Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
13. Nature of the injuries and the different parts of the body of the deceased whereupon the same were inflicted in our opinion clearly go to show that the knife was indiscriminately used. Injuries had been caused to vital parts of the body of the deceased namely chest, abdomen. His lung and lever were also damaged.
14. Appellant evidently intended to cause grievous injuries to the deceased. He put resistance thereto as far as possible and in the process suffered injuries on his arms, finger and thigh.
15. The deceased was unarmed. He was merely resisting infliction of F injuries on him by a knife and in the process the appellant also received minor f " injuries and that too on his thigh, palm and shoulder. Such minor injuries received by the appellant were not required to be explained by the prosecution.
16. Incident did not take place at or near the house of the appellant. G Deceased might have picked up quarrel with his mother in the morning, but the same by itself cannot be treated to be relevant for the purpose of determining the nature of the offence. Distinction between Section 299 and Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code is well known. What would amount to a "murder" is stated in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code. What is necessary for attracting the said provision inter alia would be that if the person committing the act, H knew that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause SHEIKH RAFI v. STA TE OF ….. NDHRA PRADESH [S.B. SINHA, J.] ·- j. death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
17. Exceptions to the said rule would be attracted only when the offender is deprived of his power of self control which is caused by grave and sudden provocation by the deceased or any other person, or by mistake or accident. Exceptions appended to Section 300 are subject to the provisos contained therein. Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1958) SC 465, B stated the law thus; "(12) To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under S. 300, "thirdly"; First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; c -Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. – Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. -Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, -Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender. (13) Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the F offence is murder under S. 300, "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no G Jo, knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No H one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional. "
18. In Vadla Chandraiah v. State of A.P., (2006) 14 SCALE 108, this Court stated the law, thus, "13. The issue as to whether the case would fall under Section 302 c IPC or under Section 304 Part-II thereof or not should be judged keeping in view the aforementioned factual backdrop. For the said purpose, the term 'evidence brought on records' must be considered in its entirety." See also Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 3 SCALE 90.
19. Each case, therefore, must be judged on its own facts.
20. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Parekh on Sukhbir Singh v. State of Hr:ryana, [2002] 3 SCC 327, wherein this Court held as under:- "The High Court has also found that the occurrence had taken place upon a sudden quarrel but as the appellant was found to have acted in a cruel and unusual manner, he was not given the benefit of such exception. For holding him to have acted in a cruel and unusual manner, the High Court relied upon the number of injuries and their location on the body of the deceased. In the absence of the existence '( " of common object, the appellant cannot be held responsible for the other injuries caused to the person of the deceased. He is proved to have inflicted two blows on the person of the deceased which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death. The infliction of the injuries and their nature proves the intention of the appellant but causing of such two injuries cannot be termed to be either in a cruel or unusual manner. All fatal injuries resulting in death !l cannot be termed as cruel or unusual for the purposes of not availing the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC. After the injuries were inflicted and the injured had fallen down, the appellant is not shown to have inflicted any other injury upon his person when he was in a SHEIKH RAFI v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [S.B. SINHA, J.] helpless position. It is proved that in the heat of passion upon a A sudden quarrel followed by a fight, the accused who was anned with bhala caused injuries at random and thus did not act in a cruel or unusual manner."
21. Apparently the said decision was rendered on its own facts. We may, however, notice that it came to be considered in Vadla Chandraiah B (supra), The distinctive feature herein are the injuries which have been caused in a cruel and unusual manner. Apart from the purported quarr1:l picked up by the deceased with his mother, there is no other immediate provocation which can be said to be the immediate cause leading to the assault. The deceased was chased and the injuries have been inflicted on a main road and that too before a hospital. It was caused in the evening before a large number c of persons. He could have been caught and disarmed only by a constable. Evidently others including PW-5 and PW-7 who had been witnessing the occurrence, did not even dare to do so.
22. Nineteen injuries caused in quick succession cannot be said to have been caused as a result of grave and sudden provocation. The very fact that so many injuries were caused in quick succession and particularly where the t deceased being unanned and in a helpless situation, is sufficient to indicate that Sec. 300 "Thirdly" is attracted in this case.
23. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Parekh on Ram Swarup and Ors. v. State of Haryana etc., [1993] Supp. 4 SCC 344. That was a case where a plea of right of self defence was raised. In that case a fight between two parties took place. Keeping in view the evidences brought on record, this Court opined that the High Court adopted a wrong approach for judging the case of bilateral clash in regard to the question as to which party was the aggressor. Having regard to the nature of defence raised therein, viz. right of F self defence, number of injuries were found to be not a relevant factor for determination as to whether prosecution party or the accused party was the aggressor. This Court merely laid down that the question must be determined on the factual matrix of each case. The ratio of the said decision, therefore, is clearly not attracted.
24. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the prosecution has brought G materials on record to prove the charge of murder against the appellant.
25. Therefore, there is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly. B.B.B. Appeal dismissed. H