SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [1961] SMT. SHANNO DEVI v. MANGAL SAIK (S. K. DAS, M. HJDAYATULLAH, K. c. DAS GUPTA, J.C. SHAH an<l :;'\, R.AJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Migration to India–Citizenship, claim for-fotention of resi- di11g pmnanently-Eleclion dispute-" Migrated lo the territory of India",
"Ordi11arily resident", meaning of – Co'lstitution of India, Art. 6. The respondent was the successful candidate at the general election held tn ~larch, 1957, for the Punjab Legislative Assem- bly.
The appellant who was one of the unsuccessful candiclatcs, filed an election petition and challeng"d the validity of the res- pondent's election on the grounds, inter alia, that the latter was not a citizen of India an<l was, therefore, not qualified to stand for election.
It was fouw) that he was born of Indian parents sometime in 1927 in India as defined in the Government of India Act, l9J5, in a village which since August 15, 1947, became part of Pakistan, that in 1944 he had moved from his home district to Jullunder in what is now the territory of India, and that after August 15, 1947, he definitely mad" up his mind to settle in India \\'ith the intr!nlion of residing thPre permanently. There was sornc evidence to shO\\' that he \Vent to Burma in January, 1950, and made un!'uccessful atten1pts to secure permission from the Government of Ilurma to stay there permanently. The
question was whether the respondent could be deemed to be a citizen of India within the meaning of Art. 6 of the Constitution of India. Held: (1) that the expression "migrated to the territory of India" in Art. 6 of the Constitution means " migrated at any time before the commencement of the Constitution to a place now in the territory of India",
(2) that in Art. 6 the words "migrated to the territory of India" mean" come to the territory of India with the inten- tion of residing there permanently ". (3) that where a person moves from one country lo an-
other and has, at the time of mo\·ing, a intention to remain in the country where he moved only temporarily, but later on forms the intention of residing there permanently, he should be held in Jaw to have migrated to that country at the later point of time.
(4) that for applying the test of being "ordmarily resi- dent in the territory of India since the date of his migration" in Art. 6(b)(i), what is necessary to be st:own is that during the period begmning with the date on which migration became
._, complete and ending with November i6, 1949, as a whole, . the person has been "ordinarily resident in the territory of India " Whether he was not in India on January 26, 1950, or whether he formed an intention of taking up his permanent residence in Burma when he left for that place in January, 1950, was not relevant.
(5) That the words "ordinarily resident" in the Consti- tution mean "resident during this period without any serious break ". It is not n.ecessary that for every day of this period the person should have resided in Ind\a.
(6) that the respondent satisfied the requirements of Art. 6 of the Constitution and that his claim to be deemed a citizen of India must be upheld. CIVIL APPELLATE ·JURISDICTION: Civil
Appeal No. 247 of 1960. Appeal from the judgment and oraer dated October 3, 1958, of the Punjab High Court in First Appeal from Order No. 131 of 1958. A: V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, fot the
appellant .. U. M. Trivedi and Ganpat Rai, for the_ respondent. 1960. ·September 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shanno D~Vi v. M angal Sain DAS GUPTA J.-Wbat do the words "has migrated
D4s Gwpta J. to the territory of India " in Art. 6 of the Constitu- tion mean? That is the main question in this appeal. The appellant, Shanno Devi, was one o( the unsucces- sful candidates at the general election held in March
1957 for the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The respon- dent, Mangal Sain, was the successful candidate. The nomination papers of these and other candidates which were scrutinised on February 1, 1957, were
·accepted on the same date. The voting took place on March 12, and after counting of votes on March 14, . 1957, the respondent, Mangal Sain was declared duly elected. On March 27, 1957, the appellant filed an
election petition and challenged the respondent's elec- . tion on various g'.ounds, the prin.cipal groun4 . being that the Returnmg Officer had improperly accepted the nomination paper of the respondent on the ground
that he was not a citizen of India ii.nd was not {}Ualifi- ed to stand for election. With the other grounds ~hi ch Shanno Dt1:1 v. Mangal Sain Das Gupta ]. [Hl61] were taken in this petition we are no longer concerned
as after the Election Tribunal rejected these several grounds they were not pressed before the High Court and have also not been raised before us. The Election Tribunal however held that Mangal Sain was not an
Indian citizen at, the time he was onrolled as a voter or at the time his nominal ion papers were accepted and even at the time when he was elected. Accord. ingly the Tribunal allowed the election petition and
declared the respondent's election to be void. On appeal by Mangal Sain to the High Court the only point raised was whether the appellant was a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution. If
he was a citizen oflndia at the date of such commence. ment, it was not disputed, he continued to be a citizen of India on all relevant dates, viz., the de.to of his enrolment as a voter, the date of acceptance of bis
nomination and the date of his alection. If however he was not a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution he had not since acquired citizenship and so his election would be void.
The respondent's ca.so all a.long was that he was a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution under Art. 5 of the Constitution and apart from that he must be deemed to be a citizen of India at such commencement
under Art. 6 of the Constitution. The Election Tribu. nal as already indicated rejectoo both these conten. tions. The learned judges of the High Court whill' indicating that they were inclined to think that tho
respondent's claim to citizenRhip of India under Art. 5 could not be sustained did not consider that matter in detail, but held that his claim t-0 be deemed to be a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitu-
tion under Art. 6 thereof must prevail. The primary facts as found by the Tribunal on the evidence led by the parties beforo it, have been correctly summarised in the judgment of the High Court in these words :-
" On the evidence led by the parties the learned Tribunal held that it was proved that Man gal Sain was born of Indian parents sometime in 1927 in village Jhawarian, District Sargodha, and that when he was
only two years old he was taken by his parents from 1· Jhawarian to Mandlay in Burma wherefrom the entire family returned to Jullunder (Punjab) in 1942 when Burma was occupied by the Japanese forces during
the Second \Vorld War. After having stayed for a few days in Jullunder, l\Iangal Sain, his parents and his brother went to their home district Sargodha where they stayed for about two or two and a half
years. During this period llfangal Sain passed Matricu· . lation examination from the Punjab University and after having himself matriculated he again returned to J ullunder, where he was employed in the Field
Military Accounts Office from 8th December, 1944 to 7th August, 1946, when his services were terminated because of his continuous absence from duty. Mangal Sain's parents and his brother according to the find·
ings of the learned Tribunal also :r:eturned from Sargodha to Jullunder and lived there for about two and a half years from some time in 1945 onwards before they again went over to Burma which country.
they had left in 1942 due to its occupa_tion by the Japanese forces. While Mangal Sain was in service in the Field Military Accounts Office, he joined Rastriya Swayam Sewak Sangh movement and became its
active worker. Sometime after his services were terminated, he shifted the scene of his activities to Hissar and Rohtak districts where he moved from place to place to organise the Rastriya Sway am ,Sevak
Sangh movement. During this period apparently he had no fixed place of residence and he used to reside in the offices of the Jan Sangh and took his meals at various Dhabas. For about 4 months from June to ·
September in the year 1948 Mangal Sain served afl a teacher in Arya Lower Middle School, Rohtak. fn July 1948 Mangal Sain submitted to the Punjab University his admission form for the University
Prabhakar examination which form was duly attested by Prof. Kanshi Ram Narang of the Government College, Rohtak. · Sometime in January 1949 he was arrested in connection with the Rastriya Swayam
Sevak Sangh movement and was detained in Rohtak District Jail from 10th January, 1949, till 30th May, 1949. In August 1949 he again appeared in Prabhakar Shanno Devi v. Matigal Sain
Das Gupta ]. · Shantto Devi v. MtJngal Sain DtJs Gupta J. SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [1961] eira.mina.tion a.nd wa.s plitced in compa.rtmont, h e a.lso a.ppea.rs to have orga.niRed Rastriya. Swayam Seva.k
Sangh in the districtA of· l{ohta.k and Hissar during tho years 1948-49 and he Used to move about from place to place without having any fixed pla:!e of a.bode. Tho Tribune.I further found that it was sometime in
the encl of 1949 or in .fanua.ry 1950 that illangal S1<in left India. and went to Burma whPro his parents and other brothers were already residing. In that country he tried to secure permission to stay there permanen-
tly, but the Government of Burma did not agree a.pd directed him lo leave that country; in this connection he applied for a writ to the Supreme Court of Burma. but his petition was disallowed. On the 29th October,
1951, :lfangal Sain deposited with the competent autho- rity in Burma the registration certificate grankd to him under the Begistration of Foreigm,rs Act, 1948, a.ud a few days later he came ba·ck 11> India and since
then he has been living in this country and has been organising RaRtriya. Swa.yam Sevak Sangh movement in the di8lrict.s of Hissar 11.nd llohtak. In 1953 he was a.gain arrested a.nd detained in
J{oht.a.k jail a.s a deteuue from the 8th Fohruary to 8th May, 1953, when he was transferred to Ambala. jail". On these facts the Tribunal further held tha.t it cannot be said " that the respondnnt hail a.n intention
to srttlP in India permanently and that he had no intention of'ever lcavmg it". Taking along with these facts the respondent's drclara.tion in the a.ffida.- vit (Ex. 5) to which we shall prrsently refer the
Tribunal fort.her lwld that " his own declaration in the aftidavit (Ex. 5) and his conduct in going over to Burma. r.nd trying to settle there permanent·!Y furnish convincing proof that all along ho had the intention
to follow hi~ pa.rents and other relations to Burma. and to settle there penna.nently ". The Tribune.I finally concluded by saying that "it is also quite clear that in the cas<J of this respondent it cannot be
sa.id that he had no otber idea than t-0 continue to be in India. without looking forward to a.ny event certain or uncrrta.in which might induce him to ch~nge his residence". On these findings of fact the Tribunal held that the
respondent could not be deemed to be a citizen of India under Art. 6 of the Constitution. On these same primary facts mentioned above, Mr. Justice Dua who delivered the leading judgment of
the High Court recorded his conclusion thus:- " I can draw but only one conclusion from the evidence on the record, that the appellant who had moved from his home district to J ullunder had, after .
the 15th August, 1947,. no other intention than of making the. Dominion of India as his place of abode. On the 15th August, 1947, therefore the appellant's migration from Jhawarian to the territory of India
was clearly complete, whatever doubts there may have been before that date, though I would be prepared even to hold that he had moved away from his village in 1944 and had migrated to the eastern districts of
the Punjab ". Mr. Justice Falshaw agreed with this conclusion. On these conclusions the learned Judges held that the respondent's claim to be deemed a citizen of India at the commencement of the Constitution must suc-
ceed. The main contention on' behalf of the appellant is . that the conclusion of the High Court, that when the respondent moved away from his viJ!age in 1944 and that at 1J.ny rate after the 15th August, 1947, he had
no otbf•; intention than of making the Dominion of India h.is place of abode, was arbitrary. It was also contended that in any case the migration under Art. 6 of the Constitution has .to take place after "the
territory of India" as contemplated in the Constitu- tion had come into existence. Lastly· it was contended, though faii;itly, .that the respondent had not in any case complied with the requirements of beirig ordina-
rily a resident in the .territory of India since the date of his migration. The respondent's counsel besides challenging the correctness of the above contention further urged that the words " migrated to the terri-
tory of India " in. Art. 6 only means "come to the territory of India " and does not inean " come to the z960 Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain Das Gupta ]. Shanno Devi v. M angal Saiti Das Gupta }.
SGPREME COURT REPORTS (1961] territory of India. with the intention of permanently residing there". The extreme contention raised bv '.\Ir. Sa.stri on behalf of the appellant that migration under Art. 6
must take place after the territory of India came into existence undor the Constitution cannot be accepted. It has to be noticed that Art. 6 dcal8 with the ques- tion as to who ~hall be deemed to be a citizen of India
at the commencement of the Constitution. That itself suggests, in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intontion, that the migration which is made an essential requirement for this purpose must
have taken place before such commencement. It is also worth noticing that cl. (b) of Art. 6 which men- tions two conditions, one of which must be sati,ticd in addition to birth as mentioned in cl. (a) and "migra-
tion" a.s ment.ionod in the Dia.in portion of the Article being proved, speaks in it8 first sub-cl. of mi!!ration "before the 19th day of July 1948" and in sulJ.cl. (ii) migration "after the 19th day of July 1948 ". Thti
second sub-cl. requires that the person must be regis- tered as a citizen of India. by an officer appointed in that behalf by the Government of the Dominion of India on an application ml).de by him therefor to such
officer before the commencement of the Constitution. The proviso to that Article sa.3 s that no person shall be so registered unless he has been resident iu the territory of India for at least ~ix mouths immediately
preceding the date of his application. lt is clear from this that the a.ct of migration in Art. 6 must take pla.ce before the commencement of tho Constitution. It is clear therefore that " migrated to the territory of
India." means "migrated " at any time before the commencement of the Constitution to a. place now in the territory of India. This brings us to the important question whether " migrated to the territory of India. " means merely
" come to the territory of India " or it means "come to the territory of India to remain hero " or in other words," come to the territor:• of India with the inten- tion of residing here permanently". There can be no.
doubt that the word "migrate" ta.ken b.v itAAlf ;. capable of the wider construction "come from one place to another" whether or not with any intention of permanent residence in the latter place. It is be-
yond controversy that the word " migrate " is often used also in the narrower connotatior! of " coming from one place to another with the intention of resid- ing permanently in the latter place". Webster's Dic-
tionary (Second Edition, 1937) ,gives the following meaning of the word "migrate":-" To go from one place to another ; especially, to move from one coun- try, region, or place of abode or sojourn to another,
with a view to residence; to move; as the Moors who migrated from Africa to Spain". The Corpus Juris Secundum published in 1948 gives the same meaning except that it also gives "to change one's place of
residence " as one of the meanings. The word " Immi- grate" which means "migrate into a country" and its derivatives " Immigrant " and " Immigration " have received judicial consideration in several Austra-
lian and American cases, in connection with prosecu- tions for contravention of Immigration laws. The Courts in Australia, were of opinion, on a consideration of the scheme and subject.matter of
their laws in question that the word "Immigrant" in the Immigrant Registration Act, 1901, and in s. 51 of the Australian Constitution means a person who enters Australia whether or not with the intention of settling
and residing there (Vide Ghia Gee v. Martin (1) ). The American courts however took the view in United States v. Burke('), Moffitt v. United States(') and United States v. Atlantic Fruit Oo. (') on a considera-
tion of the purpose and scheme of the legislation, that " Immigrant" means a person who comes to the United States with a view to reside there perma- nently. We have referred to these cases on the meaning of
the word " Immigration " to show that there can be no doubt that the word "migrate" may have in some contexts the wider meaning " come or remove to a (1) (1905) 3 C.L.R. 649. (2) (1899) 99 Federal Reports 895.
(3) (1904) 128 Federal Reports 375. (4) (1914) 212 Federal Reports 711. Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain Das Gupta ]. S}uusno Devi v. Mangal Sain D•s Gupta]. [1961] place without an intention to reside permanently"
and in some context the narrower meaning "coml' or remove to a place with the intention of residing there permanently". The fact that the Constitution-makers did not use the words " with the intention to reside
·permanently" in Art. 6 is however no reason to think that the wider meaning was intended. In deciding whether the word "migrate" was used in the wider or the narrower sense, it is necessary t.o consider care-
fully the purpose and scheme of this constitutional legislation. The Constitution after defining the terri- tory of India and making provisions as to how it can be added to or altered, in the four articlos contained
in its first Chapter proceeds in the second Chapter to deal with the subject of citizenship. Of the seven articles in this chapter the last Article, Art. 11, only saves expressly the right of Parliament to make pro-
visions as regards acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizen- ship. Of the other six articles, the first, Art.. 5, says who shall be citizens of India at the commencement
of the Constitution ; while Arts. 6 and 8 lay down who though not citizens under Art. 5 shall be deemed to be citizens of India. Art. IO provides that once a person is a citizen of India. or is deemed to be a citi-
zen of India he shall continue to be a citizen of India, subject of course to the provisions of any law that may be made by Parliament. Art. 9 provides that if a person has voluntarily acquired citizenship of any
foreign State be shall not be a. citizen of India or deemed to be a citizen of India. Art. 7 also denies the right of citizenship to some persons who would . have otherwise been citizens of India under Art. 5 or
would be deemed to be citizens of India under Art. 6. The primary provision for citizenship of India, in this scheme is in Art. 5. That follows the usual prac- tice of insisting on birth or domicile which shortly
stated means "residence with the intention of living and dying in the country" as an essential require- . ment for citizenship; and confers citizenship on a person fulfilling this requirement if ho also satisfied
another requirement as regards his birth within what • J 1 S.C.R. is now the territory of India or birth of any of his parent8 within this area or ordinary residence in this area for a continuous period of five years immediately
preceding the commencement of the Constitution. If there had been no division of India and no portion of. the old India had been lost this would have been sufficient, as regards conferment of citizenship apart
from the special provision for giving such rights to persons of Indian origin residing outside India. But pa.rt of what was India as defined in the Government of India Act,. 1935, had ceased to be India and had
become Pakistan. This gave rise to the serious pro- blem whether or not to .treat as citizens of India the hundreds of thousands of persons who were of Indian origin-in the sense that they or any of their parents
or any of their grand-parents had been born in India -but who would not become citizens under Art. 5. The Constitution-makers by the provisions of Art. 6 decided to treat as citizens some of these but not all.
Those who had not come to the new India before the date of the commencement of the Constitution were excluded; those who had so come were divided into two categories-those who had come before the 19th
July, 1948, and those who had come on or after the 19th July, 1948. Persons in the first category had in order to be treated as citizens t_<J satisfy the further requirement of" migration" whatever that meant, and
of ordinary residence in the territory of India since they "migrated" to India; while those in the second category had, in addition to having migrated, to be residents for not less than six months preceding the
date of the application for registration . as citizens which application had to be filed before the date of the commencement of the Constitution. But while · the primary provisions in the Constitution as regards
the citizenship for people born at a place now includ- ed in India and people whose parents were born at a place now in India insist on the requirement of inten- tion to reside here· permanently by using the word
" domicile ", Art. 6 which under the scheme of the Constitution deals with what may be called "secon- dary citizenship " and says about some persons that Shanno Devi v. .l\:Jangf!l Sain
Das Gupta J. T'j60 Sh(11'.110 J)r·.,1 ;1.Jcu1;.-,l Sain Das Ci11p1a J. SCPREJIE COURT REPORTS [ 1961] they will be deemed to be citizens of India, does not mPntion "domicile" as a requirement. Can it be
that the Constitution-makers thought that though in the ca.so of persons born in what has now become India or those any of whose parents was born in what is now India as also in the case of person who had
been residing here for not less than five yea.rs in what is now India, it was necessary to insist on domicile before confor~ing citizenship, that was not necessary in the case of persons whose parents or any of whose
grand-parents had been born in what was formerly India but is not now India? In our opinion t.he Cons- titution-makers could not have thought so. They were aware that the general rule in almost a.JI the
countries of the world was to insist on birth or domi- cile as an essential pre-requisite for citizenship. They know that in dealing with a somewhat similar problem as regards citizenship of persons born out of what was
then the territory of Irish Free Sta.to, tho Constitution of t.he Irish Free State had also insisted on domicile in the Irish Free State as a. requirement for citizen- ship. There can be no conceivable reason for their
not making a similar insistence here as regards the persons who were born outside what is now India, or persons any of whose parents or grand-parents were born there. Mention must also be made of the curious
consequences that would follow from a view that an intention to rosido permanently in the territory of India and is not necessarily in Art. 6. Take tho case of two persons, one of whom was born in what is now
India and has all along lived there and another person who though born in what is now India went to live in areas now Pakistan and then moved back to areas in what is now India. The first named person would
have to satisfy the requirement of domicile at the commencement of the Constitution before he is a citizen; but the second person would not have to satisfy this condition. It would be unreasonable to
think that such a curious result could have been intended by the Constitution-makers. For all these reasons it appears clear that when the framers of the Constitution used the words " migrated
to the territory of India" they meant "come to the territory of India with the intention of residing there permanently ". The only explanation of their not expressly mentioning "domicile " or the " intention
to reside permanently " in Art. 6 seems to be that they were confident that in the scheme of this Consti- tution the word " migration " could only be interpret- ed to mean "come to the country with the intention
of residing there permanently". It is of interest to notice in this connection the proviso to Art. 7. That article provides in its first part that a person who would be a citizen of India or would have been deemed
to be a citizen of India in Arts. 5 and 6 would not be deemed to be a citizen if he has migrated from the territory to Pakistan after March 1, 1947. The proviso deals with some of these persons who after such migra-
tion to Pakistan have returned to India. It appears that when this return is under a permit for re-settle- ment or permanent return-that is, re-settlement in India or return to India with the intention to reside
here permanently-the main provisions of Article 7 will not apply and for this under Art. 6 of the Consti- tution such a person would be de.emed to have migra- ted to India after the 19th July, 1948. That the
return to India of such migrant has to be under a per- mit for re.settlement or permanent return in order that he might escape the loss of citizenship is a strong reason for thinking that in Art. 6 the intention to
· reside in India permanently is implicit in the use of the phrase " migrated to the territory of India". It may sometimes happen that when a person moves from one place to another or from one country
to another he has, at the point of time of moving, an intention to remain in the country where he moved only temporarily, but later on forms the intention of residing there permanently. There can be no doubt
that when this happens, the person should at this later point of time be held to have "come to the country with the intention of residing there perma- nently ". In other words, though at the point of time
he.moved into the new place or new country he can- not be said to have migrated to this place or country Shanno J)evi v. .. ~fan gal Sain Das Gupta]. Sl:a,11:0 Dn.i }fa11gal Sain Das Gupta].
SL'PHEllIE COl:RT REPORTS [I 961] he shoul<l be held in law to have migrated to this later place or country at tho later point of time when he fornrn the intention of residing there permanently.
This view of law w11.s taken both by the Election Tri- buna.1 and the High Court and was not seriously dis- puted before us. The Election Tribunal and the High Court there- fore rightly addr!'ssed themselves to the <JUPstion
whether in 1944 whon :lfangal. Sain tirnt came to Jullunder in what is now the territory of India from his home in J ha warian now in Pakistan he had the intention of residing in Iudia pcrmanc11tly and even if
he at that point of time had no such intention, whe- ther after h0 had come in 1944 to what is now the territory of India, he had at some lat er point of time formed tho intention of residing here perma.nently.
On this llucstion, as already i11dicated, the Election Tribunal and tho High Court came to different eon- clusio11s. While the Election Tribunal held that ~\Iangal Sain had at. 110 point of time the intention of
rPsiding in India permanently, the High Court was prepared to hold th11t even whPn he moved from his home in 1944 to the <>astern districts of Punjab he had the intention of n·siding tlwre permanently, and held
that at least aftc.r August 15, 1947, he had no other intent.ion than of making the Dominion of India his pbre of abode, ancl residing here permanently. It has heen strenuously contended before us Lbat in coming
to this conclusion the High Court. has acted arbitra- rily (l.nd has ignored importaut evidence which, it is said, showed clearly that the respondent. had no intention of residing ptirmanently in India.
In considning such an argument, it is ]Jroper for us to bear in mind the pro,·isions of R. 116B of tho Representation of the People Act which lays down that. the decision of the High Court on appeal from an
order of the Elect ion Tribunal in an election petition sball be" fiual and conclusive". It. has been pointed out in more than one case hv this Court that while these provisions do not stanrl in the way of this
Court's interfering with tbe High Court's decision in a. 1 S.C.R. fit case, it would be proper for us to bear these provi· sions of the Representation of the People Act in mind when the correctness of such a decision is challenged
before this Court. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether the view of the High Court that even in 1944 Mangal Sain could be said to have been migrated to the eastern districts of Punjab can be successfully
challenged or aot. Even assuming that that conclu- sion is out of the way, the further conclusion of the High Coµrt that having moved from his home district to Jullunder in 1944 Mangal Sain had after August 15,
1947, no other intention than of making.the territory of India his place of abode would be sufficient to prove his migration to the territory of India from what is now Pakistan. We have been taken through the
materials on the record relevant to this question and we can see nothing that would justify our interference with the High Court's conclusion on this point. Much stress was laid by the appellant's counsel on the fact
that Mangal Sain left Indian shores for Burma in January, 1950, and after his arrival there made an application under s. 7(1) of the Union Citizenship Act, 1948, (of Burma) giving notice of bis intention to
apply for a_certificate of naturalization and his state- ment therein that he intended to reside permanently within the Union of Burma. Assuming however, that in October, 1950, or everi in January, 1950, when he
left for Burma, Mangal Sain had formed the intention of taking up his permanent residence in Burma, that is wholly irrelevant to the question whether in 194 7 he had the intention of residing permanently in India.
Lea~ned counsel for the appellant also drew our atten- tion to a statement made in this very application that Mangal Sa.in had returned to Burma with his mother in 1947. The High Court has after considering this
statement held that he had not so returned in 1947. We see no reason to differ with this finding of the ·High Court. In our opinion, there is nothing on the record to justify any doubt as regards the correctness
of the High Court's decision that aft;er August 15, 1947, Mangal Sain who had earlier moved from a place now in Pakistan to J ullunder in India definitely made up Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain
Das Gupta]. Shanno Devi v. I'll a11 gal Sain [1961] ~is mind to nrnice India. his permanent home. Whe- ther or not in Ja.nua.ry, 1950, he changed tha.t inten- tion is irrelevant for our purpose.
· Our conclusion therefore is that the High Court is right in holding that :\fangal Sain satisfies the first requirement of Art. 6 of the Constitution of " migra- tion to the territory of India from the territory now
included in Pakistan''. It is not disputed and does not ever appear to ha.ve been disputed that Mangal Sain was born in India. as defined in the Government of India. Act, 1935, and thus satisfies the requirement
of cl. (a) of Art. 6. There can be no doubt also tha.t since the date of his migration which has for the present purpose to be taken as August 15, 1947, Mange.I Sain has been "ordinarily residing in the territory of India". Mr.
Sastri contended that to satisfy the test of being "ordinarily resident in the territory of India. since the date of his migration " it had to be shown that Man- ge.I Sain was in India on January 26, 1950.
We do not think that is required. It is first to be noticed that Art. 6 of the Constitution is one of tho Articles which came into force on N ovembor 26, 1949. For applying the test of being" ordinarily resident in the
territory of India since the date of his migration", it is necessary therefore to consider the period up to the 26th day of November, 1949, from the de.to of migra- tion. It is not however even necessary tha.t on the
26th day of November, 1949, or immediately before that da.te he must have beon residing in the territory of India.. What is necessary is tha.t ta.king the period beginning with the date on which migration became
complete 1rnd ending with the da.te November 26, 1949, as a whole, the person ha.s been " ordinarily resident in the territory of India". It is not necessary that for every day of this period he should have resided in
India. In the absence of the definition of the words "ordinarily resident" in the Constitution it is rea.son- ablo to take the words to mean "resident during this period without any serious break". The materials
on the rocord leave no doubt tha.t there wa.s no brea~ worth the na.me in Mange.I Sain's residence in the 591 '. territory of India from at least August 15, 1947, till.the 26th November, 1949.
We have therefore come to the conclusion that the High Court was right in sustaining Man gal Sain 's . claim to be deemed a citizen of India under Art. 6 of the Constitution and, in that view was also right in
allowing his appeal and ordering the dismissal of the Election Petition. In the view we have taken as regards Mangal Sain's claim to citizenship under Art. 6 of the Constitution it is not necessary to consider whether his claim
to citizenship under Art. 5 of the Constitution was also good. We therefore dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed. B. V. PATANKAR AND OTHERS v. C. G. SASTRY (B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, P. B. GAJENDRA·
GADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.) Rent Control-Restrictions agaiiist eviction of tenants-Decree for possession of house-Delivery given in the absence of tenant- Executing Court ignoring restrictions-Legality-Repugnance- Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Order, z948, ss. 9 and z6 and Transfer of Property Act, z882 (Act IV of z882),- Code of Civil Proce~ure (Act V of z908) ss. 47, z5z.
The appellants in execution of a decree passed in their favour for possession over a house obtained possession thereof on July 22, r95r. The order for delivery of possession was made without notice to and in the absence of the respondent. The respondent made an application in the Executing Court under ss. 47, 144 and r5r, Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex-parte or.}er of delivery and for redelivery of possession of the house to him or in the alternative, for an order to the appellants for giving facilities for removing the moveables from the house. The Executing Court upheld the contention of the appellant that Ig6o
Shanno Devi v. Mangal Sain Das Gupta ]. Septetnber _8.