Nldu'ftllri Kttmaroorammt s.,,,,,1111 S•bl>a Ru Hid..,.,.i/d J. Ifft service inam Wal! correct in tho circumstances of the caBe, and the High Court was not justified in revel'll- ing it.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the High Court set a.side, and that of the lower Court restored, with costs throughout. A ppw.l allowe.d. SREE RAGHUTHILAKATHIRTHA
SREEPADANGALAVARU SWAMIJI v. THE STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAOADKAB, K. N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and T. L VENKA.TARA…'llA AIYAR, JJ.)
Landlord and Tenant-Rem-Enactment providing for jixaticm of ma:r:imum rent – COMtitulional validity-Notijicalion ai:r:ing atandard rent-Validity-Bombay Tenanc.~ and ,,ipncult- ural Landa Act, 1918 ( Bom. 67 of 1948), a. 6-M ysore TeMn· cy Act,.1952 (Myaore 13 of 1952), as. 6(1112), 12-CO'Mlitutimi of India, Art. U,19(1) (fl, 26,31,31A.
The Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, was enacted, inter alia, for the purpose of regulating the law which governed the relations of landlords and tenants of agricultural lands. Sub- section (I) of s. 6 of the Act provided: "Notwithstanding
any agreement, usage, decree or order of a court or any law, the maximum rent payable in respect of any period …… by a tenant for the lease of any land shall not exceed one-half of the crop or crops raised on such land or its value
as determined in the prescribed manner". "The Government may, by notification in the Mysore Gazette, fix a lower rate of the maximum rent payable by the tenantS of lands situate in any particular area or may fix such rate on any other
suitable basis as they think fit". In exercise of the Power. …, conferred by s.6(2), the Government of Mysore issued a • notification purporting to fix the standard rent for land
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT l'tEp(IRTS specified in Sch. I which dealt with Maidan areas i. e., lands on· the plains at one third of the produce, and. for those specified in Sch.II which .dealt with Malnad areas 1, e., lands on hilly tracts at one fou· ;h.
The appellant who owned garden land in the district of Shimoga in Mysore State and who had 'leased out the land to a tenant, challenged the validity or s.6(2) of the Act as well as the notification on the grounds that they contravened Arts. 14, 19'1) (f), 26, 31 and 31A of the Constitution of India, and that, in any case, the notification was inconsistent with s. 6( t) inasmuch as it was based on s. 6(2) which bein<t an exception to s. 6( I) could not be allowed to swallow up the general rule and tliat was precisely what the notification purported to do. The Mysore Tenancy Act was modelled on the pattern of the
Bombay Tcnancv and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and the provisions of s.6 of the Mysore Act were •imilar to s.6 of the Bombay Act. In Vaaantlal Maganbhni San,ianwala v. The State
of Bomba.,, (1961] I. S. C. R. 341 ; it was held that s. 6 of the Bombay Act wa• vaild. The appellant contended that the aforesaid decision was not applicable bccaust'! there were rlifferencec; • bt'!tween the twO Acts inasmuch as ( l) in the preamble to the Bombay Act it was stated that it was passed inter alia for the purpose of improving the economic and socia1 conditions of peasants and this was not mentioned in the Mysore Act, (2\
unlike the Mysore Act, the Bombay Act, made a distinCtion between the irrigated and non·irrigated land {3) the Bombay Act while prescribini: a maximum took the precaution of also prescribing a minimum and the absence of the latter provision in the Mysore Act made a material difference.
Held, that: (I) the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952, was substantially similar to Bombay Tenancv and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and that the question as to be whether s. 6 (2) of the Mvsore Act was valid must be held ti> be covered by the decision the Vasanllal Ma.ganbhai Sanjanwala v. The Stat. of Bo..,.bay [1961] I S. C.R. 341. Accordingly, s.6(2) of the Mysore Ter.ancy Act, 1952, was valid.
(2) on its true construction, s. 6(1) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 19~2. wa• intended to apply to all agricultural leases until a notification was issued under 9'6(2\ in respect of the areas where the lea••d lands might be situated ; s 6(2) ~ could not, therefore, be considered as an exception to s.6(1). Consequently, the notification in question was valid.
Ba,hulhilakathirlhG Paclat galavaru Swamiji v • Thi Slat1 of M_,,.,, 19~2 Roghulhilakathirllur l'oi••ga/a1Jtull Su:ramiji v. Thi Stall of M,sOTt SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963] Macbeth v. Aahky, (1874) L.R. 2 Sc, App. 352, consi-
dered and held inapplicable. Civu. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 537 of 1960. Appeal from tho judgment a.nd order dated December 23, I 959, of the Mysore High Court in
Writ Petition No, 229of1955. S. S. Shukla and E. Udayarathnam, for the appellant. H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, R. Gopalakrislman and P. D. Menon, for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
R. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent No. 3 1962. April 18. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises from a writ petition filed by the appellant, Raghu·
tilaka Tirtha Sripadanga.lavaru Swo.miji, in the Mysore High Court challenging th1.1 validity of s. 6 (2) of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 (XIII of 1952) hereafter oalled the Act, and the notification issued
under the ea.id section on March 31, 1952. The appellant's case as set out in his writ petition before the High Court was that the impug- ned section as well as the notification issued under
•' ' it infrin~ed his fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, J9 (1) (f), 26, 31 and 31A of the Constit- ution. This con ten ti on has bePn rejected by the High Court and it has been hold that the section
and the notification under challenge are valid and constitutional. The appellant then applied for a certificate from the High Court, both under Art. 132 and Art. 133 of the Constitution. The High
._~ Court granted him a certificate under Art. 133, but refused to certify th\) ca.so under Art. 132. There 2 S.C.R. after the appellant applied to this Court for liberty to raise a question ab'>Ut the interpretation of the
Constitution and permission has been accorded to the appellant accordingly. That is how the pre- sent appeal has come to this Court. The appellant owns 6 acres and 30 ghuntas of garden land in
village Mulba.gilu in Taluka Thirthahalli in the district of ShimogJt. Respond· ant No. 3, Ramappa, Gowda, is his tenant in respect of this land. A registered lease deed was executed
in favour of respondent No. 3 by the appellant on March 11, 1943; under this document respondent No. 3 undertook to pay 82-1/2 maunds of areca in addition to Rs. l 7/12-in cash as rent per year. In
1955 ,respondent No. a filed an application before respondent No. 2, the Tehsildar of Thirthahalli, under section 12 of the Act and claimed that the standard rent payable by him to the appellant
should be fix:ed (Tenancy case 85 of 1955-56). Meanwhile respondent No. l, the Government of Mysore, had, in ex:ercise of the powers conferred on it by s. 6 of the Act, issued a notification No.
R9. 10720/L. S. 73.54 2 on March 28/29, 1955. This notification purported to fix: the standard rent for lands of the category to which the appellants land belongs at one third of the produce.
Feeling aggri· eved by this notification the appellant filed the present writ petition in the High Court on Decem- ber 16, 1955, His case was thats. 6 (2) as well as the ndtification issued under it were ultra vires,
invalid and inoperative. Before dealing with the contentions raised before us by Mr. Shukla on behalf of the appellant it would be necessary to consider very briefly the scheme of the Act.
The Act has ·been passed by the Mysore Legislature bec!tuse it was thought necessary to regulate the law which . governs the relations of landlords and tenants of agricultural lands and to regulate and impose restrictions on the
'Raghuth;loknlhirth a Padangatav~ru Swamiji v. Tht State of Afysore Gajendra1adltar J. id1lt11ll1ilakatltirtha l'od<1ntal.,a4t'V Sw3111iji Tlt1 Sia-. of M)60t1 Gijtndragad~r J. Ji30
SUPREME COUhT REPORTS [1963) transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites and lands appurtenant thereto belonging to or occupied by agr~oul.turists in the State of Mysore
e:icoe~t Bellary DIBtnct and to make provisions for oertam o•her purposes appearing in the Act. That is the recital contained in the preamble to the Aot. It would ~hue be seen that the primary objeot of
the Act 18 to afford much needed relief to the agricultural tenants by regulating their relations with their landlords and in that respect the Aot bears a very close resemblance to the provisions
of the Bombay Teaanoy and Agricultural Lands Act, LXVH of 1948. Indeed, the material provisions of the Act with which we are concerned are sub- stantially similar. Chapter I of the Act deals with the preliminary
topic of defining the relevant terms used in the Act. Chapter II contains general provisions regarding tenancies. Section 4 defines persons who are dee- med to be tenants. Section 5 provides that no
tenanoy would be for Iese than five years. iSeotion 6 deals with the maximum rent payable by the tenants. 8eotion S provides for the oaloulation of rent payable in kind in the manner indicated by els.
(i)' and (ii) and prohi)>its the landlord from reoover- '-<-· ing or receiving rent caloulated in any other manner. Under s. II receipt of rent in terms of service or labour is prohibited.
Section 11 abolishes all casea and e. 10 enables the tenants to claim a refund of rent which haa been recovered in contra- vention of the provisions of the Act. Section I:! then deals with enquiries with regard to reasonable .rent.
8ub-section (3) of s. 12 lays down five factors which have to be borne in mind by the authority dealing with an application for the fixation of reaaonable rent. Section 13 is a corollary of s. 12 and author-
ises the reduction of rent after reasonable rent has been determined under e. 12. Section 14 deals _. with suspensions or remission of rent. Section 15 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPO.t<:fS
provides for termination of tenancy. Under s. 18 a statutory bar is created against the eviction of a tenant from a dwelling house and under s. 19 the tenant has the first option of purchasing the site
on which he has built a dwelling house. Similarly, under s. 22 the tenant is given an option of purch- asing the land leased out to him. tjection 24 deals with some ca;es where relief can be granted against
termination of tenancy aud s. 25 with relief against termination of tenancy for non-payment of rent. Section 30 provides for the procedure to recover rent and s. 31 protects the tenants' rights under
any other law. Chapter III deals with the proced· ure and jurisdiction of Amildar and provides for appeals against the decisions of the Amildar. Chapter IV deals with offences and prescribes pen·
alties for them and Chapter V contains miscellane- ous provisions. That, in its broad outlines, is the nature of the provisions made by the Act in order to give relief to the agricultural tenants.
Section 6 with which we are directly conce1·· ned in the present appeal reads thus:- "6. (l) Notwithstanding any agreement, usage, decree or order of a court or any law, the maximum rent payable in respect of any
period after the date of coming into force of this Act by a tenant for the lease of any land shall not exceed one-half of the crop or crops raised on such land or its value as determined in the prescribed manner :
Provided that where the tenant does not cultivate the land the rent payable shall be the reasonable rent to be fixed by the Amildar. (2) The Government may, by notification in the Mysore Gazette, fix a lower rate of the
maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands 1"62 Rugltut•(ilakatl1irtl1a Pada1.gal vatU SwtJrni}i v. The State of Myu1r Gojendraladk'lr J • ll aghu 1 hiJako th ir lha Pada r.gaf<zt'aru
Swanli;i fh1 Stale of M;·Jor1 Gqjendraiadkur J, SUl'~J<;lllli OOURT REPORTS [1963] situate in any particular area or may fix such rate on any other suita.hle basis as they think fit."
As we have already indicated, the provisions of the two sub-clauses of s. 6 a.re substantially similar to the provisions of s. 6( I) and (2) of the corres· ponding Bombay Act. Indeed, it would be correct
to say that Act with which we a.re concerned has been modelled on tho pattern of tho Bombay Act and has adopted most of its important provisions. The validity of s. 6 of the Bombay Act was
challenged before this Court in "V asantal M aganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of .&nnbay (1)" and it has been held that the said section is valid. The reasons given by this Court in upholding the
validity of s. 6 of the Bombay Act apply with equal force in support of the validity of s. 6 of the Mysore Act and so the point raised by the appellant in challenging the validity of the impugned section is
really covered by the earlier decision of this Court. Mr. Shukla., however, contends that the preamble to the Act differs from the prc&mble of the Bombay Act inasmuch as the latter preamble refers
to the ia.ot that that Act was passed int,er alia for the purpose of improving the economic and social conditions of peasants and ensuring the full and effioient use of land for agriculture and so considera-
tions of social justice on which the validity of the corresponding provision of tho Bombay Act was sought to be sustained cannot be invo.ked in dealing with the proaent appeal. We a.re not impressed by
this argument. It is true that the preamble to the Act merely says that the Act was passed because it was though necessary to regulate the law which governs the relations of landlords and tenants of
agricultural lands and it does not refer to the requirement of social justice or doea not specifically c' mention the object of ensuring the full and efficient .L (I) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 341.
-,_._ 2 S.C.R. use of land for agriculture. But in dealing with a law which has been paBBed for the purpose of effect- ing an agrarian reform it woulJ be pedantic to ignore the essential basis of its material provisions
merely on the ground that the concept of. social justice on which the said provisions are based has not been expressly stated to be one of the objects of the Act in the preamble. .We have already
examined briefly the broad scheme of the Act and it is obvious that the important provisions of the Act are intended to improve the economic and social conditions of the agricultural tenants and so
the policy of social justice can be safely said to be writ, large on the face of the Act. Therefore, we do not think that the argument based upon the fact that the preamble does not ·refer to social
justice distinguishes s. 6 of the Act from the corre1ponding section of the Bombay Act. · Then it is urged that unlike the Mysore Act, the Bombay Act has distinguished between irrigated
land and non-irrigated land and has provided by s. 6(1) that the maximum rent payable in the case of irrigated land shall not exceed one-forth and in the case of other lands shall not exceed one-third
of the crop of such land or its value as determined in the prescribed manner. It is true that s. 6(1) of the Act makes no such distinction between irrigated and non-irrigated lands. But that, in our opinion,
is not a matter of eBBential importance. Like s. 6( 1) of the Bombay Act s. 6( I) of the Act also intends to provide for a maximum ceiling beyond which agr1cultural rent will not be allowed to soar and
so far as the fixation of a maximum ceiling of rent is concerned it is not eSBential that a distinction must necessarily be made between irrigated lands and non-irrigated lands. It must be borne in mind
that 1what the section does is to prescribe the maxi- mum and not to provide for a minimum, In pres· oribing a maximum it may be open to the Legis- lature to provide for a maximum which would be
, Roghuthilakothirtha Padangalovmu Swamiji The S'ote oj~ MJS'iM Gajendrag~dkar J. Re,IMllilokathirtM Patkngolovoru Sw 0miji Tiu Stirk of Mysore Gaj.nbo1.dltar J. common to a.11 la.nds whether irrigated or not That
is why we are not inclined to a.tta.ch any importance to the point tha.t in the absence of classification of la.nd, while prescribing a maximum s. 6(1) suffers from a.ny infirmity.
Then it is argued that the Bombay Act while prescribing a. maximum has ta.ken the precaution of a.lso prescribing a minimum a.nd the absence of the latter provision makes a. material difference.
This argument is clearly mi•coneeivod. It is true tha.t s. 8 of the Bombay Act which ha.d been insert· ed by the Bombay Legislature in 1956 did provide for the maximum and the minimum rent, but a.s the
decision of this Court in the case of Sanjanwala ( 1) shows in upholding the validity of the impugned provision of the Bombay Act no reliance was placed upon the fixation of the minimum rent.
Indeed, the minimum rent was fixed subsequent to the decision of the High Court which was under appeal before thill Court in that ca.se and the fact tha.t a minimum had been prescribed subsequently has
been only incidentally mentioned in the judgment. '.rherefore the absence of a provision fixing the minimum rent docs not introduce .i.ny infirmity in the impugned provision. \Ve are, therefore, satisfied
that the case of tho impugned section is substantial· ly similar to the case of s. 6 of the Bombay Aot with which this Court W«S concerned in the case of Sanjanwala {I) and the oha.llenge to the validity of
section in thu present appeal must, therefore, be held to be covered by the said decision. ……. .#).~ . That takes us to the question as to whether the impugned notification is in valid.
This notifica· tion has been issued in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Government by s. 6( :!) and it provides that th" rate of maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands situated in the areas specifi-
ed in Schedule I and Schedule I I to the notification ..i (IJ [1961] I S.C.R.. 341. '<– 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS shall be one-third and one-fourth respectively of the crop or crops raised on such lands with effect
from the year commencing on April 1, .1955. Schedule I deals with Maidan areas in which the maximum. rent or rents shall be one-third of the crop or crops and ochedule II deals with Malanad
areas in which the maximum rate of rent shall be one-fourth of the crop or crops raised. It appear'!' that the classification of lands between Maidan an Malanad lands is well known
in Mysore. Maidan lands are lands on the plains, whereas Malanad are lands on hilly trac.ts. The distinction between the two categories of lands takes into aocount the different condition~· of rain
fa.II, the dilferent nature of the cultivation, the difference in the living conditions and the avail· ability of labour and the difference in the quantity and the quality of the produce. It i~ true that the
notification does not prescribe the lower rate of the maximum rent area by area in the sense of dist.riot by district, but it purports to prescribe the .said maximum· by classifying the' land in the whole of
the State in the two well-known categories of Maida.n and Mal11J1ad lands. It is urged by Mr. Shukla that the impugned notification is invalid, because it is inconsistent with the provisions of s. 6( 1). The argument is that
s. 6( 1) lays down a general rule and s. 6(2) provides for an exception to the said genf'ral rule. On that a&umption it is contended that an exception cannot be allowed to swallow up the general rule and that
is precisely what the notification purports to do. 'l'his argument is based on the decision of the House of Lords in Macbeth v. ·Ashley ('). It would be noticed that this argument raises the question ·
about the construction of the two sub.clauses of ~.6. \. Before addressing ourselves to that question, (I) (1874] L.R. 2 Sc. App, 352. RogJiulhilalc<1thi1tha Padangalavaf'u Sw,mi/i
v. Thi State of Myaere Qqjentlragallf.ar J. 1116t Hol·l11.11hilakr. tJii,1!1'J l'od.t1g't/av. r" Su· ,,,,1; v, Tie S11.tt vf Jl)sore (," ~jr111/ n.~adlcr.r .J, :1;m Sl'l-RE.ME COl RT REl'OHTIS [lllti3J
h•Jwover. we m:i.y rnfer to the cloici~ioa of tb.o Hotl'lo of Lords on which tae argument is based. It appears that I I o'clock at night was the hour appointed for closing public-houses in Scotland,
although in Bpecia.I cases, and for well considered reasons, a deviation was allowed with reference to any particular locality really requiring it. The lllagistrates of Rothesay had ordered for closing
at 10 instead of I l and the effeot of the order was that it embraced every public-house in the burgh. The House of Lords held that the Magistrates order was ulti"a vires. The statutory provision with which
the House of Lords was concerned was contained in the Act of Parli&ment, 25 and 21) Viet. c. 35. As a result of these provisions I l o'clock ~t night WW! appointed tu be the hour for closing public houses.
There was, however, a proviso which said inter alin that in any particular locality req:iiring other hours for opening and closing inns, hotels, and public- houses it- shall be lawful for
such justices and Magistrates respectively to insert in the schedule such other hours, not being earlier th'm six or la.for than eight o'clock in tho morning for opening, or earlter thaa nine o'clock or later
than eleven o'clock in the c.-eni1w for clusin" the same as they shall thiak fit. IL is in pursuance of the authority conferred on them by tho said proviso that tho ::\Ia.gistratcs of Hothesay passed an order
embraciag every public-house iu the burg0 by which, a deviation from the statutorily fi:i;ocl hour was effected. In di·aling with tho validity of the order is~ ued by the :1-Iagistrates Lord Chancellor Lord Cairns
expressed his opinion that if the exception is to swallo\v up the rule it ceases, of course, to be an exception at all and that which might fairly have been an exercise of discretion becomes no exercise ~"
of tho kind of discretion mentioned in the Act of Parliament. It was for this reason that the order …. – 2 S.C.R, issued by the Magistrates was declared to be ultra vires. It was conceded that the Magistrates had a
discretiOn, but the Lord Chancellor observed that the· ~ords "conferring discretion" expressly bear with reference to a particular locality and no't with the whole burgh. What should be true about the
whole burgh had been treated as a. matter reserved for and determined by the consideration of the Imperial Parliament. The Lord Chancellor did not express any opinion on the question as to whether
the discretion vested in the Magistrates can be exer- cised by them more than once but without deciding that point he held that the order of tlie Magistrates really amounted to evading an Act of Parliament.
In substance, the Magistrates had ·once for all att- empted with regard to all the public-houses in their district to change the rule laid down by the Act of Parliament. Lord Chelmsford, who
concurred with the opinion expressed by the Lord Chancellor, rested his conclusion on the ground that it was · impossible to say that the limits which the Magis- trates had defined could be called a particular loca-
lity within burgh and so it appeared that what the Magistrates had done was something very like an at~empt to evade the Act of Parliament. Accord- ing'to Lord Selborne, the participle. "requiring" is
connected with the su':>stantive "locality" and there- fore it must be a requirement arising out of the particular circumstances of the place. That is why Lord Selborne thought that the Magistrates must,
in exercise of an honest and bona fide judgment,· be of opinion that the particular locality which they except from the ordinary rule is one which, from itti own special circumstances, requires that
difference to be made. It would thus be seen that though the genera.I · basis of the decision, as it has been expressed · by Lord Cairne, appe11.rs .to be that the exception can- not swallow up the rule one of the reasons which
Raghuthilakcthir th:i Padangalawaru S!""mji Th, Stal• of .lfy,.,. Gajendr•gadlt•r J. Boghu thilol:otlairth• P11tlan1c.l•t1eru Swarmji v. Thi Sl'Ott oj My1011 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963]
ultimately influenced t.he decision wa.A tha.t the dis- cretion had to be exercised lxmafide and a.fter due deli bera ti on in respect of a particular locality a.nd tha.t the manner in which the order we.s iBBued in-
dicated that the requirements of the pa.rticu,lar localities had not been duly examined by the Magis- trates. It is significa.nt that though Lord Ca.irne posed the question a.a to whether the discretion in question
ca.n be exercised more tha.n once, he did not choose to a.newer it; but the trend of the opinions expres- sed by the La. w Lords during the course of their apeoohes may seem to suggest tha.t the discretion
cannot be exercised more than once a.nd in a.ny case, it must be exercised by special reference to the particular locality as indica.t£d by the proviso. If a.n order is made in respect of the whole of thA
burgh, it. cannot be said that it has been passed after exerdsing due discrPtion in rrapect of the requirements of ea.ch pa.rticula.r locality. With respect, if the discretion is given to the llfagietratee
to provide for a. departure from the rule prescribed by the genera.I provision by reference to particular localities, it is not ee.sy to see why the said discret.- ion cannot be exercised more than once. Indeed,
sit.ua.tions may arise when the Magistrates may have to consider the matter from time to time in respect of different localities and if it appears to the Magistrates considering tho ca~es of different
localities that in regard to each one of them a dep- arture from the general rule should be rnade,.it i~ not eary to follow why the proviso does not justify diff<'rent c.rders being passed by the MagiPtrates
in respect of different but particular localities. On the other hand, if the ma.in provision is construed to mean that the time prescribed by it was to apply generally only with certain PXceptions con-
templated by the proviso, that would be a different matter. However, it is not necessary for us to pursue this point further and to expre88 a definite \ …….. . –r.l 2 S.C.R. opinion on the general proposition that an excep-
tion cannot swallow the general rule, because, as we will presently show, this rule cannot be applied to the provioions of s. 6 at all. In this connection we may, however, point out that both in Max-
well and in Craies, the decision in Macbeth's case(') appears to have been treated as an authority for the proposition that an order like the one passed by the Magistrates in tliat Clll!le amounted to an
evasion of the Parliamentary statute, because it was not in hgnest and bona fide exercise of the discretion vested in them. (Maxwell on Interpreta- tion of Statutes, 11th Edn., p. 121, and Craies on
Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 75.) But assuming that the proposition for which Mr. Shukla contends on the authority of the deci- sion in Macbeth's case (I) is sound, does it apply to s. 6 at all and the answer ·to this question will
depend upon t.he construction of the provisions contained in the two sub-clauses of s. 6. It would be noticed thats. 611) declares a maximum beyond which no landlord can recover rent from his tenant.
In other words, as soon as the Act came into force a ceiling was fixed beyond which the landlord mm. not recover rent from his tenant even though it may be justified by agr_!lement, usage, decree- or
order of a court or any other law. The provisions of this eub-seotion apply individually and severally to all agricultural leases and govern the relations of individual landlords and tenants in respect of
paymPnt of rent by the latter to the formn. The fixation of the maximum by sub-a. ( 1) is really not intende<I to lay down a general rule as to wh'-'t a landlord should recover from his tenant and it is in
that sense alone that its relation to the provisions of sub-a. (2) must be judged. In that connection we may point out that there is one provi 10 to S; 6( l) which deals with cases of tenants who do not
{I) (1874) L. R. 2 S.C App !52. Rag fu,tlul ::i A:a tli i' tha PodangalaD""' Sw::imiji Tiu Stott of MyBO'I Qa}lndragadkor J. 496t Ro1h11t•il 1kothirtho PadilngaJap~M Swomiji Tiu Stott oj MJ•ott
(1963) cultivate the land and it Jaye down that in their case the rent shall be ree.sonable rent to be fixed by the Amildar. Sub-section (2) ie so worded that in terms it oannot be said to be a proviso to eub-e. (I) add io
substance it is not B'lch a proviso nor ie it an excep· tion to sub-a. (1). Having prescribed the maximum beyond which agricultural rent cannot go under s. 6(1) the legislature he.s premitted the Government
to fix a lower rate of the maximum rent in respect of lands situated in particular areas. The Govern· ment ha.s also been authorised to fix the pe.;vment of rent on any other suitable baaie as i~ thinks fit.
In other words, the authority conferred on the Government is either to fix a lower rate or to fix any other basis on which the rent coulil be fixed. The provision is a'l independent provision and eo
the two sub-sections must be read aa different, independent, though co-ordinate, provisions of the Statute. It would, we think, be erroneous to treat sub-s. (2) as a proviso or exception to sub-s. (I).
Whereas 8U b·e. ( l) deals with and applies to all lee.see individually and prescribes a ceiling in that behalf, sub-s. (2) is intend to prescribe a maxi- mum by reference to different areas in the State.
The object of both the provisions is no doubt simi- lar but it is not the same and the relation between them cannot legitimately be treat.Pd as the relation between the general rule and the proviso or except·
ion to it. The argument that by issuing the notification the Government has purported to amen<l e. 6(1) ie, in our opinion, not well-founded. Ae. we have already 8een, e. 6(1) is intended to apply to all the
agricultural leases until a notification is iesued under s. 6(2) in respect of the areas where the leased la.ode may be eitua.ted. It is not suggested that. …-' 2 s.c.R. under s. f(2) it is necessary that the Government
must fix the lower rates by reference to individual lands and eo there can be no doubt that even on the appellant's argument it would be competent to the Government to fix lower rent.e, say
dietrictwise. If instead of preeoribing the lower rates distriotwise after classifying the lands into two categories which are well recognised, the Government prescribed the rates by referenoe
tci the said categories of lands throughout the State. we do not see how the said notification can be said to be inconsistent with s. 6(2) or withs. 6( I) either. The scheme of s. 6 does not seem to postulate that
after the notifications are issued under e. 6(2) some area must inevitably be left to be covered bys. 6(1). Such an aesumption would be inconsistent with the object underlying ths said provi~ion itself. Whl\t
s. 6(1) has done is to fix a genPral ceiling apart from the areas and without considering the special faotore appertaining to them. Having thus fixed a ireneral ceiling the Legislature realised that the
ceiling may have to be ohanged from area to area and so power was conferred on the Government to fix the ceiling at a lower rate. The Government having examined the matter came to the conclusion
that the more _equitable and reasonable course to adopt would be to divide the &!lfioultural lands into two well-known categories and fix the ceiling by reference to them. Now in the very nature of things,
the Legislature must have anticipated that the exercise of the power under s. 6(2) might cover all the areas in the State and that may mean that the general ceiling preeoribed by s. 6( I) may not apply
to any land which is oovered by the notification. If s. 6(1) is not a general rule ands. 6(2) is not an exception to it, ·then the ooneequenoe flowing from the issue of the impugned notification cannot be
oharacterised as an exception swallowing up the IHI R111hu,hi/Jkathirtlra Padanga/aoafK Swamiji v. Tlw Stal1 of M:µor Goj1ndrozai1car J. 19G:! R 'fl1hulhi f ,,/,:o1thirtlaa i > Jdangat.:~'.'"
,•wt/tll!JI Tht State of ~llysot1 Ua}e111/r,todkar J, ,<pril JR. ~-12 ~PPRF.i\IF, COTTR't" REPORTS [l!l63] l!<'ncral rnlc. Th11.t, in A•ibstancc, is tho view which the Mysore High Court ha~ taken in tho matter
and we think tl1at tho said view is right. In the n•snlt, t.hc app~al fails and is dismissed with costs. Appenl dismi.9sed. RA:\£ LAL KAPUR AND SONS (P)LTD. 1.'• RAM NATI! AND OTHERS
(B. P. SINHA, c. J .. P. B. GAJF.NllRAGADKAR, TC N. \VAxcnoo, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR nnd T. L. YENIL\T,\ It.DIA An-AR, J J.) Suprenze Courl–Ap111ication for .eptcial lcflre-DeTaJ1-
Condo11a1i'on–;.'·cces.~ity to gh·c notice .1o rtspondtnt bPfore n1aki11q nrder-S11pre?ne Court R11lra, 1950, 0 .• Y.lll, r. 1. prnri"o ( r). Against the judgment of the Single Judge of the Punjab
High Court dated January 5, 195j, in which he followed the de<·ision of a Di\·ision Bench holding thats. 7/\ of the Delhi and Ajmcr Rent Control :\ct, 194 7, \Va" unconstitutional and \'oid, the appellants preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent.
~leanwhile the judgment or the Division Bench was brought up by way or appeal to the Supreme Court, and as the appeal was getting ready to be heard, the appellants nlade an application on January 3, 1959, for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the
Single Judge. ~o notice was give"n to the respondent to the application, and special leave ,.;as granted cx-parte. 'fhe Letters Patents appeal was therraftcr withdrawn by the appellants. \\'htn the appt>al came on for hearing in due course, the respondent r:liot.rd an objection to the hc<iring of the appeal on die ;.:ro11nd" th;\t the application for special leave \VclS barred by limitation, that there ''·ere no sufficient r~a sons for condoniu; the ldll.,:;' delay of four years, and that the ~pecial leave g-rantecl ex-pa rte should be CC\'okccl.
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