl. (j) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, which have been delegated to the Provincial Govern- ment in relation to foodstuffs in the notification of the
Government of India, Department of Food, No. PY" 603 (2)-1, dated 21st October, 1946, the Governor of Bihar is pleased :- ( 1) to authorise the District Magistrate, Patna, and/or the
Special Officer-in-charge of Rationing, Patna, to search the stock of sugar held by Messrs. Jagdishpur Zamindary Company, Bhita, in the District of Patna, which is about to commit a contraventiqn of
Sanlo:Sh Krunai' Jaiti Vo The State Patanjali Sastrij. 1951 —- ]ad v. T/uSIDI• [1951] the. order . .of the Chief Controller of Prices and Sup- plies, Bihar, made under cl. 7(1) (ii) of the Sugar and
Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, and issued in or- der No. 1613-P.C.R., dated 27th September, 1947, in so far as the said order relates to the said Company, and (2) to direct that 5,000 maunds of sugar held in
stock by the said Company shall be seized. By order of the Governor of Bihar, Sd. T. P. SINGH, Secretary to Government." On the 6th Decembc;.r, 1947, when the officers named went to the factory to carry out the aforesaid order,
they were told by the appellant that he would do everything possible to obstruct the removal of the sugar-, and accordingly it. was found that the sugar godowns had been locked and the road leading to them
blocked by heaps of coal, firewood and tins placed across, so as to make vehicular traffic impossible. A railway siding leading to the godowns had also been rendered unserviceable by the removal of some – of the
rails and fishplates. As . a result of such obstruction, the officers had to seek the aid of armed police to break open the locks, repair the railway line and clear the road block .before the sugar. could be removed from
the factory. The appellant's main defence was that on a proper construction of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Tempor- ary Powers) Act, 1946, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) it was not competent for the Government to pass
the order of 5th December, 1947, which was con- sequently illegal and void, and that obstruction to the exccutien of that order could not constitute an offence under s. 186 of the Indian Penal Code. The conten-
tion was rejected and the appellant was convicte<l and sentenced to simple imprisonment for a term of three weeks. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, Patna, confirmed the conviction and sentence, agreeing with the findings
of the trial court, and a Revision Petition preib;red by the appellant was rejected by the High Court, S;C.R. which, however,. granted a certificate under article (1) ( c) of the Constitution that the case was a fit one
for appeal to this court as it involved a point of "sufficient public importance" as to the interpretation of section 3 of the Act. Section 3, so far as it is material here, runs as follows :-
"3: (1) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for n-.ain- tairiing or increasing supplies of any essential com- modity, or for securing their equitable distribution
and availability at fair prices, may, by notified order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof; and trade and com- merce therein. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
powers conferred by sub-section (1), an order made thereunder may provide- (j) for any incidental and supplementary matters, including in particular the entering. and search of premises, vehicles, vessds and aircraft, the seizure by
a person authorised to make such search of any articles in respect of which such person has reason to believe that a contravention of the order · has been, is being, or is about to be committed, the grant or issue of licences,
permits or other documents, and the charging of fees therefor." · It was contended that an order under sub-section (1) should be in the nature of a rule or regulation of general application, like the Sugar and Sugar Products Control
Order, 1947, issued by the Central Government on 4th August, 1947. as the suJHection confers on the Central Gl)Vc:rnment only the power to "provide for regulating ar vrohibiting" the production, supply,
distributfon, etc., of essential commodities, and d<>es not authorise the making of . ad hoc or · speeial orders with respect to any particular person or thing. We see no reason to
place such a restricted construction on the scope of the power conferred on the Central Government. The term "notified order" which is defined as meaning "an . .f-0 SantosliKIUIMIT
]Qin v. The State Patanjal; ·SastriJ. Santosla K11ma' Jain v. Th~Stalt! Palanjali Sastri]. [ 1951] order notified in the official Gazette" is wide enough to cover special as well as general orders .relating to the
matters specified in section 3. The power to provide for regulating or prohibiting production, distribution and supply conferred on an executive body may well include the power to regulate or prohibit by issuing
directions to a particular producer or dealer or by requiring any specific act to be done or forborne in regard to production, etc., and the provisions of section 4 lend support to that view. The Central Government
is empowered under the latter section to delegate its . power to make order under section 3, subject to con- ditions to be specified, to any officer or subordinate authority either of the Central or a Provincial Gov-
ernment. It would be strange if, as contended for the appellant, a subordinate officer in charge, say, of a small area, should, by delegation, exercise powers of a legislative character in relation to the
matters specified · in section 3, but should not have the power of issuing special orders concerning specific individuals or things. We do not think that such a situation could have been contemplated. The power delegated
under section 4 must, in our opinion, include the power of issuing directions to any producer or dealer in rela- tion to production, etc., of any specified essential com- modity. If so, the delegating authority itself must
pos~ess such power under section 3. For instance, ·secl:Ion 7. of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947, made by the Central Government em- powers the "Controller" "to issue directions
to any producer or dealer to supply sugar or sugar products" to specified areas, persons or organisations. This delegation is expressed .to be made "in exercise of the powers -onferred by section 3 and 4" of the Act, but
unless the Central Government itself had the power of issuing such directions under section 3, it could not delegate that power to the Controller under section 4. This view is reinforced by the language
of section 15, which. contempla~es orders under section 3 being made _ agamst a part:Icular person, for it speaks of "an order made under section 3 which prohibits him (that S.C.R.
is, the person prosecuted for its contravention) from doing any act or being in possession of a thing with- out lawful authoritv, etc." The restricted construction of section 3 contended for by the appellant's counsel
would render the scheme of the Act largely unwork- able, and we have no hesitation in rejecting it. Even so, it was argued, an order for seizure could be made only subject to the conditions and
limitations specified in clause (j) of sub-section (2) of section 3, that is to say, only where the person authorised in that behalf "has reason. to believe that a contravention of
the order [an order made under sub-section ( 1)] has been, is being, or is about to be committed". In the present case, the order of 5th December 1947, directing. the seizure of 5,000 maunds of the company's sugar J.n
the execution of which the appellant has been found to have obstructed the officers of the Provincial Govern- ment, recited that the company was "about to commit a contravention of the order of the Chief Controller of
Prices and Supplies, Bihar, made under cl. 7(15 (ii) of the Sugar and Sugar Products Control Order, 1947,' and issued in order No. 1613 P.C.~, dated 27th Sep- tember, 1947, in so fur as the said order relates to the
said company". The latter order, while it dire·cted the company, among others, "to supply sugar at the prices fixed t.o the approved dealers of certain Dist- ricts'', left it to the District or Sub-divisional Officer to fix quotas for the approved dealers of his District
or Sub-division from the District or · Sub-divisional allotment and to inform the company when and where the supplies are to be made. It has been found by the courts below that the total quantity of sugar which
the order required to be supplied was varied from .time to time, and no quotas to approved dealers were ever fixed nor information sent to the company as to when and where supplies were to be made. The order of the
27th September, 1947, having thus remained inchoate and incomplete and so incapable of being carried out or contravened till the.5th December, 1947, it was sub- mitted that no seizure and removal could be lawfully
ordered on the basis of an anticipated contravention . SantoshKumm Jain v. Th1Stat1 Patanjali SastriJ S•Usi KllMCt ]«in v. TheSe.te Polm!iali SttslriJ. f195l J of such an order, and that the officers concerned
in the illegal and unauthorised removal of the sugar were not acting in the discharge of their public func· tions. Reference was made in this connection to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Lilla Singli
v. Queen Empress(') and Queen Empress v. Jogendra Nath Mukherjee( 2 ) where it was held that the public function in the discharge of which a public servant was obstructed must . be a legal or legitimately autho-
rised function, in order that the obstruction might constitute an offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. On the other hand, counsel for the res- pondent maintained that for an offence under that
section it was not necessary that the act which was Obstructed must be duly authorised and otherwise lawful if it was being done or was sought to be done by a public servant honestly and in good faith believing
that it was part of his public functions, and reliance was placed in support of this view on the decisions of the Madras High Court in Queen Empress v. Poomatai Udayan( 8 ), Public
Prosecutor v. Madava Bhonjo Santos(') and Peer Masthan Rowther v. Emperor("). We think it is unnecessary for the purpose of this appeal to pronounce on tbe true scope of section 186 of
the Indian Penal Code as we are of opinion that the appellant's argument must fail on another ground. It is manifest that sub-section (2) of section 3 con- fers no further or other
powers on the Central Government than what are conferred under sub-section (1), for it is "an order made thereunder" that may provide for one or the other of the matters specifically
enumerated in sub-section (2) which are only illustra- tive, as such enumerarion is "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section ( l) ". Seizure of an article being thus shown to fall within
the purview of sub-section (1), it must be competent for the Central Government or its delegate, the Pro- vincial Government, to make an order for seizure under (1) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 286.
(4) 31 M.L.J. 505. (2) I.J..R. 24 Cal.'320. (5) 1938 M.W.N. 418. (3) I.L.R. 2 I Mad. 296. S.C.R. that sub-section apart from and irrespective of the anticipated contravention of any other order as con-
templated in clause (j) of sub-section (2). The order of 5th December, 1947, must, therefore, be held to be a valid order, notwithstanding its reference to the order of the 27th September, 1947, as being about to be
contravened. If the latter order was incomplete and inoperative and consequently there could be no ques- tion of its contravention, as contended for the appellant, the reference to it in the order dated· the. 5th December, 1947, would be an immaterial redundancy
and could not affect the validity of the latter order. The seizure of the company's sugar must, therefore, be regarded as duly authorised and lawful, and the appellant by obstructing its removal, committed an
offence under section 186 of the Indian Penal Code even on the stricter construction placed · on that pro- vision by the Calcutta High Court. The view we have expressed above receives support
from the decision of the Privy Council in Sibnath Baneriu's case(1). Section 2(1) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended by section 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Act, 1940, empowered the Central
Government to make rules for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, etc., and sub-section (2) enacted "without prejudice to the generality · of the powers
conferred by sub-section (1), the rules may provide for all or any of the following matt.!rs …… ". Among such matters was the detention of any person "reason- ably suspected" of having acted etc. in a manner
prejudicial to the public safety etc. [clause (x) ]. Rule 26 of the Rules made under the section, however, authorised the Government to detain a person "if it is satisfied" that it was necessary ro detain him with a·
view to prevent . him from acting prejudicially ……. . The Federal Court held (9) that this rule was ultr• vires as it went beyond the . scope of clause (x) in that it left it to the satisfaction
of the Government to decide whether or not it was necessary to detain :a (1) [19+5] F.C.R. 195; 72 I.A. 241, 248. · (2) (19+4] p;c, Stm"1SllK11111., Jain v. Tiii Stat• Patanjali Sastri;l.
Santosh .Kumar Jain Th1Stal1 P111anjali SastriJ. 1'51 Muabl9. [1951] person. The decision was reversed and Lord Thanker- ton, delivering the judgment of the Board, observed : "In the opinion of their Lordships, the function of sub-
section (2) is merely an illustrative one; the rule-making power is conferred by sub-section (1), and "the rules" which are referred to in the opening sentence of sub- section (2) are the rules which are authorised by, and
made under, sub-section ( 1) ; the provisions of sub-sec- tion (2) are not restrictive of sub-section (1), as, indeed is expressly stated by the words "without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-sec-
tion (1)". "There can be no doubt-as the learned Judge himself appears to have thought-that the general language of sub-section (1) amply justifies the terms of rule 26, and avoids any of the criticisms
which the learned Judge expressed in relation to sub- section (2) ". This accords with our view of the effect of sub- sections (l) and (2) of section 3 of the Act. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant's bail bond
is cancelled and he is ordered to surrender. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: Rajinder Narain. Agent for respondent and Intervener: P. A. Mehta. R.R. CHARI THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
[SHIU Rum.AL KANIA C.J, PATANJALI SASTRI and DAS JJ.) Indian· Penal Code (XLV of 1860), SI. 161. 165-Criminal l'rocedure Code, 1898, ss. 190, 197-Preveniion of Corruption Act (II of 1947), ss. 3, 6-0fjence under ss. 161 and 165, l.P.C.-War- ra.nt issued by Magistrate during investigation by
police-Sanction under s. 197, Cr. P. C., not obtained before iS1uing warrant- Le11ality of trial-When Magistrate takes "cognisance" of offence. Un«r •· ~ of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947, an offcnc:c pllnishable under •· 161 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code