P. H. Ira(l<illi Mjs. Air Fra11" C.Jndl4 WdllcAH J, F1truary 15 respondent had however to justify· the order of dis- missal before the Labour Court in view of the defect in the inquiry. It has succeeded in doirig so and
therefore the approval of the Labour Court will relate back to the date on which the respondent passed the order of dismissal. The contention of the appellant therefore that dismissal in this case
should take effect from the date from which the Labour Court's award came into operation must fail. There is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we pass no order
as to costs. STATE OF PU~JAB & ANOTHER v. BRITISH INDIA CORPORATION LTD. (S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAH, K. c. DAS GUPTA and 'i\. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR JJ.) Properly 1'ax-Exemption-"Uscd for the purpose of a
factory" and "Rent"-Mea11i11g of-Punjab Urban Immot'!lbk Property Tax Ac/, 1940 (Pb. 17 of 1940), ss. 3, 4-Punjab Urban lmmovabk Property Tax Rules, 1941, r. JS. The property involved in the first appeal was a set or
room5 used for indoor games b)' the mill employees, one big hall used as the Gurkha (;uards Club, a set of rooms used as ~ Officers' Club and a set of roon1s used as residential quarters t by workers of the mills. The property involved in the second •— appeal consi•ted of 200 quarters which had Leen allotted to the workers of the factory for their occupation. The question wa• whether these properties w<"rc exempted fro1n taxation under s. 4 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1940, 2 S.C.R.
br not, The assessing Authority held that these properties were !fable to taxation, Appeals against the orders of the Authority were rejected by the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commis-
sioner. The respondents moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for getting the orders quashed. The High Court held in both cases that the petitioners were entitled to exemption prayed for and quashed the orders of assessment. The State of Punjab came to this Court] against the order of the High Court.
Held, that no tax was leviable under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1940, in respect of the buildings in the two appeals and the High Court had rightly quashed the orders of assessment. In the first appeal, the buildings were allotted for the use of workmen and that was a purpose which was neceS5ary for the efficiency of workmen. In the second appeal also, the allotment of 200 quarters was necessary for the welfare and efficiency of workmen. Hence it must be held
that the buildings were being used for the purposes of a factory. Just as the use of a building for a purpose which maintains the efficiency of the machines is a user for the pur- po•e of a factory, so also is the user of a building for the pur- pose of providing something which is necessary for maintaining · the efficiency of workers.
Where a building is used for a pur- pose which the Factory Law requires must be fulfilled in order that the factory may function, that user is also for the purpose of a factory. Held, also; that the word "rent" in cl. (ii) of r. 18 (4)
of the Punjab Urban Immovable Tax Rules, 1941, means pay- ment to a landlord by a tenant for the demised property and does not include payments made by licensees. London Go-operative Society Ltd.
v. Southern Esaex AsBts8ment Oommitlu, [1942] I K. B. 53, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil_ Appeal No. 639 of 1961. From the judgment dated August 4, 1960 of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in Letters
Patent Appeal No. J 86of1957. AND Civil Appeal No. 287 of 1962. Stat1 of Punjab v. Briti1'1. ,India Corporation Ltd. Stat• of P>mju v. BritiJla /Mia G.rporaJioo Ltd. Du Gupta J. …… , …………
• … ~ +i-·- From the judgment and order datcil September 7, 1960, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh, in Civil Writ No. 216 of 1958. S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab,
N. S. Biiulm aud P. D . .Menon, for the appellants. Bhagimth Das and IJ. P. Jfahesl1wari, for respondent (In C. A. No. 6:l9i6 l ). A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, 0. P. Malhotra, 0. G. J!athur, J. B. Dadachanii and Ravimkr
Narain, for the respondent (in C. A. No. 287/62). 1963. February 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GuPTA J.-These two appeals raise the· question whether certain buildings belonging to the
respondent the British India Corporation Ltd., in one appeal and the respondent Shri Gopal Paper Mills Ltd., in the other appeal, arc liable to taxation under the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act,1940.
The buildings in both these cases arc situated in the rating area shown in the Schedule to the Act and would consequently be liable to taxation under s. 3 of the Act unless the exemption provided in s. 4 of
the Act is available. That section provides that the tax shall not be levied in respect of the properties mentioned in els. (a) to (g) thereof. Clause (g) mentions "such buildings and lands used for the
purpose of a factory as may be P.rescribed." "Prescribed" has been defined as 'prescribed by the rules made under the Act.' Rule 18 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, that were
framed by the Punjab Government in 1941, pres- cribed buildings and lands for the purpose of cl. (g) of s. 4. The Assessing Authority rejected the claims for exemption made by the respondents and assessed
2 s.a.R; SUPREME QOURT REPORTS the buildings for the purpose of taxation. The aepcals to the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commi- ss10ner were unsuccessful. The respondents then moved the Punjab High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution praying that the order of the Taxation Commissioner be quashed. In both the cases the High Court held that the petitioners were entitled to the exemption prayed for and quashed the orders
of assessment. The question in these appeals there- fore is ,whether the High Court was right in its view' that the buildings of the respondents come within the class which has been prescribed for exemption by
Rule 18 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Rules, 1941. The relevant portion of this Rule, which has been altered from time to time, stood thus in 1956 when the assessment order was made:-
';'18. (I) Under the provisions of clause (g) of sub-section (I) of s. 4 of the Act, all buildings and lands used for the purpose of a factory, which are owned by the proprietors of such
factory, shall be exempt from the tax, if a manufacturing process involving the use of power is being and has been carried on therein for a continuous period of six months, or in the
case of a seasonal factory since the commence- ment of the working season. o o o • • • • • • o o • • • o •••JO t 0 O 0 I I 0 ltl • O o o o • 0 0 0 • • o • o • • • o • • o o o o o o o o o o (4) The exemption provided by sub-rules (1)
and (2) shall not extend to- (i) godowns outside tl::e factory compound; (ii) godowns, shops, quarters or other buildings, whether situated within or without the factory compound, for
which rent is charged either from employees of the factory or from other persons; and State of Punjab v. British Indio Corporation Ltd. Das Gupta J. St•t1 Df Pu,Y•• BritiJlr br•ia
Gtr(JO'raliM l1J. Vas Gu,14 J, u …… ,….,..,,,..,…_ -~ ……. , •··•…….,. "'""'"'" •• .. oi. -JJi_..,;,…._ … :,- •-I (iii) bungalows or houses intended for or occupied
by the managerial or superior staff whether situated within or without the factory compound." There is a proviso to sub-rule (1) with which we are not concerned. We are alse not concerned
with sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 18. The effect of this Rule therefore is that build- ings belonging to the proprietors of the factory will' get the benefit of exemption from taxation under s. 4
of the Act provided three conditions are satisfied : (1) the building must be used for the purpose of a factory; (2) the factory must be one where a manu- facturing process involving the use of power is being
and has been carried on for a continuous period of six months; and (3) (a) no rent is being charged for the buildings; (b) it is not a godown outside the factory compound, or (c) it is not a bungalow or house
intended for or occupied by the managerial or superior staff. In the present case there is no dispute that the second condition was satisfied, viz., that the factory was one in which manufacturing process involving
the use of power was being and had been carried on for a continuous period of six months. Admittedly, also the building was not a godowu outside the factory compound nor was it a bungalow or house
intended for or occupied by the managerial or superior staff. The controversy is limited thus only to two questions. ( 1) \Vhether the building was used for the purpose of a factory and ( 2) whether rent
was being charged for it. Before we examine the facts of the two cases for solving the controversy we have to arrive at the correct interpretation of the words "used for the purpose of a factory"
and the word '·rent" in the Rule. It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt to define what amounts to "use for the purposes of ,r c 2 S.C.R. SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS 119 a factory."
That the legislature left this undefined is a good indication that the intention of the legis- lature was to have the question decided, in any case where controversy arises over it, on a consideration
of the facts of the case. It appears to us to be reasonable to think, however, that two principles will be easy of application in the solution of the problem in the majority of cases.
One is that where the building is used for a purpose which the factory law requires must be fulfilled in order that the factory may function, that will be user for the purpose of a factory.
The other is that where the user of the building is such as is necessary for the efficiency of the machines or of the workmen engaged in the fa.::tory the building should be held to be used for the purpose of a factory.
The 5th Chapter of the factories Act contains numerous provisions for the welfare of workmen employed in the factory. Section 42 requires that adequate and suitable facilities for washing shall be
provided and maintained for the use of the workers in every factory. It empowers the State Government to prescribe standards of the facilities to be provided. Section 43 empowers the State Government to make
rules in respect ·of any factory or class or description of factories requiring the provision "of suitable places for keeping clothing not worn during working hours and. for the drying of wet clothing." Section 46
empowers the State Government to make rules requiring that in any specified factory wherein more tha,n two hundred and fifty workers are ordinarily em- ployed, a canteen or canteens shall be provided and
maintained by the occupier for the use of the workers. ….. Section 4 7 requires that in every factory employing more t?an one hundred and fifty workers "adequate and suitable shelters or rest rooms and a suitable
lunch room, with provision for drinking water, where workers can eat meals brought by them shall be provided.and maintained for the use of the workers." Stt1t1 of Punja '1 British India
c.,por.ii•• Lli. Dos Gupta J. S~alt of P11nja6 v. BrifiJh lnrli• C()fftoTOlio11 lttl. Das Gupt~ J. ……….. Section 48 requires the provision and maintenance of a "suitable room or rooms for the use of children
under the age of six years of such women" employed in the factory if more than fifty women are employed ordinarily. Section 92 makes the contravention of any of the provisions of the Factory Act or of any
Rule made thereunder or any order in writing given thereunder punishable with imprisonment or fine. It is obvious therefore that in order that a 'factory may function in accordance with law buil-
dings or parts of buildings have to be provided by the owner for the use of the workmen for the purposes mentioned in the several sections mentioned above. Such use of these buildings must therefore be held
to be "use for the purpose of a factory." Advances in scientific knowledge as to how the industrial efficiency can be improved have made it clear that even other facilities and amenities, other
than those required bv the factory legislation, conduce in a great measure to a rise in the efficiency of the industrial worker and that some of these arc indeed necessary to the maintenance of a proper standard
of efficiency. ~fany enlightened employers of labour, taking a long view of things have there- fore invested considerable sums of money for the provision of such facilities and amenities even though
not rcq uired by law and have raised buildings for that purpose. In our opinion, the use of buildings for the provision of such facilities and amenities which are necessary to the maintenance of a proper
standard of efficiency of the factory workers must also be held to be "use for the purpose of a factory." The learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the State of Punjab, readily agreed that when a
building is provided for the use of the machinery in order that the machinery may function efficiently or that it may not deteriorate, the building is being used "for the purpose of a factory''.
He is reluctant ; :•.- -~ – 2 S.C.R. however to apply a similar rule to a building used for the purposes of maintaining the efficiency of the men who work the machinery. We are unable to
see any reasonable ground for this differentiation. Just as the use of a building for a purpose which maintains the efficiency of the machines i~ a user for the purpose of a factory, so also, we are convinc-
ed, is the user of a building for the purpose of pro- viding something which is necessary for maintaining the efficiency of the workers. A large number of cases were cited at the Bar
to show how the English courts have understood the words "industrial purpose" or "purpose other than the manufacturing process or handicraft carried on in the factory" in connection with the Rating and
Valuation (Apportionment) Act, and the Factory Act 1901. No useful purpose will be served by discuss- ing all these cases as the schemes of those Acts are largely different from our Act.
We shall refer only, however, to the decision · in London Co-operative Society Ltd., v. Southern Essex Assessment Committee (1), to indicate the tendency of the English courts in more recent times to attach importance to
what is necessary for the welfare and efficiency of the workers in deciding the question. There was a place of refreshments for persons employed in a laundry which was qualified as a
factory and workshop and therefore was an "indust- rial hcreditament". The question was whether this refreshment place was "solely used for some pur- pose other than the manufacturing process or handi-
craft, carried on in the laundry". The Kings Bench answered this question in the negative. Viscount Caldecote, C. J. said that applying the up-to-date consi<lerations in the equipment and. layout of
a factory, the Canteen was not a place which was "solely used for some purpose other than the manu- facturing process or handicraft carried on in the (I) [1942) l K.B, 53, Sfot1 of Prmt46
v. British lMi• Corpordtian , Ltd. Das Gupta.- J, S1at1 of Punjab y, B•iliih lndi• W.p.r11m Ltd. Dos G•pto J. laundry." His Lordship observed that these con· siderations might assist in the determination of the
character of parts of a factory like-a lavatory, or a room where surgical first aid is provided or a cloak- room, or a number of other parts of the heredita- ment. Tucker .J. agreed with this conclusion and
observed .— "The element which, to my mind, is decisive is that the facts stated show that the canteen was necessary and essential for the welfare and efficiency of the workers engaged
in the admittedly industrial part of the under- taking." For applying the two principles mentioned above to the facts of these two appeals, we have to ascertain to what use the property in question has
been put. In the first appeal (in which the British lud1a Corpornl ion Ltd. is the respondent) we are concerned with four .units : (I) A set of rooms used for indoor games by the mill employees; (2) One
big hall used as the Gurkha Guards Club; (3) A set of rooms used a~ Officers' Club, and (4) A set of rooms used as residential quarters by workers of the mills. In our opinion, the allotment of these buildings
for the use of the workmen was made for a purpose which was necessary to the efficiency of the workmen. The property · asscsse<l in the other appeal (in which Shri Gopal Paper Mills Lt<l., is the respondent)
consists of 200 quarters which have been allotted to· workers of the factory for their occupation. The provision of such quarters is clearly necessary to the welfare and cfliciencv of the workmen and it must be
held that in this c'ase also the buildings were being used for the purpose of a factory. 2 S.C.R. The next qHestion is : what is the meaning of "rent" in cl. (ii) of Rule 18 (4). In its wider sense
rent means any payment made for the use of land or buildings and thus includes the payment by a licensee in respect of the use and occupation of any land or building. In its narrower sense it means payment
made by tenant to landlord for property demised to him. Did the rule-making authority when providing that the exemption provided by sub-rules 1 and 2 of Rule 18 shall not extend to quarters and other
buildings for which "rent" is charged, used the word in its wider sense or in its narrower sense? In seeking an answer to this question it is legitimate to examine the use of the word "rent" in the Act for
which these rules were made. At the time the rules were first made in 1941 the Act used the word "rent" only in ·two seciions. First, in s. 5': where in providing how the annual value of land or building
shall be ascertained the legislature said that it shall be ascertained "by estimating the gross annual rent at which such land or building …………………… . .. . . .. .. .. . . .. . .. .. .. …. .. .. .. .. might reasonably be expec- te.d to . let from year to year". It is absolutely clear
that here the word "rent" is used in its strict and narrower sense of payment by tenant to landlord for demised property. The other section where the word "rent" occurs is s. 14, where in providing for
recovery of tax in arrears the legislature said : " …………………… it shall be lawful for the pre- scribed authority to serve upon any person paying rent.~ ………………………. to the person from whom the arrears are due, a notice stating the amount of
such arrears of tax and requiring all future pay- ments of rent by the person paying the rent to be made direct to the prescribed authority ………… and also providing that such notice shall operate to trans-
fer to the prescribed authority the right to recover, receive and give a discharge for such rent". While the section itself leaves it doubtful whether the word "rent" has been used in the narrower or the wider
St1t1 of Punjq6 y, British lntii• Corporation LJJ,, DatGupttt Si.u of Puojoh v. B rilisli "/ nJia C01p.roll.. ltd. Dtu Gupta J, sense, the marginal note describes the subject-matter
of the section thus : "Recovery of tax from tenants." If this note is taken into consideration it becomes clear that in this section also the word "rent" was used in its narrower sense to mean payment made by
tenant to landlord for demised property. When in 1941 the rule-making authority st:t about framing the Rules, it had before it this clear use of the word "rent" in its narrower sense in s. 5
and the marginal note in s. 14 which was some indica- tion that there also the word "rent" was used in the narrower sense. In the absence of anything to indicate the contrary, it would be reasonable to think
that the nde-making authority would not depart from the meaning in which it had reason to believe that the legislature had used the word, and that it used the word in cl. (ii) of Rule 18 (4) in the same narro-
wer sense of payment by tenant to landlord for demised property. Our conclusion therefore is that the word "rent" in cl. (ii) of Rule 18 (4) means payment to a landlord by a tenant for the demised property and
docs not include payments made by licensees. In coming to this conclusion we have not over- looked the fact that there is scope for an argument that in els. (d) and (e) of s. 4 of the Act as they
stand after the amendments in 1954 and 195i, respectively, the word "rent" has been used in the wider sense. Assuming that this is so, such use of the word in 1954 and I 957 cannot be taken into
account for the purpose of interpretation, as the Rule under consideration was framed long before these dates. Coming now to the facts of the two cases before m, we find that admittedly, in both the cases the
property that has been assessed was allowed to be 25.C.R. used by the employees on leave and license. What- ever payment.w~s received f~om them ~as not them· fore "rent" w1thm the meanmg of cl. (u).
Our conclusion therefore is that no tax is leviable under the Punjab Urban Immova?li; pr?- perty Tax Act, 11140, in respect of the buildmgs m these two appeals. The High Court therefore rightly
quashed the orders of assessment. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeals 'dismissed. THE TATA OIL MILLS CO., LTD. v. WORKMEN & ANR. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH
and J. C. SHAH JJ.) Industrial Disputt-'.l'ermination of service of an employee an payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice-Order of termination purported ta be discharg• under R. 40 (1) of Service Rules-Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to examine whether it
amounU to a discharge or dismi8Sal. Mr. Banerjee was an employee of the appellant. His services were terminated on the ground that the appellant had lost confidence in him and in Heu of notice he was paid one month's salary. The union to which Mr. Banerjee belonged
took up his cause and on the failure of the parties to reach a settlement the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Government. The appellant contended before the Tribunal that the
order of termination of service of Mr. Banerjee was an order of discharge which it was competent to make under R. 40 (I) l963 Stat1 ofol'unjab Britcl India iorpoT<tifJll Ltd. D., Gupu /,
1965 —