Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
21. The section makes it clear that a Court cannot alter or review its judgment or final order after it is signed except to correct clerical or arithmetical error. The scheme of the Code, in our judgment, is clear that as a general rule, as soon as the H judgment is pronounced or order is made by a Court, it becomes __L ,- SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.] functus officio (ceases to have control over the case) and has A. no power to review, override, alter or interfere with it.
22. No doubt, the section starts with the words "Save as otherwise provided by this Code". Thus, if the Code provides for alteration, such power can be exercised. For instance, sub- section (2) of Section 127. But in absence of express power, alteration or modification of judgment or order is not permissible.
23. It is also well settled that power of review is not an inherent power and must be conferred on a Court by a specific or express provision to that effect. [Vide Patel Narshi Thakershi c & Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844) No power of review has been conferred by the Code on a ' Criminal Court and it cannot review an order passed or judgment pronounced.
24. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 169, this Court held that a High Court has no jurisdiction to alter or review its own judgment or order except to the extent of correcting any clerical or arithmetical error. It deprecated the practice of filing Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions after disposal of main matters and issuance of fresh directions in such petitions.
25. The Court said; Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a F case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio G and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order H –+- . .A cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error.
26. In the case on hand, charges were framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and the said order was affirmed by the B High Court and by this Court. It is no doubt true that thereafter r there was a talk of settlement between the parties which could j not be materialised. It is also true that the appellant filed a suit for compensation of Rs.20 lakhs against the husband and in- laws. In our considered opinion, however, that would not confer c jurisdiction on the High Court to quash criminal proceedings when the action of framing of charge against the respondents had been upheld by this Court. The order impugned in the present . appeal is thus clearly illegal, improper, contrary to law and deserves to be set aside.
27. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that virtually the High Court sat over the decision of this Court and exercised appellate power by upsetting the order of the Court of framing charge against the respondents. The counsel, in this connection, referred to Jharia slo Mania v. State of Rajasthan E &Anr., (1983) 4 SCC 7. In that case, the accused was convicted by a Sessions Court for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC. The order of conviction and sentence was confirmed by the High Court as well as by this . Court. Thereafter, a substantive petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was instituted by the accused for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the State to forbear from giving effect to the judgment of all Courts including this Court. A declaration was also sought that the conviction was illegal and his detention in jail was without the authority of law and violative of Fundamental Rights. 1).ii
28. Dismissing the petitio·n, this Court observed: We fail to appreciate the propriety of asking for a declaration in these proceedings under Article 32 that conviction of the petitioner by the High Court for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the __ ,,_ 'I SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.] Indian Penal Code is illegal, particularly when this court has declined to grant special leave under Article 136. Nor can the petitioner be heard to say that his detention in jail amounts to deprivation of the fundamental right to life and liberty without following the procedure established by law in violation of Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19. When a special leave petition is assigned to the learned Judges sitting in a Bench, they constitute the Supreme Court and there is a finality to their judgment which cannot be upset in these proceedings under Article 32. Obviously, the Supreme Court cannot issue a writ, direction or order to itself in respect of any judicial proceedings and the learned Judges constituting the Bench are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court.
29. Even if we may not go to the extent that the High Court ventured to sit over the order passed by this Court in quashing the proceedings, in our considered opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the High Court was not justified in invoking Section 482 of the Code and in quashing prosecution against the respondents.
30. Moreover, it is well-settled that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code must be exercised in rarest of rare cases. Before more than four decades in the leading case of R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1960) 3 SCR 388, this Court stated: It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to q·uash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise c –+– of this inherent jurisdiction_ However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings.
There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against f- an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned r proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the I ._ criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence f, c alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding I ·,, on that ground_ Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint; even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not_ In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person.
A third category of cases in which the inherent –.( jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no ·legal evidence or where th ere is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation SU NITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.] r made and cases where there is legal evidence which on A its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not.
That is the function of the trial B Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. c (emphasis supplied)
31. Yet, in another important decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1 SCC 355, the Court referred to a number of leading decisions on the point and laid down the following principles for exercising power of quashing criminal D proceedings. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie E constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Cbde. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the G same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constityte only a non-cognizable H :,……:.;;. offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express leg~I bar engrafted in any c of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
32. Speaking for the Court, Pandian, J. stated: "(T)he power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that .too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice."
33. We are in respectful agreement with the above observations. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, ;;,…_ in our judgment, the High Court was clearly in error in exercising power under Section 482 of the Code and in quashing criminal H proceedings. The said order, hence, .deserves to be set aside. SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. [C.K. THAKKER, J.} The matter will now be decided in accordance with law by an A appropriate Court.
34. Before parting with the matter, we may clarify that we have not entered into merits of the matter or allegations and counter allegations by the parties and we may not be understood B to have expressed any opinion one way or the other. All observations made by us hereinabove have been made only for the limited purpose of deciding the issue before us. As and when the matter will come before the Court, it will be considered on its own merits without being inhibited or influenced by the· observations made by the High Court or by us in the present· C order.
35. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. S.K.S. Appeal disposed of.