c SMT. sARABATI DEVI. & ANR. v. SMT; USHA DEVI December 6, 1983 (E. S. VENKATARAMIAH AND R. B .. MISRA, JJ,) Insurance Act, 1938 (Act IV of 193/f), Section 39-Assured of a .life insurance pO/icy dies intestate leaving be}iind him his mother, his widow, and a·ton, bUt for the purpose of Section 39 has nominated hjs widow alone- Whether ,he nqminee of a life insurance policy, on the. assured dying intestate would become entitled to the beneficial interest in th'e amount received llnder the policy to the · e:xcl~sion of the heirs o{ the assuP.ed.
The appellants being n1other and son of. one Jagmohan Swarup who was governed by the Hindu Sqceession .Act, 1956 and who died intestate on June 15, 1967 filed Civil Suit No. 122 of 1970 on the file of the first Additional Civil Judge, Dehradun for' a declaration to the effect that they were together entitled t.o 2/3rCl share .of the amount due a~d -payal?le under the insurance policies though the deceased assured has nominated the res- . pondent his widow as the person· to whom the amounts were payable. The respondent contested the suit claiming that she has the .absolute right to the amounts to the exclusion of· her son and ·her mother-in-law. The suit was dismissed. The First Appeal before the Dt. Judge, Dehradun and the Second Appeal before the HiQh .. Court were dismissed. I-Jenee the appeal after obtain- .ing sp~cial leave of the Court.
.,_ Allowing the appeal, the Court, HELD :· l.1 A mere nomination made undc:r Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 docs not h~ve the effect of conferting .ori the nominee any ~neficfal interest in the' amount payaJ:>le under the life insurance.policy on the death of ·the accused. The nomination only indicates the hand which is authorised to receive the amount, on the, payment of which the i asurer gets a valid discharge ~fits liability under the policy .. The amount, however, can be claimed b)- the heirs of the assur"ed ia accordance-with the law of :;uccession ·governing them. (1009G, 1004 B·D]
1.2 An analysis of the provisions of Section 39 of· the Act clearly estab- lished. that the policy holder continues to hold inter~st in the policy during his life tir'!1e and the nominee acquires no sort of interest· in the policy during the life time of the holder. lf.that is so, on the death of the policyholder "the amount payable .under the policy becomes part of his estate whiCh is governed by the law of succession applicable to hin1, Such ~,uccession may be "testomen· tarY or ilitesfate. The tenuous character of the right of a nominee becomes more·pfonounce.d 'w_hen one contrasts the provisions of Section 39 with that of ..r
SARBATI DEVI v. USHA DE\'! (Venkatoramiah, J.) 993' -5ecti0n' 38. ,-Section 39 of the Act was not intended to act as a third mi:)de of su~ession providCd by the stature and i.ncorrectly st); led as ~'stat.uiory ·te~t!· . .:· m0nt … by the Delhi High Court. (998 C-EJ
1.3 Tho language of Section 39 of the Act is neither capable of -alteria.g· thC·course or"succession under la\v nor can be said to have equa.ted a nominee to an heir or legatee. [999Fj
S. Fauza Singh v. Ku/dip Singh & Ors .. AIR 1978 Delhi 276; Mrs. Uma. Sehgal & Anr. v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal and Ors. AIR 1982 Delhi 36; overuled. Rama Bha//av D)randhania v. Gangadhar Nathmall AIR 1966 Ca'l. 275; · "D. Mohananardu Mudaliar and Anr. v. Indian lnSurance and Bankinll Corporation _ , Ltd., Salem and Anr. Alll"1957 Madras 115; Sarojini Anu11a v. Neelakanta Pillai AIR 1961 Kerala 126, Life insurance Cvr.PoratiOll Pf India v. United Bank of India Ltd. & Anr. AIR 1970 Cal. 413; RajilRam ·v. Mata Prasad and Anr. AIR 1972 All.167; Ma//idei and Anr. v. Kanchan Prana Dei ,AIR 1973 Orissa 83; · Lakshmi A1nn1a and Anr~ v .. Saguna Bhagathi & Ors. IL~ 1973 Karnataka. 827; -· Atmaran1 Mohan/al Panchal 'v. Guna1·antiben and Ors. AlR 1977.Gujara.t 134 ~ approved.
· … ·C Karuppa Gounder & Ors. v. Palaniammal & Ors. AIR 1.963 Ivfadras 245;." B. M'. Mundkur v. Life J11sura11ce Corporation oflndia and Ors. AIR ,977 Mad. 72, discussed and distinguished.
CIVIL APPELLATE. JURlSDlCTI0'1: Civil Appeal No. 96of1972 . From.the Judgment. and Order dated 23rd December, 1971 of the High Court of Judicature !II 'Allahabad in Second Appeal No. 3082 of 1971.
Yogeshwar Piasad, Mrs. Rani Chh~bra a11d S. K. Bagga for the . Appellants. B. R. Agarwa/a, R.H. Pancholi and Ms. VijayalakshmiMenon, _.. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was.delivered by
VENKATARAMIAH, J. The ·short questlon which arises for consideration in this ~ppea(by special leave is whether a nominee of . a life insurance policy under section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 · (Act No. IV of 1938) (hereinafter ·referred to as 'the Act') on the assured dying intestate would become entitled to the beneficial int~rest in ~he .amount received under the policy to the exclusion of the heiJs of the assure<\.
c ff SUPREME COURT<tEiORTS [19a4J .1 s.c.R. Tihe facts leadi11g to this appeal are these : One Jag Mbhan Swarup· who was governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 died· intestate on June 15, 1967 leaving behind him his son, A°lok Kumar (plaintiff No. 2), his widow Usha Devi (defendant) and 'his mother Sarbati Devi '(plaintiff No. I) as hjs heirs. He had during his lifetime taken out two insurance· policies for Rs. 10,000 each and had · nominated under section 39 of the Act his wife Usha Devi as the person to whom the amount was payable after his death.· On the basis of the said nomination, she claimed absolute right to the amounts payable under the two policies to the exclusion of her son and her mother-in-law. 'Thereupon Sarabati Devi and Alok Kumar' (minor) represented by his. next friend Atma Ram who was the father of Ja~ Mohan Swarup filed a ~uit in Civil Suit No. 122 of 1970 on the file of the 1st Ad.ditional Civil Judge. Dehradun fot a declaratiofl to the effect th.at they were together entitled tO' 2/3rd share of the amount due and payable under the insurance policies referred to above.' .Usha Devi, the defendant resisted the suit. Her contention was that on the .death of the assured, she as his nominee became absolutely e~titlcJ. to the amounts due under the insur~nce policies by virtue of section 39 of the Act
The trial court dismissed the suit. The first appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the decree of the trial court .was dismissed by the Dist-ict Judge, Dehradun. The second appeal filed by them against the judgment of the District Judge before the High Court of Allahabad was dismisse.d in /imine under Rule 11, Order 4i of the Civil Procedure Code.
The plaintiffs have filed this app~al after obtaining special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. The only' question which requires to be decided'in this ·case is whether a nominee under section 39'qfthe Act gets an absolute right to the amount due under a ·life insurance policy on the death of the assured .. Section 39 of the Act reads :
"39. Domination by policy,holder.- (1) The holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may, wben effecting the policy cir at any ti\lle before . the policy matures for payment, nominate·the person or persons to
whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death : Provided that where any nominee is a minor, it shall be lawful for the policy-holder to appoint in the· prescri- J..'
. SARBATI DEVI ~ ,USHA DliVI ( Jlenkataramiah, .(.) 9,5 bed manner any person to receive the .money secured by the policy in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee.
(2) Any such nomination in order to be effectual shall unless it is incorporated in the text of. the policy itself, be made by. an enqorsement on the policy communicated to the insurer and registered by h.im
iJl die records relating ·to the policy and any such nomination may at any time before the policy matu- res for payment be cancelled or changed by an endorsement, or a further endorsement or a will, as
the case may be, but uniess notice in writing of any such cancellation or change has been delivered to the insurer, the insurer shall not be !iable for any pay- ment under the policy made bona fide by- him to a
· nominee mentioned in the text of the policy or registered in records of the insurer. (3) The insurer shall furnish to the policy-bolder a written acknowledgement of having registered a
nomination or a cancellation or change thereof, and may charge a fee . not exceeding one . rupee for registering such cancellation or change: . ( 4) A transfer or ass.ignment of a policy made in
accordance with section 38 shall automatically cancel a nomination : . .,,_. ·Provided that the assignment of a policy to the· insurer who bears the risk on the policy at the time o.f the assignment, in consideration of a · 1oan granted by that
insurer on the security of the policy within its surrender value, or its reassignment on repayment of the loan shall not cancel a nomination, but shall affect the rights of the nominee only to the extent. of the insurer's interest in the policy.
(5) Where the policy matures for payment during the lifetime of the person whose life is insured or where the nominee or, if there are more nominees tha.n one, . all the nominees die before the policy matures for
·payment, the amount secured by the policy sI.tall b~ ll c ·G ·A c . D ,_ …. f ' .• ;996 il984j I s.c~Ii.. payable to the policy-holder or his heirs or legal representatives or· the holder . of a succession certi~
jicate, as tlie case may be. (6) Where the nominee or· if there are more nominees 'than one, a nominee or nominees survive the person whose iife is insured, the amount secured by the
policy shall . be payable 'to such survivor or survivors. · (7) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any policy of life insurance to. which section 6 of the Nlarried Women's Property Act, 1874 applies or has
at any time applied : Provided that where a nomination _made whether before or after the commencement of· the InsuraDce (Amendment) Act, 1946, in favour of. the wife of the . person who pas insured his life or of his wife and children or any of them, is exeressed, whether or' not on the face
of the policy, as being tnade .under this section the said section 6 shall be deemed not .to apply. or not to have applied to the policy."· At'the out set it should be mentioned that except the decision of the Allab,abad High Court in Kes.ari Devi ·v. Dharma. Devi(') on . which reliance was placed by the High Court in dismi.ss-ing the appeal before it and the two decisions of the Delhi: High Court in S. Pauza Singh v. Ku/dip Singh & Ors.(') and Mrs. Uma Sehgal & Anr. v. Dwarka Dass Sehgal & Ors(') in all other decisious • cited before · ~s the view taken is that the nominee under section 39. of the Act is nothing more than an agent-to receive the money due und.er a life insurance policy in the circumstances similar to those in ihe ·present case and that the money remains the property ·of the assured·· during his lifetime and on his death forms part of his estate subject :to the Jaw of succession applicable to him .. · The cases which have taken . the above view are Ramballav DhanJhania v. Gangadhar Nathmall.(') Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd. & {I) A.I.R. 1962 Allahabad 355.
(2) A.l.R. 1978 Delhi 276. (3) A.LR. 1982 Delhi 36. (4) A.I~R. 1956 Cai. 275. J 1 • •• .,. .. SARBATI DEVI v. iisHA DEVI (Venkataramlah, },) •,' .. .Anr.,(1) D .. Mohanaeelu Mu/daliar
& Anr. v. Indian Insurance and Banking Corporation Ltd. Salem & Anr.,(2) Sarojini · Amma · v. Neelakanta Pil/ai.('J Atmaram Mohan/al Panchal' v. Gunavantiben & . Or~ .• (') Ma/Ii Dei &. Anr. v. Kanchan Provo Dei and Lakshmi Amma(") Anr. v. Sagnna Bhagath & Ors.,('! Since there is a conflict of judicial opinion on the fjuestion involved in this case it is necessary to examine the above cases !ft some length. The Jaw in force in England· . on the above question is summarised in Halsbury's Laws of Ilngland (Fourth Edition), Vol. 25, Para 579 thus:
"579. Position of third party,-The policy money payable oi:t the death. of the assured may be expressed to be payable to a third party and the third party is then prima facie nterely . the
agent for . the time being of the legal owner .and has his authority to rec'eive the policy mol)l;Y and. to give a good discharge; but he . generally has no right to su~ tjle insurers in his own name. · The question has been raised whether the· third. pa'rty's
autborityto receive the policy money is terminated by the death of the assured; it seems, however, that unless and until they are otherwise directed by the assured's personal representatives the insurers may pay the money to the
third party and get a good discharge from him." We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of sectiOn 39 of the Act. The said section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on bis own life may when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or · persons to whom the ·money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee .is . a minor,. the policy holder may appoint any person to receive the mopey in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy holder is alive. when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and (I)
(2) (3) (4) (5) \6) A.l.R. 1970 Cal. 513. A.I.R .. 1957 Mad. 115. A.I.R. 1961 Kerala 126. A.l.R. 1977 Gujarat 134. A.l.R. 1973 (Orissa 83. 1.L.R. 1973.Karnataka 827. c· n c [1984) l s.c.It.
not the nominee. Any such nomination 1nay at any time before the policy matures for·payment be cancelled· or changed, but -before such_ cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment hon fide tO the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets' a valid discharge.
Such . power of cancellatfon of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee bas no. ,right t.o the amount during the lifetime of tge assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned under section 38 of the Act, the nomi- nation autol)'latically lapses. If the nominee or where. there are nominees more than one al! the nominees die before the policy matu- res.for payment the'money due under the policy is payable to the hefrs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to sub-section (7) of section 39 of the· Act here. But \he summary of the relevant provisions of section 39 given above establishes clearly that the polic1 bolder continues to – hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acq- uires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy holder. If that is so, .on the death of the policy hold<r the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to-him.
Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There· is no warrant for the position that section 39 of the Act operatd as.a third kind of succession which is styled as a 'statutory testament' in paragraph 16 of the decision cf the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's case (supra). If section 39 of the Act is contrasted with section 38.ofthe Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It i_s difficult to hold that sect ion 39 of the Act was intended tQ act · as a t)lird mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of section 39 ·which says that the· amount shall be payable to the nominee or· nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diver-. ting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not rela.xed even where wills are registered.
As observed in the Full Bench decision of the_ Allaha_bad High Court in Raja Ram v. Mata Prasad & Ani'.(1) which has interpreted (1) A.l.R. 1912 All 167. . •• SARBATI DEVI v. USHA DEVI (Venkataramiah, J.)
section 39 of the Act correctly, the judgment of that .High Court in Ke sari Devi's. cast\ (supra) related to a different set of facts. In Kesari Devi's case (supra) the dispute arose regarding the person who was entitled to the succession certificate in respect of the amount payable under .a life insurance policy which had been taken •out by the assured between the widow of the assured and the widow of the· . nominee tinder section 39 of the Act. On going through. the judg- ment in Kesari Devi's· case (supra) we feel that the Court ill that case. paid little heed to the earlier judicial precedents of .its own Court . The decision of the Full B.ench in Raja Ram's case (supra) set at rest all doubts which iilight have been treated by Kesari Devi's case (supra) about the true import of section 39 of the Act in so far as the High Court of Allahabad was concerned.
Jn Fauja Singh's case (supra) there is reference onli two three cases-Life Insurance Corporation of India v. United Bank of India Ltd. (supra), Matin v. Mohomed Matin and Kesari Devi's(') case (supra) .. The Court expressed its dissent from the Calcu(ta decision on the, ground that decision had not considered sub-section (6) of section 39 of the Act. The Lahore case was one decided before the .J…
Act came into force. The distinguis.hing features of Kesari Devi's case tsupra) are already mentioned. Otherwise there is not much discussion .in this case about the effect of section 39 of the Act. We have carefully gone tbr~ugh the judgment of the Delhi
High Court in Mrs. Uma Sehga/'s (case) supra. ·In this. case of the High Court of Delhi clearly came to the conclusion that the nominee had no right in the lifetime of the assured to the amount payable under the policy and ihat his rights would spring up only on the· death of the assured. The Delhi High Court having reached that conclusion did not proceed to. examine the possibility of ari existence of a conflict between the la)V of succession and the right of. the nominee under .section 39 of the Act arising on the death of the assured and in that event which would preyail. We are of the view that the l~nguage of section 39 of the Act is no.t capable of altering the course of succession under law. The second error committed by the Delhi High Court in this case is the reliance pla.ced by it on the effect of the amendment of section 60(1) (kb) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 providing that' all moneys payable under a (I) A.I.R: 1922 Lah 145.
c c . HJPREME eotiRT REPORTS ll984i 1 s.c.R. · 'policy ofinsurance on the life of the judgment debtor shal! be exempl from attachment by his creditors. The High Court equated a nominee to the heirs and legatees of the assured and proceeded to hold that the nominee succeeded ·to the estate with all 'plus and minus points'. We find it difficult to treat a nomin·ee as being eq1,1ivalent to an heir or legatee having rcgard·tci the clea·r ·provisions of section 39 of the Act. The exemption of the moneys payable under a life insurance policy under the amended sedion 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of 'devaluing' the earlier decisions which upheld the.right of a creditor 'of the estate of tile assured to ~ttach· the amount payable under the life insurance policy recognises such aright in· such creditor which he could have exercised but for· ·the amendment. It Is because it was attachable the Code qf Civil Procedure exempted it from attachment in furtherance of the policy of -Parliament in making the amendment.
The Delhi High Court bas committed another error iii appreciating the two decisions of the Madras High Court iQ Kar(;ppa Gounder & Ors. v. Pa/aniammal & · Ors.(1) and in B.M. 'Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporiuion of India & Ors.(') The'rclevant part of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Uma Selzga/'s case (supra) reads thus:
10. "In Karuppa Gounder v. falaniammal, AIR,; 1963 Mad. 245 (para 13), K had nominated his wife in . the insurance policy. K died. It was held . that in virtue of the nomination, the motlier of K was not
entitled to any portion of the insurance amount. 11. I am in respectful agreement with · these . views,. because they accord with the law an!i reason. They are supported by S. 44 (2) of . the Act.
It provides that the commi~sion payable to an insurance agent shall ofter bis deaih, continue to be payable to his heirs,, but if the agent has· nominated any person the commission shall be paid to the person· so nomi-
nated. It cannot be contended· that the nominee u/s 44 wili receive the money not as owner l:mt as an ~gent on·behal( of someone else vide .il.M. Mundkur v. Life Insurance Corporation, AIR 1977 .Mad. 72:'
. Thus, the nomine~ excludes the legal heirs." (1) A.l.R. 1963 Madras 245. (2) A.I.R. 1977 Madras 72. SARBAti DEV; v. USHA DEVI 1Ve11kataraiiiah, J~) ~1ooi Two 'mistakes committed by the Delhi High Court iu the above passage are these. ln Karuppa Gounder'~ case (supra), 'ihe question · was whether tlie amounf payable under the insurance policy in . question was joint Jamily property or separate property of the assured. In that connection, the High Court of Madras observed· thus:
"But where a coparcener has effected insurance upon his.own life, though be might have received the premia from out of the funds which he might have received. from · the joint family, it does notfollow that the joint family · insured the life of ihe member . or paid the premia in
relation thereto. It is undeniable thai a member of a coparcenary may with the. moneys which be might receive from the coparcenary effect an insurance Uf!On bis own life for the benefit of the members of bis
immediate family. His intention to do so and to keep the property as his separate property would be manifested if he makes a nomination in f;ivour of his wife or children as tbe·case may be. It would therefore appear.
that no generai proposition can be advanced in the . matter of the in&urance- policy of a member of a · coparcenary and that . eac.h case must be dealt with in accordance with the circumstances surrounding it."
It is obvious from the above passage tb&t the above case has no bearing on the meaning of. section 39 o( the Act. The fact of nomination was treated in that ca,e·as a piece of evidence in support of the finding that the policy was not a joint family asset but the· . separate property of the coparcener concerned. No right based on . the ground that one party was entitled to" succeed to the estate of the . deceased in preference to the other ,;r along with the other under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act wasasserted in that case. The next error committed by the. Delhi High Court is· in drawing an annalogy between section 39 and section 44'2) of the Act thinking thanhe Madras High·Court had done so in B. M; Mundkur's case (supra). In B.M. Mundkur's case (supra), ·the High Court of Madras instead of. drawing an analogy between section 39 and section 44(2) Of the Act actually contrasts them· as can be seen from .the followiJ;ig passage :
c c ·1aoi .. SiJPR.EME COUJ\T REPORTS [!98411 s.c.il.. "There are vital differences between the nomination contemplated under Section 39 of the Act and the nomination contemplated under the proviso to Sectfon
44(2) of the Act. In the first place, the sum assured, with which· alone Sec. 39 was concerned, was to be paid in the event of the death of the assured under the terms of the contract entered into between the insurer and the
asslited and. consequently it Was the .contractual right which remained vested in'the insured with reference to which the nomination happened to be made. It ·should be· pointed out that the nomination as well as
the liability o~ the part of the insu.rer to pay the sum assured· become effective simultaneously' namely' at the moment of the death of the assured. So long a.s he was alive, the money was not payable to him, in the case of a whole
life policy, and equally, having ·regard to the language of Section' 39( I) of the Act, the nominee's right to receive the money arose only·on the death of the assured, Section 39 itself did not deal with the title t.o the money assured, which was to be paid by . the insurer to the
nominee who was bound to give discharge to the insurer. It was in this context that the Court took the view that . the title remained 'with the estate of the deceased, and therefore, with the heirs of'ihe deceased, that the nomina- tion did not in any way affect the title and that it merely clothed the nominee with the right to receive the amount
from the insurer. 12. On the other hand, the provJSions and purport of Section 44 of the Act are different. In the first place under Sectiori 44(1) it was a statutory right conferred on the agent to receive the. commission on the renewal
premium notwith,tanding the termination of the agree- ment between the agent and the insurer, which provided for the payment of such commission on · the renewal premium. The statute also prescribed the. qualification
·which rendered the'agent eligible to receive commission on such renewal premium. Section 44(1) provides for the payment of the commission to the agent during his · lifetime only and does not contemplate the contingency
of his death and the.commission being paid to ·anybody . even after his death. It is S. 44(2) which deals with the • SARBATi DEVi v, USHA DEV! (Vei1katatamjah, J.) payment of commission "to . the heirs of deceased for so
long as such commission would have been payable had such insurance agent been alive. Thus it was not the general law of inheritance which conferred title on the · heirs of the deceased insurance . age.it to receive the
commission on the renewal premium, but it was only the particular statutory provision, namely, Section 44(2) which conferred the right on the heirs of the deceased agent to rece_ive the commission on the renewal premium.
In other word·s, the right of the ·heirs to -receive the commission on renewal· premium· does not arise under any law of succession and it is a right directly conferred on the heirs by.Section 44(2) of the Act, even though who
the heirs of'the deceased insurance agent are will have to be ascertained under the law of succession applicab!O tp him. Thus the statute which conferred such a right on the heirs is certainly competent to provide Jor an
exception in certain case1 and take away such a. right from the heirs; and the proviso which has been intro· duced by the Government of India notification 1962· has done exactly this in taking away the right of the heirs
conferred under the main part of Section 44(2), in the event of the agent, during his lifetime; making a nomina· tion in favour of a particular person and not cancelling or altering that nomination subsequently. If the statute
itself was competent to donfer such a right for the first time on the heirs of the deceased agent it is indisputable that the statute could take away that right under st~ted circumstances·.''
The reasons given by the Delhi· High Court in this case in support of its view are not tenable. Moreover there is. one other strong circqmstance in this case which "d4'suades us from taking a view contrary to "the decisions .of all other High Courts and accepiing.the Yiew expressed by the Delhi · Righ Court in tije two recent judgments delivered in the year 1978 and in the year 1982. The Act has been in force from the year 1938 and all along almost all the High Courts in India have taken the view that a mere nomination ·effected under section 39 does not deprive the heirs of their rights in the amount payable under a life insurance policy. Yet Parli.ament has not· chosen to make any · .B
c c [1984) l s.c.R. amendment to the Act. In such a situation unless there are strong and eompelling reasons to hold that _all these decisions are wholly erroneous, the Court should be slow to take a different view. The
reasons given. by the Delhi High Court are unconvincing. We, therefore, hold that the judgments of the Delhi High Court in Fauja Singh' s case (supra) and in Mrs. Uma Sehgal's case (supra) do not lay down the law correctly. They are, therefore, overruled. We approve the views expressed.by the other High Courts on the mean· ing of section 39 of the Act and hold that a mere. nomination made · under section 39 of the Act does not have the. effect of conferring Qn the nominee any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the life insurance policy on the death of the as'smed. The nomi~ation only indicates the band which is authorised to receiye the amount, on •the payment of which the insurer gets a valid ·discharge of its liability. unde'r the policy, The .amoun!; however, can be claimed ·by . the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession goyefn· ing them.
In view ·or the above concluston, the judgments and decrees of the High Court, the first appellate court and the trial court are liable to be set aside. They are accordingly set aside.
Since it is not disputed that tbe plaintiffs are under tlie law ·of succession governing them each entitled to l '3 share in the estate of the deceased, it is hereby declared that each of the 'plaintiffs is entitled io I/3rd shar~ in the amount received under the insurance policies in quest.ion and the interest which may have been earned by its · investmen·t. The suit stands decreed accordingly.
Parties shall, however, bear their own cost~ throughout. · S.R. ApP,eal allowe1·