Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
13. The law on the point of summoning additional accused in exercise of power conferred by Section 319, Cr. PC is well settled. One may profitably refer to and rely on the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab,9 where law has been authoritatively declared. We consider it proper to quote the conclusions reached by this Court qua the questions arising for decision, hereunder: “117. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows: Questions (i) and (iii) — What is the stage at which power under Section 319 CrPC can be exercised? AND — Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word “evidence” is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? Answer 117.1. In Dharam Pal case [(2014) 3 SCC 306], the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person (2014) 3 SCC 92 8 not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of the investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 CrPC and the Sessions Judge need not wait till “evidence” under Section 319 CrPC becomes available for summoning an additional accused. 117.2. Section 319 CrPC, significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) inquiry (2) trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 CrPC, and under Section 398 CrPC are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 CrPC. Materials coming before the court in course of such inquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC, and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. 117.3. In view of the above position the word “evidence” in Section 319 CrPC has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial. Question (ii)—Whether the word “evidence” used in Section 319(1) CrPC could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? Answer 117.4. Considering the fact that under Section 319 CrPC a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) CrPC the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross- examination. [2025] 5 S.C.R. Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar and Others Question (iv)—What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 CrPC to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319(1) CrPC can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? Answer 117.5. Though under Section 319(4)(b) CrPC the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 CrPC would be the same as for framing a charge.10 The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different. Question (v)—Does the power under Section 319 CrPC extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not charge-sheeted or who have been discharged? Answer 117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under In paragraph 106, the Court held “Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross- examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC.” 10 Section 319 CrPC provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, insofar as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 CrPC has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.”
14. Quite recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Jitendra Nath Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another,11 upon considering Hardeep Singh (supra), had the occasion to observe as follows: “10. Section 319 CrPC, which envisages a discretionary power, empowers the court holding a trial to proceed against any person not shown or mentioned as an accused if it appears from the evidence that such person has committed a crime for which he ought to be tried together with the accused who is facing trial. Such power can be exercised by the court qua a person who is not named in the FIR, or named in the FIR but not shown as an accused in the charge-sheet. Therefore, what is essential for exercise of the power under Section 319 CrPC is that the evidence on record must show the involvement of a person in the commission of a crime and that the said person, who has not been arraigned as an accused, should face trial together with the accused already arraigned. However, the court holding a trial, if it intends to exercise power conferred by Section 319 CrPC, must not act mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence has come on record implicating the person sought to be summoned; its satisfaction preceding the order thereunder must be more than prima facie as formed at the stage of a charge being framed and short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if unrebutted, would lead to conviction.”
15. It is in the light of such settled law that we need to examine the impugned order of the High Court. However, we must exercise caution lest any observation has the effect of influencing the trial.
16. Neeraj happens to be the sibling of Mukesh. The initial statement of the appellant referred to the fact that Neeraj had held him facilitating (2023) 7 SCC 344 [2025] 5 S.C.R. Satbir Singh v. Rajesh Kumar and Others stabbing by Mukesh, who gave a knife blow in the waist followed by another blow near his heart which penetrated up to his lungs. Insofar as Rajesh is concerned, it was alleged that he had threatened the appellant by saying “Chaaku maar ke tassali kar di, agar dobaara zinda gaon me ayega to mai goli se uda dunga”. Although, the Sessions Judge formed the requisite satisfaction bearing in mind the decision in Hardeep Singh (supra) and held that the tests laid down therein were squarely met, reading the impugned order in its entirety, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court failed to consider the matter from the proper perspective and arrived at an entirely wrong conclusion.
17. Mr. Gupta has assiduously attempted to impress upon us that involvement of Rajesh and Neeraj were not found in the several reports of the Deputy Superintendents of Police, attached to Karnal district, and such reports should be given credence. We are, however, of the opinion that no conclusive finding can be given that Rajesh and Neeraj were not involved merely on the basis of such reports. Having regard to the version of the appellant in course of examination-in-chief, the Sessions Judge formed a satisfaction higher than a prima facie satisfaction of the alleged involvement of Rajesh and Neeraj and that their complicity in the crime has to be examined and tested on evidence being led at the trial. To ascertain whether the Sessions Judge in allowing the application under Section 319, Cr. PC had acted mechanically or in a manner not authorised by law or in derogation of the law declared in Hardeep Singh (supra), the High Court was well within its competence to adopt an ‘eyes on’ approach, considering the nature of power conferred on the High Court by the Cr. PC as the revisional court, but regard being had to the facts and circumstances, a ‘hands off’ approach would have been advisable and the correct approach.
18. We have no hesitation to hold that the conclusion of the Sessions Judge was a plausible conclusion and not an absurd one so as to warrant interference by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
19. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order of the High Court stands set aside and that of the Sessions Judge is restored. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
20. We clarify, no observation made hereinbefore shall be construed as an expression of opinion as regards the involvement of Rajesh 12 and Neeraj in the crime and whatever we have said is solely for the purpose of disposal of this appeal.
21. The Sessions Judge is encouraged to take the trial to its logical conclusion, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
22. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. Result of the case: Appeal allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain