Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. On behalf of the prosecution (i.e., the State of Uttarakhand), it was submitted: (i) PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 have all been consistent about the deceased reporting to them that accused persons were demanding a motorcycle and cash of Rs.50,000/- and threatening her that if their demand is not met by the date of child naming ceremony, she would be killed. Naming ceremony was held on 11.01.2007 and soon thereafter the deceased died on 17.01.2007. Thus, deceased’s statement was in respect of circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death and, therefore, admissible in evidence under Section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. (ii) The courts below justifiably raised a presumption of the offence of dowry death; and that presumption was not dispelled by the accused- appellants. Moreover, the appellants being father-in- law and mother-in-law of the deceased, residing in the same house where the deceased died an unnatural death, were liable to be convicted. (iii) The photograph (Ex. Kha-1) was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. Otherwise also, it did not reveal any such compromising position of which the deceased will be ashamed of. (iv) The appeal is concluded by concurrent findings of fact, therefore no case for interference is made out. 826 ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION
11. Before we proceed to test the merit of the rival submissions, it would be useful to cull out certain facts as regards which there is no serious dispute. These are: (a) the deceased was married to the son of the appellants within seven years of her death; (b) the deceased died an unnatural death on account of ante- mortem burn injuries; (c) place of death of the deceased was her matrimonial home; (d) just 18 days before her death, the deceased had given birth to a male child; (e) prior to her death there was no police complaint or FIR in respect of harassment of the deceased for any reason whatsoever; (f) there is no evidence that any of the accused demanded dowry, or a motorcycle, or cash from the family members of the deceased either before the marriage or at the time of marriage; and (g) there is no evidence that the deceased was physically assaulted by any of the accused in connection with demand for dowry or motorcycle or cash.
12. To constitute a ‘dowry death’, punishable under Section 304-B7 IPC, following ingredients must be satisfied: i. death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or it must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; ii. such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; Section 304-B. Dowry Death. – (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. — For the purpose of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 [28 of 1961]. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life [2024] 9 S.C.R. Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand iii. soon before such death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and iv. such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with any demand for dowry. The phrase ‘otherwise than under normal circumstances’ is wide enough to encompass a suicidal death.
13. When all the above ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B8 of the Evidence Act is to be raised against the accused that he has committed the offence of ‘dowry death’. What is important is that the presumption under Section 113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry, which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of ‘dowry death’. The presumption, however, is in respect of commission of the offence of ‘dowry death’ by the accused when all the essential ingredients of ‘dowry death’ are proved beyond reasonable doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that to prove the essential ingredients of an offence of ‘dowry death’ the burden is on the prosecution.
14. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the deceased died otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage. However, the issue between the parties is about her being subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative, soon before her death, in connection with any demand for dowry.
15. The testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 do not indicate that any demand for dowry was made by the accused-appellants either before or at the time of marriage of the deceased with their son. Further, there is no evidence that the accused appellants directly demanded a motorcycle or cash from any of the above witnesses. In fact, evidence is to the effect that the deceased had informed PW-1 and PW-2 on 4.1.2007 and 11.1.2007 about the demand for a motorcycle and cash. Further, from the deposition of PW-1 and Section 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, dowry death shall have the same meaning as in section 304 capital B of the Indian Penal Code [45 of 1860] 828 PW-2, it appears that the aforesaid demand was not in connection with marriage but as a mark of celebration on birth of a male child.
16. No doubt testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 would not be hit by the rule against hearsay evidence because it related to one of the circumstances of the transaction resulting in their daughter’s unnatural death. However, a distinction must be drawn between admissibility and acceptability/reliability of a piece of evidence. Merely because a piece of evidence is admissible does not mean that it must be accepted. Before accepting the evidence to hold that the fact in issue stands proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court must evaluate the same against the weight of surrounding circumstances and other facts proven on record.
17. In the instant case, the witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 were asked whether they took up the issue of motorcycle /cash demand with the accused. Their reply was that they did not, because they took it as a joke. We fail to understand how parents could treat their daughter’s multiple reporting of threat to her life, on account of demand being not met, as a joke. This creates a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the allegation more so when there is no allegation that any such demand was ever raised either before or at the time of marriage. This doubt gets fortified by change in stance of PW-1 from what was taken in the FIR. Notably, in the FIR it was alleged that the accused-appellants including their elder son, and his wife, had directly raised demand for a motorcycle and cash. This allegation was not supported by the deposition of both PW-1 and PW-2 while admitting that appellant’s elder son was a doctor serving in another district. Thus, there appears to be a knee-jerk reaction to the unnatural death of their daughter to make out a case of dowry death. Besides that, no independent witness of the vicinity was examined. In our considered view, therefore, one of the essential ingredients of dowry death, namely, any demand for dowry, was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
18. Indisputably, the accused have not been convicted for murder, and rightly so, because there was no worthwhile evidence to show that except for the burn injuries, which could be self- inflicted, the accused suffered any other ante-mortem injury. Moreover, the presence of the accused in the house at the time of occurrence is not proved. In such circumstances, the death was most probably [2024] 9 S.C.R. Shoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttarakhand suicidal though this would not make a difference for commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC if all the other ingredients of dowry death stand proved. But, as noted above, here harassment/ cruelty at the instance of the appellants in connection with any demand for dowry has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. As regards the reason to commit suicide, though it is not necessary for us to dwell upon, suffice it to say that husband of the deceased was in service and stayed away from the deceased. Suggestion was given to the prosecution witnesses, and statement was also made under Section 313 CrPC, that the deceased used to remain depressed for being unable to join her husband at the place of his posting due to lack of residential quarter. That apart, a photograph of the deceased (Ex. Kha 1), regarding which no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses, showing her alone with a male stranger had surfaced. In the statement under Section 313 CrPC a stand was taken that this photograph had shamed her. Be that as it may, once all the necessary ingredients of dowry death have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would not be available to the prosecution. Hence, in our considered view, the appellants are entitled to be acquitted of the charge of offences punishable under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC.
19. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order convicting and sentencing the appellants under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC is set aside. The appellants are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bond(s) stand discharged.
20. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. Result of the Case: Appeal allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain