Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. Amongst the Sikh Jats of Punjab province, there exists a custom, where the widow marries her first husband's brother in the Karewa form, D remarriage would not cause forfeiture of her own share. [See Chunnilal v. Mst. Attar Kaur, AIR 1933 Lah. 69].
12. In respect of Jats belonging to Firozepur district, it has been held that a widow who remarried her first husband's brother succeeds to a co- E widow in preference to collaterals. But the widow's right only accrues on husband's death, and if it does not accrue then, it cannot accrue later by the death of subsequent heir. The fact, if the widow is a Karewa widow it would not':affect her right in a suit the parties to which were the two widows of a Manhas Rajput resident in the Shakargarh Tehsil of Gurudaspur District, had that the plaintiff (upon whom under the circumstances the onus lay) had F failed to prove a custom in her favour, excluding the defendant, who was a co-widow by a Karewa marriage, from succeeding to a share in the deceased husband's estate (Mst. Dakho v. Mst. Gano 22 P.R. 889]. Even a woman who had contracted such marriage may not forfeit her life estate, if any, in her deceased husband's property despite the provisions of the Hindu widows G Remarriage Act, 1856. However, the said principle would not apply where. a remarriage is not with the brother of her deceased but with· some other relative.
13. In Shrimonai Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee and Ors. v. Harchar~n Singh, AIR (1934) Lahore I, a Division Bench of the Lahore High H Court held : y t ASS KAUR (DECEASED) BY L.RS. v. KART AR SINGH (DEAD) BY L.RS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 679 "First of all, it was objected that Harcharan Singh was not the A legal representative of his deceased brother Gurcharan Singh, but that his mother Mr. lJttam Kaur, was his legal representative. Counsel for Harcharan Singh stated before the Tribunal that he had no objection to the mother also being impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased Gurcharan Singh, if it was held that she was one. It was denied however that she was the legal representative of the deceased B Gurcharan Singh, and this contention was upheld by the Tribunal on the unrebutted testimony of the witness examined. There is no question that this decision is right. A mother as a rule in the Punjab, where custom is the rule of decision, only succeeds when there are no sons and the succeeds not as the mother of the sons but as the C widow of her deceased husband. See in this connection the replies to questions 35, 41 and 53 of Currie's Customary Law of the Ferozepore District. In reply to the last question there is a note to the effect that the mother succeeds really as the widow of her husband and not as the mother of the last owner. There are numerous decisions to this effect as well. It follows that, where there are sons they exclude the · D mother and if a son dies he is succeeded by his brother but when the last surviving son dies without issue then the mother succeeds in her capacity as widow of her deceased husband. I may here refer to one authority that of a Full Bench, reported as Mt. Desi v. Lehna Singh. It is clear from this case that there were two sons who both died E without issue and it was not till the death of the second that their mother set up a claim as against the collaterals. She was however non-suited on the ground that she had remarried and could not therefore be looked upon as the widow of her first husband." [Emphasis supplied] F
14. Yet again in Diwan Singh and Anr. v. Natha Singh and Ors., AIR ( 193 7) Lahore 468, it was held : " … The case of a mother inheriting property on the death of her son obviously stands on a different footing and cannot, I think, be G considered to be analogous to the present case. In the present instance, it seems clear that when the widow Mt. Utmi succeeded collaterally on the death of Jowala Singh and Mihan Singh, she succeeded to the estate as the representative of her husband and not of Jowala Singh or Mihan Singh. Consequently on her death the H (2007) 7 S.C.R. estate must, I think, be treated as though Prem Singh himself had succeeded to it…"
15. Our attention has, however, been drawn to a decision of this Court in Ujagar Singh v. Mst. Jeo, AIR (1959) SC 1041, wherein this Co~rt· upori noticing a large number of conflicting decisions, came to the conclusion that B existence of a general Cl)stom entitling the collaterals to succeed in preference to sister had not been proved .. It, therefore, seemed to Their Lordships that in the interest of justice the respondent th.erein (sister) should succeed in the suit as her brother's heir undet the Hindu law. t
16. In absence of any proof of custom, indisputably the Hindu Law C would apply. A' fortiori Hindu Law oflnheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 in terms whereof a sister becomes an heir in preference to the collaterals would be applicable in regard to devolution of property.
17. We may, however, notice that customary law has been recorded in D Rattigan' s Digest of Customary Laws. The courts below have categorically held the law to be applicable in the instant case is the customary law having regard to the fact that the parties belonged to the community of Sidhu Jats.
18. In R.B.S.S. Munnala/ and Ors. v. S.S. Rajkumar and Ors., AIR (1962) SC 1493, this Court was considering the question as to whether a Jain widow E could adopt a son to her husband without his express authority, being governed by the custom which had by long acceptance become part of the law applicable to them. Therein, it was observed : " .. .It is well-settled that where a custom is repeatedly brought to the notice of the Courts of a country, the courts may hold that custom introduced into the law without the necessity of proof in each individual case … "
19. The court can also take judicial notice of such customs in terms of Section 57 of the Evidence Act, 1872. As and when custom has repeatedly been recognized by the courts, the same need not be proved. Reference in G regard to the Punjab 'general custom' may be made to Ujagar Singh (supra), and Bawa v. Taro, AIR (1951) Punjab 239.
20. In Harcharan Singh v. Mohinder Kaur, AIR (1987) P&H 138. Paragraph 22 of the Rattingan's Digest was noticed, holding that in terms thereof there is a custom in Punjab to the effect that in default of male lineal t ASS KAUR (DECEASED) BY L.RS. v. KART AR SINGH (DEAD) BY L.RS. [S.B. SINHA, J.) 681 descendants and of a widow the mother of the deceased succeeds to a life A interest, provided she had not remarried. It reads as under : "22. In default of male lineal descendants and of a widow the mother of the deceased succeeds to a life interest, provided she has not remarried."
21. In Chunnilal (supra), Lahore High Court observed : "Where a person dies leaving two widows and one of them remarries the whole estate of the deceased passes to the other widow and the mere retention of the re-married widow's name in the revenue records would not place her in adverse possession of her share qua C the co-widows and owing to her intervening between the estate and the reversioner the latter's rights would not be affected."
22. The learned trial Judge categorically held that Relu Singh belonged to Sidhu Jats of Muktsar Tehsil, who were governed by Zimindara custom, stating : " …. Since the property was ancestral according to para 13 of the Digest of customary law on the death of one of the two co-widows the survivor took the entire estate by survivorship. Raj Kaur was therefore entitled to succeed to the estate of Sobhi by the rule of survivorship to the exclusion of the plaintiff'
23. Para 13 of the said Digest reads as under : "13 On the death of one of two co-widows the survivor takes by survivorship, even if she has remarried by Karewa, provided such re- marriage has not caused a forfeiture of her own share."
24. Rattigan's Digest was also referred to by this Court in Daya Singh (Dead) through L.Rs. and Anr. v. Dhan Kaur .AIR (1974) SC 665: [1974] 1 sec 700, but therein again existence of such a custom had not been proved. It is no doubt true that if the 1929 Act applies, the appellant would succeed . to the interest of her brother after her mother's death; but the said Act of G 1929 is also subject to applicability of customary law.
25. As· statutory law did not exclude the applicability of the customary law, customary law would prevail over the statutory law. It was so found by the courts below. (2007) 7 S.C.R.
26. A serious contention was raised that the validity of customs must be judged on the touchstone of justice, equity and good conscience. No such contention had been raised before the learned Trial Judge or before the High Court. It is one thing to say that customary law had no application or the custom had not been proved; but it is another thing to say despite its acceptance and proof the same should not be applied on the ground of B equity, justice and good conscience. We, therefore, cannot go into such a contention.
27. No contention had also been raised before the courts below that the custom in question is not a special or local custom, but merely a general C custom. Such a contention again call!lot be allowed to be raised for the first tune before this Court particularly in view of the fact that they have categorically held that the Jats are governed by customary law; the principle being 'keeping of the property within the family'.
28. Raj Kaur, who was a widow of Hira Singh, was married to another D brother just to sJfeguard the family property. She succeeded under the customary laws to her husband after the death of her co-widow. In that view of the matter, if the daughters who were married were to be excluded by customary law, no exception thereto can be taken.
29. In Daya Singh (dead) through L.Rs. (supra), paragraph 23 of E Rattingan's Digest of Customary Law of Punjab has been noticed. It was held: "It is on the basis of this Customary Law that the reversioners succeeded in the suit filed by them questioning the gift made by the respondents mother to her. There is no doubt that Rattigans work is an authoritative one on the subject of Customary Law in Punjab. This Court in Mahant Salig Ram v. Musammat Maya Devi, said: The customary rights of succession of daughters as against the collaterals of the father with reference to ancestral and non-ancestral lands are stated in para 23 of Rattigans Digest of Cu.<1tomary Law. It is categorically stated in sub-para (2) of that paragraph that the daughter succeeds to the self-acquired property of the father in preference to the collaterals even though they are within the fourth degree. Rattigans work has been accepted by the Privy Council as a book of un4uestioned authority in the Punjab. Indeed, the correctness of this para was not disputed before this Court in Gopal Singh v. r i ASSKAUR(DECEASED)BYL.RS. v. KARTARSINGH(DEAD)BYL.RS. [S.B. SINHA,J.) 683 Ujagar Singh "
30. However, therein the customary law was not applied in view of the application of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
31. We may furthermore notice that the customary law has been specifically been excluded in terms of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. If the intention of the makers of the statute in the 1929 was to completely exclude the applicability of the customary law, it would have been said so explicitly.
32. Reliance has been placed on Smt. Dipo v. Wasson Singh and Ors., [1983] 3 sec 376, wherein the sister was held to be a preferential heir as it was found that the entire property was an ancestral property, stating : " …. We also proceed on the basis that according to the prevailing custom of the area, collaterals and not the sister are preferential heirs to ancestral property in the hands of a propositus, while the sister and not the collateral is a preferential heir in regard to non-ancestral property. We must add here that we are not quite satisfied that the custom has been properly established, but for the purposes of the present case, we proceed on the basis that the custom has been established. But that is not the end of the problem before us. No doubt the properties which have been found by the lower courts to be ancestral properties in the hands of Bua Singh are properties which originally belonged to Bua Singhs ancestors. But Bua Singh was the last male holder of the property and he had no male issue. There was no surviving member of a joint family, be it a descendant or otherwise, who could take the property by survivorship. Property inherited from paternal ancestors is, of course, ancestral property as regards the male issue of the propositus, but it is his absolute property and not ancestral property as regards other relations. In Mui/as Principles of Hindu Law (15th Edn.), it is stated at p. 289: … if A inherits property, whether movable or immovable, from his father or fathers father, or fathers fathers father, it is ancestral property as regards his male issue. If A has no son, sons son, or sons sons son in existence at the time when he inherits the property, he holds the property as absolute owner thereof, and he can deal with it as he pleases. . . . c [2007) 7 S.C.R. A person inheriting property from his three immediate paternal …,– ancestors holds it, and must h~ld it, in coparcenary with his sons, sons sons and sons sons sons, but as regards other relations he holds it, and is entitled to hold it, as his absolute property. Again at p. 291, it is stated: The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, -r is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. As regards c other relations, it is separate property, and ifthe coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to his heirs by succession. 3. We are, therefore, of the view that the lower courts were wrong in refusing to grant a decree in favour of the plaintiff as regards property described by, t})em as ancestral property. The defendants were collaterals of Bua Singh and as regards them the property was not ancestral property and hence the plaintiff was the preferential heir. The plaintiff was entitled to a decree in respect of all the plaint properties …. ,, 33. There is no dispute in regard to the aforementioned proposition of E law. To the same effect is the· decision of this Court in Dharma Shamrao Agalawe v. Pandurang Mircgu Agalawe and Ors., [1988) 2 SCC 126 and Sheela Devi and Ors. v. Lal Chand & Anr., (2006) 10 SCALE 75. The said decisions, however, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, have no application in the fact of the present case.
34. For the reasons aforementioned, the appe11l being devoid of any merit is dismissed. However, in the facts and circums.tances of the case, there shall be no. order as to costs. f- NJ. • Appeal dismissed. f