SHEIIW MOHAMM&.D llAFIQ v. KHALlLtJL REitMAN & ANOTHER May 3t 1972 [K. S. Hi!GD~ ~ND A. N. G:toVEil, JJ.] Mohammedan Law-Demand in a_pre..emption tuit has to be mode after tale-deed having heeh copied out in Sub Re,;strar.r Books-Date entered In the book is date of sale ..
Law Rt/orm–Mohamedan Law-Pre-emption, suit for-Require- ment of 4e1fi!Jnd. A musiim left behind him as his heirs, his widow, twu sons, and 4 daug~ters A1 B, C and D. In 1941, the heirs partitioned his property.
A portion was aU()tted to the widow and the sons and the remaining portion to the daughters. Respondent No. 1 purchased the portion allotted to the widow and the sQn~. On August 19, 1952, he also enter~ into an agreement with the 4 daughters for the
purchase of their portion of the property within 3 months. The sale was, howeve!', not completed. On August 11, 1953, all the 4 daughters executed an agr~ment of sale in favour of the appellant.
Of the 4 daughters, D, h5>Wever, dtanged her mind and on August 14, 1953, executed a <>ale–deed in fav~r of respondent No. 1. 'Th.e other 3 daughrers, however, sold their shares to the appellant on
August 17, 1953. The sale, however, was actuaUy registered in the books of the Sub-Registrar on October 6, 1953. Thereafter, the ap~Uant filed a suit against D, (respond:!nt No. 2) for specific performance of her part of the a~ement. Respondent No. 1 also filed a !.Uit for possession by pre-elnption on the ground that he had become a co-sharer with the other 3 daughters by virtue of the sale
affected in Ius favour by D of her share. 1'he trial Court dismissed the suit for specific pzrformance, but the suit relating to pre-emption was decreed in favour of Respondent No, 1. The appellant failed before the first appellate Court, and his appe<.;·, to the High Court were also not succes~ful. The High Court upheld the decree of dismissal of the suit for specific performance filed by the appellant;. and as regards the suit for pre-emption, the High Court concluded that re5pondent No. 1 was entit!ed to pre-emption.
…. In the appeal arising out of the suit for pre-emption, the sole con- tention raised by the appellant was that under Mohammedan Law, no right of pre-emption accrues unless a demand for pre-emption is mare and such a demand could only be made after the completion of the sale of property sought to be pre-empted. It was contended by the appellant that since the only demand was made on August 17, 1953, the demand was premature because the actual registration of the ~ale deed in favour of the ap(iellant. by the three daughters was not completed in _the books of the Sub"'-Registrar tiU October 6, 1953 and therefore, the smt fo£ pre· emption
was bound .to fail. Dismissing the appeals, HELD : (i) After the pronouncement of this Court in Ram Saran Lall's case, th~: necessary. demands in a pre-emption suit had to be made after the sa:·~ had been completed not by execution or registration of c
p ·~ ……… _.. .:..-..!,. ~ .:..J.. • ..L_;_ c MOHD. RJ\J'IQ v. JC. lt.EHMAN 50J tM ,sale-Geod b"& ~y tbe aaJe..deed bavirJ.t bt1!o 1109\ed out tn me Suf>-lle ·s-. tttts bOOks ~d at would be tbe date entered in tbat boolc wtmf1 gJ
be considered as the date of sale. (SOSB] was to (ii) The •wellabt .et up in this Court a wboUy new b'cb was not agitated before any of the Courts below. Tbc po~ ~tber the demands made were
lkeana~ or compli:d with the rules f Mohammad an. Law could only be detennined by reference to the entf:e evl~ence and ~ not a RUrc question of law. Even il\ the apcial lea\"C" petitldn the J)Ot!1t Will tlot nllsed.
AccordinJly the appclla01 ca.aoot ~ allowed to raUe the q~ of lovall~lty of the demanda at tho r.t.e stage and tbertfore the awt for pre-emptiOn must fall. [$060-E] Ram Saran lAI and Ors. v. Mst. Domini lut, &: Ors, (19621 2 S.C.R. 474. referred to.
. (iii) The M~~medan Law .relating to demand before filiog a. SUit for pre-erophoo IS Of 8 higbly technical nature. Tbc tafabi·i- mowsaibat is apoken of I!S the tint demand and tulab-Usllad is
the second demand. 1be third demand consists of the imtitutioo of the suit for p~mptiot1. Both the talabs are conditions ~eot to tho excn:ise of tbe rigbt of pre-emption. The tlrst talab should be made as
soon as the fact of the saJe is known to the claimant. Ally unreasooable or unoeceasory delay will be construed as an election not to pre-empt. 'Ibece are other highly technical rules which a pre-emptor has to follow before he con succeed in a suit forr pre-emption. A strict compliance with all the requimnents of the demands which are neoess:uv before a pre-emptor can auccud in a suit for pre-emption under the Mohamme- dan Law may become
very diffiCult, pattit:ularly, ott tbe question of promplne&s and avoidance of delay with regard to the lint demand. A nle shall be deemed to be completed only after the sale-~ has bee~ l
copied in the books of the Sub-Registrar. If the demand has to be made afl.er such completion it would be virtually im~sible or at any rute extremely difficult for any pre-emptor to make the first demand as
proml'tly u required under the principles of Mo- hammedan Law. A prG-emptor cal)not be expected to keep a per· petual watch with regu.rd to the point o( time when the office of the· Sub-Registrar would copy out the s.ale-dlled in the PfCscTibed . ~k. It is, however, a rotatter for the Parliament to make sutlt!.ble legulataon to- r
II overcome lbis d.ifficulty. [$0SFI /'rlnr:iples o/ Molwmtdun Luw, by Mulla, 16th Edn. referred to. (iv) TI•e other appeal arising out of the suit. for specific perf~ance also fa.ils, bec.auK. f~nt, the respondent had a n~tht of pre~ptJon, .aoct ICCOndly the earlier agre-ement dated August 19, 1952
entered mto between 'Rnpom.lent 1 and 4 dau~hten at ill subsisted and t~ ,appell~nt hnd no ri~ht to brint a auit for spec1fic pcriornunce against D by VIrtUe of the aubiequent al[ncmcnt dated August II, 1953.
CIVU. APPELLATE JualSDJCTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 691 an<f 692 ot 1967. Appeals 1;.y sr>ecfal leave trom the judg~~ and order dated·_ luly 12, 1966 ot the .Allahabad Hl&b Court tn ~nd Appeals
Nos. 1031 and 1032 ot 1959.. M. c. Ch.aglt~ and s. s. Sltukta. for the appellants (in both the: 8PPeals). ,j ,I SUPREM"E COURT REPORTS [1973] 1 S,C.R. C. B. Agarwala and K. P. Gupta, for respondent No.1 (in both the appeals).
A.N. Goyal, for respondent No.2 (in C.A. No. 691 of 1967). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- Grover, J. T~ese appeals have been brought by special leave from. a ~ommon Judgr;nent of the Allahabad High Court whereby the dtsmtssa~ of ~he smt for specific perfonnance filed by the appel- ~ant was mamtamed and the decree for possession· by pre-emption 111 favour of respondent No. 1 was confinned.
On~ Gauhar Ali was the owner of a pucca two storeyed house m the city of MQradabad. On his cleath he left behind as his heirs his widow Musammat Begum, two sons Liaqat Ali and Ishtiaq
Ali and four daug~ters Sughara Begum, Kubra Begum, Mehmooda • Begum and Chhotl Begum. In 1941 tht .. eirs of Gauhar Ali parti- tioned the property. According to the partition the house in dis- pute was divided longitudinally east and west. The western portion was allotted to the widow and the sons and the eastern portion came to the share of the four daughters. Respondent No. 1 pur- chased the western nortio11 of the house from the widow and the '-.nns.
On August i9, 1952 he also entered into an agreement with the four daughters for the purchase of their part of the home, namely, the eastern portion. The period in which the sale-deed was to be executed was three months but it appears that the sale was not completed. On August 11, 1953 all the four daughters executed
an agreement of sale in favour of the appellant. Musammat Chhoti Begum, howeve:-, changed her mind and executed a sale-deed in favour of respondent No. 1 on August 14, 1953. The other three daughters, however, did not go back on the agreem.ent entered into with the appellant and they got a sale- deed transferring their share registered in favour of the appellant on August 17, 1953. This sale was, however, actually registered in the books of the Sub-Registrar ·on October 6, 1953.
On September 9, 1953 the appellant filed a suit against res. pondent No. 2 (Chhoti Begum) for specific perfonnance of her .part of the agreement. ~espondent No. _1 also filed on Feb~uary 6,
1954 a suit for possession by pre-em phon on the allegatiOn. that he had become a co-sharer with the other t~ree da~ghters by vn1l_le of the sale effected in his' favour by Chhoti Begum of her share m ~he eastern portion of the house. Both the suits were tried and . disposed of by the trial court which held tha~ respondent N?· 1 was not a bona fide purchaser for ·value but smce ~e ha<l: a ~1ght of pre-emption the suit for specific perforn1ance. was dismissed and the suit relating to pre-emption was decreed m favour of res- c
c MOHO. RAFIQ V. K. REHMAN (Grover, /.) 5-'0:3 pondent No. 1. The appellant filed appeals before the first appel-· late court which failed. He preferred two appeals to the High Court which upheld the decree of dismissal in the suit for specific performance filed by the appellant. As regards the suit for pre- emption it was held that tr.e ground of vicinity was no longer avail- able in view of the judgru.ent of this Court in Bhau Ram v. B. Baij- nath Singh(!).
The High Court, however, came to the con- clusion that respondent No. 1 was a sharer in the appendages- common gate and common .passage-and therefore he was en- titled to pre-empti ~n.
In the appeal arising out of the suit for pre-emption the sole· contention raised by Mr. Chagla is that under the Mahomedan Law no right of pre-emption accrues unless a demand for pre- emption is made and such a demand can only be made after the· completion of the sale of the property sought to be pre-empted. For the purpose of finding out whether the sale had been com- pleted the court had to consider the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 and the Registration Act 1908 and not the Principles of Mahomadan Law. Our attention has been in- vited to a decision of this Court in Ram Saran Lall & Others v. Mst. Domini Kuer & Otherse). There a sale deed had been executed on Jan11ary 31, 1946 and presented for registration on the same date. On coming to know -:>f the execution of the sale- , deed the pre–empter made a talab-i-mowasibat on February .2, ~ 1946. But the deed was actually copied out in the registration books on February 9, 1946. The suit for pre-emption had been resisted on the ground that the. talab (demand) had b~n made· prematurely.
By a majority this Court held· that the sale was completed only on February 9, 1946 when the registration was complete and that the talab· was made prematurely and, therefore, the suit must fail.
Now prima facie it would appear that in accordance with the above decision the sale sought to be pre-empted . by respondent No. 1 could not be regarded as having been completed until October 8, 1953 when the sale deed was copied qut in the books of the Sub-Registrar. The talab had been made according to the· evidence which was accepted by the courts below on August 17, 1953, namely, the day on which the sale deed in favour of the appellant by the three daughters was got registered by the Su~ Registrar, but the registration of which was not completed m the books of the Sub-Registrar till October 6, 1953. Mr. Chagla has contended strenuously that the only dernan~ alleged to h~ve· been made was on August 17, 1953 and the smt for pre-emption_ was bound to fail as being premature according to the ratio of the decision of this Court in Ra~ Saran Lall'$(2) case ..
(1) [1962] 3 Suppl. ·S.C.R. 724. ( 2) [1962)2 S.C.R. 474. ~04 ~UPKE.ME-COUaT ~EPOR'l's [197 3 j 1 S.C.R. T~ difticul~y in tbe way of the appellant i~ that a wholly n~w .ca5~ lS. now boJng s~t up on his beftalf by Mr. Chagla. ·In the plaJDt It was stated m para 14 that as SoOn as. the plaintiff came to loww about the purchase of the property by defendant No. 1 .he fulfilled the condition of the pre-emption according to Maho- madan Law and sent message to defendant No. 1 and also served a notice that. ~ must· take from the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 3750/ ~ paid by him and transfer to the plaintiff the portion pur- chased by him from defendant Nos. 2 to 4 but he did not pay any .heed. In the written statement in para 4 it was asserted by defen- dant No. 1 the present appellant tlj.at the plaintiff did not fulfil any· co~dition of pre-emption nor did he ever place any demand orally or in writting before the contesting defendant regarding the purchase and reconveyance of the property in respect of which pre-emption was sought.
The allegation of the plaintiff that he had fulfilled any demand according to the Mahomedan Law was totally incorrect and against the facts. On the above pleadings on the point the issue was framed in the following terms : "Whether necessary demands of pre-emption as re-
quired by Hanafi Law were performed by the plaintiff ?'' The trial court discussed the evidence led on the above issue ·and held that demands had been properly performed in accordance with law.
The evidence related mainly to what happened on August 17, 1953 when the plaintiff was· informed of the sale deed which had been executed in favour of defendant No. 1. That wa·s the first demand and a second demand was also per- f<¥ffied later. The date on which the second demaf!.d .was made is, however, not mentioned in the judgment of the·trial court. In ·the appeal against the decree of pre-emption reference was made to the evidence led on the question of demand and this is what .the learned Additional District Judge said :
"Again addressing Haji Nisar and Mehruddin wit- nesses he said that he performed the first demand in their presence and the second demand was again perform- ed before them and that if it was necessary they would be
summoned as witnesses." Now this judgment was delivered on February 13, 1959 by which time the law laid down by this Court in Ram Saran Lall's case(!), could naturally not have come to the notice of the counsel for the parties and the same could not have been referred to before the Additional District Judge.
But by tile time the appeal carne to be decided by the High Court–the judgment was delivered in July 1966-the law had been settled by this Court and if the appel- lant wanted to rely on the argument which has .been raised before us there is no reason or justification for not havmg done so at that (I) [l962J 2 s.c.R. 474.
c c -D MOHD. RAFIQ v. JC. JtEHM'AN (Grov~r, I.) stage. It must be remembered that fhe entire litigation had l'fO" cceded on the basis that the rules of Mohamodan Law relating-not only to pre-emption but also to the point of time when the $ale is completed were being applied by the courts. After the pl'Onoun~ ment in Ram Saran Lall's(l) case it became settled that the neees~ sary demands in a pre.emption suit had to be made after the sale had been compl~ted not by execution or registration of the sale deed but by the sale deed having been copied out in the sub–Registrar's Books and it would be the date entered in that bOOk which was to be considered as the date of· sale.
According to Mr. Chagla the demands on the evidence of the resp<>ndent himself, were made before the 6th of October ,1953 and not afterwards. This was a question of fact which wei& never investigated by any of the courts. Even if the argument canvassed before us had been raised before the High Court that could have gone into the matter and consi- dered thle evidence on the record to find out when the demands were made.
Our attention has been called to a registered notice having been se:rved on the appellant by the respondent. -There is men· tion of 1mch a notice in para 14 of the plaint. This notice, Ext. 10, was sent after October 6, 1953, its date being November 30. 1953. After giving the details necessary for showing the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff it was stated that the demand had already been made and that for the purpose of avoiding any dis~ pute before filing the suit for pre-emption the vendee was being infonned that he should accept the amount of consideration and · give the property to the plaintiff. Mr. Chagla says that this notice could hardly be regarded as a proper demand according to the requirements of Mahomedan Law.·
The Mahomedan Law relating to demand before filing a suit t'or pre~emption is of a highly technical nature. It is stated in the Prindples of Mahomedan Law by Mulla, 16th Edn. that the talab- i-mowasibat is spoken of as ·the first demand and the talab-i~ishad as the second demand. The third demand consists of the institution of the suit for pre-emption. Both the talabs are conditions precedent to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. The first talab should be made as soon as the fact of the sale is known to the claimant. Any .unreasonable or unnecessary delay will be construed as an election not to pre-empt. In some of the cases referred to a delay of 24 hours or even 12 hours wa~ considered too long and it was held that where there has been so much delay the pre-emptor was not entitled to sustain his elaim for pre-emption. There are other highly technical rules about the presence of witnesses and the nature of evidence which they should give with regard to the second dfimand, the view of the High Courts being conflicting in the matter; (See pages 242, 243).
· _ It seems to us that a strict compliance with all the requirements of the two demands which ~ necessary before a pre-emptor can (1) .(1962] 2 s.c.R. 474. . S:LJPREME COURT REPORTS
.succeed in a suit for pre-emption under ·the Mahomedan Law 1;1Uly become very difficult, particularlyj· on the .question of.the prompt- ness and .avoidance of delay with regard to the first demand. As
.stated before a sale shall . be ~~ed to .~ completed only after _the sale deed has been copied in the books of the Sub~Registrar. If the demand has to be made after such completion it would be virtually impossible. or at any rate extremely difficult for any pre- emptor to make the first demand as promptly as required under the principles of Mahomedan Law. It cannot be expected that a pre-emptor should keep a perpetual watch and go on making cons- tant inquiries with regard to the point of time when the office of the Sub-Registrar would copy out the sale deed in the prescribed book.
However, that is a matter on which legislation tnay become necessary and that is for the Parliament to consider and not for us. It would be abundantly clear from what has been stated above that the question of demand has not been examined by any of the courts keeping in view the law laid down by this Court and the principles to which reference has been made.
Obviously it was the appellant who was to blame for not agitating these matters at least before the High Court. The point whether the demands made were premature or complied with the rules of Mahomedan Law could only be determined by reference to the entire evidence and· is not a pure question of law.
It is surprising that even in the petition for special leave to this Court the points which Mr. Chagla has raised were not canva~sed. In the Statement of the Case only the matter was put in these ~ords:
"Further, the respondent could not claim pre-emption as a co-sharer ( Shafi:.e-Sharik) he had not become owner of the one fourth share in the eastern portion before the sale deed in favour of the appellant.
The sale deed in his favour was regist~red on the 17th August 1953, some time after the, three sisters registered the deed in favour of the appellant. As held by this Hon'ble Court
in the case reported in 1962~2)SCR 474 the demand made by the respondent at 4 or 5 p.m. on 17-8-1953 was not valid". Mr. Chagla, while fairly and properly admhting that all these infirmities are present, has maintained that we should give a deci- sion on the question of demand in the light of his argument · and that the pre-emptor whose right is weak and is of a piratical nature should not be allowed to succeed unless he satisfies the court that he has strictly complied with the requirements of law relatin11 to pre-emption. In our judgment adjudication of this matter whlch is a mix·ed question of law and fact should have been invited from the court~ below and in the absence of any such decision it will not c
.. , ~~;' c MOHO. RAFIQ v. K. REHMAN (Grover, J.) be just and proper for us, at this Stage, to allow the matter to be re-opened and to entertain the contention of Mr. Chagla on the Qu.-…stion of the invalidity of the demand or demands··made by the ~espondent before. filing the suit for pre-emption.
. Acco~~d~ ~ appeal arisip~ o~~. of ~e suit for .J>~·emption fails and It 1S chsmissed. But tlie Parties wtll bear their own costS thrOughout. In the other appeal arising .out of the suit for specific perf~ mance it had been decided by the first appellate court that the· preliminary condition specified in the agreement Ext. A-3 which· had.~en ·executed by Mussama:t Chhoti Begum and her 3 11isters in favour of the respondent about getting the premises-vacated from the tenant had not been satisfied and therefore the agreement had not lapsed.
Respondent No. 1 could have enforced that. agree- ment and the appellant had no right to bring ~ suit for specific per .. formance against Chhoti Begum by virtue of the subsequent agree.; ment dated August 11, 1953.
The suit for specific performance was liable to be dismissed both on the ground that the respondent had a right of,pre·emption and that the appellant could not enforce the agreement dated August 11, 1953 in the presence of the earlier agreement dated August 19, 1952. The High Court had affirmed that view. On behalf of the appellant an attempt was made by Shri M. C. Chagla to assail the above decision but we are unable to find any error in the judgment of the first appellate court or die High Court of a nature which wQuld justify interference by w. therefore the appeal arising out of the suit for specific performance also fails and it is dismissed.
In that appeal the parties will bear their own costs in this Court. S.C. Appeals dismis~ed.