Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
8. So far as O.S. no. 65 of 1995 is concerned, the appellants (plaintiffs) claimed therein money decree ofRs.5400/- towards damages for use and occupation of the suit-land for the period (01.07 .1989 to 31.07.1992) i.e. 36 months and further at the rate ofRs.1507/-permont~ for preceding three years ending on 30.06.1992 against the respondents.
9. So far as the respondents are concerned, they filed three civil suits being O.S. No. 53of1993, 0.S.No. 69of1994 and O.S.No. 71 of 1994 against the appellants in the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Kumool.
10. So far as O.S.No.53 of 1993 is concerned, the respondents (plaintiffs) filed a suit against appellant No.I and State of A.P. for a declaration that respondents are the owners of the suit-land and also they are entitled to claim permanent injunction against the ~ppellants from interfering in their possession over the suit-land. The respondents in substance claimed title over the suit-land by adverse possession against the Government alleging that their predecessor were in possession of the suit-land for the last 100 years and on their death, respondents continued to remain in possession throughout and has, therefore, perfected their title by being in adverse possession to the exclusion of all, including the Government as owners.
11. So far as second suit being O.S.No. 69of1994 is concerned, it was filed by the respondents against the appellant no. I and APEB to challenge the notice dated 07 .06.1990 issued by APES for disconnecting the electric supply to the respondents' structure. A relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants (APEB) from giving effect to the notice was also prayed.
12. So far as the third suit being O.S.No. 71 of 1994 is concerned, the respondents filed this suit against the Municipality and the appellant no. 1 challenging therein the assessment made by the Municipality by which appellants names were entered in the register of Municipality in relation to the suit-land/structure. According to the respondents, they having perfected their title over the suit-land by adverse possession, their names should have been entered in place of the appellants names c SUPREME C.OURT REPORTS in the records of the Municipality. c
13. Since all the aforementioned five suits were in relation to one suit-land and were between the same parties pending in different courts, all the five civil suits were clubbed together for disposal in accordance with law. Parties adduced common evidence in all the five civil suits.
14. By a common judgment and decree dated 22.04.1997, the learned trial judge dismissed three civil suits being O.S.Nos. 53of1993, 69 of 1994 and 71 of 1994 filed by the respondents, whereas decreed the appellants' two civil suits being O.S.Nos. 77 of 1994 and 65of1995. It was held that respondents in their suits failed to establish their title over the suit-land. It was held that since they failed to establish their title over the suit-land, a fortiori, they are not entitled to claim permanent injunction against the appellants over the suit-land. So far as appellants' two civil suits are concerned, it was held that appellants were able to establish the relationship oflandlord and tenant between appellant No. I and the respondent and hence they are entitled to claim the eviction of the respondents from the suit-land. It was also held that appellants are also entitled to claim the money by way of damages from the respondents for the period in question for the use and occupation of the suit-land as claimed in the suit.
15. The respondents felt aggrieved, filed five appeals being S.A. No 56of1997, 57of1997, 58of1997, 59of1997 and 60of1997 before the II Additional District Judge, Kurnool. By five separate judgments dated 15. I 0.1998, the first appellate court dismissed all the five appeals and affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial judge.
16. Felt aggrieved, the respondents filed five Second appeals before the High Court. The High Court admitted the appeals and by impugned order allowed the appeals and while setting aside the two courts judgment/ decree remanded the cases to the trial court for fresh trial on merits by permitting the parties to amend the pleadings, to frame additional issues and to adduce the evidence. The concluding para of the High Court reads as under:- " .•..•. in the light of the respective stands taken by the parties, without expressing any further opinion relating to the other aspects, this Court is inclined to set aside the Decrees and common judgment made by the Court of first instance and also the Decrees and judgments made by the appellate Court and SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] remand these matters to the Court of first fos'tilltce – to record the evidence of P. W.4 in to to and also to permit the parties to let in further evidence relating to the identity- of the property especially in the light of the admissions made by D.W.1 and record further findings if necessary permitting the parties to amend their respective pleadings and also setting additional issu,~s as well and further permitting the parties to it in further evidence on such additional pleadings and additional issues as well which may arise for consideration in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case." I 7. Felt aggrieved, the appellants who are plaintiffs in their two civil suits and defendants in three civil suits filed by the respondents herein have filed these appeals by special leave. 18. Learned counsel forthe appellants while assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned judgment urged four submissions. 19. Firstly, the learned counsel contended that the High Court erred in admitting the second appeals on questions, which according to him did not arise out of the case and in any case, the questions framed were not the substantial questions of law within the meaning of Section I 00 of Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, his contention was that High Court erred in setting aside the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two courts below. It was his submission that .these findings were binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal. Thirdly, his content_ion was that there was no case made out by the respondents (who were appellants before the High Court in second appeals) before the High Court for remanding the cases to the trial court for de nova trial in the suits. It was urged that firstly it was nobody's case much less of the appellants before the High Court that the trial in the suits was unsatisfactory or/and that the parties were not afforded full opportunity to present their case; secondly, this objection was neither raised by the appellants before the first appellate court and nor before the High Court; thirdly, no question oflaw was framed by the Hi.gh Court on the issue of remanding the cases to the trial court. In these cird.iinstances, the remand order is wholly without jurisdiction and fourthly, learned counsel contended that both trial court and the first appellate court on proper appreciation of evidence having rightly held that the respondents failed to establish their title over the suit-land on their plea ofadverse possession, whereas c [2016) 6 S.C.R. the appellants were able to establish the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the respondents, therefore, these findings were binding on the High Court. 20. Per contra, learned coun~el for the respondents supported the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court and urged for its upholding. c 21. Having heard the learned counsel forthe parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to accept the submissions urged by the learned counsel for the appellants, as in our view, it has force. 22. The questions which arise for consideration in these appeals are (i) whether the second appeal filed by the respondents involved any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section I 00 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short "CPC"): (ii) whether the High Court was justified in admitting the respondents' second appeal on the questions framed and if so whether the questions framed can be regarded as substantial questions of law arising out of the case; (iii) whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case to the trial court for de nova trial in all the five civil suits and (iv) whether the respondents were able to prove their title over the suit-land so also whether the appellants were able to prove the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellants and the respondents. 23. The scope of Section JOO ofCPC while deciding the second appeal by the High Court has been the subject matter of several decisions of this Court and thus remains no more res integra. A reference to the two cases on this question would suffice. 24. A three-judge Bench of this Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs. reported in (200 I) 3 SCC 179 speaking'!Tfrough R.C. Lahoti J (as His Lordship then was) examined the scope of Section I 00 ofCPC in detail and laid down the following propositions in paragraphs 9, I 0, 12 and 14 as under: "9. The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. & 521· ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] , jurisdiction under the a.m.ended Section lOO of the Code. (See Kshitish Chandra Purkait v .. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438, Panchugopal Barua v: Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 4U and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999)3 SCC 722) 10. At the very outset we may point outlhat the memo of second appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant before the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity. Section lOO of the Code, as amenqed in 1976, restricts the. ju~isdiction 6f the High Court to hear a second appeal . only on "substantial question oflaw involved in the case". An obHgation is cast 0;1 the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant· proposes to urge before the High Court. The High Court , must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. Such questions or question may be the one proposed by the appellaat or may be any"other question which though not proposed by the appeliant yet in the opinion of tlie High Court arises as involved in the case a1t.d is substantial in nature. At the hearing_ of the appeal, the s~ope of hearing is circumscribed by the question so formufated by the High . _Court. The respondent is at liberty to show that "the question formulated by the High Court was not invol\l.ed in the case In spi1" uf. a substantial question ·of law determining the scope of hearing of second appeal having be.en formulated by the.High Court,Jts power to h~ar the appealon any other substantial que~tion oflaw,-.not earlier formulated by it, is not taken away sulJjeet to the twin conditions.being satisfied: (r) the High Courtfeels s~tisfied that the case involves such question, and (ii) the High Court records reasons for its such satisfaction. 12. The phrase "substantial questio·n oflaw", as occurring .in the amcded Section 100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, l!'.' qualifying "question of Ia_w", c · means:- of having substance, essential, r!al, ofsound worth, important or considerable. It is tu be under~tood as something in confradistincti~n jvit~ —"". c ·a:. technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clea1· that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article l33(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question oflaw on which a second appeal s)!all be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. 111 Gu ran Ditta v. T. Ram Ditta (AIR 19iS PC 172), t'he phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held thatit did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as between the parties. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd.(AIR 1962 SC 1314) the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v •. ·· Noony Veeraju (AIR 1951 Mad 969): "When a question oflaw is fairly arguable, where there is room ·for difference of opinion on it or 1 where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the · decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular . facts of the case it would not be a substantial . question of law." an(j laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question oflaw raised in the case is substantial: SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS.-& ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, L] "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directl_y and substar.tially affects the rights of the parties .and if so whether it is either an open question in the se1:se that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Priv) Council or by the Federal Court or is not free · from difficulty or calls for discussion of ahernative views.'_ If ·the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of . applying- those principles or that the plea raised is ·palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question oflaw." 14. n. point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of. law. To be "substantial" a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding pre~edent, and must hav~ _ _,a-Illaterial bearing on the decisipn of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question oflaw "involving in the c~se" there must be:first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question oflaw for a just and proper dedsio" ".-the case. An entirely new point r.aised for the fir~t time before the High Court is not a question. involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the- paramount overall <;onsideration being the need. for ; , striking a judicious balance between th~ndispensable pbligatio'n to do justice at all stages and impelling . r.ecessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any tis". 25. Again in the case of Thiagarajan 'And Others VS; Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil And Others reported in 2004 (5) SCC 762, a two Judge Bench of this Court in para.graphs 17, 24, 25 and 26 observed as under: c . _·q- c "17. Sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC says that the appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall at the hearing of the appeal be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such a questiun. The proviso states that nothing in this sub- section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power oft.he Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it ifit is satisfied that the case involves such questi6n. In the instant case, the High Court at the time of final hearing formulated five more questions oflaw as extracted above after hearing the counsel for both sides having miserably failed to record the reasons for formulating the other substantial questions of law. 24. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in holding that the appellants have failed to estabHsh their title to the suit property evidently without appreciating the evidence on record in its proper perspective by making only. reference to portions of evidence having once decided to reappreciate the evidence. The High Court, in our opinion, ought to have examined the entire.evidence both oral and documentary instead of only a portion thereof especially while deciding to look into and rea ppreci;tte the evidence despite the limited scope under Section 100 CPC. In our view, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has exceeded his jurisdiction in reassessing, reappreciating and making a roving enquiry by entering into the factual arena of the case which is not the one contemplated under the limited scope of jurisdiction ofa second appeal under Section 100 CPC. 25. In the present case, the lower appelll!te court fairly appreciated the evidence and arrived at a conclusion that the appellants' suit was to be decreed and that the appellants are entitled to the relief as prayed for. Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material. SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] 26. To say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation ·or the courts of Jaw to further the clea.r intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings Of fact by the lower appellah" court are based on evidence, the High Court in_ second api.Jeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the gronnd that another view was possible". 26. Reverting to the facts of the case at hand and keeping in view the aforesaid principles oflaw in mind, we find that the High Court while admitting the second appeal had formulated the following quesr:.:;ns: 1) Whether the finding of the Court below, that the suit · site 011 ~.S.No.53/93 in S.No.35/S, Ex.C.IAI and the leased site, surrendered by P.W.6 in S.No.35/5CIA19 arc one and the same, is vitiated by its failure to consider the admissions of D.W.I and the relevant documentary evidence, which establish that there was a sub~division of S.No.35/5L the suit site is S.No.35/5, CI Ex.A.I bein~ a Government poramboke land and the site of the defendant classified as a "Darga Burial Ground Mosque"; · each distinct and different from the other? Admissions of D.W.1:- 20 Whether the Court below have failed to see that Ex.A.2 (Gift deed being a thirty year old document, the presumpt;o1; •111.-1.,p ~ection 90 of Evidence Act applies, both with regard _to execution agd attestation, and as such the opinion of the trial Court that it is suspicious. · document, is untenable and unsustainable in law? 3) Whether the lower appellate Court erred iiI law in not framing proper points for_consideration, on t~e v~lidity. of~.A.2 gift deed and the sub-division of suit property S.No.35/5 ClAl, aSrrequired under Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. and as such the Judgment ofthe.Jower appellate Courl ;:;s" final Court of fact is vitiated by errors of law? 4) Whether the lower appellate Court has erred in -law, in holding that Ex.A2 gift deed is invalid, because the property gifted is poramboke, when the Government itself c c [2016) 6 S.C.R. (second defendant) has not disputed either the long possession or possessory title of the plaintiff of the suit property? 5) Whether the lower appellate Court has erred in law on the question of title, merely by adverting to Ex.A.3, Ex.A.4, Ex.A.5 – tax receipts, and the entire reasoning is based on mere guess work ignoring the relevant and clinching documentary evidence? 6) Whether the finding of the lower ?ppellate Court that P.W.6 (plaintiff's son) did not vacate the site even after the lease period of the site S.No.35/5 C1A19 of D.I is not based on any evidence except the word of D.W.2 (no witnesses wee examined) and the conclusion reached by itthat the suit site in O.S.No.53/ 93 and the leased site are the same, is contrary to the evidence on record?. 7) Whether the-lower appellate Court has erred in law in its failure to consider the admission of D.W.2 himself that his father encroached into the plaintiff's site and was issued B-Memos and· paid the penalty, which conclusively establishes that the two sites are different and not one and the same? 8) Whether the very approach of the lower appellate Court is essentially erroneous and its findings are liable to be set aside (AIR 1992 S.C., 1604)? 27. In our considered opinion, the aforementioned questions cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being a "substi\:\1tial questions of law" within the meaning of Section 100 ofCPC. Th~se questions, in our view, are essentially questions of fact. In any event, the second appeal did not involve any substantial questions of law as contemplated under Section I 00 ofCPC and lastly no case was wade out by the respondents · before the High Court for remanding of the case to the trial court for de nova trial in all the civil suits.,This we say for following reasons. . 28. Firstly, when the trial court and the first appellate court on ·'appreciation of evidence concurr~ntly held in three civil suits filed by the respondents that they failed to prove their title. over the suit-land and further in two civil suits filed by the appellants that they were able to establish their relationship of landlord and tenant in relation to the suit- SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN Bl (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] land, such findings, in our opinion, were binding on the High Court being concurrent in nature. 29. Secondly, none of the findings of the two courts below were perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever come to such conclusion and that these findings were not in conflict with any provision oflaw governing the issue and that the findings were also not against the pleadings or evidence. Jn this view of the matter, in our view, these findings were not capable of being set aside by the High Court in exercise of its second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC; rather they were binding on the High Court. 30. Thirdly, apart from what is held above, the questions formulated were neither debatable nor arguable and nor did they involve any question oflaw which could be said to arise in the case. In other words, sine qua non for admitting the second appeal was existence of "substan!J!ll 'question of law in the case" and therefore unless the questions framed were debatable, or/and arguable or/and involving any legal question, the High Court had no jurisdiction to formulate such questions treatingthem to be substantial question of law. Indeed the High Court had the jurisdiction under sub-Section (5) of Section 100 ofCPC to examine at the time of hearing as to whether the questions framed were substantial questions of law or not and whether they arose out of the case, but the High Court failed to do so. 31. Fourthly, having formulated the questions (though wrongly), the High Court went on to discuss all the issues in 59 pages as if it was hearing first appeals and instead of answering the questions, set aside the judgment/decree of the two courts below and proceeded to remand ·the cases to the trial court for de novo trial in all civil suits. In our opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction to remand the case to the trial court inasmuch as no party to the appeal had even raised this ground before the first appellate court or/and the High Court as to why the remand of the case to the trial Court is called for and nor there was any finding recorded 0\1 this question by the first appellate court. 32. We also fi;d that no party to the appeals complained at any stage of the proceedings that the trial in the suits was unsatisfactory which caused prejudice to them requiring remand of the cases to the trial court to enable them to lead additional evidence. In any event, we find that the High Court also did not frame any substantial question of c (2016) 6 S.C.R. law on the-question as to whether any case for remand of the case to the trial court h'ls.been made out and if so on what grounps? 33. Section 100 empowers the High court to decide the second appeal-only on the.questions framed. In other words, the jurisdiction of High Curt to decide the second appeal ,is confined only to questions framed. When the High Court did not frame any question on the question of remand, to the trial court a fortiori it had no jurisdiction to deal with such question much less to answer in respondent's favour. 34. The High Court, in our view, further failed to see that ifthe first appellate court could decide the appeal on merits without there c being any objection raised for remanding of the case to the·trial court, we are unable to appreciate as to why the High Court could not decide the appeal on merits and instead raised the issue of remand of its own a1id passed the order to that effect. · 35. It is a settled principle oflaw that in order to claim remand of the case t{) the trial court, it is necessary for the appellantto first raise such plea and then make out a case of remand on facts. The power of the appellate court to remand the case to subordinate court is contained in order XL! Rule 23, 23.-A and 25 ofCPC. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the appellant to bring the case under any of these provisions before claiming a remand. The appellate court is required to record reasons as to why it has taken recourse to any one out of the three Rules of Order XL! ofCPC for remanding the case to the trial court. In the absence of any ground taken by the respondents (appellants before the first appellate court and High Court) before the first appellate court and the High Court as to why the remand order in these cases is called for and if so under which Rule of Order XL! of CPC and further in the absence of any finding, there was no justification on the part of the High Court to remand the case to the trial court. The High Court instead should have decided the appeals on merits. We, however, do not consider proper to remand the case to Higj1 Court for deciding the appeals on merits and instead examine the merits of the case in these appeals. 36. We, however, find no error in the judgment of the first appellate court, wlJich in our view rightly upheld the judgment and decree ofthe trial -court. …–;– 3 7. Indeed, it is clear from mere reading of the pleadings. The main case set up by the respondents for claiming title over the suit-land SYEDA RAHIMUNNISA v. MALAN BI (DEAD) BY L.RS. & ANR. ETC. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.] was founded only on the pleaofadverse possession against the State. In other words, the respondents' case was that they acquired title over the suit-land on the strength of their adverse possession in the suit-land through their predecessors who were in continuous possession over the suit-land for the last 100 years qua state. The respondents did not claim title on the strength of any .grant or Lease Deed or Patta etc. issued by the B State in their favour. 38. The only question which, therefore, arose for consideration before the courts below was whether the respondents were able to establish their adverse possession over the suit-land as against the State so as to entitle them to claim title in their favour over the suit-land. c 39. The respondents having set up this plea were required to prove it with the aid of satisfactory evidence as the burden of proof lay on them being the plaintiffs. As observed (supra), both the courts held on appreciation of evidenc.~ that the respondents were failed to establish their adverse possession over the suit-land qua State for want of adequate D evidence. It being a question of fact, a finding on this question was binding on the High Court unless any error of law in such finding had been pointed out. It was not so pointed out. 40. We also find that the High Court had framed one question on E the validity of one gift. This question in our view was of no significance · for deciding the main question involved in this case. It is for the reason that the dispute in this case was between the respondents on the one hand and the State on the other relating to the title which was claimed by the respondents on the basis of their adverse possession and to decide this question, execution of gift inter se two members of respondents' family was of no relevance. 41. In these circumstances, the alleged gift whether executed between the two members of respondents' family or not and if so whether it was valid or not, did not arise out of the case. It is apart from the fact that it did not GOnstitute any substantial question oflaw within the meaning G · of Section 100 ofCPC. 42. In the light of-foregoing discussion, we are of the consider.ed opinion that the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is not legally sustainable and is accordingly liable to be set aside. SUPREMJ?: COURT REPORTS [2016].6 S.C.R. 43. As a consequence, these appeals succeed and are hereby allowed~ The impugned judgment is set aside. and the judgment/decree of the first appellate court and that of the trial court are hereby restored. 44. The respondent no.I to pay costs quantified at Rs. I 0,000/- to· the appellants. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals allowed.