STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS. versus SAIJANLAL PANJAWAT & ORS.

r 1! STATE OF RAJAS1HAN AND ORS. v. SAJJANLAL PANJAWAT & ORS. December 14, 1973 HI rp JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S. N. DWIVEDI AND p K Gos WAMI, JJ.) JUJiwtlran Public Tmm -:fCI 1959-Ss. 17(3); 52(1 1 and SJ–if . Art. 25 and 26 of the Corumltllon.

Yk>lod•o of The respon~cnts :tllcccd before the Hiih Court that certain rovisiooa of RajruthM Pubhc Tmsts Act, 1959 t<;>ntravcned thel! fundamental ~iihts &UMaD~ ullll<r 1\rL'- 25 nnd 26 of the Constl!utJon. . In the lint set 0_r appeals (C.A. Nos. 1083 :llld 109~ of 1967) ~e rcspoodcnt.s, Ill Lbcl! wru petiuon, claiwed tlw the temple of Sbn Rik.babdeVJt (abo l.no>n1 as Kesbariyaaatbji temple) ,.. a Swewnb.:r Ja1n temple wln•h W.>s UndcT the owner.;lup and Dl:lrulgomeut ol Jain s.sh:ln :wd had been rccoarused as 'ucb 10 of!iCI:ll document.s as weU .., in tho lirman> issued by the .cl'litwhile S~11.e of McwM and Lbat the SLate usurped the tnllll.'lg<mcnt and apphed the provtstons of RaJasthan Public Trusts Act ao.1 there- by contravened their fundamental rigbt.s. In Lbe second set or a~pealt (C A!J Nm. 1119 and 1087 of 1967) the Chairman of Lbe Trwt ComDllttce of Sbri Natodati Pansoath Tirath illleged lh.u the a<.lministntion and man:te•ment of tltt temple was beinll carried on by Lbc Tlll!t Committee on bellalt of Swe~mber J>.in temple and th~ interference in t.be manaeemont of tho temple and other religious institutions envisaged by the Act 11-a.s apiost Lbe IIS&&tS 111d cwtolll!, pnncipiCII and ~ncl3 of t.be Jain re)jgion.

The Hi&h Court struck down a. 17(3) of the Act on Lbe pound thai under tho rul<a made under the Act the sum cltasaed as reci.stratioo fee COOS tu the co,.<>- lidated lund and was thu' not " fee but a tax wllicb the SUtc Leaislatu.re ~ not

competent to levy. Section '2(1 )(d) and (e) were suud down as .mvaltd as o. 53 bad not provi'ded for proper sale~ . oi leavm&. the admtn~>traOon of tbt property in the baQd, of t.be d~oolllln•uon. 8111 ~

.the mana~cment of the temple had ve.•ted in the State prior to the coo>urnuon. the cucAor Rilbabdevji wa.s held to have been covered by o.. '2tl)(a) or (c) of the ct. ~on 53 was 'true I. down oo t.bc around th:l1 si~ ArL 26 contemplateo ubi:~ . ooly a denomination but n S<:ttion of the dcno1n1naUon. the !nmj ~.~ s~cUon •ru•t rcpr<11entina the same rd1gion n>~Y not n~rily be member.l 0 has the a&lllo or the denomination man:.ging the property even if sufch. ~~~''is U:~s tnnSlcmtl O..,..t a• thut of the public llu.o;t. tho ruanagc:ment o "' "' to the Commiltee of M•naacment.

1 th h ld Lbat the ttmplc W3S a Swetall>- bt n . e tint ~ct of appeals the Hi!)t Court eb S .t It directed the Statt to r htn ltmple which wa• be in~ rnan~~ed bv t e 1• ,•·tl ·n the Act.

<010\utute D Committee for ito manasemcnt as proVIu< S.: . to be pn:scotcd under sub-s.(!) o! 'Chon 17(3) provides t.bat nn nprllc•llon . not e>ctcdint 6ve !llpce5. thnt section "•hall be accompanied br "'ch fee. If ~nY. ib<\i" Rule IS of the

OUid to be utili>ed for • ucb pumo><8. :L< rn-w b> ~~~ of tho trust property kutcs apecin •• the rat<s of {ce paya~le on u>tferent f bJll be cre.Jittd to the ~~m•r:•tcd U>eroin, ond (urthcr pmd~cs th.;'\th) ':,r ~Act enacts tb•t tb~ P!!'" ….._.,.,huated Fund of the State. Sc"tton ~.(

blic trUSt wllicb ves!J 111 ,.o Slstotu COntained in Chapkr X stwll npply to evef'j p~ by tho State Govenun<at 1~lc: G•h·ernmenL (cl. u) or wh1"h I• n~1n>!"'!,l~ d,urt of Wards (d. d); ~d of· j!: or which is u11da .U1c sllpc;rinten.tencco.nd ru~<S or 1)10te (ct. e). ·~t

33 " 11<~ the ~ttuss •nnual ta.omc " ten tbOII_' 1 shall v"t in a epmm~)' ro- 'f CrQ"d<e lh•t the nt•n•temenl of a ~u~hc tru5 menl Sub .. ecnon ( P'a11 ·' •ltllse b h h 't·tte Go,crn

f M""•JeOl:DI •h vid ltlent to e con,ututed Y t c .;, t.b Committee o tb.e woe be c. that the Cb:utm3Jl knd Members e bli- !ttJSC. represcnu~sttrcsted in rei' 8PPDinted !rom amongst (a) trustees ofrjedS• and (b) pc11ons /'nomination ~~ton o~ persuasion und having tho '~ of or beloogin8 to tbe • public trusts or in the endowment• there

for the purpose of whicb or for the benefit of whom ~e trust was founded in accordance with the aeneral wishes of the persons so Interested so far as such wishes can be ascertained in the prescribed manner.

Allowinc th.e appeals, HELD: Section 17(3) cannot be held to be invalid and 11l1ra yir~s the DOWer_ of the State Leiislature. The mere fact that the amount was patd lDto the con solidated fund is by itself not sufficient t~ ~old that tho levy under s. 17(3) ~t..~~ ."-ct is a tax. It was held in the c;ommlss1oner of H. R. E. Madraj. v. ~rl ~ Jindra Tirtha Swamiar of Shri ShmJr Mutt that the essence of taxatwn as co .. ion and imposition made for public purpose with~ut reference to any apeaa benefit to be conferred on the payer of the _tax, that n to say, that the levy of ~~ is for the purposes of genc:ral revenue which, when coll~cted, forms part ot . ublic revenues of the State. A fee on the .other ha':ld 1s t)ayment for a..apeClal_ teoefit or privile&e which the ill.dividual recetves. It 19 reaarded as a sort ot return or consideration for ~rvices rendered and sho!lld be correlated to tke ex nscs incurred by Government in rendering the .serv1ces. ln the. Secr~t•Y.· G~"nment of Madras, Home Departtm!'~ll v. Zenith lAmp & ~lectncal Ltd .• u was reiterated that the fact that the collecttons went to the ,Consoll~ated; FUDd "liS not in itself. conclusive thou&h not much stress could be llud on thJ.S poUlt beQa~e Art. 266 requires that all revenues raised by the State !!hall form part of tttc Coii60Jidated Fuod. {7650-H; 766A)

In the instant case the expenditure on Devasthan Department wu much more than the income from registration. The mere fact that the amount was paid toto the Consolidated Fund is by ··$elf not sufficient to hold that the levy was a 1a1. Secti?n Sf(l)(d) has no a~plica.tion in this case because it deals with a p•btic tru~t wh1ch 1s under the supenntendenc:e of the Court of Wards and thi~ part of the judgment of the High Court was clearly wrong.

[761 D] it i! for the State Government, if it intends to apply tile provisions of Chapter X of the Act, if it is satisfied that the &roea annual mcome exceeds ten th001a.nd rupees to include it in the list of t'Ublie ttusts publi.med under sub-section (2) of s. 52 in the official aazette. Section 53 postulates the application of Char1er X before the management of the temple can be said to vest in a Committee of Management to b~ constituted by the State Government in the manner provided in that section. . Until the notification is published under sub-s. (2) of e. '1 ~ responden~ could not claim that their ri&hts were affected. {761E-G] The hypothesis on which the High Court has based its conclusioJU ia oot wvrant.:d by the provisions of sub-s.(.5) of •· .53 of the Act. In the first cate~. apart from the CoiJllllittee being constituted from amongst the trustees of p1.1bi.U: trusts representing ·the same 'religion the Committee can also be coJUtituted from amongst the trustees of the same persuasion. The eignificance of the word "'llr- suasion" and what it connotes does not seem to have been considered by the Hilh Court. The word persuasion is a S}'llonym of faith; creed, denomination, reliJjon etc. In the first category also a Committee can be appointed from persons of the denomination to which the trust belongs 11 in the second category with this di!a- rence that in the first category if the State Government chooses, it can appoint it from the trustees representing that denomination or persuasion while in the acco.:l category from amongst the persons who belong to the said denomination who may not be trustees as such. Even where the persons interested satisfy the require- ment! of s. 2(9) the additional requirement of cl. (b) of ~ub·s. (.5) of s. 53 is that such persons must be also persons for whose benefit the trust was founded. A reading of cl.(a) of Eub-s. (5) clearly indicates that the trustees must TCprcse.ol the concerned religion or persuasion, which includes a denomination. It could not have been the intention to l}ppoint a Committee of management oomprid~a~ trustees of a public trust of a particular religion or persuasion who do not belo!li to that religion or persuasion or denomination. Nor d~s cl. (b) or suba-s. (.5) of s. 53 empower persons who do not belong to a denomination to be appointed to a public truit of that denomination. Again, the word "denomination" is wide enOU!!h to include sections thereof, and it cannot therefore be said. a.~ the Hi&h Court seems to assume, that a section of the denomination managing the property may not be the same as trustees of public trusts repre,enting the same relig~on e~en management of which is being transferred to the Committee. If s. S3(5)(a) L~ read in the manner 11uggested the difficulties pointed out by the High Court 'W(MI!d not arise at all. f763D-H: 764A..Cl

c t. – l ,I ll l~ c IIMASTHAN V. SAJJA:-ILAL (Jagamnofran Reck~, J.) 7~3 On " consideration of all the documents admitted wb· b tb d could not challen~e. there W» no doubt that Shrl Ril:~ bd e ~tate bad not, ):in temple and the Stat7 of Rajasthan hod produced 00 ev·~ e•1• templo was a to show that It was a Hmdu temple where Jain< ut all se~ :.n~e !t!' the ~ntrary all sects were allowed to worship. [749Fl

as Hmdus of – There ~vas no ~ol!bt that the. mana1ement of the temple of Rik.habdevji with iL< propertres had ~ ohdly vested !n the Ruler of Udaipur, and thereafter in the successor Stole b:t~re the_ Con; tttuu"n o! India came ,010 {om:. There can he no doubt thut any n~ht whtch. tho Jams or Myone of the \Wo Jain denom'nati nam:Jy, tho Swetam~ar.; or _D•gacnb•r.~ or ~?alit, mi~t have had in the ~mpJ~'::; in its mana~::.mcnt \\3S lost an the pre·Constuuuon penOd: and. 1! now vested in the St>t. of Ruusth01n.

1753A I Dirt<'IOr of Endowmtnts. Govt. of /IydmJbad & Orr. v Akrum Ali A 1 R 1956 S.C. 60 ond Sarh'arlul & Ors. v. The Srutt of 1/ydt;aba.J [1960) j s.c:R: 311, referred to. The constitution under which the properties and mana:tment of the te-o' · b•<l \'ested in the Ruler ond thereafter in the :;r.,tc continued to be law by virtue of Art. 312 of the Col1.5titution till it was repealed by the impu~ Act. Since the r<,.pondents lo't the ri~ht to mao~~• ~nd admonC.tcr the temple and it• pro. JXrtic& prior co the Constttulion by a valid !aw, they cannot now ~g:Un th~t ril!ht on the plco that thor law contravened the rij<ht gu>ronteed Wl<ler Art. 26(d) of the Constitution. 17S3Cl

DurRJlt Commilltr Ajmu v. Sred Hussain Ali, (19621 I S.C.R. 383, follow- al. Tilakoym Sllri Go>·imllu/ji Maharai v. Tilt Slott of R~iastl:an & Ors. [19'-41 I S C.lt. Sf> I nt p. 621: Thr Commissioner, Jlirulu Rtligiou.t £11Lio,.,•mrors, Madras, , .. ~ni l.ahlmiindra 'J'hirrhn Swamiar of Sri Sltirur Mutt. [19541 S.C.R. 1005. and Sri VtnkatUttllllaJ/a Del"aru v. The St~te o/ Mysore, [19581 S.C.R. 895, referee~ to.

The High Court w;L, in erro r in giving the Lm.pogned direaions it! view ~~d fact that the right of management of Rikbabde•J• temple wa:~. Ios_t as 11 was f tbcir in the S~te and the respondents could not con:tplain !'f any mfnngcment o. fuo.t.mcntal nghts to manage and admuuster tts offam.

CiVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 10S3 and 1092 of 1967 . . From the judgment nnt.l order c.lat~d the 301~ ~~~~\~· J~J3o~f:. Htgh Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur tn D.B. Ctv

SO! of 1962. Civil Appeals Nos, 1081 and 1119 of 1967 d h 30th M:ud1 1966 of the H. From the judgment aod order c.l;!tc !Be Civil Misc. 'writ Petition c t&h Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur 1n D. ·

No, 407 of 1962 aod via vusa. II Civil Appeal No. 1647 of 1961 66 f the d th 4th August, 19 o . ·rom the judgment and order .dale C~ivil Writ Petition No. 19 · Rajnsth<~n High Court ut Jodhpur 10 D.B.

of 1963, . for tile appellants (in D. V. Patel, G. c. Kasliwal and S. M. Jau(· C. A. Nos. t0S7 -' CJ\. Nos. 10~3 & 1119/67 aod respondents 1092/67) _ .. ~ ,;;_>• .– — [1974) 2 S.C.R.

M. C. Chagla, s. S. Khanduja, Pukhraj Singhvi, D. N. Misra and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondents (rn C.A. No. 1083) and sole . respondent in C.A. No. 1119/67 and appellants (in C.A. Nos. 1087 & IO':J2j6i) .

S. M.Jcin for the appellants (in C.A. No. 1647/67) S. c. Agrawala, B. K. Garg and V. ! . Francis, for the respondents. (in C. A. No. 1647f67) The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

J.WANMOHAN REDDY, J.-These five appeals are by certificata . .l under Art. 133(l)(a) & (c) of the Constitution and have been heard together as common questions of law were raised in all these ap. ' I

peals. c ) . Civil Appeal No. 1083 of 1967 is an appeal by the St<!te of Rajas- than against the respondents, while Civil Appeal No. 1092 of 1967 is the appeal by the respondents against the State of Rajasthan. Thesa two appeals, which we may also refer as the first set of appeals, arise out o! a writ petition filed by the respondents against the Statt of Rajasthan alleging that the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji, also known as Keshariyanathji temple, situated about 40 miles from Udaipur, is a Swetamber Jain temple which is under the ownership and manage. •ent of Jain Shasan and has been recognized as such in official docu· mcnts as well as in the f11mans issued by the erstwhile State of Mcwar. NoiWithstanding the position it was averred that the management of the said temple bas been illegally usurped by the State of Rajasthan through the Dcvasthan Department for some years, and that thcs State of Raja.~than had applied certain provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trust., Act, 1959-hereinafter called 'the Act'-to the said temple which contravened the fundamental rights of the respondents guaranteed unJcr Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The r~spondcnts, th..-rcforc, prayed that the Court should refrain the State from enforcing· provisions of the Act specified in the petition and ,.,…

declare them void being in contravention of the fundamental rig.h~ f . of the respondent~ guaranteed under Arts. 14 19, 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution of l ndia. They also challcng~d s. 17 ( 3) of the ~ct on !he ground that the f~:c levied along with the application for rtg!S• tratJon of the public trust is a tax. and therefore beyond the con1pe· tcnce of the State Legislature. The case of the State ·of Raj;JSthnn, ~owevc~, was that the temple in question was not a Jain temple, but 15 a Hm<lu tempi.: where Jain~ o( all sects ag well as Hindus of all b~~tcfs and sects including the Bhils worship.

Jt dcnh:d th~t tho pro- \'ISJO~~ of the Act which had been enactcJ to rcgulato and to make ~cttel" provlSJ.ons for the administration of public rcligiou~ ond chnnt;lbW trust~ m the SliJtc of Rajasthan were in any way violativ" of Arts. 25 and 26 or ;.ny other article o( the Constitution.

Tt usscrtcd that tile •una~eirlC'ot of t11e ~crnple was with the State of Rajash:m which h:ul Jl a valid. and le~al ~il.!ht to manal'e it, ~n<l tho• K. 17 (3) c,f the ACt ~\dS val1d:

The Hrgh C,ourt held that Rikhabdcvji temple is a Swet: ''libcr Jam temple and ts at pre~nt managed by the State of Ralai. than., that ' · 17(3) of the Act is invalid because undc:r the RultS '-i.; .

—~ P.AJASTHAN v. SAJJAN' LAL (Jaganmolum Reddy~ J.) H5 that have been framed under the Act an amount of Rs. Sf- charpd as registration fee goes to the Consolidated Fund, and is thus not a fee but a tax which the State Le&islature was not competent to 1~. Following the decision in another writ petition, which is the subject- matter of the second set of appeals to wb.lch we shall refer presently, the Hi&}l. Court struck down s. 52(1) (d> & (e) of the Act, but as the management of the temple had :vested in the State prior' to the n Constitution, the case of Rikhabdevji was held to have tieen co…e.rcd by s. S2(l) Qa) or (c) of the Act. In the petition relatinc to the sec- ond set of appeals the High Court had held that cases of trust as are mentioned in sub.ss. (l)(a>, (b) and (c) a secular Stato may not like to keep the man.asement of public truat1 belonainJ to variou denominations with it and may like to transfer it to ~

who zni&ht c be better equipped for manaama it in accordance with the wilbtl ol the founder or of the religious denomination to which the tru1t be .. loop. But that would not be violative of Art.

26~b) and. (d) of tU Constitution in any way. It was of the view that s. SZ( U (d) i <•) of tlle Act was invalid ass. 53 had not provided for proper adt~U~fd• for the administration of the property bein& left in tho haDda of the denomination. Even so it held that these clause& were not applicable to tbat case. In so far as the challenge to u. 30, 31, 38 to 43 of the Act was concerned, it held them to be valid. In the result tho HiJh Court pve the directions which are contamed in the followin1 con• elusion now impugned :

.. This being our· conclusion the question is what reUcf the petitioners (respondents) arc entitled to. Since we hl'fe come to the conclusion that the management of the temple ia with the State OoveJ;Dment the case lalla withJn HCtloD

52(1) ('aj or (c) of the Act which have been held. vaUct by us. Therefore, no question of d.eprlvina the denomination of the management of the temple arises in this cue. But the Act contains a provision for the transfer of the manaa~ ment even for those public trua•s which fall under sub-lection (l)(a), (b) and (c) of section 52 and the OoverJlJDtlnt

should therefore act accordingly and take early step~ to transfer the management to a committee as envisaged by sec!ion 53 of the Act and in doing so we hope the Govern~ ment while constituting the committee shall have due regard to the wishes of the denomination as was done in the past

by the Maharana of Udaipur in Sambat Year 1934." In this view the High Court partly allowed the writ petition boldinJ that the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji is a Sweta.mber Jain templo and' is at present being managed by the State of Rajasthan and since it was being managed by the Sfate of Rajasthan the High Court directed the State to constitute a Committee for its management as provided in the Act. As seen earlier s. 17f3) of the Act was held ultra vire9 the State Legislature. Both the parties, being aggrieved, have·filed sepa- rate appeals as af~resaid.

Civil Appeals Nos. 1119(N) Qf 1967 is bv the State of Rajasthan while Appeal No. 1087(N) of. 1967 is by Shri Surajmal Singhvi. These '746 (1974} 2 S.C.R. .a~peals~ whi~~ we. may also term the second set o~ appeals, arise out .of a wr1t petltlon filed by the respondent Surajmal Singhvi who claims .to be the Chairman of the Trust Committee of Shri Nakodaji Parasnath Tirath alleging that the ad~nistration and management of that temple was being carried on by the Trust Committee on behalf of the Swetam- ber !~ Sangh. in. whi.ch is vested the entire property of the temple .conststmg of buildmgs, cash, ornaments of the idol and all other mov- able and immovable properties.

It was claimed that according to the religious faith and belief of Jains, the properties of the said temple can only be utilised for the maintenance, upkeep and worship of the idol and for the purpose of different religious ceremonies, prop.tgation of Jain faith and religion and for other analogous purp:>ses which are pious, religious and charitable. It was, therefore, averred that inas- much •s tne administration and management of the said temple and worship of the idol and other religious ceremonies

are' carried on .according to the scriptures and tenets of Jain religion they do not brool .any outside interference, and consequently the interference . in the. management of the temples and other religious institutions envisaged by the Act was against the usages and customs,. principles and tenets of Jain religion.

On these allegations the various provisions of the Act were challenged on the ground that they were in direct and fiagrant breach of the fundamental right of religious freedom and freedom of conscience of the Jains and their right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion. It was also contended that the impugned provisions imposed unreasonable restrictions on the religious denomination to maintain and manage religious institutions and to manage their own aJfairs in the matter of religion and to administer the property accordin~ to the Jain Shasan.

The High Court held that Chapters V, VI and VII of the Act -deal with the registration of public trusts and provide certain safeguards to protect them from dissipation. These provisions are analogous to those contained in the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950-hereinafter ~ailed 'the Bombay Act'-which provisions regarding registration of public trusts were held to be valid by this Court in Ratilal PanachoHd . Gondhi v. State of Bombay(1).

The High Court, however, allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent as in its view proper safeguards were not provided in s . .53 of the Act for leaving the administration ·of the property in the hands of the denomination and that ss. 17 (3) ·and 52 (1 )(d) and (e) of the Act being ultra vir e.$ the State Legislature were invalid.

The rest of the provisions of the Act were held con- ·stitutional and valid. Against this judgment, . both parties have :appealed as pointed out earlier. The fifth appeal is Civil Appeal No. l647(N) of 1~67 arising out 'Of a writ petition filed by one Pandit Ram Dayal agairlst the State of Rajasthan challenging the constitutional validity of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder on the ground, inter alia; that they contravened his fundamental rights enshrined in Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution. as they take away, limit or abridge his right to manago the affairs of ——··—–

(1) [19541 S.<::.R. lOSS. n c c c RAJASTHAN ~·. SAJJANLAL (Jagamnohan Reddy, J.) the two temples known as Thakurji Vijay Govindji and Thakur.ii Shri. Sin•h Bchar1ji itt accord~nce with the tenets of the religion and the traditions of his family.

The respondent's case was that the temple of. Thakurji Vijay Govindji is situated within the residential premises of the respondent in Ramganj Bazar, Jaipur City, and the temple of

Thakurii Shri Sireh Behariii is situated ncar the first temple. Both these temples, according to him, were his family temples and neither the public in general visited those temples for worship nor any offerings were made to the deities.

Nevertheless it was admitted th.at certain properties were granted by the then Maharaja of Jaipur to his great~· grandfather for the maintenance anc.l for providing B.hog, Pooja etc. of those temples. The resp;:>ndent, therefore, challenged the constitu- tional validity of the several provisions of the Act specified therein on. the ground that they contravene his fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution to freely profess, practise, propa~· gatt' his religion and has placed unreasonable restrictions on his fundil-· mental right to manage t~e affairs and to carry on the administration· of the aforesaid temples in accordance with the tenets of his religion and the traditions of his family.

He, therefore,. prayed that the High Court should declare that the two temples in question ..ycrc private temples and tha.t the Act was not applicable to them. The appellant contested the claim of the respondent that the tem- pb were his private temples. . According to the State, these temples were public temples, that Shri Anandilal the great grand-father of the: respondent was put in charge of Scwa-Pooja of the temples and that !he land was granted by the Rulers of the former State of Jaipur for the maintenance of the temples, for the performance of Sewa-Pooja: nnd for making offerings to the deities, and, therefore, they were public rdigious trusts within the meaning of s. 2( 11) of the Act. It denied• that the respondent would be deprived of any of the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, nor in its view do any of the provisions of the Act interfere with the religious freedom of any person muct, less the respondent, nor do any of those provisions impose unreasonable· restrictions on the respondent. The High Court, foUowing the decision in Surajmal Singhvi's case, which is the subject-matter of the second· set of appeals, held the provisions of the Act to be valid except those mentioned in sub~s. ( 3) of s. 17 and clauses (d) and (c) of sub~.· ( 1) of s. 52 of the Act, which were, as already noticed, struck down ns being ul!ra vires the State Legislature. The question whether the temples were private temples or :public religious trusts docs not seem· to have been urged, as on the petitioner's contention in view of the dcci~ion in Surajmaf Singhvi's case the State should be directed not 10 take any action the Court P,ranted the relief referred to above. This appeal is against this judgment.

In the first set of appeals. three questions arise for determination- ( I) whether the petitioners/respondents who claim to represent the· s.,~·etamber Jain sect can challenge the right of the State to m:Jn3gc Shri RH-.habdevji temple; (2) whether the provisions of the Act in any way infrin~e their fundamental rights to manage their own affairs in m:~Ucrs of reli~ion and to administer such property in accordance with· t?o law under clause (b).~ (d) ot AI},. 26; and (3) if they have a r!ght to manage and adrru!l1ster the temple whether any of the provi- sions of the Act offend the1r fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution,

If the temple is a Hindu temple the respondents have no loc11s standi to ask for the reliefs prayed for in the petition. But if it is not a Hindu temple, then the question whether it is a Swetamber Jain temple or a Digamber Jain temple will become relevant only if we were to hold that the management of the temple was not validly vested in the State prior to the Constitutio~'-or even if it had vested in tho State any of the fundamental. rights of ~e ~orshippen of the temple gu~ran: teed under Arts. 2S and 26 are infrm&cd.

ln our view. the que~tlon whether tie temple is a Swetamber J iln temple or a Dlgamber 1 aitl temple as contended by the interveners does not arise for decision in the&e appeals, firstly because, it the management had vested in the State of Rajasthan under a pre-Consti~ution law and that law cannot be challenged under the Constitution, the nght of the State to adminis· ter and manage the temple is unassailable; secondly, even if the right of the State to manage the temple after the Constitution came into force can be successfully challenged as offending the provisions of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, the management of the temple by the State will be held to be ultra vires and illegal.

And in that event the Court need not go further. The learned Advocate for the respondents, however, contests this reasoning, because according to him as the re~pondenta in their petition have categorically stated that they rcpre· sent the Swetamber Jain sect entitled to the management of the temple and bne accordingly prayed that not only the State of Ralasthan be restrained from carrying out the management of the temple but that they be allowed to manage it and continue the said management, it is i:.lcumbent upon this Coun to give a finding as to whether the Keshari· ., <'!'iathji temple is a SwetambCr Jain temple. lt is further contended that even if the management of the temple bad been taken over prior · to the Constitution under a valid law, the right of the respondents to follow their religion in accordance with the tenets of that religion would nevertheless continue after the Constitution, and therefore they can challenge the right of the State to continue the manageme11't as being in contravention of the provisions of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

We may here mention that the Digamber Jain sect which was not a party before the High Court had ·applied for being allowed to intervene in these appeals. It appears that after the respondents filed the writ petition on November 17, 1962, a notice was given by the solicitors of the interveners to the respondents on March 12, 1963, requiring them to implead the interveners in the writ petition failing which thev would themselves apply to the Court for bein~ made a party. It is, therefore, contended that since the interveners did not apply to make them a party, they·cannot now be allowed to intervene. This contention is no longer available to the respondents, as the

learned Chamber Judge after giving notice to the respondents allowed the petition and permitted them to intervene. Accordingly we have c II c WASTHAN v. SAJJANLAL (Jaganmohan Reddy) I)

allowed the interveners to represent their point of view. The learned Advocate for the interveners submits that Digamber Jain sect did not set themselves impleaded even though they had intended to do so, because at that tirne the res_pondents did not pray that the xna.naseme-t of tho temple should be &lven to them, but had only challenged the riJbt of the State to manage the temple and to restrain it from doin1 so. As the prayer then was, which did not in any way conflict with their rights, they dld not apply .for b~ing made a party to the petition, but filed a separate writ petition of their own. It was only after the notice was given to implead the interveners that the respondents applied on April 3, 1963, for an amendment praying that they be allowed to manaae the said temple which amendment was il'anted. The appli~ c•tion wa5 granted on July 29, 1963 and accordingly the proposed amendment was effected in the writ petition. The contention of tlte interveners is that as the High Court has now given directions to the . State of Rajasthan for appointing a Committee of Swetamber Jain sect on the assumption that the temple was a Swetamber Jain temple, the Digamber Jain sect worshippers are affected and have, therefore7 applied for and obtained perinission to intervene.

As we ~ave said earlier, in this case we do not wish to determine the question whether the temple is a Swetamber temple or a Digamber temple, not only because the Digamber sect was not a party, but because tho State of Rajasthan was not interested in contesting tho claim of the respondents that it was a .Swetamber temple. What the State was interested in was to non·suit the petitioners/respondents on the ground that they had no right to the management of the temple,- as that riaht had vested in the State prior to the Constitution, and· even if .that right can be challenged afer. the Q:)nstitution. the temple beina a Hindu temple where all sects including the Jains and the Bhils worshipped~ the respondents would have no locus standi.

In our view, however, without going into the question whether the temple is a Swetamber or a Digamber Jain temple, it will be sufficient for us to consider whether the temple is a Jain temple, or as alleged by the State a Hindu temple. on· a consideration of all the documents admitted, which the State has not, and cannot challenge, we have no doubt that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple and the State of Rajasthan has produced no evidence to the contrary to show that it is a Hindu temple where Jains of all-sects as well as Hindus of all sects including the Bhils are allowed to worship.

Apart from a, copy of the firman of the Emperor Akbar producea by the respondents to show that Shri Rikhabdevji temple. is a Swetamber Jain temple, the authenticity of which has been disputed by the State, there are other documents from which it appears in~

disputable even as was represented by the State and its predecessors that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple. Annexure 26-The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XXI (New Edition 1908 pp. 168~ 169) describes it .as "The famous Jain temple sacred to Adinath or Rikhabnath." · It further states that it is annually visited by thousands of pilsrims irom all parts of Rajputana and Gujarat, and that it is difficult to determine the age of ~his puilding, but three inscriptions [19741 2 s.c.R.

mention that it was repaired in the· fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There can be no doubt that it is an ancient temple, though it is not possible to say when and by whom the idols were consecrated. We find as late as in 1958 that Annexure 30-:-a Calendar printed and published by th~. Gf>vernment of Rajll$than-has a photo of Shri . Rikhabdevji temple under which there is a caption ''UDAIPUR KE PAS RlKHABDEVJI KA PRASIDH JAIN MANDIR" i.e. famous

Jain temple of Rikhabdevji near Udiapur. Annexure 17 is a notifica- tion issued by the 'Mewar Government on Chait Suk.Ia 7 Monday 1982 corresponding to April 19, 1926 A.D. with the heading "Unique Angi Utsav in Shn Dhulevnagar". In it Shri Keshariyanathji Maharaj is described as a holy Jain Tirath whi~h was managed previously by Udiapur Nagar Seth and Seth Jorawarmalji. We are not for

the present concerned with the statement contained therein about the ntis· appropriation of the money of the deity in Samvat Year 1934. But this document also shows that the State of Mewar describes it as a hoJy Jain Tnth. Annexures 2t 3, 4, 6, 7 A, 713 and 7C show that some embezzlement of the temple funds was St;!Spected in Samvat Year 1933 (about year 1875-76 A.D.) as a result of which one Molvi Abdul Rehman Khan was deputed by the State of Udaipur to make enquiry a~ check th~ accounts. lt aP,pears that while this enquiry was pro- ceeding, one Bhandari JawailJi Khem Raj complained against th~t

Molvi for forcibly breaking open the loct of the Bhandar aild taking away the account books and other papers. In that connection he described the temple of Shri Rekhabdevji Maharaj as belonging to the Jain Sangb. Annexure 9 dated January 27, 1878, is a notification of the Government of Udiapur State for the information of the, pilgrims and tho devotees of Shri Rikhabdevji stating that Bhandaries were rcmm·ed due to their mismanagement of the temple affairs and that a Committee consisting of five respectable Oswal Mahajan devotees of Shri Rikhabdevji, was appointed.

Annexure 10 dated November 22, 1878, is a notice issued by the members of the Committee to dispel doubts about the action taken by the Ruler of the State in appointing a Committee for the management of the temple.

It also mentions that the management has been assigned to a Committee of five or seven big Sahukars who follow Jain religion and lead a religious life. Annexure 24 dated May 29, 1886, is a copy of the report made by Mehta Govind Singh Hakim Magra (an officer having both judicial and magisterial powers) to Mahkama Khas, Udaipur, on an application submitted by some Digamber Jains objecting to the raising of Dhawaja i.e. flag over the 'Jainalaya' by the Swetamber Jains. In that report it was stated tbat thr: temple was a Swetamber Jain temple. Annexure 21 dated July 19, 1907, shows that on a complaint that some people l1ad allowed low caste people to perform Puja of Shri Rikhabdevji by taking some illegal gratification, the matter was referred by the Officer of the Devasthan Bhandar to Jain Muni Paniyas Nem 'Kushalji as to what step.;; be taken for purification of the temple and the reply given by the said Muni.

Annexure 28 dated Kartik Sudi 10 Samvat 1979 (1922 A.D.) is a copy of the report of the Devasthan Department to Mahk:ama Khas, Udaipur State, stating that 'Naivedya' should not be offered to the deity Shrl Rikhabdevji as neither the Committee nor the Jain Sangh nor the Acharyas of the Jain Sangh are in favour of it, and c

II c P..AJ'ASTHAN v. SAJ.TAN LAL (laganmohan Reddy, /.) that the new practice of offering 'Naivedya' for the first time is un- called for. On this· report, the· Mahkama Kbas ordered that the

Devasthan be informed that there is no necessity of offering 'Naivedya'. Annexure 29 dated Samvat 1889 (Sak 1759) (1833 A.D.) is a copy Qf inscriptions engraved on the main gate in which there is a reference to the performance of the ceremony of Dhawja-Danda on the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji Maharaj. All these documents, there being no document to the contrary filed by the State of Rajasthan, clearly show that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a 1 ain temple.

The next question is whether the manag~ment of the temple ·had been taken over prior to the Constitution by. the erstwhile Udaipur State under a law; and whether that management continued to be vested even after the Constitution in its successor State, namely the State: of Rajasthan, and if so, whether the respondents' fundamental rights

guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 are affected. The High Court has held that the Ruler of the erstwhile Udaipur State, by virtue of his. sovereign power always exercised general superintendence over the temples and on finding that there was mismanagement of the temple affairs, the management which was· till then vested in the Nagar Seth was transferred to a Committee and the President of the "Sel Kantar Sabha" (a Department of the erstwhile State of Mewar) was appointed its Manager. The Sel Kantar Sabha took the keys of the Bhandar from the Nagar Seth ori November 29, 1877, after the management was transfered to the Committee. It also held that vacancies in the . Committee occurring from time to time were being filled up by the orders of the Ruler of the State and whenever there was a dispute about the affairs of the temple it . was referred to the Government ·and its decision was obtained. In 1948 when mismanagement of the temple was again reported; the Government appointed a Tribunal to make an enquiry and report about the state of mismanagement and ordered that the affairs of the temple should be managed according to the report of Shri Tej Singh Kothari until a final decision was taken · by the Government on the report of the Tribunal. Tht;se findings, in our view, are supported by Annexures 6, 7A, 33, 41 and 42.

It also appears that a Constitution was . promulgated by the Maharana of Udaipur on May 23, 194 7, which was subsequently amended on October 11. 1947. It is evident from the preamble that the Rulers of Mewar claimed that they were ,ruling the State as the Dewans on behalf of Lord Shiva represented by Eklingji MaharaJ. The Ruler was always referred to as Shriji. In paragraph 2 of Art1cle II it is stated that .. All shrines; temples and other religious and charitable institutions forming part of Devasthan described in Schedule I or which may hereafter be found to have formed part thereof or which form part thereof by future dedication and all property and funds appertain- mg thereto are hereby declared to be vested m Devasthan Nidhi hereby constituted in law as a Corporation with a seal of its own." By para- graph-3 of Article II it was provided that the Devasthan Nidhi shall hold all the s~d institutions, their properties and funds for the purposes specified therein. The constitution of the Devasthan Nidhi, its powers · and duties have been set out in Paragraph 4 to 10 of Article II of the Constitution. Shree Rikhabdevji temple at Dhulve anc;l its propertie$ 2-!.748 SuPCI/74

[1974] 2 s.c.a. are set out in item 32 of Schedule I of the List of Devasthan Temples. To this Constitution cer~in amendments were made by the Ruler on <?cto}?er 11. 1947 •. the main object of which was to deal with the object- uons to the formation of Devasthan Nidhi and allocation of its funds on other grounds also. Paragrll>hs 2 to 10 of Article II were replaced and it w~s ordC!ed. by. him that .all shrines. temples !!nd other religious and chantable mstltl.ttlons foraung pat:t of Devasthan described in S~hed~le I etc. w.ere vested)n Shriji (the Ruler) to be administered by him wtth the asststance of ~n advisory body. in which representatives from different sections of worshippers at the temples were to be included; that the income of these institutions was to be used for the purposes for which the institutions have been founded; and that the surplus income after meeting those p~oses was to tie· made available for other like or similar purposes. 'tlie Article further stated that in the administration of the Devasthan Shriji (Ruler)

shall have all powers necessary, proper and incidental to carry out the administration of the Devasthan and may invest its funds in securities. lands. business or industrial undertakings and may vary the investments as he may think fit.

The relevant portions of these Constitutions have been furnished to us by agreement of counsel for parties. The learned advocate for the respondents, however. contends that the Constitution was never

promulgated in so far as the taking over of the shrines, temples and other religious and chari· table institutions was concerned. This submission. in our view, is not j'Ustified. because not only was· it specifically proclaimed thnt the Constitution was being promulgated, but by the notification of October U, 1947, it was further declared that the Constitution that was proclaimed on May 23, 1947, was amended that oay, namely on Octpber 11, 1947. It may further be pointed out that pursuant to the amendment an Advisory Body was constituted on March 20 1948, with the Maharana as

its resident, Major ·General Rao Manohar Sinhaji as Vice Pres,ident and eight other members named therein. From evidence it appears clear that for quite so.me time before the promulgation of these Constitutions the management of Shri Rikhabdev;i temple had been taken over by the erstwhile Ruler of Udaipur State, and by virtue of the Constitutions it had finally vest- ed in the State and was being managed by the Maharana with the Advisory Body.

This Court has in several decisions held that the Rulers of the erstwhile Indian States exercised sovereign powers, legislative, executive and .iudicial. Their firmans were litw which

could not be challenged prior to the Constitution. See Dtrector of Endowments. Governrrimt of Hyderabfld . and others v. Akram Ali(l); and Sarwarlal and others v. The State of Hyderabad( 2 ). In view of these deci~ions. we have no hesitation in holding that the management of the temple of Rikhabdevii with its properties had validly vested in the Ruler of Udaipur. and thereafter in th~

succe<>!;Or ·Str1te b~"f'r~re the Constitution of India came into force on January 26-1-1950. There can, therefore, be no doubt that any ) I) A.T.R. 1956 S.C. t'O 11) [1960) 3 S.C.R. 311.

c 1\AJASTHAN. V, SAJJAN LAL (/aganmohan Reddy,],) right which the Jains or any one of the two Jain denominations, namely, the Swetambers.or.Digambers or both, may have had in the temple or in its management was lost in the pre-Con~tltution pe~iod and is now vested in the State of Rajasthan.

It is, however, contended that even after the CoQ.stitution, the respondents have a ri~t to get back the. management as the conti- nued management of ;he temple tr!lnsgresses their rights under Art. 26(1>).

This contention, iri our view. is not tenable. The Constitution under which the properties arid management of the temple had vested in the Ruler, and thereafter in the State continued to be law by virtue of Art. . 3 72 of the Constitution till it was repea_led by the impugned Act. Since the respondents lost the right to manage and administer the temple and its

pro~rties ,prior to .tbe Constitution by a valid law, they cannot now regain that right on the plea that that law contravenes the right guaranteed under Art. 26(d) of th~ Constitution. In Durgah Committee, Ajmu v. Syed Hussain Ali(l), it was observed at p.

414 that-'if ~he· right to administer the properties never vested in the denomination or had been validly surrendered by it or has otherwise been effectively and irretrievably lost to it, Art. 26 cannot be successfully invoked.'' To the contention that the right to manage the temple and its properties fall under Art. 26(b) and nor under Art. 26(d), ·the answer may be two-fold : (1 ) the J ains, whether Swetamber or Di gamber. had lost the right before th~ .Constitution and Art. 26 would. not re- invest ·the right in them; (2) the administration of property being dealt with in Art. 26(d), should be deemed to be excluded from the. purview of Art. 26(d). Dealing with the first matter, Gajendra- gadkar said : "It is obvious that Art; 2 6 (c) and (d) do not create rights in any denomination or ~~ section which it never had; they merely safeguard. and guarantee the continuance of rights which such denomination or its section had. In other words if the denomination never had the right to manage the properties endowed in favour of a denominational.ins.titution as for instance by reason of the terms on which the endowment was created it cannot be heard to say that \it has acquired the said rights as a result of Art. 26( c) and (d), and that· the practice and custom prevailing in that behalf which obviously is consistent with the terms of the endowment should be ignored or treated as invalid and the administration and management should now be given to the denom'ination. Such a claim is plainly in· consistent with the provisions of Art. 26.u (Durgah Committee of Ajmer at p. 414) ..

Dealing with the second matter the learned Judge said : "If the practice in question is purely secular or the affairs which is eon- trolled by the statute is essentially and absolutely secular in charac· ter, it cannot be urged that Art. 25 (1) or Al:t. 26 (b)

has been contravened. The protection is !rlven to the ora<'tlce of relieion and to the denomination's right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion." Again at p. 625 he said : "Art. 26(b) relates to affairs {1) [196211 S.C.R. 38:l~

[l974J 2 r..C.l. in matters of region· such as the performance of the religious rites or ceremonies, or the o1>servance ot religious festivals and the ·like; it does not refer to the administration of the property at all. Article 26(d), therefore, justifies the enactment of a law to regulate the administration of the denomination's property an~ that is precisely what the Act has purported to do in the presen.t case. If the clause "affairs in matters of religion" were to include affairs in regard to all matters, whether religious or not the provisions under Art. 26(d) for legislative regulation of the administration of the denomination's property would be rendered illusory." (Tilkayat Sri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and others) (1).

Earlier in T~e Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endpwments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swa~ar of Sri Shirur Mutt(2) (to whic:h a reference was made by Gajendragadkar J. in Tilkayat's case(l), Mukherjea, J., as he then was considered the scope of Art. 26(b), the language of which according to him undoubtedly suggests that there can be other affairs of religious denomination or a section thereof which are not matters of religion and to which the guarantee · given by this clause would not apply.

(After pointing out that clauses (c) and, (d) of Art. 26 guaranteed to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer ~uch property in accordance with law, that administration of its property by a religious denominRtion had been pi aced on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, and that whereas the latter is a fundamental right which no Legislature can take away, the former can be regulated by laws which the Legislature can validly enact he observed : "It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution are not matters of religion to which clause (b) of the article applies." To the question "what then are matters of religion ?" his answer was "Religion i$ certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any Intelligent Frrst Cause. "A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a, system of beli.:lfs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well beill.lt, but it

1 would not be correct to say that reli~on is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it mi,ltbt prescribe rituals and · observ.ances, ceremonie~ and modes of worship which ar~ re.2;arded as integral parts of religion. and these forms and obser· vances might extend even to matters of food and dress."

The observations of Venkatarama Aiyar, J., in Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore( 8) were to the same effect. Bearin~ in mind the scooe of clauses (b) and (d) of Art. 26 as expounded in the decisions of this Court. if, as we have held, the right of management of Rikhabdevji te~ple is lost as it is vested in (l) [~9S4] I S.C.R. 56! at p. 621

{2) [1954] S.C.R. IOOS. (3) [19S8J S.C.R. ·s9S. c . .A c RAJASTHAN V. SAJJAN LAL (/aganmohan Re_idy, 1.) 75 5 the State, the respondents cannot complain of any infringement of their fundamental. riibt to manage and administer its affairs, and as such the High Court was an error in giving the impugned directions. In the view we have taken, the validity of the provisions of the Act which have been· challenged does not fall for consideration in the first set of appeals and it has also been so held by the High Court. In the second set of appeals it is not denied that Nakedaji Paras- oath temple is a Swetamber Jain temple coming within the definition of a public trust under s. 2 ( 11 ) of the Act. It is the contention of the respondents that the establishment of a trust or a temple is a part of the Jain religion and, therefore, the administration and manage· ment of Nakedaji Parasnath temple is also a part of th'eir religi~m. Whether this is a valid claim or not, and whether the impugned pro~ visions of the Act c;:ontravene any of the tenets of the Jain religion has to be ascertained by reference not only to the impugned pro- visions of the Act but also to the tenets and injunctions of the Jain religion upp!icable to the Jain endowments. Though many of· the provisions of the Act had been challenged as unconstitutional, the main attack before the High . Court was confined only to sections 30, 31, 3~ to 43~ 52.and 53 of the Act on the grourld that they infringed the petitioners' rights guar11onteed under Arts. 2S and 26 of the Constitution. The contention of the writ petitioners before that Court were that the administration and management of the religious trusts was a part of the Jain religion and that contributions to th-: parti'cular funds must be utilised for the purposes for which th~ funds existed and cannot be utilised for other purposes, and that according to the tenets of the Jain religion the funds of the temples or religious institutions have to be invest-ed and utilise4 for the··maintenance, upkeep and worship of the idols for th.e purposes of' different re· ligious ceremonies, for the propagation of Jain faith and religion etc. · and the State has no right to interfere with those tenets which are an integral part of their religion except on grotitiifs of public-·Order, morality or health. The High Court, while holding sectiOJlS 30, 31, 38 to 43 and clauses (a), (b).and (c) of sub-s. (1) ofs-." 52.valid, struck down sub-s. ( 3) of s. 17 and clauses (d) and (e) ofsub"s. ( 1) of s. 52 as invalid· As the correctness of this conclusion has been challenged, we will examine the scheme and the provisions of the Act to see whether any of them infringe the right of the respondents guaranteed under Art. 26 of the Constitution.

Chapters 'II, m, IV and V of the Act deal with .public trusts not being void on the ground of uncertainty; the appointment of officers and seNants by .the Government:· establishment and functions of the Board and Committees; registration of public trusts. Of these pro~ visions; as· we hav.J mentioned earlier, s. 17(3) for pay!lJ.ent ·of regis· tration fee has been declal'ed by the High Court to be ultra rires as the fee leviable· thereunder was in fact a tax which the State Legis- lature has no power to levy. Section 3() and 31 of Chapter VI relate to the investment · of public trust moneys and obtaining of previous sanction for certain transfers of trust property. Sections 32 to 36 of Chapter VII deal with accounts; auditing of accounts and [1974J 2 ~.c.a.

buth:ct ·of public trusts. Sections 37 to 46 of Chapter VIII f which ss. 38 to 43 were seriously challenged on various grounds 0 )ate to the power of the Distric~ Court to re!llove any trust¢~ r~; appoint a new trustee; to deterrnmc what port1on of trust propen , shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust and for pr~- · viding a scheme of management of the trust property. The District Court was also empowered to direct how the funds of the public trust, the original object of which bas failed, shall be spent and issue furth.::r directions as it thinks fit.

Sections. 4 7 to 51 of Chapter IX provide for the general control over pubhc trusts, of which s. 51 particularly deals with the filling of the vacancy iu the Board of trustees. The writ petition challenged ss. 48 and 51{2) but during the course of the arguments bdorc the High Court objection to the validity of s. 48 was not seriously pressed.

Sections 52 to 65 of Chapter IX were the main subject of controversy of which ss. 52 and 53 were seriously challenged and that challenge found . favour witl1 the High Court, which, as we have seen e<~rlier, struck down s 52(d) and (e) for being u/1ra vires as they did not provide for . prop.:r safeguards of l.:aving the adminis:r.:tion o( the property in the hands of the denomination.

Though th~ validity o[ ss. 77 and 80 o! Chapter Xlll was clwllcngcd in th~: petition, it nppcars this cont.:ntion was not pressed at the time of the arguments before the High Court.

· \\'e have already ref.:rro:d to the contention o( the p~titioncrs/ n:spondcnts while dealing with the first set of appeals which h_as :Jbo been urged in these appeals as to what constitutes the essential pan: of a religion and the fundamental right which a person :has under Article 26 of the Constitution. \Ve have held that what IS nn £. ·

essential part of o rdigion l1as primarily to be ascertained with rc- f.:rencc to the doctrines of that religion. Jn Rmilul Pnnnchand Gandlli's case (supra) it was obs.:rved that: ''Every person .has fundamental right under our Constitution 110t merely to entertum _sue r~ligious belief as may be approved of by his judgment or cons~1: 11~

but to exhibit his belief and id.:as in such overt acts us nre enJ_o~ne r ,. o~ ~:mctioncd by his rdigion and further to prop:tgutc: his r~h~ous VIews for the edification of others'' and that ''Religious pracuc~ or pcrhJrmance1 o( acts in pursuance ~f religious belief are as "much 3 part of rl!ligion as faith or belief in particular doctrines'', \\'hat arc those religious practices in . the J 11in rclir:ion whach ~ rcg~dcu as essential and integral purt of the n:ligio1t w•ll b~ 11 ~~ala G v.-hlc.h has to ~ considered by rcfcrcoce to the tenets of ~ 1"uJc~A·

r~h£.1on. The pctnioncrs/rcspondcots io thi~ case had filed ~c!acd. JalO·· La'>L vf Sha.~htrapath-which deals with Greatness of rcltg•?"~· at' Shan\:JIIa Samstha; Sampali-Dharma-Druvya· Performance of ~ ~g~r nr !\1:ulag,·mtot of rcligtous property· what 'type of person ~ .r- an En· ~hould b-.: rtc. We ha\'e uho a rc~ort of the HinJu Rdt~to~s with d·~~~ iih:nts ,Commis~ion . ( 1960·62) in wbkh Chapter 1~ ~k:~s thC }I

J.un.tnJv".\ments of wh1ch paragraphs 7 to 13 were udn11tt•d t uide p:": ':'~ }~fore thc High <;curt to be relevant as serving a U.'~!:n ~iv~o !'JT \Ltt~m~: th~ matters an Issue. These paragraphs have b.: ain ill an tk.t Judgntcnt and we do not propose to cxtr:tct thelll Ill:• c

RAJASTHAN V. SAJJAN LAL (/aganmohan Rtddy, /.) ' '151 extenso. In paragraph 7 it is stated that Jain scriptures have ·made meticulous rules and regulations for the utilizatioQ. of funds

and . management of the trusts and have enunciated seven types of funds called "Sat ·Kshetras" and have also dicfated the uses to which each type of fund could be put. These seven funds- were then enumerated. Pnrograph-8 refers to the Jiva-Daya· Fund which is apart from the seven Kshctras which can be used for the care and maintenance of birds, animals etc. In paraif1ph·9 it is stated that the funds donated to one Kshetra cannot be utilised for another Kshetra. Even in the saxn.: Kshetra, funds allocated for a particular purpose can be utlllJed onl~ for that purpose and for no other. However, if the purpou for wh1ch the donahon was made become• extinct or if by reuon of circumstances the purpose cannot be carried into eftect either in whole · or in pBrt of where there is a surplus ~~eft after exhauatlnJ the purp01e1 of the trust, the funds in a Kshetra, for the lower purpoaea can be taken to higher ones but not vice-versa. Similarly funds of a lower Kshetra can be transferred to a,ny higher .Kahetra but not vice-versa. The application of the doctrine Q.f cypres may thus be allowed to a Jimit~d extent. In paragraph-10 it was stated that iriCome not spent in ~ny one year is not necessarily surplus. Such balance may have been kept from year to year to accumulate to a larger amount so as to be utilized later in a more effective manner on objects for .which the funds are intended.

Generall~ the :eurposes in the Kshetra are perennial in charncter. They do not fSJl nor do they become in· capable of fulfilment. There is, therefore, no question of exhaust- ing the object for which donations in the Jain religion· are made. Jt is also stated that ·Jnin tenets do not recognize any cognate purpoae in the secular sence of ·the word. The purposee looking alike are not coanate. They are different with d1fferent charaeteristtca. In parngraph~ll it was obte.rved that the. guiding principle in the utlli· 2ntion of funds of a particular Kshetra is the special religious merit. The person receiving the benefit of the funds ts a secondary consi· deratton. Thus the fund for one place or for a particular aroup of p!rsons can b~ used for another place and for other persons_ any- where in the world, but for the same identical object. Paragraph·12 states that by and ·large Jain trusts are public trusts, tho beneficial interest being vested in an uncertain and fluctuating body of JX:rsons, either the public at large or a considerable section of it answering a par~icutar description. The trusts which come into existence on ac- count .of Dravyadan to Kshetras belong to the Jain Sarigh. There is no individual ownership. The possession is alway$ of the Sangh thro~g.h the trustees. In so far as Digatnber Jains are concerned, it is stated in paragraph-13 that they do not have Dev Dravya or Gyar1 Dravya as such. The funds are donated to the

Bhandar Fund rtnd money from that Fund can be used for the purpose of that temple or for any instit~tion that is run by that temple or for . rtny good object. .The money can also be utilized for teaching the principles of Jain philosophy exclusively or along with secular learning· It is also contend-:~d before us that according to the Jain tenets, earning of income from religious property or increasing it is prohi- bited. but we find t~at there is no warrant for this submission. What 75 8

SUPREME CO.URT REPORTS (1974J 2 S.C.R. IS p~·ohibited is only certai p:!rtJes. ln the Shash n methods for mcreasing the reli . heading 'The Method troafp~th-~ravya Sapatali. Tika ·8

gJunodus prho· mcreas1 r · -~r t e !ton How ·to earn interest" 't , ng re •gtous property" and th; cap , 1 IS stated · . . ''?:ner;tlly,. the . following are s~me ~ncreasmg. rcltg•ous . pwpcrty. which

of th-:: Methods of tn the . scnptures :- are strictly prohibited "(J) For th l. . example giving away of th . e re ·~•ous property on interest . e money out of Jt lo the following people :-

• With a vtcw to incrcasin~: C 1 ) ~Ute~~',- ( 2) Fisherman, ( 3) Prostitute; . ( 4) Cul.l- er. "In!! of money to these people is not propl!r. (2) E<1rn~nl: r~t out .of "Devc·Dravya" and buililin

houses etc. With a v1ew to mcreusin~ it (i.e. Deva-Dra,ya/ . ( 3) .Hoarding of. food~ains :With the Deva-Dravy;~ w~th _an mtcnt to sell 1t dunng the ttme when prices "O hi"b thtnkm2 that the "Deva-Dravya·· would thereby in~reosc~

(4) Digging of impulium (B..:wac.Ji) and building on fields etc. earmarked for the idol. ( 5) Churginl! of anv kind of tax in the name of tl1c 1do! on the .I!Oo:ls e\'en when the exci~c or custom liutr has already b~cn charged by the State's Customs Departm~nt.

c These arc- vicious practices :~nd the ··ocva-Dravya" should be increased after forsuki:ng them.'' Jt i~ further stated therein that there call be ex~:cptions ubo. From a ocrusal of the above text it apocars

to us clear tl!at th.:rc is no prohibition from increasin_g the Dcvu-Druvya. On the other hand it permits the increase .of Dcva·Dmvva thou):h not by th~ methods specific:~!Jy cnumcratt;\:1 therein.

Even in respect of these prohibited methods exct"ptions have been permitted. The State can, therefore, bv J;,w rclatin!! to the administration of public trusts direct the in- vc~tmcnt of prooertics of the trust in a specified

manner und in specific invc~tments so as to prolc.ct the corpus from beinJ: dissip:~t.:d or depreciated aniJ to a~surc a rcl!'ulur income. It wa~. however, contended in the Hicb r.ourt as well as before us that ns the funJs bcionl!inl! lo n J;jin rclhtious tru~ts c:lnnot be im·cstctl fur earning

interest with such vcr~ons or institutions which may utilise thCRI for cau.~inu 1/illJa or for other purposes prohibited by the Jain r .:li)!ion. there L'iin he or• interference hy tl1c State in th.:

exercis~ of that ril!ht c:xceot on the: 2round~ of public onh:r. moralilv or health. Tn our view. this contention h:L'I no validity, What was injundC\1 w;~s that invc~tm('nts will not IJ\! mode by the trustees thcmsdv.:s for the purros,·s fnrbiddl·n in the scriptures. rrom this it cannot be inferred th.u the JJin rclicion ha~ forbicldl!n the dcoosit in banks or any insti- tuti{•n m~ntioned in 1 30 of the Act.

\Vt' think that such an argu- nt.:nt i> ~:.~r ;ctchd . c lt –··-··—–.. ….:_ ~.: RAJASTHAN V. SAJJAN LAL' (Jaganmohan Rtddy, J.) In a similar ~ase of . the Jains,' this Court ha•;!"in R I'/ I D G . dl –

h ld h a l u ~ana- chan.l .111 11 s case supra up e t e val1d11y of the prov· . f the Bombay Act analogous to those· contained in Chaplcrs \' ~~~ 0d Vll of the Act. _The an~lo~ous Provisions of s. 1713) of tht~~t were somewhat d1ffcr~nt rn. th~ Bombay Act and constqueotly the Hieh Court <?D a ~oos1dcratron of s. 17(3) held it to be inva&d. We sbal! deal wrth thts aspe~t later.

It was, however, observed in Rutila~ Pw:achand Gandlu's case (supra) that. the provisions relating to registratiOn undoubtedly have been made w1th a view to ensurll due supervision of the trust propertks an'J the exercise of proper C<>olroi over thcru. and that these . are. matters relating to admini.~tr.ltion of trust _property as contemplated b~· Art. 26(d 1 of the Con;titution and cannot. by anv stretch of jma~inatioo. be held to b: on attempt at interference with the ri!lhts of relicious institutions to manage their own affairs.

It was further pointed out that the provisions of the Bombay Act also cast a duty on a public trust to l;eep accouDis and to get them audite:;:l and to prepare balaoce·sheet and to report irre~:ularities. if any. whic!i certainly were not matters of religion and the objections raised with ce~rd to the validity of those provi- . ~ions seem to be alto}!.ether baseless.

~ction · 35 of the Bombay Act which is similar to s. 30 of the Act was upheld on the ground th;1t .. It is a well-established principle of law that truste~ iu ch:u:)!e of tru~t properties should not keep cash money in th~ir hands wh1ch an~ not necessary for immediate expenses: an~ a hst ~f .a~p~v& securities upen which trust money could b: rnvested IS JDI?nabl~ laid down in every legislation on the subj.:ct of. trust." s..-cuon of the Bombav Act which is analo.eous to s .. 31 of the Ac~l wn~f 1~

consid.:red to re salutorv aimed ~~ protecttng the pro~ Y C th t the Asststant om- trust. Section 38 in Chapter Vlll reautreS a •. al ob'ect of th~ missioner when he is satisfi~d that-(a) the ~ngm t be·J properly oublic trust has failed: (b) th~ trust ~rc~rty ~ ~~e co:Uf is neces- mannecd or administered; or (~) the f

1recl.lo~ mav direct the work- ~arv for the a<llllinistration of ~1e pub tc ttus havinll intrr<<t in the 1112 tru.~tce or aov other truste_es. or. person case thes.. · . ..-.;ens fail tru::t to aoply to the rourt for li1rectton ica~~n 10 the cuut t. When to do ~n. he mav himself mak.~. :tn oppl mmission~r to apply, nn there i5 a refusal

hv the Ass1stant To C mmi<sioncr. s~ction 40 application can be made under s. _39 to t 1~ad~ cith~r under s. 38 or l'monwcts the Court on an noohcntion m 't maY consider proper. s 3Q to

Jl::tss suclt ot:dcr thereon ~s. I s w' hich ore applicable S" ti k · 'I•• prOVISIOn ths -c ons 41 to 43 also ma ·~ 51~ 1 .u d' ·s absent for stx mon ~hen the working trustee disclnnns ~r ICS,ed from the truSt. or 1~ d~darcd insolve11t, dcsire5 to be dtsch.~~~le to administer the trus!t refusl's to nc:t ns a tru.~ll'C or is not avm' k'n" such inquiry as · lJnJcr s. 43 it is the Court which after ma ~vln regard to the r~c L' th ink~ fit. uponints n new worki~e. trustee h ar ~nc:c:ccptin~abl:. :~~d enumerated thcrdn. These orovtslon~ ~Preocts of the Jain rdte:• -~ do not in nnv wny conflict with anv 0 t \sioncr Ms not !>~en t"''~­ Thc Assistant Commissioner or the f0m

~~ccpt in the matt~r 0 P (\r anv P<>wcr to vnss orders by thcmse ves. as to invite a c targc s •nt . th~ court so • • c ahon of an :tpplicatlon to .. ' SUPJ.!MB COV.T .lli!POaTS [1974) 1 a.c.l.

arbitrariness or capriciousneu. It is tho Court which hu been em- powerd to pass such orders as it con~idera fit accordia& to the circum· stances of the case, which it can only do after heariDJ the partiet and lheir objection$, if any, uraed before it. The Court ahould ~ ex· pected to have reaard for the riJbts of the partioa and if any of their fundamental riabts is infrinaed, they have remediet both under tho Jaw by an appeal or under the Collltitution.

The Hiah Court, as we hive already notlcod, struck down 1. 52 (l>(d) & (o) 11 the provision• of •· 53 did not iay down ~r 1aCesuards for leavinJ tho admloiJtratlon of tho ~petdea In the haDdl of a denomination. What wo have now to couiC!er 11 whether thll declslori it Justified. It ls, therefore, nocouary to eum~ the rtle· vant provis1oni of as. 52 an~ 53 of Olapter X of the Act which are u under:

"52; ( 1) The provisions contained in this Chapter ahall apply to every public t,rust- (a) which vests in the State Government, or (b) which is maintained at the e~penSe of the State Oov·

ernment, or (c) which is manag~ directly by the State Government, or (d) which is under the auporintendenc~ of tho Court of Wards, or · (e). of which the aross annual income is ten thouand

rupees or more. 4(2) The State Government shall, as aoon as may be niter the commencement of this Chapter, publiah in the official Gazette a Jist of the public trusts to which · this Chapter applies and may by like

no~iflcation and in like manner ada· or vary such list." "53. ( 1) As from such date as the State Government may appoint in lhis behalf the management of a public trust to which this Chapter applies shall notwithstanding

anything contained in aay provision of this Act or in any law. custom or usage, vest in a Committee of management to be constituted by the State Government in the manner f . h~reinafter provided .and the Sta~e Government may appoint d1fferent dates for different pubhc trusts for the purpose of this section.

(2) X (3) X ( 4) A Committee of management shall consist of a Chairman 1\nd such even number of members not exceed- ing ten and not less than two as the-State Government may deterrnin~

·A c RAJASTHAN v. SAJJAN LAL (laganmohan Rtddy, 1.) (5). The Chairman and members of a Committ:.e . of management shall be appointed by the State Government by notification in the official G~tte from amongst- .

(a) ·trustees of publk trusts representing tho same reliaion or p~rsuasion and having the same objects~ and (b) persons interested in such public trusts or in the en· dowments thereof or belonaing to tho denomination

for the purpose of which or for the benefit of whom the trust was founded, in accordance with the aeneral wishes of tho persons to . interested so far as such wishes can be a1certalned ln the prescribed manner,

Provided that in the c:ase of a ,PUbllc trust having a here· ditary trustee, such trustee~ and tn the ease of a Math, the head thereof, shall be the Chairman of the Committee of manap:ement, if he is willing to serve as such.''

lt may be observed from t~e above provisions that s. 52(1)(d) which has also been struck down by the High Court has no applica· tion in this cas~, because· it deals with a ·public trust which is under the superintendence of the Court of Wards.

~is part of the judg· mC'nt is, therefore, clearly wrong. We will now have to only con~ slder the validity of s. 52 (1 )(e) which concern! a public trust of which the gross annual income is Rs. 10,000/- or more.

It is allcpd that Nakodajl Parunath temple is a pubUc trust or which the aross annual Jnc:ome exceeds Rs. 10,000/· and is, tbere- fort-. governed by clause (e) of sub-s. (1) of a,

5~ of the Act. Whether this is so or not cannot be determined by us merely on the n.fltgatlons in the petition. It is for the State Government, if it in· tends to apply the provisions of Chapter X of the Act to the said temple, to include it in the list of public trusts published under sub·•· (2) of s. 52 .in the official Gazette. Section 53 postulates the appli· co.tion of Ch!J.pter X before the management of tho temple can be sniu to vest in a Committee of management to be constituted by the S~ate Govemtnent in the manner provided in ~at section. Until a notification is t>Ublished under sub-s. (2) of s. 52 the respondents cannot claim ,that their rights are affected. The learned Advocate for the respondents. however, submits that when it is apprehended that the Act may be made applicable to the Nakodaji Parasnath temple, the denomination or persons il\(erested in that temple could cbal· lenge the vires of the Act or of any of its provisions. Even assuming that the provi~io.ns of ~~apter X are made applicable to the temple or to other stmilar religious trusts, though these have not yet been made applicable, the question will be whether the t>rovisions of sup-s. (5) of s. 53 empower the Government to take away from a religious denomination the management of that public religious trust not al· ready vested in it, as specified in clauses (a> to (d) of sub-s.' (1) of s. 52, and vest it in a Committee to be .constituted under that sub· Section and whether s.uch vesting WOUld CQntravene the fundamental rights guaranteed under clauses (.b) and (d) of Art. 26.

~UP.REME COURT JlEPOJlTS [ 1974] 2 S.C.Jl, We have alrcadr referred to the decisions of this Court which deal with matters to wh1ch clauses (b) and (d) of Art. 26 apply. It was pointed out in those cases that under clause (d) of Art. 26 a religious denomination has undoubtedly a right to administer its properties but only in accordance with law. While the State has power to regulate the administration of trust properties. it cannot by law tal\e away the right to administer those properties altogether and to vest it in any oth~r authority which does not comprise that denomination. To do so would be a violation of ~e right guaranteed under that clause. We have also noticed that the administration of the property of the deno-· mination is obviously outside the scope of clause (b) b:cause that clause only relates to affairs in matters of religion such as the per· form~e of the relijious rites or ceremonies or the obst!rvance of religious festivals and the like and does not at ·an refer to the adminis· tration of the property which is dealt witll in clause (d) of Art. 26. What we have to decide is whether tbe provisions of sub-s. ( 1 ) read with aub·ss. (4) and (5) of a. 53 authorise the veatlna of the admlnil· tl·ation of a public religious trust in a Committee of manapment which does not represent the reUJious denomination and which is entitled to manaae and administer that rellafous trust.

The Com- mittee of manaaement that the State Government is empowered to constitute under sub-s. (5) of s. 53 has to be from amongst the tw6 categories specified therein in accordance with the general wishes of the perso!JS so interested so far. as such wishes can be ascertained in the prescribed manner. The State Government has pr~scribed the man· ner of ascerf!lining the wishes of the persons interested in the endow· ment in r. 36 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Rules, 1962. This rule provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the perso~ mterested under sub-s. (5) of s. 53, the State Government shall direct the Assistant Commissioner to issue a public notice in such manner u he may think proper for fnvitina augesti.on• for the constl.tutJcm of the Committee of manapment.

The A11i1tant Commissioner, thall forwud the •uaae•tlon• 10 received alona with hi• comment.~ to the State Government throuah' the Commi11Joner. The State Govern· ment may thereafter vest the manaaement ot n public religious trust under aub-s. ( 1) of 1. 53 in a Committee" so apPointed under sub~. · (5) of that section. We are not relylna on thli rule for testlna the constitutionality of a. 53(5).

It is contended on behalf of the State of Ra.jasthan that clautes (a) and (!b) of sub·•· (5) of •• 53 may b& read reuonlably fn such · a way u to ,presume their validity, for u theae provisions are ·applt· cable to trusts of dift'ercnt hue1, the Gove~nmont will bo expected to call for. sunestlon• from those denomination• who may repment the reliaton to which the public trust belongs from penon• lntereated In a public trust or endowment belonaina to the denomination, and only af~er considerln~ their wishes that the Chairman and the members of the Comm!ttee wou1d be I'Pl'Ointect It 11 apparent that 1. 53 makes it obllaatory to aopolnt the Chairman and memben of the Commlttei from amo11pt-(a> tru•tee1 ot '-public tru1t1 re'Prtlent!nJ the sam• religion or omuaslon and havlna the 11me object•, and (b) per1on'. intere1ted In 1uch public tru1t1 or In the endowment• theroof or be• · c

r !lAHSTHAN V. SAJJAN LAL (Jaganmohall R.~ddy, !.) 1 •ins 10 the denomination for the purpose of wh· h /1 ~n~1 whom tbe t:ust was found~d. These provisi~~s ~~ for the benc- ""'cnt to nppomt two sets of persons as en,.;~

able tbe Gov- er.~· _u,an and mcmbe f the Commtttce, name y, one set representing trust rs ~ustS of the concerned .religion or pe~uasion and ha~~ of public objcc's, the second set ts of persons mtercstcd in such g u~l? same or jn the endowments _thereof, persons bclo~giog to the J:no~ tr~ts 8 lor the purpose of whtch and tor the benefit ot whom th 1 nation founded.

The High Court thought that if tbe State Ge rust wa~ · t ns of the ftrst c· t g ovcrnment appotn s. pcrso a c O:Y ~r s_ccond category they may not ncccss.t~tly be. of. t~e same denommal~on which manages the trust. Accordmg to tt, 1t ts Of!ly ~1c persons tD the second c:ttegory \\Ito may be of the same denommatton. . It :-vas observed that since Art. 26. contemplates not only a de~ommatton but a section of lbe denomina- llllO, the trustl!es of a publtc trust repr~seming the same religion mar oot necessarily be members of that section of th.: denomination. managing the prop~rty even if such public trust has the same object as that of the pubhc trust the management of which is b.:ing transfer- red to the Committee of management.

In our view, the hypothesis on which the ffigh Court has based: it~ conclusions is not warranted by the provisions of suf}.s. (5) of s. 53 of the Act. In the first category, apart from the Commiuee being. et>n.1tit utcd from amongst the trustees of public trusts representing the same religion, tfte Committee can also be cons!ituted from amongst the trustees of the same persuasion. The significance of the word 'pcrwasion' and what it connotes docs not Sc'l:m to have been con- std~red by the High Court. The word 'persuJSion' is a synonym of f:tilh, creed, denomination,

religion c'c. !Vebster's Thir~ New ~~lcrnati?n:tl Dictionary Vol. H, p. 1688, gl\'eS ~c. mcamng of p.:rsu;1~1on" among oth~rs (a) as "a syst.:m of rchgto~ or. other bdicfs (the scvcr.tl protestants .•.• sl; (b) a group, fac.tton, sect, or p;lrty th,Jt :ulhcres to a particular system of be lids or tdeas. o: pro- mntcs a particular view theory or cause …. n. The same diC,!i00[Y F in Vol. I gives the mc;ning of "denomination" at P· 602 as a re !~ giou~ group of a community of bcli~vcrs called by .the ~~

~am: · lnyth ~·r words. in the first category als_o a Co~f!mtttee st bclon~ P01~'cJ from persons of the dcnomin~tton to wht~h the ~ui tego~ as 111 the scconJ cat~gory with this .difference t~.tt !n tocm tlte ~ruste5 tf the State Government choos~s. tt cnn ~ppou>t. tt . tho third cate- G representing th;tt dcnomination or ~rsuaston V>h~l~

1~-J d·nominarion S•Jry I rom amongst the p.:rsonJ who b.:!•'11!l' .to .t c~a~~~~ to" note that ~hu may not be trust~es a.~ such. It IS Stgtufi h been defined' rrson5 inlet'e~ted' falling in the second category a;c tempks and· Y sub-s. (9) of s. 2 as including for the ~urposcsc~ of a temple, ~llcu/u in dauo;e (a) and (b) namdy; .<a? 10 !h~abit of atccnding the a person who is entitlt:d to attcod or IS 10 th 1 ' who is entitled .to It Performance of worship or service in the teOlp ed~r 'bution of grfts Pari 1 •

k' in the tstn son- tl a"lll): or is in the habit of parta ·tn~ . 1 of the math or a per tcrcof, (b) in the case of a matlt. 11 dtsctp e, belongs''. Even: whcr~ N the rdi~:ious persuasion to which the mat 1

·I l l SUPJ.I.BMB COURT J.I.BPOI.TS [ 1974] 2 a.c.1.. the persons interested satisfy the above requirements th~ additional requirement o_f clause (b) ot sub-s, (5) of s. 53 is that such persons must be also persons for whose benefit the trust was founcfed. reading of clause (a) of sub-s. ~5) clearly indicates that the trustees must represent the concerned religion or persuasion~ which includes a denomination. It could not have been the intention to appoint a Committee of management comprising trustees of a public trust of a particular religion. or persuasion who da not belong to that r_eliglon or persuasion or denomination. Nor does cliuse (b) of suo·s, (S) ()£'s, S3 empower persons who do not belong to a de®minatlon to be appointed to a 1;1u&Uc trust of that. denomination. Aaain the ~·ord

.. denomination,. 1s wide enouah to include sections thereof, and it C:ln· not therefore be said, as the Hlah Court seema to assume, that a sec .. tion of the denomination managing the property may not be the samt as trustees of public trusts representing the same religion, ~ven .if tho public trust has the same objC(:t as that of the public trust the manage· ment of. which is being transferred to the Committee. If s, 53(S) (a) is read in the manner suggested by us, as it should be, the difficulties pointed out by the High Court wo~ld not arise at all.

It appears to us, therefore, that merely because the provisions of ~ub·s. (5) of s. 53 enable the Government to appoint a Committee from the two categories specifi~d in that clause, it does not mean that the Government wiU appoint or can appoint persons who are not constitutionally entitled to be appointed to that particular trust. If the temple is a Swetamber temple, merely because the Dlgambors, like Swetambers, are also J£1ins, it does not empower the Government to appoint them ns a Chairman and members of the Committee of management. The very fact that th~ Legislature has provided for the ascertainment of the general wishes of the persons interested is a positive direction to the State Government to take those wishes into consideration in the matliner to be prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act This provision furnishes, in our view, a safegunrd against the appointment of the Chairman and the members of the Committee to manage the trusts, who do not subscribe or adhere to the tenets of n particular religion or denomination to which the trust belongs.

No such appointment can be made which contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitu· tion, and if any such appointment is made, those who have a riQ;ht .to challenge it can do so and have the appointment struck down. In this view clause (e) of sub-s. (1) of s. 52 read wi•h sub-s. (5) of s. 53 as interpreted by us cannot be held to be invalid.

Lastly we will consider the validity of sub-s. ( 3) of s. 17 which provides that an aoolication to be presP.nted under sub-s. ( 1) of th1t section ''shall be accomoanied bv ·such fee, if any. not exceeding 1ive ruoees. and to be utilised for such ourooses. as mav be orescrih~d." Rule 18 of the Rules soecifies the ratP-s of fee pavable on diff,.rent values of the truc;t oronertv enumP.rat .. d ther .. in. antt furthP.r ornvides th~t the fee shall be credited to 1he Con!;()lidated Fund of the State. The High Court seems to have accepted the contention of the learned c

c RAJASTHAN v. SAJJAN LAL (Jaganmohan Reddy1 J.) Advocate for the petitioners that for the levy to be a fee. there must at least be a provision that the amount so collec~d should not be paid into the Consolidated Fund of the State or should state that it should be utilised separately for the upkeep of the ·machinel'Y for" registration and since the Act does not specify for what purpose the fee would be utilised and has left it to the State Government to denote the purposes· in the Rules sub-s. (3) of s. 17 does not levy a fee but a tax, which the State Legislature has not the power under List II of Schedule VII to. the Constitution to l~yy.

Under the Constitution a distinction has been made between a tax and a fee and in each of the legislative lists power has been given for levy of various forms of taxe_s. There is an entry in each of the three lists as regards fees which could be levied in resp~t of any of the matters dealt with in the Jist. As was observed by Latham, C. J. ol the High Court of Australia in Matthews v.

Chicory Marketing BoOJ'd(1 ): "A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered''. These observations were approved by this

Court in Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shir:~r Mutt's case, (supra) where Mukherjea, J., as he then was, said that· the essence of taxation is compulsion and imposition made for public pur- pose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. that is to say, that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. A fee on the other hand is payment for a special benefit or privilege which the individual receives. It is regarded as a sort of a return or consideration for services rendered and should on the face of the legislative provision he co-related to the expenses in- curred by Government in rendering the services. In that case s. 76 ( 1) of the Madras. Hindu .Religious and Charitable Endowmen1s Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951) which related to the paynn:at ef annual contribution stated that .it was for the purpose of properly administering the religious trusts and institutions wherever they extSted. In determining whether that levy was a tax or a fee one of the mate· rial facts taken into consideration to negative the theory that it was a fee was that the money raised by levy of the contribution was not ear- marked or specified for defraying the expenses that the Government had to incur in performing the services.

All the collections went to the Consolidated Fund of the State and all the expenses had to be met not out of those collections but out of the general revenues by a proper method of appropriation as was done in case of other Government expenses. Though this was so it was nonetheless observed at p. 1044: "That in itself might not be conclusive". But as there was total absence of any co-relation between the expenses incurred

by the Government and the amount raised by contribution under the provision of s. 76, it was observed that the theory of a return or counter-payment or quid pro quo could not have any possible application to that case. ThYs case was considered in The Secretarv, Gow~rnment of Madras, Home Department & Another v. Zenith Lamp & Electrical Ltd. (2 ) by 60 C.L.R. 263, ~76. (2) C.A. No. 293 of 1967 decided on Novr. l I, 1972. [ 1974] 2 S.C.R.

the Constitution Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Dwivedi, J.) was a party. Sikri, C.J., referring to the observations of Mukherjea; J., in Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt's case lsupra) that the fact collections went to the Consolidated Fund was not in itself conclusive thought that not much stress can be laid on this point, because Art. 266 of the Constitution requires that all revenues raised by the State shall form part of the Consolidat.ed Fund. He considered the observations of the Privy Council in Attorney-GeMral jor British Columbia v. Esqu,imalt ar~d Nanlmo Railway 'Company ~I Others( 1·) and distinguished it, because the Privy Council did not have to deal with fees and taxes but interpreted the word "taxation" in s. 22 of the Act therein considered, to mean a compulsory levy by the State. Whether it was fee or tax did not matter. The only question was whether it was compulsory levy. In the Zenith Lamp & Electrical Lt(l's ca!:e (S\lpra) it was found t~at there was not enough material to determic ~ whether the fees taken in Courts under Entry No. 3 of list II of Schedule VII to the Constitution were taxes or fees

namely, whether the State was making a profit out of the administration of civil justice or whether the amounts so collected from those fees were spent on the administration of civil justice. In that view the case was remanded to' the High Court to decide whether the impugned fees were court fees or taxes on litigants or litigation.

The case of the State. in this case is that the fee is a sort of contri- bution levied on public trusts towards meeting the expenses incurred by the State Government in rendering services to the public trusts through the agency of the Devasthan Department and that according to the budget proyision .for the year 1964-65 the expenditure on the Devasthan Department was Rs. 2,76,715/- as against the income of only Rs. 3,000/- for the same year from the registration fee. This

averment in the reply of the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, was not controverted by the petitionets either by a reply thereto or by any other material produced by them. In these circumstances, the .mere fact that the amount was paid under r. 18 into the Consolidated Fund is by itself not sufficient ·to hold that the levy under s. 17 (3) of the Act is tax.

As the income by way of fees is far below the expenditure incurred on the Devasthan Department, ·the levy would be a fee. In this view, s. 17 ( 3) cannot be held to be invalld and ultra vires the powers of State Legislature. We express no opinion on the question whether s. 17 ( 3 ) can be declared to be in valid on account of Rule 18 requiring the fee to be deposited in the State Consolidated Fund.

In Civil Appeal No. 1647 of 1967 the Act has been challenegd on the grounds similar to these in · the other appeals and no separate arguments were addressed, except tho~e advanced by the respondents' Advocate in the other appeals. This appeal also will be decided accordingly.: The. question whether t~e two temples which the State contended were public. trusts and the petitioner averred were his private property was not agitated before the High Court, as the petitioner was then content to have the _matter disposed of in accordance with the (1) I.L.R. 43 Born. 507

MJASTHAN v. SAJJAN LAL (laganmollan Reddyj J.) decision In the Writ Petition which is the subject matter of the secotld set of appeals. It was open to him to have invited the High Court to give a finding on the question whether. the two temples were his private property, but since he has not done so the question cannot be gone into in this appeal. The appropriate authority under the Act will however decide this question before applying the Act to these tempi~. In the result the appeals of the State are allowed. The direction given in the Writ Petition No. 50 of 1962, out of which Appeal No. 1083 of 1967 arises, that Rikhabdevji is a Swetambei temple and that the State of Rajasthan should constitute a Committee for its manage- ment as provided under tlie Act is set aside. In this appeal as also in appeals Nos. 1119 and 1647 of 1967, the decision of the High Court that s. 17(3) and s. 52(1) (d) and (e) are void and unconstiMional c

is al~o set aside. Appeals Nos. 1092 and 1087 of 1967 filed by the respective respondents are dismissed. In the circumstances, eac.h party will bear its own costs. P.B.R. 9-L 748 Sup Cfj74

Appeals No. 1092 and 1087 o/1967 dismissed • .A.pp~als Nos. 1119 and 1647 of 1967 allowed.