Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
17. A Judge should not perceive a situation in a generalised manner. He ought not to wear a pair of spectacles so that he can see what he intends to see. There has to be a set of facts to express an opinion and that too, within the parameters of law.
18. In this regard, another.aspect needs to be noted. We have already stated that some of the directions are in the nature of legislation or policy. In Union of India mu/ another v. Deoki Nam/an Aggarwa/6 a three-Judge Bench has observed that the power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts and, therefore, the court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. 4 Bacon, "Essays: Of Judicature in l The Works of Francis Bacon" (Montague, Basil, Esq ed., Philadelphia: A Hart, late Carey & Hart. 1852), pp. 58-59. ' Frankfurter, Felix in Clark, Tom C., '"Mr Justice Frankfurter: •.-J Heritage for all Who love the law'·". 51 ABAJ 330. p. 332 ( 1965) 6 1992Supp(l)SCC323 c [2016] 12.S.C.R.
19. In Venwreddy Kumaraswamy Reddy and another v. State. of A.P. 7 the Court observed that the judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased.
20. In this context, we may fruitfully refer to the authority in Sureslt Seth v. Commr., I11dore Municipal Corponttion mu/ otlzers8 wherein it has been held that the Court cannot issue any direction to the legislature to make any particular kind of enactment because under the constitutional scheme, Parliament and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power to enact laws and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to enact a particular piece of legislation. In Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Associatio11 v. U11io11 of l11dia a11d a11otlter9 it has been ruled that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly, when an executive authority exercises a legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to the delegated authority of a legislature, such executive authority cannot be asked to enact a law which it has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority. This view has been reiterated in State of Jammu & Kasltmir v. A.R. Zakki and otlters'0•
21. In this regard, the following passage from the authority in Ma11oj Sltarma v. State'', would be relevant:- "The doctrine of judicial restraint which has been emphasised repeatedly by this Court e.g. in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass 1" and State of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi13 restricts the power of the Court and does not permit the Court to ordinarily encroach into the legislative or executive domain. As observed by this Court in the above decisions, there is a broad separation of powers in the Constitution and it would not be proper for one organ of the State to encroach into the domain of another organ." '(2006) 2 sec 670 '(2005) 13 sec 287 '(1989) 4 sec 187 '"1992 Supp ( 1) sec 548 "(2008) 16 sec 1 " (2008J 1 sec 683 " (2008J 4 sec no STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH v. SUBHASH CHANDRA JAlSWAL [DIPAK MlSRA, J.]
22. In State of U.P. v. Mahindra mu/ Mahindra Ltd. 1 ~, the Court observed:- "Within our Constitution, we have specifically demarcated the ambit of power and the boundaries of the three organs of the society by laying down the principles of separation . of powers, which is being adhered to for carrying out democratic functioning of the country. So far as the legislation is concerned, the exclusive domain is with the legislature. Subordinate legislations are framed by the executive by exercising the delegated power conferred by the statute, which is the rule-making power. The judiciary has been vested with the power to interpret the aforesaid legislations and to give effect to them since the parameters of the jurisdiction of both the organs are earmarked. Ther!!fore, it is always appropriate for each of the organs to function within its domain." c
23. Some of the directions, as we perceive, are in the sphere of D policy. A court cannot take steps for framing a policy. As is evincible, the directions issued by the High Court and the queries made by it related to various spheres which, we are constrained to think, the High Court should not have gone into. It had a very limited !is before it. Be it stated, the directions may definitely show some anxiety on the part of the learned Judges, but it is to be remembered that directions are not issued solely out of concern. They have to be founded on certain legally justifiable principles that have roots in the laws of the country. In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to the following passage from St(l/e of Utt"r Pradesh "nd oilier$. v. Anil Kum"r Sh"rma mu/ "notller1·':- "17. Quoting the observations in respect of policy-making by Lawton, L.J. in Laker Airways16 A.S. Anand, C.J., as he then was, reiterated the principle that the "role of the Judge is that of a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the players how to play". Anand, C.J. added: 1'(2011) 13 sec 77· 1'(201.5) 6 sec 716 1'' Laker Airways Ltd. v. Deptt. of Trade, 1977 QB 643 : ( 1977) 2 WLR 234 : ( 1977) 2 All ER 182 (CA) c .. F "The judicial whistle needs to be blown for a purpose and with caution. It needs to be remembered that court cannot run the Government. It has the duty of implementing the constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights but they cannot push back the limits of the Constitution to accommodate the challenged violation."
24. Be it noted, the said case also arose from the High Court of Allahabad where sweeping directions were issued. Thus anlaysed, we are of the convinced opinion that the. High Court has crossed the boundaries of the controversy that was before it. The courts are required to exercise the power of judicial review regard being had to the controversy before it. There may be a laudable object in the mind but it must flow from the facts before it or there has to be a specific litigation before it. Additionally, the High Court should have reminded itself that it cannot enter into the domain where amendment to legislations and other regulations are necessary. We are absolutely conscious that it is the duty of the State Governmentto discharge its obligations in the matters relating to law and order and remain alert to the issues that emerge. It has a duty also to see that the investigations are speedily completed in an appropriate manner. If there is a failure oflaw and order situation, the executive is to be blamed. In the maintenance of law and order situation the judicial officers are not to be involved. But the executive has to remain absolutely alive to its duties and we are sure, the State Government shall look into the aspects and endeavour to see that appropriate steps are taken to maintain the law and order situation.
25. A few words by way of clarification. Though we have not appreciated the opinion expressed and the directions issued by the High Court as the opinions arc general in nature arid directions fall in the legislative domain and some of them are beyond the scope of the litigation, yet we have observed certain aspects in the preceding paragraph. Our observations made hereinabove are words of caution for the State and we are sure that the State shall remain alive to its obligations.
26. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. The High Court is requested to fix a fresh date and dispose of the writ petition in accordance with law. Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.