Stai. f A.tu/''" PraJ1•h BuvVti'u 8aloromi lied'' U'ane"'1o J. SUPREME COURT RE.PORTS [1963] him to grant a mining lease to any one. It follows therefor" that the mining leases granted in this case were granted by persons who
he.d no right to the minerals and therefore confer no rights on the respondents to claim as of right from the Government that they should be granted a mining lease under the l:tulea.
In view of the above decision appeal No. l!52 must be allowed and appeal No. 25a must fail. We th11refore allow appeal No. 252 and setting aside the order of the appeal court dismiss the writ
petition with costs to the State throughout. Appeal No. 253 is hereby dismissed but in the circumsta- nces parties will bear their own costs. 0. A. No. 252 of 1958 alkJwed. 0. A. No. 253 of 1958 dismissed.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. KOLLA SREERAMA MURTHY (B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDR,AGADKAR, K. N. WANCnoo, N. RAJA.GOP.ALA AYYANGAR and T. L. VENKATARAMA AIYA.R, JJ.) Sales Tax-Delivery order-Endoraement–Properly in
good& paaaea on taking delivery by tho laat endoraet-E//ect- Original holder of delivery order, if liable to pay salea taz- Madras General Sales taz Act, 1939 (Mad. IX of 1939). s. J. The respondent was a dealer.in gunny hags. He pur-
chased gunnies from the ¥ills on terms of a wri1ten contract which was on a printed form. The Mills after receiving a part of purchase price, issued "delivery orders" directing the delivery of goods as per the contract. Instead of taking deli-. very himself the respondent endorsed the delivery orders and these passed through several hands before the ultimate hol· der of the delivery order presented it to the Mills and obtaiJ'.!e<! delivery of the gunnies from them.
l 1 S.C.R. At the date of the contract for purchase, the goods which wne the subject matter of the purchase were not appro- priated to the contract so that there was no ccmpleted sale since no property passed but only an agreement of sale.
The Sales Tax Officer assessed the respondent and collected sales tax on the said transactions. The question was whether the transactions were or were not "Sales of goods" within s. 3 the Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, so as to enable the turnover represented by these sales to be brought to tax under the Act, or were mere sales or transfers of delivery orders: and further what was the effect of the property in the goods passing to the ultimate endorsee of the delivery order. Held, that the principle laid down in Butterworth v.
Kingway Motors Ltd., which is the basis of the decision in the case of Bayyana Bhimayya v. State of Andlua Prariesh, would equally apply to the facts of the present case . Bayyana Bhimayya v. Government of Andlira Praaesh,
(1961) 3 S. C.R. 267 and Butteiworth v. Kingway Motors Ltil. ( 1954) 2 All E. R. 694, applied. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISIDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 368 and 369 of 1961. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated
June 27, 1957, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in S. A. Nos. 194 and 195 of 1954. K. N. Rajgopal Sastri and P .. D. Menon, for the appellants. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. Satyanarayana,
for the respondents. 1962. April 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, J.-These two appeals are before us by virtue of certificates of fitness granted by the . High Court of Andhra Pradesh under Art. 13 "} (I) ( c)
of the Constitution. The State of Andhra Pradesh is the appellant in both the appeaJs and one Kolla Sreerama Murthy-a dealer in gunnies-is the res- pondent in each of them and the point involved
relates to the liability of the respondent to Sales SMeof Andhra Pradesh v. Koll a Sreerama Murthy Ayyangar J, Stal1 of And~ra Prad1sh Xolla Sf'urama MurtJi1 AyyangarJ. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1963]
Tax in respect of the transactions to which we shall later refer. Civil Appeal No. 368 of 1961 arises out of original suit No. 268 of 1951 in the file of the Distrint Munsif's Court, Rajahmundry by the res-
pondent for setting aside an assessment and obtain refund of a sum of Hs. 2,941/7 /- which was partly the sum assessed and collected as sales-tax for the assessment year 1947-48, while Civil Appeal No. 369
of 1961 is from a similar suit praying for dentical reliefs in respect of the year 1946-47, the amount of which refund was sought however being Rs.1,631/12/-. The basis of the suits
briefly was that the transactions whose turnover was included in bis assessment, were not "sales of goods" within the Madras General Sales Ta-x Act 1939 (Mad. IX of 1939) and that consequently the assessment\ to tax
and recovery of the same were illegal and without jurisdiction. Both the suits ~ere decreed by the District Munsif-a decision which was affirmed by the 8ubordinate Judge of Rajahmundry on appeal
by the 8ta.te and by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on further appeal also by the State. It is from these two judgments and decrees in the two second appeals tha.t the present appeals have been
brought. It was common ground that the respondent was a "dealer" within the · Madras Sales Tax Act (which for convenience we shall call the Act) being "a person who carries on the business of buying or
selling goods", and .that the transactions whose legal cha.racter is now in dispute were put through by him by way of business. Section 3 of the Act which is the charging section-enacts that "every
dealer shall pay for each year a tax on his total turnover for such year". "Turnover" is defined in the Act as: " •rurnover' means the aggregate amoun~ rs.o.R. SUPREME OOORT REPORTS
for which goods are bought or sold, or suppli- ed or distributed, by a dealer either directly or through another, on his own account or on account of others whether for cash or for
deferred· payment or other valuable considera- tion provided that the proceeds of the sales by a person of agricultural or horticultural ·pro- duce grown by himself or grown on any land
in which he has an interest whether as owner, ttsufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise shall be excluded from his turnover". and clauses ( c) and (h) of s. 2 of the Act define
"goods" and "sale" respectively thus : '' 'Goods' means all kinds of movable property other than actionable claims, stocks and shares and securities and includes all materials, commodities and articles · including
those to be used in the construction, fitting out improvement 6r repair of immovable property or in the fitting out, improvement or repair of movable property and also. includes all growing crops, grass and things attached
'to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed befo~e sale or under the contract of. sale". ''Sa.le with all its grammatical variations· and cogriate expressions means every transfer ·
of the proper~y in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for casli or for deferred payment or other valua- ble consideration and includes also a transfer
of property in good~ involved in the execution of a works contract, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge OJ.'. pledge". The only matter therefore which is in controversy
between the parties is as ·to whether the transac- tions to whose details we sh&ll present1y refer, whio~ the respondent admittedly entered into; wel'A s1,11 o/ Antlhto Praclesli v.
Koll a 8111rom1 .MUllh:J .d.»0111• J. J962 Sta!e of .1fndhra J'radesh KolJa Srurama Munhy 4Jyan.:..ar J. or were not "sales of goods" within the Madras General Sales Tax Act (Act IX of 1939) so as to
enable the turnover represented by these sales to be brought to tax under the Act. We shall now set out the nature of the transa- ctions which the learned Judges of the High Court
have held have not resulted in "a S!l.le of goods" by the respondent so as to attract the tax under the charging section in respect of the "turnover" rep- resented by such sales. 'l'he respondent is, as
stated e1trlier, a dealer in gunny bags. The gunny bags dealt with by him were those ma1,ufactured in two mills known as Chittivalsa and Nellimerla Mills both situnted in Chittivalsa in Visakhapatnam
District. The purchase by the respondent from the mills was on terms of a written contract which was on printed form. We shall set out the relevant terms of one of the sample contracts for understan-
ding the point involved, as it is common ground that evPry contract f'ntered into by the respondent with the mills was in this form. These contracts were entered into by brokers acting for the respon-
dent and who sent him "bought·notes" setting out the terms npon which the purchases had been effected from the mills, and one of these Ex. Al, filed in 0.S. 268 of i DGl, has been treated as typical.
It rMites the purchase on behalf of the respondent of 30,0C:O bags from the Chittivalsa mills, specifies the description of the goods, the manner of their packing and the fact that delivery was to be affec·
ted within a period of three months. The buyer was required to make a deposit of Rs. 1 5/- per bale within 24 hours after the contract was banded over to him and the respondent fulfilled this requirement.
The Mills having thus received a part of the purcha- se price, they issued. "delivery orders" directing the deiivery of goods as per the contract and these were handed over to the bltyer on his honouring a hundi
for the value of tho goods, the buyer.in this case being the respondent. It was common ground that I S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'l 1 REPORTS , 189 by the date when the delivery orders were issued,
there were gpods answering the contract description and of quantity sufficient to comply with the rela- tiveterm in the contract, in the godown of the mills wherefrom on the terms of the contract, delivery
was to be effected. It \YaS open to the buyer him- self to have gone to the mills and taken delivery of t.he goods, but this was not done and it is the departure in this respect that has given rise to the
legal controversy involved in these appeals. Ins- tead of taking delivery himself, the respondent (and this appears to have been the practice of others as well) endorsed the delivers orders and these
passed through several hands before the ultimate holder of the delivery order presented it to the mills and obtained delivery of the gunnies from them. It need hardly be stated that s,t each endor-
. sement of the delivery order the price of the bales represented by the quantity specified in the delivery order would be collected by the successive endorsers which would, in most cases, include the profit., if it
was a rising market. The case in the Courts below as well as before us was argued on the basis of this pattern of dealing. The learned trial Judge and the appellate Courts including the learned Judges
of the High Court came to the conclusion that on these facts there was no ''sale of goods" by the respondent, because the transaction so far as he was concerned consisted merely of the endorsement of
the delivery order issued by the mills and that the fact that the ultimate endorses of the delivery order got delivery of the goods from the mills was treated as irrelevant for considering whether by the transfer
of the delivery order <_X>upled with the delivery of the goods to such endorsee, there was in fact a completed sale effected by the respondent. Put in ~nother form the argume~t which was upheld by
the .Courts below was t'iat the transactions entered into by the respondent were mere sales or transfers of delivery · or~41lr& and· not any "sale of goods" so Stale of .4.ndhla Pradesh
v. Kol/a Sf'eerama Murthy Ayyanzar J. Sl•ll of .diulira Praihsh v. Kolla Sre1r•RG Murlly A.1)angar J. as to bring them to charge under s. 3 of the Act. It is the correctness of this conclusion that is in
controvery in these appeals. It is unnecessary for us to canvass in detail the argument whicti found favour with the Courts below by reason of the judgment of this Court in Bayyana Bkimayya versus Governrrum,t of Andhra
Pradesh (1), where the points. urged in favour of the respondent were considered and repelled. The correctness of this deci&ion was not disputed before us. Dealing with the transaction involved in the
succeEsive endorsements of the delivery orders issued to the purchaser from the Mills, this Court said: "In so far as the third parties were con- cerned they had purchased the goods by
payment of an extra price, and the transac- tion must, in law and in fact, be considered a fresh transaction of sale between the appel- lants and the third parties. A delivery order
is a do!mment of title to goods { vide S. 2( 4) of the sale of Goods Act), and the possessor of such a document has the right not only to receive the goods but also to transfer it to
another by endorsement or delivery. At the moment of delivery by the Mills to the third parties, there. were, in effect, two deliveries, one by the Mills to the Appellants, represen-
ted in so 'far as the Mills were oonoemed by the appellants' agents, the third parties and the other, by the appellants to t.he third parties as buyers from the appellents. Theae two deliveries might synchronise in point of
time, but were separate in point of faot and in the eye of law. If a· dispute arose as to the goods delivered under the kutoha delivery (I) (1961] 3 S C. R. ?o1 I S.C.R. i91 order to the third parties again~t the Mills,
action could lie at the instance of the appel- lants. · ~ …. 'he third parties could proceed on breach of contract only against the appellants and not against the Mills. In our opinion,,
there being to separate transactions of sale, tax was payable at both tho points, as has been correctly pointed out by the tax authori- ties and the High Court". The position would appear to be this.
At the date of tht-~ contract for J>uchase by the respondent the goods which were the subject of the purchase were not appropriated to the contract, so that there was no completed sale since no property passed,
but only an agreement. for sale. -Whether or not the goods which were the subject of the agreement for sale were in existence on the date of the agree- ment, they were 'existing goods on the date the
delivery order was iss)led, and they _would have been appropriated to the contract and property in the appropriated goods would have. passed to the respondent if he bad cared to present the delivery
order at the Mills godown. The respondent however without taking delivery himself, en9ersed the deli- very order and enabled his endoraee to take delivery and that endorsee (and it makes no difference to
the prinoiple if a further endorsee from him did so) took delivery of the goods a.nd the goods became appropriated to the contract and property in goods passed to him. One view to take, and it was this
that found favour with the ,Courts below~ was that since no goods had been appropriated to the re.spon- dent'fl contract before the delivery orders were endorsed, the successive endorsements o.f the delivery
orders were not ''sales of goods" but were merely transfers of the delivery order as some pa.per, though this was of some value in that it enable the endorsee to approach the mills and obtain delivery
. of the goods. The result of the aooeptanoe of this 196Z State of Andhra P1adesh v. Kalla Srtn:ama Murthy Ayyangar J. State of Andhra Pradesh Kalla Sreerama Mur1h, A,JYangor J. view would be to eliminate the respondent alto-
gether from the cha.in and so to spe~k, treat the ultimate cndorsee as the purchaser from the mills. Naturally if that was correct the respondent would have effected no purchase of the goods nor, of
course, any sale of goods, there being only one tran- saction of sale by the mills to the ultimate endorsee of the delivery order. In Dayyana's ca.S<J this Court held that this was not a correct understanding of
the legal effect of the endorsment of the delivery orders. No doubt, without an appropriation of goods to an agreement for sale the're cannot be a comple- ted contract in which the property in the goods
passes to the purchaser and unless property in the goods passes, there is no sale. But the question is what is the effect of the property in the goods pass- ing to the ultimate endorsee of the delivery order.
In thie connection reference could usefully be made to the decision in Butterworty v. KingBway Motor8 Ltd. ('). It was a case where a hirer of a motor-car under a hire-purchase agreement under
which the necessary payments of instalment etc. had not been made and so his title had not matured(i.e. where the title remained in the owner) transferred the vehicle or such rights as he possessed in it, to
o1 he1·s and the ultimate tra.nsfere paid the balance of the purchase price to the owner and thus acqui- red title to the motor-car. The question before the Court related to the effect of thil! completion in the
title of the ultimate transferee on the legal position of the intermediate parties. Pearson J. dealing with this matter expressed himself in these terms : "The various purported sales all took
place at times when Bowma.ker, Ltd. were still the owners of the car, so that all the purported sellers in this rather long chain had no title to it at the times when the purported sales were made. But on or about
(I) [195*] 2 All B. R. 694. I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS July 25, 1952 Miss Rudolph acquired a good title from Bowmaker, Ltd., or, at any rate, made payment to Bowmaker, Ltd. which ext-
inguished their title and induced them to relin- quish .any claim which they had to the car. I think that the right view is that Miss Rudol- ph acquired the title as between her and
Bowmaker, Ltd. but I further hold on authority that the title so acquired went to feed the previously defective titles of the subsequent buyers and ensured to their benefit ………… "
We consider that it is this principle that forms the basis of the decision of this Court in Bayyana's case and that it would equally apply to the facts of the present case. Learned Counsel for the respondent placed
some reliance on the penultimate paragraph of the judgment in .Bayyana's case where this Court referring to the judgments now under appeal stated: ''The facts were different, and the Divi-
sion Bench itself in dealing with the case, distinguished the judgment under appeal. observing that there was no scope for the application of the principles laid down in the judgment under appeal, because in the
cited case, 'the property in the goods did not pass from the Mills to the assessee and there was no agreement of sale of goods to be obtained in future between the assessee and the third party'. "
We are unable to read this observation as a decision by this Court that the High Court was right in dis- tinguishing the earlier decision. '{he circumstance that in Ba.yyana's case basides the contract of pur-
chase of the gunny bags there was a further agree- ment that the mills would give delivery of the goods to the nominees of the purchaser does not really affect the principle, in view of the admitted
State of Andh1 a Prades!t v. Kolla Sreerama Murihy Ayyangar J. State of J.nihra Pre d•~ A Kol/a Sre,,ama Mur1h, fact that on the uncontradicted evidence in this case, it was the common understanding of the
parties that the mills would honour the endorse- ment of the delivery order and deliver the goods contracted for to the endorsee who produced it. Learned Counsel for tlie respondent made a
suggestion that in the present case there was no proof that the goods represented by the contract had been delivered to the ultimate endorsee, with the relllllt that the appellant had not established a
"sale of goods" at any stage. No doubt, if on the facts there was no delivery of the goods to the last holder of the delivery order, the entire fabric on which the case for the appellant rests would disap-
pear. There is however no factual basis for this submission. This fact was not alleged by the respon- dent at any stage of the proceedings starting from the plaint in the Court of the District Munsif right
up to the statement of the case in this Court and besides, all the Courts have proceeded on the basis that such delivery was effected to the last f ndorsee of the delivery order but they held that rnch deli-
very did not become a sale by the respondent so as to attract the liability to tax under s. 3 of the Act. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting this argument. Before concluding, however, it is necessary to
refer to one matter. O. S. 268 of 1951 was filed on July 25, 1951 and the plaint in O.S. 309 of 1951 on September 6, 1951. Even, however, before that date, on May 15, 1951 the Madras General Sales
Tax Act, 1939 was amem!ed by Madras Act VI of 1951 by which, inter alia, 8. ISA was added to the parent Act. This sectio:Q : uns: "No suit or other proceeding shalJ, except as expressly provided in. this Act, be instituted
in any Court to set aside or modify any ass- easment made under this Act." 1 s.c.R. I95 No plea based upon the bar contained ill this section was raised before any Court right up to the High
Court a.nd not even in the grounds of appeal to this Court or even in the appellant's statement of the case as originally filed. At the beginning of 1962 however the appellant applied to this Court
for leave to urge additional grounds and in pursu- ance of the leave· so granted it has raised a point that the suit should have been dismissed by the Courts below as not maintainable, being barred by
the section just now set out. In answer to this new plea the respondent put forward two objections: ( 1) that on a. proper construction of s. ISA particularly taken in conjunction with the other amendment
effected by Act VI of 1951 by which s. ISA was inserted in the parent Act, the section had no retro- spective effect and could be invoked only in the case of those assessments which wera completed
after. the new section came into force. (2) In the alternative, he raised the contention t.hat if s: ISA barred even suits in respect of illegal assessments which had been completed and had become final,
the provision was unconstitutional as violative of rights guaranteed by Art. 19,I){f) & (g). Though we heard arguments of lea.med Counsel in relation to these points, we consider it unnecessary to make
any pronouncement on them in view of the con- clusion tltat we have reached on the merits of the appeals. The result is that these appeals succeed and are allowed with coats. Hearing fee one Set.
Appeals allowe,d. State of .4.ntlhra Pr a ties\ v. Eolia Sreerama Murthy A.yyangor J.