Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the appellant had filed objections to the report filed before this Court by the learned Members of the Tellers Committee alongwith the objection affidavits sworn by certain learned Advocates practicing in the Madras High Court. The learned counsel for the respondents had contended that question relating to the validity of the amended bye-laws should not be considered by this Court and that the appellant should be relegated to the alternative remedy available under the law. Thereupon, the learned counsel for the appellant had pointed out that the bye- laws had been amended pursuant to the orders passed by this Court on August 3, 2010 and, therefore, no other Court or forum would examine the question of validity of the amended bye-laws because of judicial discipline and propriety. On this submission being made the Court had decided to examine the validity of the amendments made in the bye-laws.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Resolution passed on September 7, 2010 should be set aside and/or modified because proper audience was not given A to all Members of the Association who had attended the Extraordinary Meeting of the General Body of the Association. It was contended that most of the members had requested the Members of the Teller Committee to consider adoption and/or otherwise of the amendments made in the bye-laws by a secret s ballot but the said reasonable request was arqitrarily tur:ned down by the Teller Committee and the Resolution was passed by show of hands which w~s illegal. It was argued that clause 9 of the amended bye-laws refers to the voting rights of the resident, non-resident and associate members but before c adopting the said clause no meticulous discussion had taken place which vitiates the Resolution. What was maintained before the Court was that the Clause 12 of the amended bye- laws relating to the eligibility to contest the election and cast vote which prescribes minimum period of three years to 0 become eligible to contest election is unreasonable and liable to be set aside. It was pleaded that the Association Membership should not have been taken as a criterion for deciding eligibility to contest election and cast vote but the date of enrolment in the Bar Council ought to have been taken into consideration for determining eligibility to contest the election E and or cast vote. The learned counsel further emphasized that Clau~e 10 of the amended bye-laws prescribes a very high amount of Rs. 2,000/- as entry fee and yearly subscription of Rs.1 ,000/- for Junior Members of the Bar. Whereas in case of renewal an exorbitant sum of Rs.S,OOO/- is unilaterally F prescribed which is illogical and deserves to be set aside. According to the learned counsel for the appellant Clause 17 of the amended bye-laws which prescribes deposit to be made for contesting the elections is exorbitant as well as unjust and, therefore, this Court should reduce the same reasonably. What G was maintained before the Court was that the four amendments mentioned above in the bye-laws are against the interest of the learned Junior Members of the Association as well as entire legal fraternity. And, therefore, appropriate directions should be given to the Teller Committee to convene another Extraordinary H General Body Meeting of the Association for considering the SUDHA v. PRESIDENT, ADV.ASSN.CHENNAI & ORS. 305 [J.M. PANCHAL, J.] question whether the amendments in the bye-laws should be adopted or not. It was also prayed on behalf of the learned counsel for appellant that direction should be given to.consider the question of adoption of those amendments by a secret ballot.
12. All the other learned counsels appearing for the respondents without exception have strongly opposed the prayer made by the learned counsel for the appellant. It was pointed out by them that pursuant to the direction given by this Court an Extraordinary Meeting of the General Body of the Association was held wherein the amendment made to the bye- laws was carried out by majority of the Members who were present. According to the learned counsel of the respondents after passing of the order dated August 3, 2010 the instant Special Leave Petition itself become infructuous and, therefore the directions as sought for by the learned counsel for the appellant to again convene an Extraordinary Meeting to the General Body of the Association should not be accepted at all.
13. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and considered the documents forming part of the instant petition.
14. From the Report-cum-Minutes of the Extraordinary General Body meeting of the Association held on September 7, 2010, it is evident that the order passed by this Court on August 3, 2010 was taken into consideration. Before the Extraordinary General Body Meeting was held on September 7, 201 0 the learned Honorary Secretary of the Association had given notice to the other learned Members of the Association stating that the Extraordinary General Body Meeting of the Association would be held on September 7, 2010. It was also specified in the notice that the Meeting of the General Body is convened to consider the question of approving the proposed amendment made to the bye-laws. The report of the Teller Committee indicates that the meeting was supervised by the learned Advocates who were appointed as Members of the A Teller Committee. The notice issued by the Honorary Secretary of the Association was exhibited at conspicuous places at the High Court premises. The said notice was also published in two newspapers i.e. Hindu (English) dated 22.8.2010 and Dhinamalar (Tamil) dated 22.8.2010. The Minutes would further B indicate that on the instructions of the Teller Committee, a copy of the notice of the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Association along with the copy of old bye-laws, copy of amendments to be made in the bye-laws, orders of the Supreme Court, orders of the Division Bench of the High Court C etc. were widely circulated amongst the Members of the Association through cause list distributors. The notice with materials mentioned above was also delivered in the chambers of all the learned Advocates including the Members of the Association. The report indicates that the meeting Hall of the Association was too small to accommodate the large number of members who were expected to attend the meeting and, therefore, with the permission of the Registry the meeting was arranged in the meeting Hall on the 5th floor of the Annexed chamber building of the High Court. As mentioned in the report of the Teller Committee, the arrangements were again E supervised by the Teller Committee. Therefore, in these circumstances, the grievance made by the learned counsel for the appellant that proper meeting was not convened has no substance. The report indicates that after the meeting was convened at about 1.30 p.m. the discussion had gone on till 3.30 p.m. Thereflfter, Mr. G. Rajagopalan had informed the members that he had received request from certain learned Members of the Association to conduct a secret ballot and as per the report of the Teller Committee this request was put to the General Body for their opinion. The report of the Teller G Committee without mincing words mentions that majority of the learned Members who were present in the meeting had desired that the resolution should be put to vote by show of hands immediately. Under the circumstances the grievance made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the meeting H should not have been conducted in the manner in which it was SUDHA v. PRESIDENT, ADV.ASSN .CHENNAI & ORS. 307 [J.M. PANCHAL, J.} conducted and that secret ballot should have been permitted cannot be entertained.
15. Another grievance made by the learned counsel for the appellant that Members of the Association were not permitted to speak at the meeting to express their views for con~ideration and, therefore, the Resolution should be set aside lacks factual basis. So far as permission to speak at the meeting is concerned the report of the Teller Committee indicates that before holding meeting the learned Advocates who were desirous of addressing the gathering were asked to put their names in the list. As per the report of the Teller Committee 30 learned Advocates had shown their willingness and they were permitted and had in fact addressed the gathering. As per the Report, the discussion had continued upto 3.30 p.m. and thereafter the proposed amendment was put to vote which was approved by show of hands by the Members who were present at the meeting. As per the Report more than 90°k' of the learned members of the Association who were present had given their assent by saying 'Yes'. Thus, it is wrong to suggest that the learned Members of the Association were not permitted to speak at the meeting. The experience of one and all is such that in such meetings chaos takes place and nq>rmally the learned Members of the Association shout at each other. In order to avoid such an eventuality before holding the meeting the names of those Advocates who were desirous of addressing the meeting were enlisted. The device adopted by the learned Members of the Teller Committee cannot be said to be arbitrary at all.
16. The argument that the four clauses mentioned earlier are against the interest of the legal fraternity in general and against the interest of the learned Junior Members in particular G who were practicing in the High Court and, therefore, fresh directions as prayed for should be given is difficult to accept. The Teller Committee had already convened a meeting pursuant to a consensus order passed by this Court. In the SLP the main grievance made was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to A interfere in the internal .matters of the Association and, therefore, the directions given and/or the approval granted to the amended bye-laws should be set aside. As stated earlier, order dated August 3, 2010 was passed on consensus of atleast 15 Advocates who were present in the Court room B including the learned Advocate for the appellant. This Court while exercising powers under Article 136 of the Constitution would hardly be justified in interfering with internal matters of a Bar Association. The Association includes Members as learned Advocates who are practicing in the Court. It is not C difficult for the learned Advocates of the Association who are practicing law day in and day out in the Court rooms to understand as to what is in their interest" and, therefore, this Court would hardly have any occasion to tender any advice to the )earned Advocates of the Association in the matters relating 0 to the internal affairs of the Association. Therefore, to expect this Court to go on giving directions to convene meeting is neither practical nor expected of this Court while exercising powers under Article 136 of the Constitution.
17. The legal profession is a solemn and serious E occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who belong to it are its Hon'ble Members. Although, the entry to the profession can be had by acquiring merely the qualification prescribed by different universities, the honour as a professional has to be maintained by its Members by their exemplary conduct both in F and outside the Court. The legal profession is different from other professions in that what the lawyers do, affects not only an individual but the administration of justice which is the foundation of the civilized society. Both as a leading member of the intelligentsia of the society and as an intelligent citizen, G the lawyer has to conduct himself as a model for others both in his professional and in his private and public life. The different Associations of the Members of the Bar are being formed to show the strength of lawyers in case of necessity. The lawyers while exercising vote in an election of office bearers of the H. Association must conduct himself in an exemplary manner. SUDHA v. PRESIDENT, ADV.ASSN.CHENNAI & ORS. 309 [J.M. PANCHAL, J.] Those who are concerned about high standard of the profession A are supposed to take appropriate action to see that the election takes place peacefully and in an organized manner. Many a times it is noticed that those who are not lawyers get entry into the Association room by putting on merely black coat as at the time of election the feelings are running high. Such elements take undue advantage of the situation and bring a bad name to the Association of the Advocates. Therefore, to deter such elements the amendments have been carried out in the bye- laws. Those amendments carri~d out in the bye-laws of the Association can hardly be regarded as against the legal c fraternity in general and as against Junior Members of the Bar in particular. In every society or association some code of conduct has to be laid down as to in which manner the voting should be done and who would be competent to vote. The Association of Advocates are expected to rise to the occasion o as they; are responsible to uphold the dignity of Courts and majesty of law and to prevent interference in administration of justice. It is the duty of the Associations to ensure that there is no unprofessional and/or unbecoming conduct by the Advocates at the time of election of the office bearers of the Association. This being their duty it was necessary to amend the bye-laws of the Association. The amendment prescribing that a Member of the Association having practice of less than two years would not be entitled to vote or that a member of the Association who has not put in three years of practice, .would not be entitled to contest the election are reasonable and are meant for enhancing status and image of members of the Bar. These restrictions have been brought to uphold the dignity of Courts and majeSiy of law and to ensure that there is no unprofessional and/or unbecoming conduct. The other ame.ndments to which the learned counsel for the appellant has G taken exception also do not impose unreasonable restriction on the members of the Association. Clause 12 of the amended bye-laws refers to the eligibility criterion to cast vote and to contest the election and the same has not been regarded as unreasonable. Clause 10 of the amended bye-laws prescribes A entry fee and yearly subscription for lhe Members of the Bar. The prescription of Rs. 2,000/- as entry fee and yearly subscription of Rs.1,000/- as well as Rs.2,000/- can hardly be regarded as exorbitant. One who is a member of the Association of Advocates can realize that several expenditures have to be incurred by the Association on beha:f of its Members. Further staff has to be employed to carry out day to day instructions and they have to be paid reasonable salary. Having regard to the circumstances prevailing as on today, the prescription of entry fee or yearly subscription can hardly be c regarded as exorbitant. It is also noticed in several Bar Associations that certain Members without making payment of entry fee or yearly subscription enjoy the facilities provided by the Association. In some cases it is found that some advocates become Member of the Association by makillg payment of yearly subscription initially but thereafter do not renew their membership and go on enjoying all the facilities provided by the Association. Under the circumstances, the stipulation that in case of non-renewal of membership, a member will have to pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- for reviving his membership can hardly E be regarded as arbitrary.
18. Again clause 17 which prescribes deposit of amount for contesting the elections cannot be regarded as arbitrary. If no amount is required to be deposited for contesting the elections the same is likely to result into chaos and undeserving F elements would take advantage of tf'l.e situation In the lighter vein someone mentioned in the Court that if no amount is required to be deposited for contesting elections all the members of the association would contest elections and there would be no voters. Therefore, the plea that the arnount required to be G deposited for contesting the elections should be reduced to a reasonable level cannot be accepted nor the said clause be regarded as illegal or arbitrary. Lastly, the contention that the amendments in the bye-laws are against and not in the interest of the junior members of the Bar and, therefore, appropriate H direction to convene a fresh meeting of the Extraordinary SUOHA v. PRESIDENT, ADV.ASSN.CHENNAI & ORS. 311 (J.M. PANCHAL, J.] General Body of the Association should be issued has no substance. Except stating that the amendments carried out in the bye-laws by thumping majority are against and not in the interest of learned Junior Members of the Bar, it could not be pointed out as to how the amendments are against the interest of junior members of Bar. Thus, it is difficult for this Court to accept such an argument advanced at the Bar.
19. The Report of the Teller Committee indicates that the learned Members of the Teller Committee had performed yeomari service to the Members of the Association for which they deserve applaud. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case this Court is of the opinion that after passing of the order dated August 3, 201 0 the main grievance made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court should not have interfered with the internal matters of the Association by giving directions stood redressed. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents are right in contending that the petition had become infructuous and, therefore, no further directions should be given by this Court. Though it was not necessary for this Court to examine the validity· of the amendments carried out in the bye-laws, the said exercise was undertaken by the Court only because of the insistence of the learned counsel for the appellant and to maintain transparency, because the Teller Committee had undertaken the huge task ·pursuant to consent order passed by this Court. The Resolution passed on September 7, 2010 is perfectly legal and, therefore, the same is hereby upheld.
20. The net result of the above discussion .is that now this Court does not find any substance in the appeal and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 21 . For the foregoing reasons the appeal fails and is dismissed and there is no order as to costs. R.P. Appeal dismissed.