Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
11. We have perused the Trial Court's record. We find that though B charge for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC had been framed against appellant A-I, no such charge was framed against appellant A-2, even with the aid of Section 34 !PC. The only charge framed against A-2 was for an offence punishable under Section 20 I read with Section 34 of !PC. True that Section 222 Cr.P.C. clothes the Court with the power to convict a person of an offence which is minor in comparison to the one for which he is charged C and tried, but by no stretch of imagination, offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC, under which appellant A-2 was convicted by the Trial Court, could be said to be minor offences in relation to that under Section 201 IPC, for which he was charged. In fact, the three offences are distinct and belong to different categories. The ingredients of the offences under the said Sections D are vastly different. Therefore, Section 222 Cr.P.C. had no application on facts in hand.
12. At this junction, we may also note that conviction of appellant A- 2 by the High Court under Section 302 IPC cannot also be held to be valid when tested on the touchstone of the provision contained in Section 464(2)(a) E Cr.P .C. If it was convinced that a failure of justice had, in fact, been occasioned, the High Court was required to follow the procedure laid down in the Section, which was not done. That apait, even on the proven facts on record, a case for conviction under Section 302 !PC was not made out against the said appellant.
13. Bearing in mind this factual and legal backdrop, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in convicting appellant A-2 for having committed a major offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Nonetheless, it is well settled that notwithstanding acquittal of the said appellant of the offence under Section 302 IPC, his conviction under Section 20 I IPC is still permissible. (See: Constitution Bench decision in Smt. Kalawati G & Anr. v. The State of Himachal Pradesh 1). Therefore, the question that remains to be examined is regarding the correctness of the conviction of appellant, A-2 for offence under Section 20 I !PC.
14. Section 201 IPC reads as follows: H I. AIR(l953)SCJ31. I t- SUKHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.) "201. Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false A information to screen offender.-Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or B believes to be false, if a capital offence.-shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with imprisonment for life. -and if ·the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine; if punishable with less than ten years' imprisonment.-and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth c part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, E or with fine, or with both."
15. The first paragraph of the Section contains the postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three paragraphs prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each situation. To bring home an offence under Section 20 I of IPC, the ingredients F to be established are: (i) committal of an offence; (ii) person charged with the offence u11der Section 201 must have the knowledge or reason to believe that an offence has been committed; (iii) person charged with the said offence should have caused disappearance of evidence and (iv) the act should have been done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment or with that intention he should have given information respecting the offence, G which he knew or believed to be false. It is plain that the intent to screen the offender committing an offence must be the primary and sole aim of the accused. It hardly needs any emphasis that in order to bring home an offence under Section 20 I IPC, a mere suspicion is not sufficient. There must be on record cogent evidence to prove that the accused knew or had information H ,_ (2007] 9 S.C.R. A sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed and that the accused has caused the evidence to disappear in order to screen the offender, known or unknown.
16. In Palvinder Kaur v. The State of Punjab (Rup Singh-Caveator)2 this Court had said that in order to establish the charge under Section 20 I B IPC, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed; that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed; with requisite knowledge and with the intent to screen the offender from legal punishment, caused the evidence thereof to disappear or gave false information respecting such offence knowing or having reason to believe the same to be C false. It was observed that tne Court should safeguard itself against the danger of basing its conclusion on suspicions, however, strong they may be. (Also See: Suleman Rehiman Mulani & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra3, Nathu & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh4, Vl. Tresa v. State of Kerala5).
17. In the present case, indubitably there is no eye witness and the D prosecution had sought to establish the case against the appellants from circumstantial evidence. It is trite to say that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn have not only to be full ive nature and consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Moreover, all the established circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence. Therefore, the E evidence has to be carefully scrutinized and each circumstance should be dealt with carefully to find out whether the chain of the established circumstances is complete or not. (See: Dhananjoy Chatterjee Alias Dhana v. State of WB.)6. It also needs to be emphasized at this stage itself that in a case based on circumstantial evidence motive assumes great significance p inasmuch as its existence is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning.
18. In the present case, the motive was alleged to be the greed for dowry and desire of appellant A-2 to have illicit relationshipwith the deceased, G 2. AIR (1952) SC 354. 3. AIR (1968) SC 829. 4. [J979J 3 sec 574. 5. c2001J 3 sec 549. H 6. [1994] Supp (2) sec 220. SUKHRAM v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [D.K. JAIN, J.] which theory, as noted above, has been rejected by the High Court while A acquitting the appellant for offences under Sections 304-8 and 498-A IPC. Therefore, there is no gainsaying that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of a motive. It is in this background that it ha£ to be examined whether the evidence and the circumstances relied upon by the High Court while recording the conviction of appellant A-2 are consistent with the B hypothesis of the guilt of the said appellant.
19. The sole reason given by the High Court for holding appellant A- 2 guilty of offence under Section 20 I of IPC is the circumstance flowing from the evidence of PW-12, wherein she had stated that: 'Accused No. I and the deceased Meerabai were sleeping in one room and we were sleeping in the C other room'. Undoubtedly, the mainstay of the prosecution case was the testimony of PW-12. There is absolutely no other evidence or circumstance attributing to A-2, the knowledge of the commission of offence in respect of his daughter-in-law, Meerabai. Merely because he happened to be father of appellant A- l, it cannot be presumed as a matter of legal proof that he must be deemed to have the knowledge of the offence committed by his son. Even D if the evidence of PW-12 is taken at its face value, though the witness was declared hostile and had been cross examined by the prosecution counsel, mere presence of the appellant, A-2 in the house, in our opinion, is riot sufficient to draw a presumption that he had the knowledge of commission of offence by his son, appellant, A-l. There is no other established circumstance E to complete the chain to bring home the offence under Section 201 IPC. We are of the view that the prosecution has failed to establish that the conduct of appellant A-2, both at the time of the occurrence and immediately thereafter, is· consistent with the hypothesis of his guilt. We have therefore, no hesitation in holding that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in convicting appellant A-2 for having committed offences punishable under Sections 302 F and 201 IPC.
20. In the light of the above discussion, conviction of appellant A-2 (Sukhram) cannot be sustained. Accordingly, we allow the appeal to the extent it pertains to appellant, A-2 and se! aside the conviction and sentence passed on him. He shall be. set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other G case. S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed.