Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. The thrust of the matter is whether in such a situation, the State would be obligated to compensate the institutions or bodies that look after the religious places which were damaged by restoring to their original position or granting reimbursement of the amount to the people who have done the same. c
12. In this regard, some of the authorities that have been commended to us require to be looked at. We may immediately clarify that the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents has copiously referred to us to various international conventions, the opinions of statutes ofTntcrnational Criminal Tribunal of other countries and also judgments of European Court of Human Rights. As far as present !is is conc.erned, we arc of the considered opinion that the same arc not relevant. We think it appropriate to refer to the authorities of this Court which have expressed this view to a certain extent pertaining to the religious rights.
13. Mr. Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the State would contend that the respondents cannot claim as a matter of right as the State is not bound to spend any amount for restoration of the place of worship. Mr. Muchhala, learned senior counsel for the respondents, per contra, would contend that when damage is caused to the places of worship ofa minority, the right of the said group or stream is affected and that right would come within Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution oflndia.
14. Articles 25 and 26 read as under: "Article 25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.- (!) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion (2017) l I S.C.R. (2) Nothing m this article shall affect the operation of any existing c law or prevent the State from making any law- ( a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; ( b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions ofa public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Exp/ona~ion l.- The wearing and carrying of kiqJans shall be deemed tP be inciuded in the profcsswn of the Sikh religion. Expla11otio11 Il.-In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly. Article 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs.-Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right- (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters ofreligion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law."
15. The submission is that the fundamental rights cannot be compartmentalized as one draws sustenance from the other. In essence, the argument is that strait-jacket compartmentalization is impermissible and when there is violation of human rights of a class, that is, minority (because of damage caused to the places of worship), the rights in a cluster spring up to action.
16. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endow111e11ts, Madras (supra), the Constitution Bench, while dealing with Articles 25 and 26, held: "22. ft is to be noted that both in the American as well as in the Australian Constitutions the right to freedom of rn'tigion has been STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE I.R.C.G. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] declared in unrestricted terms without any limitation whatsoever. Limitations. therefore, have been introduced by courts oflaw in these countries on grounds of morality, order and social protection. An adjustment of the competing demands of the interests of Government and constitutional liberties is always a delicate and diflicult task and that is why we find difference of judicial opinion to such an extent in cases decided by the American courts where questions ofrcligious freedom were involved. Our Constitution-makers, however, have embodied the limitations which have been evolved by judicial pronouncements in America or Australia in the Constitution itself and the language of Articles 25 and 26 is sufiicicntly clear to enable us to determine without the aid of foreign authorities as to what matters come within the purview of religion and what do not. As we have already indicated, freedom ofreligion in our Constitution is not confined to religious beliefs only; it extends to religious practices c as well subject to the restrictions which the Constitution itself D has laid down. Under Article 26(b ), therefore, a religious . denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies arc essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no. outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfore with their decision in such matters."
17. In S.R. Bommai (supra), Sawant, J. opined: " … religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups and protection of their life and property and of the places of their worship arc an essential part of secularism enshrined in our Constitution: We have accepted the said goal not only because it is our historical legacy and a need of our national unity and integrity but also as a creed of universal brotherhood and humanism. It is our cardinal faith. Any profession and action which go counter to the aforesaid creed are a prima facie proof of the conduct in defiance of the provisions of our Constitution."
18. In the said case. B.P. Jccvan Reddy, J. observed: "While the citizens of this country are free to profess, practice and propagate such religion, faith or belicfas they choose, so far ;2017] ll S.C.R as the State is concerned. i.e., from the point of view of the State. the religion, faith or bcliefofa person is immaterial. To it, all are equal and all are entitled to be treated equally …. " u c
19. Ahmaqi, J. (as His Lordship then was), concurring with the views of Justice $awant, Ramaswamy and Jeevan Reddy, JJ., held: "Notwith~tanding the fact that the words 'Socialist' and 'Secular' were adMd in the Preamble of the Constitution in 1976 by the 42nd Am~ndment, the concept of Secularism was very much embedded in our constitutional philosophy. The term 'Secular' has advisedly not been defined presumably because it is a very elastic term not capable ofa precise definition and perhaps best left undefined. By this amendment what was implicit was made explicit."
20. In Dr. M. Ismail Far11q11i (supra), after referring to the authority in S.R. Bommai (supra), the Constitution Bench hdd: "The Preamble of the Constitution read in particular with Articles 25 to 28 emphasises this aspect and indicates that it is in this manner the concept of secularism embodied in the constitutional scheme as a creed adopted by the Indian people has to be understood while examining the constitutional validity of any legislation on the touchstone of the Constitution. The concept of secularism is one facet of the right to equality woven as the central golden thread in the fabric depicting the pattern of the scheme in our Constitution."
21. The aforesaid authorities clearly enunciate that as far as State is concerned, it is obliged under the Constitution to treat persons belonging to all faiths and religions with equality. The individual has his freedom to practice the religion as he desires and it is totally immaterial from the perspective of the State. The protection of property and places of worship is an essential part of secularism. The freedom of individual in this regard has to be respected and there has to be tolerance for each other. This principle has been accepted in the constitutional scheme keeping in view the concrete sustenance of national unity and integrity.
22. Having said so, we are required to examine the liability of the State to repair or restore the places of worship which are damaged by the mob during the riot. There is no dispute that the places of worship belonging to all religions have been damaged and affected. Be it clarified, STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE l.R.C.G. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] though the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents laid immense stress on the failure oflaw and order situation and non-existence of the active role of the executive to curtail the disaster, we need not dwell upon the same inasmuch as there had been mob fury and places of worship at certain places have been damaged. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that the State cannot be commanded to repair or restore any place of worship as such an act on the part of the State will create a dent in the secular fabric and further the expenditure from the State exchequer is impermissible in view of the language employed in the Article 27 of the Constitution.
23. Before dwelling upon A11icle 27, we may profitably refer to certain aspects that have been highlighted in Destruction of Public and Private Properties, In Re (supra). In the said case the two-Judge Bench, taking a serious note of various instances oflargc-scale destruction of public and private properties in the name of agitations, bandhs, hartals and the like. had initiated suo motu proceedings. It had called for reports from two committees – one headed by Justice K.T. Thomas and the other by Mr. F.S. Nariman, a senior member of the legal profession. It has referred to the recommendations of the Committee headed by Justice K.T. Thomas and also that ofF.S. Nariman Committee. Summarizing the basic principles as suggested by Nariman Committee, the Comt enumerated the same: (l) The basic principle for measure of damages in torts (i.e. wrongs) in property is that there should be "rcstitutio in intc1,'fl1m" which conveys the idea of"making whole". (2) Where any injury to prope11Y is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation by way of F damages the Court should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation. (3) In this branch of the law, the principle ofrestitutio in integrum has been described as the "dominant" rule of law. Subsidiary rules can only be justified if they give effect to that rule. (3.1) In actions in tort where damages arc at large i.e. not limited to the pecuniary loss that can be specifically proved, the Com1 may also take into account the defendant's motives, conduct c and manner of committing the tort, and where these have aggravated the plaintiff's damage e.g. by injuring his proper feelings of dignity, safety and pride–aggravated damages may be awarded. Aggravated damages are designed ro compensate the plaintiff for his wounded feelings. they must be distingutshed from exemplary damages which arc punitive m nature and which (under English Law) may be awarded in a limited category of cases. (3.2) "Exemplary damages" has been a controversial topic for many years. Such damages are not compensatory but arc awarded to punish the defendant and to deter him and others from similar behaviour in the future. The law in England (as restated in Rookes v. Barnard" affirmed in Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome") is that such damages are not generally allowed. In England they c<m only be awarded in three classes of cases (i) where there is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the Government; (ii) where the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the claimant; and (iii) where such damages arc provided by statute. (3 . .3) In the decision in Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicesters/ciire Co11stab11/a1:v"', the most recent judgment of the House of Lords. the Law Lords did not say that in the future the award of exemplary damages should be restricted only in the cases mentioned in Rookes v. Barnard (as affirmed in Cassell & Co. Ltd. ''· Broome). Lord Nicholls in his speech at p. 211 stated that: (Kuddus case, WLR p. 1807. para 68) "68 …. the essence of the conduct constituting the cout1's discretionary jurisdiction to award exemplary damages is conduct which was an outrageous disregard of the plaintiff's rights." (3.4) In this Committee's view, the principle that courts in India are not limited in the law of torts merely to what English Courts say or do, is attracted to the present situation. This Committee is of the view that this Hon 'ble Court should cvol vc a principle of " 1964 AC 1129: (1964) 2 WLR 269: (1964) 1 ALL ER 367 (HL) " 1972 AC 1027: ( 1972) 2 WLR 645: ( 1972) 1 ALL ER 801 (HL) " (2002) 2 AC 122: (2001) 2 WLR 1789: (2001) 3 ALL ER 193: 2001 UKHL29 (HL) STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE l.R.C.G. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] liability, punitive in nature, on account of vandalism and rioting leading to damages/destruction of property public and private. Damages must also be such as would deter people from similar behaviour in the future, after all this is already the policy of the law as stated in the Prevention of Damage to Property Act, 1984. and is foreshadowed in the order of this Hon 'blc Court dated 18-6-2007 making the present reference. (3.5) In Winfield andJolowicz on Tort, 17th Edn. (at pp. 948-49) the authors set out the future of exemplary damages by quoting from the decision in Kuddus v. Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary where two Law Lords, Lord Nicholls and Lord Hutton expressed the view that such damages might have 'a valuable role to play in dealing with outrageous behaviour. The authors point out that the boundaries between n c the civil and criminal law are not rigid or immutable and the criminal process alone is not an adequate mechanism to deter wilful wrongdoing. The acceptability ·of the principle of D compensation with punishment appears to have been confirmed by the Privy Council (in Gleaner Co. Ltd. v. Abrahams'; AC at 54) where it was felicitously said that: (AC p. 647, para 54) "54 …. Oil and vinegar may not mix in solution but they combine to make an acceptable salad dressing." (3 .6) The authors go on to say that exemplary damages certainly enjoy a continuing vitality in other common law jurisdictions, which, by and large, have rejected the various shackles imposed on them in England and extended them to other situations, thus punitive damages were held to be available in Australia in cases of "outrageous" acts of negligence. The Law Commission of Australia has also concluded, after a fairly evenly balanced consultation, that exemplary damages should be retained where the defendant "had deliberately and outrageously disregarded the plaintiff's rights".
24. The Court also referred to in detail to Justice K.T. Thomas Committee which basically dealt with law and order and tort. After approving the reports of the Committee, the Court took note of the absence oflegislation and framed the following guidelines: " (2004) I AC 268: (2003) 3 WLR I 038 (PC) (2017] 11 S.C.R. .. (!)Wherever a mass destruction to property takes place due to protests or thereof, the High Court may issue suo motu action and set up a machinery to investigate the damage caused and to award compensation related thereto. (II) Wh~re there is more than one State involved, such.action may be taken by the Supreme Court. c (!II) In each case, the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, appoint a sitting or retired High Court Judge or a sitting or retired District Judge as a Claims Commissioner to estimate the damages and investigate liability. (IV) An assessor may be appointed to assist the Claims Commissioner. ( V) The Claims Commissioner and the assessor may seek instructions from the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be. to summon the existing video or other recordings from private and public sources to pinpoint the damage and establish nexus with the perpetrators of the damage. (Vl) The principles ofabsolute liability shall apply once the nexus with the event that precipitated the damage is established. (Vil) The liability will be borne by the actual perpetrators of the crime as well as the organisers of the event giving rise to the liability-to be shared, as finally determined by the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be. (VIII) Exemplary damages may be awarded to an extent not greater than twice the amount of the damages liable to be paid. (IX) Damages shall be assessed for: (a) damages to public property; (b) damages to private property; (c) damages causing injury or death to a person or persons; and (cl) cost of the actions by the authorities and police to take preventive and other actions. (X) The Claims Commissioner will make a report to the High Court or the Supreme Court which will determine the liability after hearing the pm1ies." STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE l.R.C.G. (DIPAK MISRA, CJI] After so stating, the Court directed that the guidelines shall be operative.
25. In this regard, reference to the authority in Sanjay Gupta (supra) would be fruitful. The factual matrix in the said case pertains to Meerut Fire Tragedy where sixty-four people had died. While dealing with the grant of interim compensation, the Court held: "Having so opined, we cannot comatose our judicial conscience to the plight of the victims who have approached this Court. Some of the petitioners are themselves the victims or next kin of the deceased and the injured persons who have suffered because of this unfo1tunate man-made tragedy. lt is the admitted position c that 64 deaths have occurred and a number of persons have suffered grievous injuries. There are also persons who have suffered simple injuries as has been asserted by the State. We have been apprised at the Bar that the State Government has already paid Rs 2 lakhs to the legal representatives of the persons who have breathed their last, and a sum of rupees one lakh has been paid by the Central Government. As far as seriously injured persons are concerned, rupees one lakh has been paid by the State Government and Rs 50,000 has been paid to the victims who have suffered simple injuries. The question that we would like to pose is whether this Court should wait for the Commission's report and then direct the State Government to pay the amount of compensation to the grieved and affected persons, who have been waiting for the last eight years, or should they get certain sum till the matter is finalised. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take into consideration the submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, that as far as Respondents IO to 12 are concerned, no liability can be fastened under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indiu, . and definitely not at this stage. As far as first pmi of the submission is concerned, we keep it open to be dealt with after the report is obtained by this Court. As far as the second aspect is concerned, we shall deal with it after we address the issue of public law remedy and the liability of the State in a case of this nature."
26. In Association of Victim.~ of Uplraar Tragedy (supra), Radhakrishnan, J., in his concurring opinion, opined: c [2017] l l S.C.R . .. … Rightto life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the most sacred nght preserved and protected under the Constitution, violation of which is always actionable and there is no necessity of statutory provision as such for preserving that right. Article 21 of the Constitution oflndia has to be read into all public safety statutes, since the prime object of public safety legislation is to protect the individual and to compensate him for the loss suffered. Duty of care expected from State or its officials functioning under the public safety legislation is. therefore, very high, compared to the statutory powers and supervision expected from the officers functioning under the statutes like Companies Act, Cooperative Societies Act and such similar legislations. When we look at the various provisions of the Cinematographic Act, 1952 and the Rules made thereunder, the Delhi Building Regulations and the Electricity laws the duty of care on officials was high and liabilities strict. • • • Legal liability in damages exist solely as a remedy out of private law action in tort which is generally time-consuming and expensive, and hence when fundamental rights arc violated the claimants prefer to approach constitutional courts for speedy remedy. The constitutional courts, of course, shall invoke its jurisdiction only in extraordinary circumstances when serious injury has been caused due to violation of fundamental rights. especially l)nder Atticle 21 of the Constitution oflndia. In such circumstances the Court can invoke its own methods depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case."
27. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid authorities is that the learned senior counsel has canvassed that the benefit under the public law remedy is available to the bodies or institutions that look after the religious places of worship of each and every religion. The hypothesis that is canvassed is that the damage caused affects the dignity of that paiticular community or a group. The stand of the State is that keeping in view the concept of secularism and the role of the State, it is inappropriate to direct the State to spend the amount from the State exchequer for these purposes. In this context, as stated earlier, Article 27 becomes relevant. STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE l.R.C.G. (DIPAK MISRA, CJ!)
28. In Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. (supra), the Court was considering whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia could have directed payment of interest by way of compensation. The issue before the Court pertained to an order by which the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court directed the appellant before this Court to refund the amount advanced to it with 12% per annum interest to the respondents. The factual matrix in the said case was that the Minishy of Human Resource Development, Department of Education, Government of India floated a scheme purpo1ted to be for securing equitable distribution of white printing pape1: The said scheme had certain relevant features. Pursuant to the scheme, the respondents allegedly placed orders for supply of white paper upon the appellant therein which the appellant Corporation could not supply. The learned single Judge by ex pa rte order had directed the Corporation to take immediate steps for release of white concessional paper to the respondents wherefor allegedly the advance money had already been accept by them. The application for recall was dismissed. In appeal, the Division Bench noted the contention of the appellant and took into ac~ount that.the appellant had already refunded the large amount to the allotees without any interest subsequent to the discontinuation of the scheme. However, it held that by such act it could not absolve the Corporation from the liability to compensate the respondents in cash if not in kind in consideration of their default and accordingly it directed for payment of interest at 12%pei: annum. The three-Judge Bench observed . that the scheme in question did not have the force of law and even if it did, a writ of mandamus could not have been issued by directing grant of compensation. In that context, the Court ruled: " … Public law remedy for the purpose-of grant of compensation can be resorted to only when the fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution is violated and not otherwise .. It is not every violation of the provisions of the Constitution or a statute which would enable the court to direct grant of compensation. The power of the court of judicial review to grant compensation in public law remedy is limited. The instant case is not oric which would attract invocation of the said rule. It is not the case of the respondents herein that by reason of acts of commission and omission on the part of the appellant herein the fundamental right of the respondents under Article 21 of the Constitution has been violated.". c (20 l 7] 11 S.C.R.
29. On a perusal of the judgment in its entirety, we find the case hinges on its own facts regarding grant of compensation. The power of the coun of judicial review to grant compensation in public law is limited. There cannot bq any quarrel about the said proposition of law.
30. In Ra(Jindra Natlt Glwsal (supra), the assail was to the order of the learned single Judge whereby he had directed the University of Calcutta to pay 'to the appellant before him Rs. 60,000/- as monetary compensation and damages. The Division Bench overturned the same by holding that in the facts of the case compensation should have been awarded but the proper course should have been to leave the parties to agitate their grievances before the civil court. This Court referred to the decision in Common Cause, A Registered Socie(v2' and adverted to the concept of public law remedy and opined: "A claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution is undoubtedly an acknowledged remedy for protection and enforcement of such right and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy, provided for the enforcement of fundamental right is distinct from, and in addition to the remedy in private law for damages for the tort, as was held by this Court in Nilabati Behera17." And again: "The courts having the obligation to satisfy the social aspiration of the citizens have to apply the tool and grant compensation as damages in public law proceedings. Consequently when the court moulds the relief in proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights and grants compensation, it docs so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizens. But it woold not be correct to assume that every minor infraction of public duty by every public officer would commend the court to grant compensation in a petition under Articles 226 and 32 by applying the principle of public law proceeding. The court in exercise of " (1996) 6 sec 667 " ( 1993) 2 sec 746 STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE I.R.C.G. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] extraordinary power under Articles 226 and 32 ofthe Constitution, therefore, would not award damages against public authorities merely because they have made some order which ll1rns out to be ultra vires, or there has been some inaction in the performance of the duties unless there is malice or conscious abuse. Before exemplary damages can be awarded it must be shown that some fundamental right under Article 21 has been infringed by arbitrary or capricious action on the part of the public functionaries and that the sufferer was a helpless victim of that act."
31. Mr. Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants c has pressed hard on the said passage. According to him in a case of the present nature, the High Court could have not in exercise ofj urisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution constituted a forum for grant of compensation and directing reimbursement. Learned senior counsel further submitted that violation offundamental right under Article 21 is different than what has been averred in the writ filed before the High Court inasmuch as the gravamen of whole issue pertained to grant of D damages caused to the places of worship.
32. Article 27 of the Constitution reads as follows: "Article 27.-Frccdom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular rcligion.-No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religions denomination."
33. In The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, ll(adras (supra), the Court, while commenting on Article 27, held thus: "What is forbidden by the article is the specific appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. The reason underlying this provision is obvious. Ours being a secular State and there being freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, both to individuals and to groups, it is against the policy of the Constitution to pay out of public funds any money for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. But the object of the contribution under Section 76 of the Madras Act is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or any denomination c [20 l 7] l l S.C.R. within it. The purpose is to see that religious trnsts and institmions, wherever they exist, arc properly administered. It is a secular administration of the religious institution that the legislature seeks to control and the object, as enunciated in the Act, is to ensure that the endowments attached to the religious institutions are properly administered and their income is dttly appropriated for the purposes for which they were founded or exist. There is no question of favouring any particular religion or religious denomination in such cases. In our opinion, Article 27 of the Constitl\tion is not attracted to the facts of the present case."
34. In Prafitll Goradia v. Union of India", the Court, while interpreting Article 27, referred to the decisions in The Co111111issio11er, · Hi11d11 Religious E11dowments, Madras (supra), Sri Jaga1111at/z Ra111a1111j Das a11d another v. State of Orissa a11d another'' and also alluded to T.M.A. Pai Fo1111dation and other.5 v. State of Karnataka 1111d others'° and opined that the said decisions did not really deal with Article 27 at any depth. Elaborating further, the two-Judge Bench held: "6. There can be two views about Article 27. One view can be that Article 27 is attracted only when the statute by which the lax is levied specifically states that the proceeds oflhe tax will be utilised for a particular religion. The other view can be that Article 27 will be attracted even when the statute is a general statute, like the Income Tax Act or the Central Excise Act or the State Sales Tax Acts (which do not specify for what purpose the proceeds will be utilised) provided that a substantial pa1t of such proceeds are in fact utilised for a particular religion. In our opinion Article 27 will be attracted in both these eventualities. This is because Article 27 is a provision in the Constitution, and not an ordinary statute. The principles of interpreting the Constitution arc to some extent different from those of interpreting an ordinary statute vide the judgment ofHon'ble Sikri, J. in Kesavananda Bharati v. State ofKerala" (vide SCC para 15). The object of Article 27 is to maintain secularism, and hence we must constrne it from that angle. '" c2011>2 sec 568 " AIR 1954 SC 400 " (2002) 8 sec 481 "(1973J4SCC225 STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE l.R.C.G. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] 7. As Lord Wright observed in Jam,es v. Commonwealth of A Australia'', a Constitution is not to be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic manner (followed in Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, l 938, In re 33). This is because a Constitution is a constituent or organic statute, vide British Coal C01pn. v. R.34 and Kesavananda Bharati v. Stale of Kera/a (supra) (vide SCC para 506). While a statute must ordinarily be construed as on the day it was enacted, a Constitution cannot be construed in that manner, for it is intended to endure for ages to come, as Marshal, C.J. of the US Supreme Court observed in M'Culloch v. Maryland", and Holmes, J. in Jvlissouri v. Holland". Hence a strict construction cannot be given to it. 8. In our opinion Article 27 would be violated if a substantial part of the entire income tax collected in India, or a substantial part of the entire central excise or the customs duties or salc.s tax, or a substantial part of any other tax collected in India, were to be utilised for promotion or maintenance ofany particular religion or religious denomination. In other words, suppose 25% of the entire income tax collected in India was utilised for promoting or maintaining any pa11icular religion or religious denomination, that, in our opinion, would be violative of Article 27 of the Constitution. x x x x x 10. In our opinion, if only a relatively small part of any tax collected is utilised for providing some conveniences or facilities or concessions to any religious denomination, that would not be violative of Article 27 of the Constitution. It is only when a substantial part of the tax is utilised for any particular religion that Article 27 would be violated." Be it stated, in the said case the Court was dealing with the constitutional validity of the Haj Committee Act, l 959 and the Amendment Act of2002 on the foundation that the said Act is violative of Articles 14, 15 and 27 of the Constitution. " 1936 AC 578: (1936) 2 ALL ER 1449 (PC) " AIR 1939 FC I " AIR 1935 PC 158 "4LEd579: 17US316(1819) '"64 L Ed641: 252 US 416(1919) c [2017] l l S.C.R. 35. In this regard, as stated earlier, the learned senior counsel for the respondent has commended us to the decisions of the Kcrala High Court in K. Reglumath (supra), the Orissa High Court in Bira Kishore Moftanty (supra) and the Karnataka High Court in Papa11na (supra). As we have already copiously reproduced few decisions pertaining to Article 27, there is no necessity to refer to the High Court judgments. 36. Having referred to these decisions, it is obligatory to refer in detail to the order passed in Archbishop Raphael Cfteenath S. V.D. v. State of Orissa af1d a1wtfter37 • The said authority has already been referred to in the order of the Court passed on 30.07.2012. 1nArc/1bislwp Raplrae/ Clteenatf1 S. V.D. v. State of Orissa and a11otlter", the Court, while dealing with the attack on the churches and public institutions, directed as follows: "7. The State is also agreed to give compensation to the victims. It is stated in the affidavit of the State that Rs. 50,000 is being given for the fully damaged house, Rs. 25,000 for partly damaged honse and Rs. 2 lakh each is being given to the damaged public institutions like schools, hospitals, etc. and Rs. 2 lakh each from the Chief Minister's Relief Fund to each of the families of the persons killed in the violence. x x x x I 0. We are told by the counsel for the petitioner that approximately 16 churches have been fully or partly damaged. As regards the damaged churches also the State can have a generous attitude on the matter and assess the damage of those churches or other religious places and render reasonable help to rebuild the same. We hope that the State would create an atmosphere where there shall be complete harmony between the groups of people and the State shall endeavour to have discussions with the various groups and bring about peace and do all possible help to the victims. The existing battalions/police force sent by the Government oflndia would continue till the end of December 2008." " (2009) 11 sec 90 '" (2009) 11 sec 87 [emphasis supplied] STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE I.R.C.G. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!] 37. It is worthy to note that vide order dated 30.07.2012 the Court had reproduced the passage from Arc/Ibis/top Raphael Cl1eenatll S. V.D. v. State of Orissa and another" and required the learned counsel for the State of Gujarat to inform the Court whether the State is contemplating any such scheme for repair or renovation of the religious places affected by the communal riots. 38. It is necessary to mention that in pursuance of the aforesaid order, a scheme has been framed by the State of Gujarat. The said scheme reads as under: "GOVERNMENT OF GUJARAT REVENUE DEPARTMENT Resolution No. RHL/I 02012/SLP/15730/12/S.4 Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar Dated: 18.10.2013 Read: 1. G.R. RD No. RHL/1070/60691/S4, dated 14.07.1970 2. G.R. RD No. RHL/2185/156/84/S4, dated 29.03.1986 3. G.R. RD No. RHL/2390/3456/54, dated 05.05.1991 4. G.R. RD No. RHL/102012/SLP/15730/12/S.4, dated 9.8.2012 PREAMBLE: c As per the assurance given on behalf of the State Government in SLP (Civil) No. 15730 of 2012, filed by the Government of Gujarat, as contained in order dated 30'' July 2012, passed by the Honourable Supreme Court, the State Government constituted a committee for formulation of policy for giving ex gratia assistance and to prepare a draft of such policy for consideration by the Government of Gujarat vide ·Revenue Department Resolution dated 9" August 2012, as referred to above. The above Committee's meetings were held on 20lh August, 2012, 4'' September, 2012 and on 21" February, 2013. The Committee went into various questions involved in formulating " (2009) 11 sec 90 c (2017] l l S.C.R. such a policy and also considered other Government Resolutions issued earlier with reference to subject matter. After detailed deliberations and considerations as above, the Committee took the view to suggest for providing ex gratia assistance to all religious places damaged/destroyed in communal riots as per the existing policy of the State Government, as reflected in above referred Government Resolutions. The Committee's conclusion reads as under: "The policy of the past, treating the public places of worship i.e. te111plcs, mosques and churches as houses for the purpose of grant of subsidy and/or loan, may be applied to the public places of worship damaged/destroyed during 2002 riots, subject to the conditions that they are not located in the middle of roads or at unauthorized places: FIR lodged: and assistance to be given up to the amount granted for damaged house as per the existing G.R. limited to the actual cost of repairing/ restoration of that public places of worship, whichever is less." RESOLUTION: After careful consideration, the State Government accepts the recommendations of the Committee and decides to pay ex gratia assistance up to Rs. 50,000/- to all religious places damageq/destroyed during the communal riots at par with the similar assistance which have been provi<kd by the State Government for damaged/destroyed houses subject to the following conditions: (i) No financial ex gratia assistance would be available/ sanctioned to unauthorized religious places: (ii) No religious place, if located in the middle of the public road or at any unauthorized place, shall be given any ex gratia assistance; (iii) For availing the financial assistance under this Scheme, it is necessary that an FIR should have been lodged at the relevant point of time in the nearest police station; (iv) The person/persons claiming such ex gratia assistance shall have to satisfy the District Collectorofthc District in which such religious place is situated about the ownership an<Vor STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANOTHER v. THE l.R.C.G. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] administration rights of religious places concerned so as to ensure that any person unconnected with a religious place may not claim and receive ex gratia financial assistance under the Scheme. The decision of the District Collector in this behalf shall be final: and (v) The ex gratia financial assistance given under this Scheme shall be up to Rs. 50,0001- and limited to the actual cost of repairing/ restoration, whichever is less. The expenditure on this account should be met under the budget head Expenditure Demand No. 82, Major Head 2235-60-200-02 Relief to persons affected by riots. c By Order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat." 39. The said scheme has to be appreciated on the anvil of the directions issued in Prafull Goradia (supra) andArclrbislwp Raplrael Clree11atlr S. V.D. (supra). In the first case, the two-Judge Bench has opined that object of Article 27 is to maintain secularism and the said Article would be violated ifthe substantial pmt of the entire income tax collected in India, or a substantial part of the entire central excise or the customs duties or sales tax, or a substantial part ofany other tax collected in India, were to be utilized for promotion or maintenance ofany particular religion or religious denomination. The Comt has made a distinction between the relatively small pa1t ilnd the substantial part. In Arclrbi.~lwp Rapltuel C/we1111tll S. V.D. v. StMe of Orissll a11d a11otl1er'" the Court emphasized on the creation of atmosphere where there shall be complete harmony between the groups of people and the duty of the State to have discussions with the various groups to bring about peace and give possible help to the victims. As stated earlier, in Arclrbisllop Rap/la el Cheenatll S. V.D. v. Stllte of Orissa a11d a11otlrer41 the Court directed the Government to formulate a scheme regarding the religious places. 40. In the present case, similar direction was given and the State has framed the scheme. On a close scrutiny of the scheme, we have noticed that the Government has fixed the maximum amom1t under the caption of ex gratia assistance and also conferred the power on the District Collector of the Districts where religious places are situated to determine about the ownership or administration rights of religious places " (2009J 11 sec 87 " c2009) 11 sec 90 c (2017] I I S.C.R. concerned. There are certain conditions precedent for claiming the amount. The terms and conditions which arc mcorporatcd in the scheme are quite reasonable. It is also worthy to note that while fixing the maximum limit, the Government has equated the same with houses which have been given the assistance. When the individual's grievances pertaining to property has been conferred the similar assistance, we arc disposed to think, the assistance rendered for repairing/restoration of public places of worship will come within the guidelines of Pru/ult Goradia (supra) and Archbishop Raphael Cheenath S. V.D. (supra). Therefore. we aqcept the said scheme. 41 .. The cl11imants who fulfil the conditions of the scheme shall approach' the authorities therein within eight weeks and the said authorities shall determine the same within three months from the receipt of the claims. If any party is aggrieved by the denial of the benefit, he can take appropriate steps in accordance with law. 42. ln view of the aforesaid analysis, the judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and the appeal is disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal disposed of.