Karirnbil a n v. State of Kerafa Ayyan:ar J. December 5. determination of the ceiling in respect of different individuals who are brought within the scope of the enactment, and (3) ss. 52 and 64for determining
the compensation payable to the several classes of persons whose lands are acquired under Act, all these are violative the guarantee of the equal protection of laws under Art. 14 of thr C,,nstitution.
I therefore agree in tho order proposed that the petitions be allowed, and with costs. Petitions allowed. STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. M/S. B. K. MONDAL AND SONS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K.
SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOo, K. C. DAs GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA .AYYANGAR, JJ.) State Government-Enjoying beiufit of non-gratuitous work- Ij bound to pay compen•ation-Absence of valid contract, if exo- nerate• !iability-lndia'lt Oo'lttract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)-•.70 Government of India Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo.5. Oh.42), •.175(3). By s. 70 of the Contract Act, "where a per•on lawfully
does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously; and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore,
~he thing so done or delivered". Under s.175(3) of the Govern- ment of India Act all contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of a province shall be expre8'ed to be made by the Governor of the province and shall be executed on
behalf of the Governor by mch persons and in such manner as he may director authorise. The respondent, a firm of building contractors doing cons- truction works for the Provincial Government did certain
additional construction on the reque1t of its officers. Its bills for these latter works were not paid and it sued the Govern- ment basing its claim on contract and in the alternative on s. 70 of the Contract Act. The defence of the Provincial
Government, inter alia, was that there was no valid and bind- ing contract and s. 70 had no application. The trial Judge found that although there was no valid contract under s.175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the claim was jutified under s. 70 of the Contract and decreed the suit. The Court of appeal affirmed that decree. The State appealed by special leave.
lleld (Per curiam), that the courts below were right in holding that s. 70 of the Contract Act applied to the case and the appeal must fail. Per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ.-
Whether a mandatory provision in a statute is merely directory or obligatory should be decided on a careful examination of · the scope of the statute and the object of the particular provi· sion. In enacting s.175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the intention of the parliament was that the state
should not be burdened with liability based on unauthorised contracts. The provision made was inJ'ublic interest and so the word •shall' used therein must be he! to make it obliga- tory and not directory .
.<Jelh Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India, (1962] 2 S. C. R. 880, approved. Ohatlurbhllj Vithaldfl8 Jasani v. Moruhwar Prashram [1964] S. C.R. 817, explained. In order that a person can invoke s. 70 of the Contract
Act he must be able to show (1) that he acted lawfully,(2) that he did not intend to act gratuitously and (3) that the other person enjoyed the benefit. A claim for compensation under s. 70 therefore is not
one based on any subsisting contract but proceeds on the basis that something was done or delivered to another who voluntari· ly accepted it even though he had always the option to refuse the same.
Recognition of the claim in the present case, could not therefore, amount to a contravention of s.175(3) of the Government of India Act, either directly or indirectly. The word •!awfully' in s. 70 of the Contract Act means
that after something is done or delivered by one person to another and is voluntarily accepted and enjoyed by the latter, a lawful relationship arises between the two which attaracts s. 70 of the Contract Act. In cases falling under the section, there cannot, therefore be any scope for claims for specific performance or for damages for breach of contract, the claim for compensation under the section being on the
footing that there has been no con tract and the conduct of parties has created a rela tionahip resembling that arising out of a contract. l'6l State of W11t B111gal v. M/s. B. K, M""'41
IHI Stalt of Wtsl B1n1al v, 11//1. B.Jr. Mun'41 There is nothing in s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, tested in the light of s. 23 of the Contract Act, that for- bids a claim under s. 70 of the Contract Act, There is no
conllict between the two sections, each covering a distinct and separate field and s. 70 Cor;tract Act should be regarded rather as supplementing s. 175(3} of the Government of India Act.
Chuli Lal v. Bhagu:an Dru, (1889) I.L.R. 11 Al 1. 234 disapproved. Held, further, that in construing a specific statutory pro- vision such as s. 70 of the Contract Act it would be unreason- able to seek assistance from English decisions on statutory provisions contained in English law.
Ramanandi Kw.r v. KalawatiKUtr, (1927) L.R. 55 I.A 18, referred to. The State Government, as much as an ordinary citizen, must be subject to s. 70 of the Contract Act and it was wrong to suggest that its position was like that of a minor and, therefore, it was outside the scope of s. 70 of the Act.
Sudland Ghoaal v. Balaram Mardana, (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. I, referred to. Case law referred to. Per Sarkar and Das Gupta, lJ. – The question in the instant ca.e was whether the three requisites of s. 70 of the Contr
. Act had hem satisfied. There was no dispute that the _, overnment had taken benefit of the work it urgently ne~<1cd the w~rk and put it to its use immediately. It was also clear that the respondent did not intend to do the work
gratuitously. What the r.quest made by the officers did was to inform the rtsponden t that the Government needed the work immediately and would pay for it when done, and works similar the respondent, who had previou•ly done and
been paid for, readily acted on it. There can also be no doubt that the work was done lawfully. Even ·assuming that work done under a contract Invalid under s. 175(3} of the Government of India Act, would be unlawful because of evasion of it, that section does not say that work done without any contract at all, as in the ins- tant case, would be work unlawfully done nor docs it make it unlawful for the Government to take benefit of work done for it without any contract at all.
Section 175(3} of the Government of India Act applies to a consensual contract which the Government makes and not to something which is also called a contract but which the (i) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS
law brings into existence by a fiction irrespective of the con- sent of the parties. Section 70 of the Con tract Act applies where its requisites exist, if it is necessary to imply a contract or contemplate a quasi-contract for applying the section !hat must be done and neither s. 175(3) of the Governmenl of
India Act nor any other impediment can stand in the way. Held, further, that a resort to English Law is not justified for deciding a question arising on an Indian statute unless it is such that it cannot be ttasonably understood without such assistance.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 286 of 1958. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the January 4, 1957, of the Cal- cutta High Court in Civil Appeal From Original
Decree No. 155 of 1953. B. Sen, P. K. Ohatt,erjee and P. K. Bose, for the State •f Wesl &ngal v. M/s. B. K. Mondal appellant. N. O. Ohatrerjee, A.N. Sinha and P. K. MukherJee, for the respondent.a.
1961. December 5. The Judgment of Gajendra- gadkar, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ., was delivered by Gajendragadkar, J. The Judgment of Sarkar and Das Gupta, JJ. was delivered by Sarkar, J.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special Gaj1nilr.,adkar J, leave arises out of a suit filed by the respondent B. K. Mondal & Sons against the appellant the State of West Bengal on the Original Side of the
Calcutta IDgh Court claiming a sum of Rs. 19,325/- for works done by it for the appellant. This claim was made out in two ways. It was alleged .that the works in question had been done by the respon-
dent in terms of a contract entered into between the parties and as such the appellant was liable to pay the amount due for the said works. In the alternative it was alleged that if the 'fontract in
question was invalid then the respondent's claim fell under s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act. The respondent had lawfully done such works not v . SBO intending to act gratuitously in that behalf and the
appellant had enjoy(;cl tlw benefit thereof. .Vfs. B. A v .. d,1 The respondent's cu.sc was that on February 8, l.ojtn«saiadkar ·'· 1944, it offered to put up certain temporary storage godowns at Arambagh in t.he District of
Hooghly for the use of the Civil Supplies Depart- ment of the State of 13engal and that the said offer was accepted by the said department by a letter dated February 12, 1944. Accordingly the respon-
dent completed the said construction and its bill for Rs. 39,476/. was duly paid in July 1944. Mean- while, on April 7, 1944, the respondent was reques- ted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Arambagh, to
submit its estimate for the construction of a kutcha road, guard rooin, office, kitchen and room for clerks at Arambagh for the Department of Civil Supplies. The respondent alleged that the Addi-
tional Deputy Director of Civil Supplies visited Arambagh on April 20, 1944, and instructed the respondent to proceed with the conAtruction in accordance with the estimates submitted by it.
Accordingly the respondent completed the said con- structions and a bill for Rs. 2,322/8 was submitted in that behalf to the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies on April 27, 1944. Thereafter the Sub.
Divisional Officer, Aram bagh required the construe· tion of certain storage sheds at K.hanakul and the ASBistant Director of Civil Supplies wrote to the respondent on April 18, 1944, asking it to proceed
with the construction of the said storage sheds. Thie work also was completed by the respondent in due course and for the said work a bill for Ra. 17,003/- was submitted. In the present suit the
respondent claimed that the two bills submitted by it in which the respondent had claimed Rs. 2,322/8/· and Ra. 17,003/· respectively had remained unpaid and that was the basis of the present claim.
The appellant denied all the material allega· tions made by the respondent in its plaint. It (1) S.C.R. &lleged that the requests in pursuance of which the respondent claims to have made the several cons-
tructions were invalid and unauthorised and did not constitute a valid contract binding the appel- lant under s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 (hereafter called the Act). It pleaded
that there was no privity of contract between the respondent and itself and it denied its liability for the entire claim. The written statement filed by the appellant was very vague and general in terms
and no specific or detailed pleas had been set out by the &ppellant in its pleading. However, G.K. Mitter, J., who tried the suit, " framed five material issues on the pleadings and
recorded his findings on them. He held that having regard to the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Act there was no valid and binding contract between the respondent and the appellant for . the construc-
tion of huts and sheds at Khanakul and Arambagh. This finding was in favour of the appellant. He held that the respondent's claim against the appel- lant was, however, justified under s. 70 of the
Indian Contract Act, and he came to the conclusion that the said claiip was not barred by limitation. He also rejected the plea of the appellant that the liability of the Province of Bengal h'ad not devol-
ved upon tutl appellant under the provisions of the Indian Independence (Rights, Property and Liabili- ties) Order 1947. Thus, on these three points the findings of the trial judge were against the appellant.
It appears that at the trial the respondent had also relied upon s. 65 of the Indian Contract Act in support of its claim. The learned judge held that s. 65 did not apply to the facts of the case and so
the finding on this point was in favour of the appel- lant. The result was that the respondent's claim was upheld under s. 70 of the Contract Act and a decree for the amount claimed by it was according-
ly paSBed in its favour. Stall oJW"t BllOfOI v. M/1, B. K. Mo Jal Gajendrazadkar J. Jgf J Stat. ofWut B'"tal v. M/1. B. Jr. Monda/ Gajtniragadk,. J. The appellant disputed the correctness and
validity of the said decree by prcferrinrr an '1ppcal to the Calcutta High Court in its civil appellate jurisdiction. The said appeal was he'lfd by S.R. Das Gupta and Bachawat, JJ. The two learned
Judges who heard the said appeal delivered sepa- rate though concurring judgments ancl substantially confirmed the material finding rerorded by the trial court. In the result the appeal preferred by
the appellant was dismissed. The appPllant then applied for a certificate to come to this Court but the High Court rejected itfl application. Thereupon the appellant moved this Court for a Rpecial certi-
ficat-0 and on obtaining it haa come to this (',ourt ; 1 and the principal point which has been urged be- fore us by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant is thats. 70 of the Contract Act does not apply to
the present caae. Before dealing wit this point it is necessary to refer briefly to the finding recorded by the Courts below that the contract on which the res- pondent relied is invalid under s. li5(3) of the
Act. Mr. Sen argues that this finding is correct whereas Mr. Chatterjee faintly suggested that the contract cannot be said to be invalid. Section 175(3) provides, inter alia, that all contracts made
in the exercise of the executive authorit.y of a province shall be expressed to be made by the Governor of a Province and all ~uoh contracts made in exercise of that authoritv shall be executed on
behalf of the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise. It is com- mon-ground that the contracts in questicn were not executed by any persons duly authorised by the
Governor in that behalf, and the question is whether the said contracts can be said to ho valid inspite c,f the fact that they do not nomply with the mandatory requirements of s. 175(3) of the Act. In our opi-
nion, there can be no doubt that failure to comply with tho mandatory provisions of the said section makes the contracts invalid. The question as to whether mandatory provisions contained in statutes
sh 'JU!d be considered merely as directory or obli- gatory has often been considered in judicial deci- sions. In dealing with the question no general or inflexible rule can be laid down.1 It is always a
matter of trying to determine tne real intention of the Legislature in using the imperative or mandatory words, and such intention can be ga- thered by a careful examination of the whole scope
of the statute and the object intended to be achie- ved by the particular provision containing the mandatory clause. If it is held that the mandatory !Jlause is obligatory it inevitably follows that con-
travention of the said clause implies the nullification of the contract. There can be no doubt that in enacting the provisions of s. 175(3) the Parliament intended that the state should not be burdened with
li<tbility based on unauthorised contracts and the plain object of the provision, therefore, is to save the State from spurious claims ma.de on the st- rength of such unauthorised contracts. Thus the pro-
vision is made in the public interest and so there can be no difficulty in holding that the word "shall" used in making the provision is dntended to .make the provision itself obligatory and not directory.
This is th~ view taken by this Court in Seth Bhih- raj Jaipuria v. The Union of India (1), and, with respect, we are in entire agreement with that view. As in the case of Rhikraj Jaipuria( 1 ) so in the
present case too Mr. Chl\tterjee has attempted to argue that the conclusion about the obligatory character of the provisions of s. 175(3) is inconsis- tent with the decision of this Court in Ohatturbhuj
Vithaldas Jasani v. M<Jreshwar Parashram (')In that case a. contract for the supply of goods had bef!n entered into with the Central Government by the (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 880. (2) [19541 S.C.R. 817 •
Slal1 of W 111 Btntol , .. M/s. B. K. Mondcl Gajtndrag.dl&ar J. Stat. of West Bmlf'l v, M/s. B. K. MondaJ Gaj1n.dratadkar J, 884 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1982) SUPP. firm Moolji Scika and Comp•my of which the can-
didate Chatturbhuj was a partner. The contract in question had not complied with the mandatory pro· visions of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution (which corresponds snbstantially to s. 17 5(3) of the Act)
and the question which this Court had to co~ider was whether in view of the fact that the contract in question had contravened the provisions of Art. 299( l) the candidate Chatturbhuj could be said to
be disqualified for being cho8t'n as a member of Parliament by virtue of the disqualifioation set out in s. 7( d) of the Representation of the Peoplp, Act 43 of 1951. In dealing with this que&tion Bose, J.,
who spoke for the Court, observed that "s. 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act docs not require that the contracts at which it strikes should be enforceable against tbe Government; all it requi-
res is that the contracts should be for the supply of goods to the Government. The contracts in ques- tion are just that and so are hit by the section". It would thus be seen that in the case of Chatturbhuj(')
this Court was dealing with the narrow question as to whether the impugned contract for the supply of goods would cease to attract the provisions of s.7(d) of the Representation ofthePeopleActon the
ground that it did not comply with the provisions of Art. 299(1 ), and this Court held that notwithstan- ding the fact that the contract could not be enforced against the Government it was a contract which
fell within the mischief of s. 7(d). 1\fr. Chatterjee, however, contends that in considering the effect of non-compliance of Art. 299(1) Bose, J., has also observed that "the Government may not be bound
by the contract but that is a very different thing from saying that the contract was void and of no effect and that it only meant that the principal (Government) could not be sued but there will be
nothing to prevent ratification if it was for the benefit of the Government." Mr. Chatterjee points out that this observation shows that the contract (1) 1[954] S. C.R. 817 . with whic!i the Court was dealing was not treated
"as void and of no effect." It would be noticed that the observation on which Mr. Chatterjee relies has to be read in the context of the question posed for the decision of this Court and its effect must be
judged in that way. All that this Court meant by the said observation was that the contract made in contravention of Art. 299(1) could be ratified by the Government if it was for its benefit and as such it
could not take the case of the contractor outside the purview of s. 7(d). The contract which is void may not be capable of ratification, but, since according to the Court the contract in question could have
been ratified it was not void in that technical sense. That is all that was intended by the observation in question. We are not prepared to read the said observation or the final decision in the case of
Chatturbhuj (1) as supporting the proposition that notwithstanding the failure of the parties to comply with Art. 299(1) the contract would not be invalid. Indeed, Bose, J., has expressly stated that such a
contract cannot be enforced against the Govern· ment and is not binding on it. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Chatterjee oa.n successfully chal- lenge the finding of the Courts below that the con-
tracts in question were invalid. It is on this basis that v.e have to consider the main question about the applicability of s. 70 to the facts of the present case. Mr. Sen argues that in dealing with the 11ues-
tion about the scope and effect of s. 70 it would be material to remember the background of this section. He suggests that the rule laid down in the section is based on the notes in Smith's Leading
Cases to Lampleigh v. Brathwaite ('), and so he argues that in construing the said section it would be relevant to refer to the English decisions bear- ing on the point. The first decision on which
(1) [1954] S.C.R. 817. (2) Smith'1 Lcadin1 Casea, Vol, I. 13th ed., p. 1.f8, Stall of W 1st Ben1al v. M /s B, K, Monial (} ajmdragadkar .1. Si." of l1'tll Bengal v. M /1. B. Ir.Moodal
Qojmdro,uk<Zf J. Mr. Sen very strongly relies is tho case of H. You1u1 &: Co. v. The Mayor and Corporation of RoyalLeaminy- ton Spa('). In that case, the House of J,ords had to consider the effect of tho provisions of s. li4( 1)
of the Public Health Act, 18i5 (38 & 30 Viet c. 55). The said section enacts that "every contract ma.do by an urban authority whereby tho value or amount exceeds £50 shall be in writing and sealed
with the common seal of euch authority". It was held that "the provision of the said section is obli· gatory and not merely directory and it applies to an executed contract of which the urban authority
have had the full benefit and enjoyment, and which has .been effected by their agent duly appointed under their common seal." It appears that the Corporation of Leamington had ent-0red into a con-
tract with one Powis for the execution of certain works to supply the district with water. Before Powis l:ould complete this contract it was termi- nated. Then the Council, in its capacity as urban
authority, passed a resolution not under seal where- by its engineer was authorised to enter into a con- tract for completing the works left unfinished by Powis. The said engineer employed the plaintiff
who completed the unfinished work and sued the Corporation for the sum due to him as balance in respect of the work executed by him. This claim was resisted by the Corporation on the ground that
the provisions of s. 174(1) were mandatory and since the contract on which the plaintiff's claim was based had not complied with the said mandatory provision no claim could be made against the Cor-
poration. The Queen's Bench Division upheld the defence and the decision of the Queen's Bench was confirmed by the Court of Appeal as well as by the House of Lords. In dealing with the argument that the cont-
ract in question was not void Lord Blackburn cited (I) (1885) 8 App. Cas. 517. ……… with approval the observations made by Lindley, L.J., in the Court of Appeal. "In a case like the
present before us", observed Lindley, L.J., "if we were to hold the defendants liable to pay for what has been done under the contract, we should in effect be repealing the Act of Parliament and de-
priving the ratepayers of that protection which Parliament intended to secure for them". He also added "it may be said that this is a hard and nar- row view of the law, but my answer is that Parlia-
ment has thought expedient to require this view to be taken, and it is not for th is or any other Court to decline to give effect to a clearly expressed statute because it may le11d to apparent hardship".
Lord Bramwell went further and in his speech added that he did not agree in the regret expressed at having to come to the said conclusion. "The Legislature has made provision", said Lord Bram-
well, "for the protection of ratepayers, shareholders and others, who must act through the agency of a. representative body, by requiring the observance of certain solemnities and formalities which involve
deliberation and reflection. That is the importance of the seal. It is idle to say that there is no magio in a water". Mr. Sen argues that the decision in the case of H. Young & Go('). offers us material
assistance in dealing with the question a.bout the effect of non-compliance of s. 175(3) of the Act and the applicability of s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act. Incidentally it may be pointed out that in
England the decision in Young's case (') has now become obsolete because' the relevant provisions of the Public Health Act, 1875, were repealed in 1933 by the Local Government Act, 1933.
Section 266 of the said Act authorises the local authority to enter into contra.ct neoessary for the discharge of their functions and provides that all contracts made by a. local authority or by a committee
thereof shall be made in acoordanoe with the {I) (1883) 8 App. Cas. 517, Stat1 of West B11'gal v. M /s. B. K, Mondal Gajendrazadkar J. Sl4ll of W 1sf Btntal v. M/s. B K. Mondol Gojt"drotadlc41 J.
standing orders of the local authority, an<! in the case of contracts for the supply of goods or ma- terials, or for the execution of works, the ~!anding orders shall (a) require that., except as otherwise
provided by or under the standing orders, notice of the intention of the authority or the committee, as the case may be, to enter into the contra.ct sh1<1l be published and tenders invited, and (b)
regulate the manner in which notice sha.11 be pub- lished and tenders invited. Tho proviso to this section lays down that a pl'rson entering into a contract with the local authority shall not be
bound to enquire whether the standing ordns of the authority which applied to the contract have been complied with, and all contracts entered into with the local authority, if othorwirn valid, shall
have full force and effect not withstanrling that the standing orders applicable thereto havo not • been complied with. Subsequently in 1960 the Corporate Bodies Contract Act 18& 9 Eliz., 2 c. 46)
has been passed ; and s. 1 of the Act now governs the contracts entered into by the corporate bodies wherever incorporated. The said section provides that ( l)(a) a contract which if ma.de between pri-
vate persons would be by law required to be in writing, signed by the parties to be charged there- with, may be made on behalf of the body corpo- rate in writing signed by any person acting under
its authority, express or implied, and ( b) a. contract which if made between private persons would by law be valid although made by parol only, and not reduced into writing; may be made by parol
on behalf of the body corporate by any person acting under ite authority, express or implied ; (2) a contra.ct made according to this section aha.II be effectual in law and shall bind the body corporate
and its successors and all other parties thereto. Sub-section (4) of s. 1 provides that nothing in this section shall be taken as preventing a cont- ract under seal from being made by or on behalf of
a body corporate. It will thus be seen that the fochnical and rigorous requirement that the oontmct shall be made under seal by a corporation has . now become obsolete ; and so the decision in
Young's case (1) has ceased to be a matter of any importance. Before these legislative changes were how- ever made a distinction used to be drawn between cases where the requirement of a seal was the
result of the common law rule as to contracts by corporations and those where the said requirement was based on a statutory provision like the one under s.174(1) of the Public Health Act, 1875.
The non-observance of the statutory provision requiring that a contract of the specified type should be in writing and sealed with the common seal of the authority in question renders
the contract void and as such exempts the corporation from any liability to pay compen- sation for the performance of the contract even where the corporation may have had the full
benefit and enjoyment of the said contract. On the other hand, where the requirement as to writ- ing and seal is based not on statutory provision but on principles of common law, failure to comply
with the said requirement would not afford a valid defence to the corporation to resist a claim made by a contractor for compensation for a work done by him if it is shown that the corporation had
the benefit and enjoyment of the said work. This latter principle has been laid down by the Court of Appeal in Lawford v. The Billericay Rural Dist- rict Council ('). In that case it was held that
"where the purposes for which a corporation is created render it necessary that work should be done or goods supplied to carry those purposes into effect and orders are given by the corporation
in relation to work to be done or goods to be sup- plied to carry into effect those purposes, if the (I) (188.'l) 8 App. Cas. 517. (2) (1903) 1 K.B. 772, State of JVesl Bengal v. M/s. B. K. Monda/
Gajendra:adkar J, /flljj Sta:t of If ut BtngaJ M /;. B. K. MondaJ Gajtndragadkar J, 890 SUP.REllIE COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. work done or goods supplied are accepted by the corporation and the whole consideration for pay-
ment is executed, there is a. contract to pay implied from the acts of the corporation, and the-· a.h~ence of a. contra.ct under the sea.I of the corpo- ration is no answer to a.n a 0 tion brought in respect
of the work done or th<l goods supplied." In coming to this conclusion Vaughan Williams, L. J., followed the rule re~ognised by Lord Denman in Doc v. Taniere (') where he said that "where the
corporation have acted as upon an executed con- tra.ct, it is to be presumed against them that everything has been done that was necessary to make it a binding contract upon both parties,
they having had a.II the advantage they would have had if the contract had been regularly made. That is by no means inconsistent with the rule that, in genera.I, a. corporation can only contra.ct
by deed, it is merely raising a p:-esumption against them, from their acts, that they have contracted in such a manner a.a to be binding upon them". In other words, the decision was based on the
ground that reliance may be placed on a.n implied contract arising from a.n executed oonsidera.tion on an ~ccepta.nce of the benefit of the contra.ct. Mr. Sen's argument is that in dealing with
the question a.bout the effect of the contravention of s. 175(3) of the Act and the applicability of s. 70 of the Contract Aot the decision in the ease of Lawford (') is irrelovent while that in the case of
H. Y aung and Co. (') is relevent and material be- cause we a.re concerned with the contravention of a statutory provision and not with the contravention of the provision of the rule of common law. We
are not impreSBed by this argument. The ques- tion which the appellant has raised for our decision falls to be considered in the light of the provisions of s. 70 and has to be answered on a fair and
reasonable construction of the relevant terms of (ll (1843) 12 Q.B. 998, 1013. (2) (1903) I K.B. 772. (3) ( 1883) 8 ,\pp. a… 517. the said section. In such a case, where we are dealing with the problem of construing a specific
statutory provision it would be unreasonable to invoke the assistance of English decisions <lea.ling with the statutory provisions contained in English Law. As Lord Sinha has observed in delivering
the judgment of the Privy Council in Ra,manandi K uer v. Kam'l£ati K uer (1) "it has often been point- ed out by this Board that where there is a positive enactment of the Indian Legislature the proper
course is to examine the language of that statute and to ascertain its proper meaning uninfluenced by any consideration derived from the previous state of the law or of the English law upon which
it may be founded". If the words used in the Indian statute are obscure or ambiguous perhaps it may be permissible in interpreting them to exa- mine the background of the law nr to derive
assistance from English decisions bearing on the point ; but where the words are clear and unambi· guoua it would be unreasonable to interpret them in the light of the alleged background of the
statute and to attempt to see that their inter· pretation conforms to the said background. That is why, in dealing with the point raised bcforl) us we must primarily look to the law as embodied
in s. 70 and seek to put upon it a fair and reason- able construction. Section 70 reads thus : "Where a person lawfully does any· thing for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so
gratuitously, and such other person enjoy1 the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered."
It is plain that three conditions must be aatisfied before this section can be invoked. The (I) (1927) L. R. 55 I. A. 18; (1928) I. L. R. 7 Pat. 221. State of Weat Bengal M /s. B. K. Mond•l
Goj~ndragadkar J. 892 SUPREME COUI\T REPORTS [1962rsUPP. first condition is that a peison should lawfully do t ate of West B.ngol something for another person or deliver something M/s. B.vK. Mond, 1 to him. The second condition is that in doing the said thing or delivering the said thing he must
Ga;endragadkar J. 'not intend to act gratuitously ; and the third is ·that the other person for whom something is done or to whom something is delivered must enjoy the- benefit thereof. When these conditions
are satisfied s. 70 imposes upon the latter person, the liability to make compensation to the former in respect of or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. In appreciating the scope and effect
of the provisions Qf this section it would be useful to illustrate how this section would operate. If a person delivers something to another it would ho open to the latter person . to refuse to accept the
thing or to return it ; in that case s. 70 would not .· come into operation. Similarly, if a person does something for another it would be open to the latter person not to accept what has been done by
the former; in that case again s. 70 would not apply. In other words, the person said to be made liable under s. 70 always has the· option not to -accept the thing or to return it. It is only where
ho voluntarily accepts the thing or enjoys the work done that tho liability under s. 70 arises. Taking the facts in the case before us, after the respondent constructed the warehouse, for instance, it was
open to the appellant to refuse to accept the said warehouse and to have the benefit of it. It could , . have called upon the respondent to demolish the – -said warehouse and take away the materials nsed
by it in constructing it; but, if the appellant ac- cepted the said warehouse and used it and enjoyed its benefit then different considerations come into- play and s .. 70 can be invoked. Section 70 occurs
in chapter V which deals with certain relations res·· embling those created by contract. In other words, this chapter does not deal with the rights or liabili- . ties accruing from the contract. It deals with the
rights and liabilities accruing from relations which resemble those created by contract. That being so, reverting to the facts of the present case once again after the respondent constructed the warehouse it
would not be open to th~ respondent to compel the appellant to accept it because what the respondent has done is not in pursuance of the terms of :iny vali!l contract and the respondent in making the
conitruction took the risk of the rPjection of the work by the appellant. Therefore, in cases falling under s. 70 the person doing something for another or delivering something to another cannot sue for
the specific performance of the contract nor ask for damages for the breach of the contract for the simple reason that there is no contract between him and the other person for whom he does something
or to whom he delivers something. All that s. 70 provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted or the work done is voluntarily enjoyed then the liability to pay compensation for the enjoyment of
the said goods or the acceptance of the said work arises. Thus, where a claim for compensation is made by one person against another under s. 70, it is not on the basis of any subsisting contract bet-
ween the parties, it is on the basis of the fact that something was done by the party for another and the said work so done has been voluntarily accepted by the other party. That broadly stated is the
effect of the conditions prescribed by s. 70. It is, however, urged by Mr. Sen that the re· cognition of the respondent's claim for compensa- tion virtually permits the circ11mvention of the
mandatory provisions of s. 175(3), because, he argues, the work done by the respondent is no more than the performance of a so-called contract which is contrary to the said provisions and that
cannot be the true intent of s. 70. It is thus clear that this argument proceeds on the assumption that if a decree is passed in favour of the respondent for State oflVtJt Bengttl
v M/s. B. K. Monda/ Gajendragadkar J, 11161 Stalt of H'~'' Bmgal Mfr. B. K.Jtondal 894 SL"'PRE.\IE COL"RT REPORTS [1962] SL"'PP. compensation as alternatively claimed by it, it would in substance amount to treating the invalid
contract as being \'alid. In our opinion, this argu- ment is not well-fo11nded. It i~ true that the provi- sions of s. li5(3) are mandatory and if any contract is mn.d0 in ,contr1wention of the said provisions the
said contract would be invalid; but it must be rerm•mhL<red that. the eause of action for the alt.er- native e !aim of the respondent is not the breach of any contract by the appellant~ in fact, the alter-
native claim is based on the a!lllumption that the contract in pursuance of which the respondent made the ctmstructionij in question was ineffective and as ~ch amounted to no contract at all. The respon-
,Jent says that it has done some work which haa hee11 ac".·,,pted and enjoyed by the appellant and it is the voluntary acceptance and enjoyment of the ea.id work which is the caus0 of action for the altcr-
nati\·e claim. Can it be said that when the respon- dent built the warehouse, for instance, without a \•1did contract betw,,en it and the appellant it waa doing something contrr.ry to s. Ii5(3}?
As we have alrfa'.ly made it clear even if the rcRpond.,nt built the warehouse he could not have forced the appel- lant to accnpt it ancl the appellant may well havo askc d it to ,i.molisb the warchome and take away
the materials. Therdore, the mere act of construct- ing the warehouse on the part of the respondent cannot be said to contravene the provi•ions of s. J 75r:l). In this connection it may be relevant to
consider illtrntratinn (a) to "· 70. The said i!luRtra- tion "hows that if A a trad<'sm1m leaves goods at Jfs hous<• b.v mistake, and B treats the goods as his own h<' i" bound to pay A for them. .Now, if wc
assume that B ~tands for the State Government, can it he sni<I that A was contravening the provisions of s. 175(3) whl'n by mistake he left the goods at the home of B? The answer to this question is obviously
in the nega.ti ve. Therefore, if gooda are delivered by A to the State Government by mistake and the State Government acoepts the goods and enjoys them a claim for compensation can be made by A
against the State Government, and in entertaining the said claim 'the Court could not be upholding the contravention of s. 175(3) at a.11 either directly or indirectly. Once it is realised that the cause of
action for a claim for compenRation under s. 70 is based not upon the delivery of the goods or the doing of any work as such but upon the acceptance and enjoyment of the said goods or the said work
it would not be difficult to hold that s. 70 does not treat as valid the contravention of s. 175(3) of the Act. That being so, the principal argument urged by Mr. Sen·that the respondent's construction of
s. 70 nullifies the effect of s. 175(3) of the Act cannot be .iccepted. It is true that s. 70 requires that a person should lawfully do something or lawfully deliver something to anotllilr. The word "lawfully" is not
a surplusage and must be treafod as an essential pa.rt of the requirement of s. 70. What then does the word "lawfully" in s. 70 denote ? l\fr. Sen contends that the word "lawfully" in s. 70 must be
read in the light of s. 23 of the sa.id Act; and he argues that a thing cannot be said to have been done lawfu Uy if the doing of it is forbidden by law. However, even if this test is applied it is· not pos-
sible to hold that the delivery of a thing or a doing of a thing the acceptance and enjoyment of which gives rise to a claim for compensation under s. 70 is forbidden by s. J 75(3) of the Act; and so the inter-
pretation of the word "lawfully" suggested by Mr. Sen does not show that s. 70 cannot be applied to the facts in the present case. Another argument has been placed before us on the strength of the word "lawfully" and that is
based upon the obser~ations of Mr. Justice Straight in Ohedi Lal v. Bhagwan Dass (1). Dealing with the construction of s. 70 Straight, J., observed: (l) (1889) I.L.R. 11 All. 234.
Stat1 of West Bengal v. M /s. B. K. Mondo/ Gajtn'1ragadAar J. 19~1 Slatt rif n· t.1t Rental Mjs. B. K. lofondal Oajtndragadl:ar J. "t presume tba.t the legislature intended something
when it used the word "]~ wfully" and that it had in contemplation cases in which a person held such a relation to another a.~ either directly to create or b} implication reasonably to justify an inference that
by some act done for another person the party doing the act was entitled to look for compensat.ion for it to the person for whom it. was done.'' It is urged that in the liirht of this test it cannot be Raid that
the respond~nt held such a relation to the appellant as to be able to claim compensation from the appel- lant. With respect, we arc not satisfied that the test laid down by Straight, J., can he said to be
j11st ifi1•d loy the tcr ms of s. iO. rt is of course true that between the person claiming compenAation and p<·rson ag~inst whom it is claimed Rome lawful rela- tionship must subsist, for that is the implication of
the use of the word "lawfully" ins. 'iO; but the said lawful relAtionship arises not because the party claiming compensation has done something for the party against whom the compensatic>n iA claimed
but because what has Leen done by the former has been accepted and enjoyed by the latter. It is only when the latter accepts and enjoys what iR done by the fnrmer that a lawful relationship arises between
the two and it is the existence of tho said lawful relationship which j?ivcs rise to the claim for com- pensation. This aspect of the matter has not been properly Lrought into the picture when Straight, J.,
laid down the test on which ::lfr. Sen'H argument is based. If the said test is 1 iterally applied then it is open to the comment that if one person is f'ntitled by reason of the relationship as therein contem-
plated to recPive compensation from the others. 70 would be hardl.v necessary. Therefore, in our opinion, a JI that the word "lawfully" in the context indicates is that after something is delivered or
something ie done by one person for another and that thing is accepted and enjoyed by the latter, a lawful relationship is born between the two which 'i under the provisions of s. '70 gives rise to a claim
for compensation. There is no doubt that the thing delivered or done must not be delivered or done fraudulently or dishonestly nor must it be delivered or done gratui- tously; Section 70 is not intended to entertain claims
for compensation made by persons who officiously interfere with the affairs of another or who impose on others services not desired by them. Section 70 deals with cases where a person does a thing
for another not intending to act gratuitously and the other enjoys it. It is thus clear that when a thing is delivered or done by one person it must be open to the other person to reject it. Therefore,
the acceptance and enjoyment of the thing delivered or done which is the basis for the claim for compen- sation under s. 70 must be voluntary. It would thus be noticed that this requirement affords suffi-
cient and effective safeguard. against spurious claims based on unauthoriRed acts. If the act done by the respondent was unauthorised and spurious the appellant could have easily refused to accept the
said act and then the respondent would not have been able to make a claim for compensation. It is unnecessary to repeat that in cases falling under s. 70 there i9 no scope for claims for specific perfor-
mance or for damages for breach of contract. In the very nature of things claims for compensa- tion are based on the footing that there has been no contract and that the conduct of the parties in
relation to what is delivered or done creates a re- lationship resembling that arising out of contract . In regard to the claim made against the Government of a State under s. 70 it may be that
in many cases the work done or the goods delivered are the result of a request made by some officer or other on behalf of .the said Government. In such a case, the request may be in effective or invalid for
Sta'< of West B"'lal v. M/s, B. K. Mondal Gajmdrog~d/;ar J, &t•t1 of Wut B111gal M/s. B. K. Moodll/ Gajtnbogtu!Ju,,. J. the reason that the officer making the requrst was not authorised under s. 175(3 ), or, if the said offioer
was authorised to make the said request the request becomes inoperative because it was not followed up by a contract executed in the manner prescribed bys. 175 \3). In either case the thing has been
delivered or the work has been done without a con- tract and that brings in s. 70. A request is thus not an element of s. 70 at all though the existence of an invalid request may not make s. 70 inappli-
e&ble. An invalid request is in law no request at all, and so the conduct of the parties has to be judged on the basis that there was no fiubsisting contract between them at the material time. Deal-
ing with the ease on the basiR we have to enquire whether the requisite conditions pn•scribed by s. 70 have been satisfied. If they are satisfied then a claim for compensation can and must be entertain-
ed. In this connection it is necessary to emphasise that what s. 70 provides is that compensation has to be pRid in respect of the goods delivered or the work done. The alternative to the compensation
thus provides is the restoration of the thing so de- livered or done. In the prllsent case there has been no dispute about the am0unt of compensation but normally a claim for compens11tion made under
s. 70 may not mean the samu thin~ a8 a claim for damages for breach of con:ract if a c011tr~ct wa.8 en bsisting b~tween the parties. Thus <:ons1dered 1 t would, we think, not be rcasollablc to suggest that.
in recognising the claim for compensation umler s. 70 we are either directly or indirectly nullifying the effect of s. 175 (3) of the Act or treating a" valid a contract which is invalid. The fielcl8 cnverecl by
the two provisions are separate and ?ist inct, "· 17'\ (3) deals with contracts and prov1dt>s how t h!'Y should be made. Section 70 deals with rases wht,re there is no valid contract and provides for compen-
sation to be paid in a case where the three r~quisit~ conditions prescribed by it are sati8fie<l. We arc therefore, satisfied that there is no conflict between the two provisions.
It is well-known that in the functioning of the vast organisation represented by a modern State Government officers have invariably to enter into a variety of contracts which are often of a
petty nature. Sometimes they may have to act in emergency, and on many occasions, in the pursuit of the welfare policy of the State Government officers may have to enter into contract orally or
through correspondence without strictly complying with the provisions of s. 175(3) of the Act. If, in all these cases, what is done in pursuance of the contracts is for the benefit of the Government and
for their use and enjoyment and is otherwise legiti- mate and propers. 70 would step in and support a claim for compensation made by the contracting parties notwithstanding the fact that the contracts
had not been made as required by s. 175(3). If it was held that s. 70 was inapplicable in regard to such dealings by government offir.ers it would lead to extremely unreasonable consequences and may
even hamper, if not wholly bring to a standstill the efficient working of the Government from day- to day. We a.r<> referring to this aspect of the matter not with a view to detract from the binding charac-
ter of the provisions -of s. 17 5 ( 3) of the Act but to point out tha,t like ordinary citizens. even the State Government is subject to the provisions of s. 70, and if it has accepted the things delivered to it or
enjoyed the work done for it, such acceptance and enjoyment would afford a valid basis for claims of compensation a!('Linst it. Claims based on a con- tract validly made under s. 175(3) must, therefore,
be distinguished from claims for compensation made under s. 70, and if that distinction is borne in mind there would be no difficulty in rejecting the argu. ment that s. 70 treats as valid the contravention of
s. 175(3) of tho Act. In a sense it may be said that Stot1 •f W11t Blft1al v. M/s. B. K. Mon4al Oajendragadkar J. s. 70 should be read a.s supplementing tho provi- … ,, of w,,1 B,.1.i sions of s. 175(3) of the Act .
14 /1. B. IC Mondo/ There is one more argument which yet re- mains to be considered. Mr. Sen ingt'niously sug. gested that the position of the appellant is like that of a minor in the matter of i t4! capacity to make a
contra.ct, and he argues that just as a minor is out- side the purview of s. 70 so would be the appellant. It is true as hM been held by the Privy Council in Mohcri Bibee v.DhurmodasGhose(') that a minor, like
a. lunatic, is incompetent, to contract, and so where he purports to enter into a contract the alleged contract is void and neither s. 64 nor s. 65 of the Contract Act can apply to it. It . i~ also true that
e. 68 of the Contract Act specifically provkles that certain claims for necessaries can be made against a minor and eo a minor cannot be sued for com- pensation under s. 70 of the Contract Act (Vide :
Bankay Behari Prasad v. },[ ahendra Prasad ('). Mr. Sen pressed into service the analogy of the minor and contends that the result of s. l 75('l) of the Act is to make the appellant incompetent to
enter into a contract unless the contract is made as required bys. 175(3). In our opinion, this argu- ment is not well founded. Section l i5( l) provides for and recognises the power of the Province to
purchase or acquire property fpr the purposes there specified and to make contracts. :N'o doubt s. 175( 3) provides for the making of contracts in the speci· fied manner. We are not satisfied that <in reading
s. 175 as a whole it would be possible to t'ntertain the argument that the appellant is in the position of a minor for the purposP of s. 70 of the Contract Act. Incidentally, the minor is excluded from the
operation of s. 70 for the reason that his case has been specifically provided for by s. 68. What s. 70 prevents is unjust enrichment and it applies es much to individuals a.s to corporations and
(1) (1903) L.R.30 J.A. lH. (21 (19<40) l.L.R.19 Pat. 739. Government. Therefore, we do not think it would be possible to accept the very broad argument that the State Government is outside the purview of s. 70.
Besides, in the case of a minor, even the voluntary acceptance of the benefit of work done or thing delivered which is the foundation of the claim un- der s. 70 would not be present, and so, on principle
s. 70 cannot be invoked against a minor. The question about the scope and effect of s. 70 and its applicability to cases of invalid contracts ma.de by the Provincial Government or by corpora·
tions has been the subject-matter of several judi- cial decisions in this coun~ry ; and it may be stated broadly that the preponderance of opinion is in favour of the view which we are inolined to take
(Vide : Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram Kumar Saha and Ohittagcmg District Board('); Aba]i Sitaram Modale v. The Trimbak Municipality(•); Pallonjee .Ed·uljee & Sons, Bombay v. Lonavla Oity Municipality(•);
Municipal Committee, Gujranwala v. Fazal Din('); Ram Na.gin Singh v. Governor-General in Oourwil(•); Union of India v. Ramnagina Singh(•); Union of India v. New Marine Ooal Oo. (Bengal) Ltd.(');
Damodara Mudaliar v. Secretary of St,ate for India('); Oorpuration of Madras v. M. Kothandapani- Naidu('); Yogambal Boyee Ammani Ammal v. Naina Pillai Markayar('0); and, Ram Das v. Ram
Babu (11). Sometimes a note of dissent from this view has no doubt been struck (Vide : Ohedi Lal v. Bhagwan Das("); Radha Krishna Das v. The Municipal Board of Benare.<!(1'); Anath Bandba Deb
v. Dominion of India(") ; Punjabhai v. Bhagwan das Kisandas("); and G. R. Sanchuiti v. Pt. R. K. Ohoudhari ("). (1) (1916) I.L.R. 43 Cal. 790. (3) (1937) l.L.R. Born. 782. 5l A l.R. (39) 1952 Cal. 306.
7 (1959) 65 C.W.N. 441. 9 A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 82. · ((11) A .LR. 1936 Pat, 194, (13) (1905) I.L.R. 27 All. 592. 15) (IV29) I.L.R. 53 Bom. 309, (2) (1904) l.L.R. 23 Born. 66. (4) (1930) I L.R. 11 Lah,121, 325, 387.
(6) (1952) 89 CLJ. 342. (8) (1895) I L.R. 18 Mad. 88. (10) (1909) LL.R. 33 Mad. 15. (12) (1889) I.L.R. 11 All. 234, ( 14) A.lR. 1955 Cal. 626. (16) (lg52) J.L.R. 31 Pat. 303. State of W•sl Be111al
v. M/s. B. K. MonUl Qqj1niTaiadkat J. SW. of W "' B1111ol v. M /1. B. IC M ondol Gaj#lfiTltoilOT J. 902 SUPREME COURT REPOHTS (1962] SUPP. Before we part with this point we think it
woul<l bo useful to refer to the observations made by Jenkins, C. J. in dealing with the scope of the provisions of s. 70 in Suchand Ghosal v. Balaram Mardana( 1). "The terms of s.70", said Jenkins, C. J.,
"are unquestionably wide, but applied with dis- cretion they enable the Courts to do substantial juatico in cases whore it would be difficult to impute to tho persons concerned relations actually
created by contract. It is, however, especially incumbent on final Cou~ts of fact to be guarded and circumspect in their conclusions and not to countenance acts or payments that are really
officious." Turning to tho facts of this case it is clear that both the Courts have found that the acts done by the respondent were done in fact in pursuance of the requests invalidly made by the relevent
officers of the appellant, and so they must be deem- ed to have been done without a contract. It was not disputed in the Courts below that the acts done by the resp,>ndent have been accepted by
the appellant and the buildings constructed h<>ve been used by it. In fact, both the learned judges of the Appellate Court have expressly pointed out that the appellant did not contest this part of
the respondent's oase. "I should mention", says i::; • .R. Dai Gupta., J., "that the appellant did not contest before us the quantum decreed in favour of the plaintiff" ; and Baohawat, J., has observed
that "the materials from the reoord also show that the Government urgently needed the work which was done by the respondent and that the Government aocepted it as soon as it was done
and used it for its benefit''. In fact the learned judge adds that "the learned Advocate-General frankly confessed that this is a case where the ProTinoe of Bengal was under a moral obligation
to pay the respondent", and has further added (I) (1911) 1.L.R. 38. Cal. I. his comment tha.t "an obligation of this kind which is apart from the provisions of s. 70 of Indian Contract Act
a moral a.nd natural . obligation is by the provision of that section convertd into a legal obligation". Therefore once we reach the conclusion that s. 70 can be invoked by the respondent against the ap1Jellant
on the findings there is no doubt that the requisite conditions of the sa.id section have been satisfied. That being so, the Courts below were right in decreeing the respondent's claim.
The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. SARKAR, J.-We also think that this appeal should fail. In 1944, the respondent, a firm of contractors, had at the request of certain officers of the Govern-
ment of Bengal as it then existed, done certain con- struction work for that Government and the latter had taken the benefit of that work. These officers, however, had not been authorised by the Govern-
ment to make the request on its behalf and the respondent was aware of such lack of authority all along. These facts are not in controversy. As the respondent did not receive payment
for the work, it filed a suit in the Original Side of the High Court at Calcutta in 19•9 against the Province of West Bengal for a decree for moneya in respect of the work. The Hiizh Court, both in
the original hearing and appeal, held that there was· no contract between the respondent and the Govern· ment in respect .of the work on which the suit might be decreed but the respondent was entitled
to compensation under s. 70 of the Contract Act a.nd that the liability to pay the compensation which was originally of the Government of Bengal, had under the Indian Independence (Rights, Pro-
perties and Liabilities) Order, 1947, devolved on the Province West Bengal (now the State Stall of West Bing• v. M /s. B. K. Mond•I <Jajmdr•1aikar J. Sarkar J. IDBI Stat1 of Wul Benr,al
v. M/s. B. K. Mondal Sarkar J, 904 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [1962] .SUPP. ,j of West Bengal) which came into existence on .tho partition of India. In .the result tho rcspoiideut. suit succeeded.
The State of West Bengal has appealed against the. decision of the High Uourt. Tlle only question arguc<l in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in passing a decree under under s. 70 of the Contr.act Act. We
think it was. · .Now s. 70 is in these terms :- Section 70 "Where,. a person lawfully docs anything for anqt]Jer person, or dr•livors any- thing to him, not intending to do so gratuitous-
ly, and such other person enjoys· tho benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compen- sation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thirlg so .dom1 or delivered." G: K. Mitter, 'J., wnq hoard the suit-in thu
first instance, .Qbserved in regard to s. 70 that., "~e requisites for ehtitl_ing a person to compensa- tion for work done are: (il ~hat it should be faw- fully done, (ii) that it should not be intended to lie
done gratditously and (iii) that the person for· whom the work is done should -onjoy the benefit thereof". We agree with this analysis of the section and the view of· the High Court that, the
necessary requisites exist in tho present caso. In this Court the case was i:irgued on lielialf of the appell;:nt on the 'basis .that the Higli Court wrui in efrot m holding that, relief under 8. 70 can
be granted where ihe Government nrui the benefit of work done' uiJ.cler a contract 'with it which "'as not made in terms of s. i 75(3) of the G'ovemment of India- Act, ·1~35, and ·was; ther,efore; in valid.
Various authorities, both Englisli"and Indian, were cited in support . of this "argtlinent. we think it unnecess~:ry to' discuss thein as the basis on which the present1contentioh is adv;anel;)d does not eiist
·ih thiB' .. 011se. Nor-do we think that the High :coii'rt decided the·,case on th'at bail.is. (1) S,C.R. SUPREME COURr REPORTS It is clear from the findings of the High Court, to whieh we shall presently refer, that there was
in fact no agreement, valid or invalid, between the respondent and the Government. It follows that the work had not been done. under any agree- ment with the Government. No question, there-
fore arises as to the validity or invalidity of an agreement with the Government because of a failure to comply with the terms of s. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act nor as to the applica-
bility of s. iO of the Contract Act foi· granting compensation for work done under a contract with the Government which is invaJid because it had not been made in the manner prescribed by
B. 175 (3). The reason why we say that there was no agreement whatever between the Government and the respondent is that the agreement could in the present case have been made only through the
officers but these officers did not to the knowledge of thll respondent possess the authority of the Government to bind it by contract. That was what the High Court held, as would appear from
the observations of the learned Judges which we will now set out. G. K. Mitter, J., said, "The plantiff never hRd any doubt about the fact that no agreement of any kind had been entered into between
it and the province of Bengal" and "The plantiff knew .right from the beginning, that the officers who were requesting the plantiff to proceed with the work had, no authority to enter into a bind·
ing contract with the plantiff and that they were awaiting sanction from higher officials whioh they hoped to get." The loamed Judges of the appellate bench also took the same view. Ba.chawat, J.,
observing, "Neither of these officers had any autho· rity from the Province of Bengal to make the request to the plaintiff. There was no agreement either express or implied between the plaintiff and
8'011 •J W 1st Bengal v. Jl./s. B. K. Mondal Sarkar J. St au of W ut Ben:al Mjs.B.K. Mondal Sarktu J. SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. tho Provinoe of Bengal. There is, therefore, no agreo-
ment which is void or which is discovered to be void". The learned Judges no doubt referred to s. 175(3) of the Government of Indid Act tha.t was obviously because arguments based on it had been advanced
before them. They distinguished th3 case of Union of India v. Ramnagi.oo Sinyh (') in which it had been held that s. 70 of the Contract Act had no application where work wa.e done under a request
which had resulted in a. void agreement, on the ground that in the present case there had been no request from the G-Overument as the persons mak- ing the request had no authority to do so for the
G-Overnment and 10 no question of an agreement with the Government, which was void, arose. It is wrong, to contend, as the lea.rued advocate for the appellant did, that the lea.rued Judges ol the
High Court decided the case on the basis that s. 70 is applicable where work is done for the Government under an invalid contract with it. No doubt the learned Judges dealt with certain
casee dealing with the question of work done under an invalid contract but that was becaus.i those cases had been cited at the bar. t We are not, therefore, called upon in the present oaee to pronounce upon the question
whether compensation under s. 10 of the Contract Act can be awarded where goods are delivered to, or work done (or, the Government under a contract with it which is invalid (or the rea.eon that it had
not been made in the terms prescribed bys. 175(3) of the Govt.rnment of India Act and we do not f · do so. Now, if the work was done at the request o( the offioers of Government who had no authority to
make the request for G-Ovemment and the respondent was aware ofthis, it would follow that the work had been done at the request made by the officers in their personal capacity. In such a case it eeema to us
(ll (1951) 89 C.LJ. 342, that if the request resulted in a contract between the officers and the respondent under which the officers were persona.Uy bound to pay the respon- dent reasonable remuneration for the work, then
it would be a. very debatable question whether the respondent would have any claim against the · Government under s. 70. We say debatable be- cause we have grave doubts if the section wa.s
intended to give a person in the position of the respondent who had a. remedy aga.inst the officers personally under a. contra.ct with them, a. remedy against the Government for the same thing in
addition to the remedy under the contract. We, however, need say no more on this aspect of the matter for we do not think that any contract had in the present case come into existence betweAn
the officers and the respondent. It is true that when one requests 11.nother to do work for him a tacit promise to pay reasonable remuneration for the work may be inferred in certain circumsta.nees and that promise may result
in a contract when the work is done whioh may be enforced. That may also be the case when the request is to do the work for another's benefit, for consideration for the promise would tn either
oase be the detriment suffered by the promisee by doing the work. The following illustration m&y be given from Pollock on Contraota (13th edition) p. 9 :- "The passenger who steps into ferry-boat
thereby requests the ferryman to take him over for the usual fa.re ". We should suppose the poai- .tion would be the same where a person expressly asks the ferryman to oarry him or another over
without saying anything about the remuneration to be pa.id for the carriage ; in ea.ch of these oases the person making the request would be tacitly promising to pay the ferryman his usual fa.re.
A ta.cit promise of this kind may however be inferred only if the oiroumsta.nces a.re auoh that State ofWts' B1ngd v. M/1. B. A.Mondal Sa1kor J. i ' .. ——- — SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP.
from them a man of business 'and experience would :. ofW.,1 Bengal consider it reasonable to infer. It is an inference v. of fact and not which any law requiresto be made 1. B. K • .Jlondal
f S4T!ar J. · n interesting passage rom heshire aud Fifoot's Law of Contract '(5th Edition) p. ao may be quo- ted here : "It would b) ludicrous to suppose that businessmen couch their communications in the
.–·form of a catechism or reduce their negotiations to such a species of interrogatory as was formu- lated fu the Roman stipulatio. · The rules which the Judges have elaborated from the· promise of
offer and acceptance are neither the rigid deduc- . ,· tions of'logic nor the inspiration of natural. justice. They are only presumption, drawn ·from experi- ence, to be applied fu so far as they serve the
ultimate object of establishing the phenomena of t agreemen … Now on the facts of this case we are entirely unable to infer any tacit promise by the officers to pay personally for the work done. As the High
Court pointed out, the officers made it clear, of which indeed the respondent itself was fully aware, that the payment would be by the Government, and, therefore, that they themselves ·would have
no liability. They said the respondent's " esti- mates have been submitted to the Deputy Direc- tor for formal sanction which when received will be communicated to them. Meanwhile they must
not delay the work." The Deputy Director presumably was the officer authorised to grant the sanction.· He however was not one of the officers who had made the request for the work. The res-
pondent was fully aware that the work was needed for the Government and the officers _had no perso- nal interest in it. And what is · most . important is that the respondent never itself thought that the
officers had made any personal promise to pay. Throughout, the respondent had been requesting the Government to sanction the orders placed by the officers, submitting estimates for the work to
the Government and requesting the latter for pay- ment ; not once did it look to the officers for any liability in respect of the work done under their orders. The respondent had on previous occasions
done work for the Government on Rimilar requests and had never thought that the officers had there- by undertaken any personnl liability. If it itself did not get that impression, no other person of
experience could reasonably infer in the same circumstances a tacit promise by the officers to pay personally. It is of some interest to point out that the learned advocate for the appellant never
even sug!?ested there was such a contract. We find it impossible in such circumstances to think that there was any tacit promise by the ,officers per- sonally to pay for the work or any contract bet-
ween them and the respondent in respect of it. It is also not possible to say on the materials on the record that the officers promised to the respondent that they would secure payment for
the work done. We think Bachawat, J., of the appellate bench of the High Court correctly put the position when he said :-" The work was certainly done at the request of these officers but it was
done under'circumstances in which it is not possi- ble to imply that the officers ,personally promised to pay for the work done. There is, therefore, no scope for any argument that the work was done in
course of performance of a contract between the plaintiff and the officers who requested him to do the work …… The materials on the record clearly show that the plaintiff did the work for the Province
of Bengal. Credit was given to the Provillce of Bengal and not to the officers. It is impossible to say on the materials on the record that work was done for the officers." If the other learned Judges
of the High Court· did not expressly refer to this aspect of the case that was clearly because· it was not argued by the advocates ; it was obviously not 19~1 State of W esl /Hlo1
v. M/s. B. K, Mor Sarkar J. ·au of W tsl Btnttal '/s. B. IC Mondal St11ka1 J. 910 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. a point which 'lny advocate could reasonably advance on the facts of this case.
We are, however, not to be underRtood as say- ing that in no case can Governm~nt officers under- take persona.I liability to contrators in the position of tht'I respondent. Each case must depend on its
own facts. Circnm~tances may con0eiva.bly exist 'l\'hPre it would be ri>11Bcmable to infer a personal undertaking by the officers to pay a <'.ontractor do- ing work for the Government. All that we decide
is that such is not the present case. The position then is that the respondent had done the work for t.he Government without any contract with anybody. Tho question is, a.re the three requisites of s. iO, a.s vny correctly formula-
ted by G. K. Mitter, J., satisfied ? We think they a.re. There is no dispute that Government ha.cl takl'n the ben£>fit of the work. We also feel no doubt that the re~p0ndent did not intend to do the
work gratuitously. It submitted its rstimate for the work :i.nd was very prompt in submitting its bill after the work wa.s dc>ne. It had earlier in similar circumstances without proper contract with the
Government done work for it at the request of its officers and received payment from the Govern- ment. It was a firm of contractors whose trade it was to carry 011t works of construction for pay-
ment a.nd th J Government wa.s aw a.re of this. There is no reason to think that in the present case it did the work gratuitously. On its part tho Government never thought that the work had
bet>n done gratuitously for it raised objections to the bill submitt!'d by the responilent on grounds of bad quality of the work and that it had been done without prop!'r sanction. The Government
urgently needt>d the work 11nd no sooner was it com- pleted, it promptly put it to its use. It wa.s pie.inly fully aware that the work was done for it by a party whose trade was to work for remuneration
9ll and who had previously done similar work and had been paid for it by the Government. The request by the oflicns does not aft'eC't the question that arises in this case. It had no compel-
ling effect and no effect as a. promise and in fact no effect at all. Its practical use was to inform the respondent that the Government needed the work immediately and it would give a sanction in respect
of it in due course and pay for it when done, an in- formation on which the respondent readily acted as it gave it a chance to do more business. So the work was done by the respondent really out of its
free choice by way of its business and with the in- tention of getting paid for it. We also feel no doubt that the work was done lawfully. It was work which the Government badly needed. We will assume for the present purpose,
a.s the learned advocate for the appellant said, that work done under a contract with the Government which is invalid in view of the provision of s. 175(3) of the Government of India. Act, is work unlawfully
done. The learned advocate contended that that would be because thereby section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act would be evaded which is the same thiug a.s doing that which the section
forbids. Assume that is so. But that section does not say that if work is done for the Government without any contra.ct or agreement at all and voluntarily, as was done in the present case, that work would
not have been lawfully done. Government is free not to take the benefit of such work. There is no law, and none has been pointed out to us, which makes the doing of such work unl11wful. No other
reason was given or strikes us for saying that the work was not lawfully done. There is no law, as Bachawat, J., s!l.id that G'>vernment cannot take any work except under a contract in respect of it ma.de
in terms of s. 175(3) of the Government of India. Aot. That section may forbid a Government to take work under a contract which is invalid because 1Y61 Stitt ef West Ben:'" v, M /s. B. K. Mondo/
Sarkar J, 8tai, of w,,1 B1neal v. M/1.B. K. Monda/ SarkM J, 912 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. , .. not in terms of it, but it does not maka it un- lawful for the Government to take the benefit of
work done for it without any contract at all. We shou Id suppose that if t.he doing of the work was unlawful the Government would not have accepted the benefit of it. In the present case, the Govern-
ment needed the work ha.div and we do not see how tlien the Government oan Sa.v that the work was not done lawfully. Wo therefore think that the work was done lawfully. It was contended that the obligation under
s. 70 of the Contract Act arises only in circumstances in which Enrlisb law would have created an obliga- tion on the basiA of an implied contract or a quaAi· contract 1md that there could be no implied contract
or quasi-contract with the GovernmPnt be<'ause a contract could be made with it only in accordance withs. 175(3) of the Government of India Act. Now it has been repeatedly held that a resort to English
law is not justifh·d for deciding a question a.rising on our statute unleBB the statute is such that it r.an· not be reasonably understood without the assist&nce of English Jaw, indeed, there is good authority
for saying that s. 70 was framed in the form in which it appears with a virw to avoid the niceties of English law on the subject, arising largely from historical reasons and to make the position simple
and free from fictions of lnw and consequent comp- lications : see Pollock on Contracts (13th ed.) p. 10. Furthermore, we do pot see that s. 175(3) in any way prevents a contract with the Government being
implied or a Government from incurring an obliga- tion under a quasi-contract. A contract impJi.,,I in law or a quasi-contract is not a r<'al contract or, as it is called, a consensual contract and s. 175(3) is
concerned only with such contracts. The section save that "all contracts 1nllde in the exercise of the executive authority of the Federation or of a Pro. vince shall be expreSBed" in a certain manner ~nd
f. • f "shall be executed on behalf of the GoTemor- General or Governor by such person and in such manner as he may direct or authorise". It therefore applies to consensual contracts which the Govern-
ment makes and not to something which is also call- ed a contract but which the law brings into exis- tence by a fiction irrespective of the parties having agreed to it. Now, by its terms s. 70 of the Con-
tract Act must be applied where !ts requisites exi!t, if it is necessary to imply a contract or to contem- plate the existence of a quasi-contract for applying the section that must be done and we do not think
that s. 175(3) of the Government of India Act pre- vents that, nor are we aware of any other impedi- ment in this regard. This argument must also fail. We, therefore, feel thats. 70 of the Contract
Act applies to this case and the decree of the High Court should be confirmed. Appeal dismissed. M/S. MATHRA PRASHAD AND SONS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB (B.P. Srnru, C.J., J. L. KAPUR, M. HmAYAT-ULLAH,
J.C. SHAH AND J.R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) Sales Tax-Exemptions-Notification is8'Ueil after com- mencement of financial 11ear-Whether effective from ilate of notification or trom eommenctment of financial year-East
Punjab Genera Sales Tax Act, 1948 (E. P. of 1948). ss. 4,5,6, 10,11-Notification dated Sepltmber 27, 19ti4. Section 6( I) of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, provided that no tax shall be payable on the sale of goods specified in the Schedule to the Act and that no dealer shall charge sale~ tax on the sale of goods which were
"declared tax-free from time to time". Sub-section (2) of s. 6 empowe"d the State Government by notification to add or . to delete from the Schedule. On September 27, 1954, the State Government issued a notification under s. 6 (2)
Slate of WtSt Bengal v. M/1. B. K. Mondal Sarka, J. December i