Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
9. To answer the question as to whether the offence, on the facts of the case, is "murder" or "culpable homicide not amounting to murder", we must see whether the case is H 1. (2002) 3 sec 327. SUCHAND BOURI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [R.M. LODHA, J.] squarely covered within Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC or A the accused is entitled to the benefit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC.
10. It would be preposterous to assume any proposition in law that in a case of solitary blow on a vital part of the body 8 that results the death, the offence must necessarily be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Legal position has been most appropriately summed up, which has now become a classic statement with regard to exposition of Section 300 "Thirdly", by Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab2. Vivian Bose, J. analysed Section 300 "Thirdly" C by laying down that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 "Thirdly": "First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily_ injury, that is to say, that it was E not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential G and has nothing to 'do with the intention of the offender." Learned Judge further went on to observe: "Once these four elements are established by the 2. AIR 1958 3 SC 465. prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under Section 300 "thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature ( not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be c present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional."
11. The tests laid down by this Court in Virsa Singh have been consistently followed by the Courts as providing the guidelines when an issue regarding the nature of offence F whether murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder is raised before the Court. "J
12. The determinative factor in Section 300 'Thirdly' is the intentional injury which must be sufficient to cause death in the G ordinary way of nature. It is immaterial whether the offender had knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. The offender's subjective knowledge of the consequences is irrelevant. The result of the intentionally caused injury must be viewed objectively. To find out whether the offender had intention to cause such bodily injury which in the ordinary course SUCHAND BOURI v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [R.M. LODHA, J.] of nature was sufficient to cause death, the diverse factors need A to be kept in mind such as: the force with which the blow has been dealt with, the type of weapon used, the vital organ or the particular spot of the body targeted, the nature of the injury caused, the origin and genesis of the crime and the circumstances attendant upon the death. [Jagrup Singh v. State B of Haryana3; and Ramashraya and Anr. V. State of M.P.4]
13. In so far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the accused appellant had a strong feeling of annoyance against Sarbeswar as he thought that Sarbeswar being a c village chowkidar was helping Sanatan with whom the accused had a boundary dispute. On a day proceeding the incident, the ,… accused had threatened to behead Sarbeswar and his son. The accused went armed with a deadly weapon like knife to the place of occurrence where Sarbeswar, his brothers and other family members were sitting and inflicted blow by that weapon on the chest of Sarbeswar. The injury that Sarbeswar suffered clearly shows that knife was used by the accused with a considerable force and injury was caused on a vital part of the body. It is true that the injury was inflicted on Sarbeswar when he intervened while his brother Bisweswar was being E assaulted but the force with which Sarbeswar has been stabbed by knife, the intention of causing such bodily injury is obvious. The said injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The stab injury inflicted on the chest of Sarbeswar by the accused was surely not accidental or F unintentional. The act of the accused is squarely covered by Section 300 Thirdly'.
14. Although the learned amicus curiae strenuously urged that the injury caused by the accused was without premeditation G nor he took any advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, we are afraid the facts eloquently speak otherwise. The four requisites of Exception 4 are not at all satisfied in the 3. AIR 1981 SC 1552. 4 . c2001) 3 sec 439. (2009] 5 S.C.R. A present case.
15. For the invocation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, it has to be probablised by the defence that the death is occurred: (i) in a sudden fight ; (2) without pre-meditation; (3) 8 the act was committed in a heat of passion; and (4) the offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The existence of all the four requisites must be probablised. In absence of existence of any of the four requisites, Exception 4 has no application. By means of judicial decisions, the C expression "sudden fight" occurring in Exception 4 of Section 300, though not defined, has been explained. "Sudden fight" implies mutual provocation; a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchange – the fight is not per se palliating circumstance, only an unpremeditated fight is such. The expression "heat of passion" has been explained by the Courts D to mean that there is no time for passion to cool down. The act must have been committed in a fit of anger. Unfortunately, in the present case none of the four requisites of Exception 4 exists much less all the four requisites. The instant case is not a case of sudden fight nor the act can be said to have been E committed in a heat of passion. As a matter of fact, the appellant had a pre-existing malice against the deceased. The appellant is not at all entitled to the benefit of Exception 4.
16. In what we have discussed above, the conviction of the F accused under Section 302 IPC and sentence awarded to him cannot be said to suffer from any legal infirmity. ·
17. The appeal must fail and is dismissed. D.G. Appeal dismissed.