Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
3. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Rajasthan, has submitted that recovery of some of the looted property had been made on the basis of the disclosure statements made by the said respondents. The law provides for a presumption that they,had participated in the crime and, therefore, the High Court has wrongly acquitted the said accused and thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri Altaf Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the said two accused, has vehemently opposed the appeal contending that mere recovery of looted property on the disclosure statement of the accused, is not enough to bring home the charges of offence of loot or dacoity, when the recovery is made after expiry of a considerable period from the date of incident and particularly when the nature of the looted property is such which can change hands easily. Thus, no inference can be drawn against the respondents. The order of acquittal made by the High Court has been passed on proper appreciation of facts and application of law. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. Admitted facts remained so far as the two respondents/ accused are concerned, that no test identification parade was held at all. Further none of the eye witnesses, particularly, Shashi Devi (PW.12), Santosh Jagwayan (PW.13), Kripa Dayal Yadav (PW.2), Preeti (PW.14) and Sandhya (PW.15), identified either of the said respondents in the court. Therefore, there is no evidence so far as their identification is concerned.
7. Thus, the sole question remains to be decided whether A adverse inference could be drawn against the accused merely on the basis of recoveries made on their disclosure statements. 7.1. In Guiab Chand v. State of M.P., AIR 1995 SC 1598, this Court upheld the conviction for committing dacoity on the 3 basis of recovery of ornaments of the deceased from the possession of the person accused of robbery and murder immediately after the occurrence. 7.2. In Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2007 SC 1355, this Court relied on the judgment in Guiab C Chand (supra) and observed that simply on the recovery of stolen articles, no inference can be drawn that a person in possession of the stolen articles is guilty of the offence of murder and robbery. But culpability for the aforesaid offences will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the D nature of evidence adduced. It has been indicated by this Court in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1956 SC 54, that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from certain E circumstances. 7.3. In Tulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR 1954 SC 1, this Court has indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act 1872 has to be drawn under the 'important time factor'. If the ornaments in F possession of the deceased are found in possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if a long period has expired in the interval, the presumption cannot be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. 7.4. In Earabhadrappa v. State of Kamataka AIR 1983 SC 446, this Court held that the nature of the presumption under Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act must depend upon the nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time-limit can H be laid down to determine whether possession is recent or STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. TALEVAR & ANR. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.] otherwise. Each case must be judged on its own facts. The question as to what amounts to recent possession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according "as the stolen article is or is not calculated to pass readily from hand to hand". If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed could not be said to be too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that period. 7.5. Following such a reasoning, in Sanjay@ Kaka etc. etc. v. The State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2001 SC 979, this Court upheld the conviction by the trial court since disclosure statements were made by the accused persons on the next day of the commission of the offence and the property of the deceased was recovered at their instance from the places where they had kept such properties, on the same day. The Court found that the trial Court was justified in holding that the disclosure statements of the accused persons and huge recoveries from them at their instance by itself was a sufficient circumstance on the very next day of the incident which clearly went to show that the accused persons had joined hands to commit the offence of robbery. Therefore, recent and unexplained possession of stolen properties will be taken to be presumptive evidence of the charge of murder as well. 7.6. In Ronny Alias Ronald James Alwaris & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 1251, this Court held that apropos the recovery of articles belonging to the family of the deceased from the possession of the appellants soon after the robbery and the murder of the deceased remained unexplained by the accused, and so the presumption under Illustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act would be attracted : "It needs no discussion to conclude that the murder and the robbery of the articles were found to be part of the same transaction. The irresistible conclusion would [2011) ·6 S.C.R. therefore, be that the appellants and no one else had committed the three murders and the robbery." (See also: Baijur v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 522; and Mukund alias Kundu Mishra & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 2622). 7.7. Thus, the law on this issue can be summarized to the effect that where only evidence against the accused is recovery of stolen properties, then although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder might have been committed C at the same time, it is not safe to draw an inference that the person in possession of the stolen property had committed the murder. It also depends on the nature of the property so recovered, whether it was likely to pass readily from hand to hand. Suspicion should not take the place of proof.
8. In the instant case, accused Kuniya was arrested on 24.12.1996 and a silver glass and one thousand rupees were alleged to have been recovered on his disclosure statement on 29.12.1996. Again on disclosure stater.1ent dated 2.1.1997, a E scooter alleged to have been used in the dacoity, was recovered. Similarly, another accused Talevar was arrested on 19.1.1997 and on his disclosure statement on 26.1.1997, two thousand rupees, a silver key ring and a key of Ambassador car alleged to have been used in the crime were recovered. Thus, it is evident that recovery on the disclosure statements F of either of the respondents/accused persons was not in close proximity of time from the date of incident. More so, recovery is either of cash, small things or vehicles which can be passed from one person to another without any difficulty. In such a fact situation, we reach the inescapable conclusion that no G presumption can be drawn against the said two respondents/ accused under Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. No adverse inference can be drawn on the basis of recoveries made on their disclosure statements to connect them with the commission of the crime. STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. TALEVAR & ANR. [OR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
9. The instant appeal has been prepared by the State against the judgment and order of acquittal of the respondents by the High Court. The law on the issue is settled to the effect that only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for c interference. (See : Brahm Swaroop & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC 280; V. S. Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai & Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 317; and Rukia Begum & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 4 SCC 779).
10. In view of the above, we do not find any reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgment and order of the High Court acquitting the said respondents. The appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. R.P. Appeal dismissed.