Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
8. In support of the above mentioned submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Maheshwari Fish Seed Fram vs. T.N. Electricity Board and another [(2004) 4 SCC 705].
9. The learned counsel for the State of Jammu and Kashmir argued that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was entitled to contest election for the reserved seat of District Poonch on the ground that at the time of commencement of the Constitution, Rajouri was part of District Poonch is misconceived and incorrect. It was submitted that . Section 5 of the Jam mu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996 Svt. (1939 AD) inter alia provides that the Government may by notification vary the limits of Tehsils, Districts and Provinces under which the territories administered by each are defined and may also by notification alter the number of those Tehsils, Districts and Provinces. What was pleaded was that in exercise of powers under Section 5 of the said Act, notifications had been issued from time to time by the Government for demarcating the areas of the Districts. According to the learned counsel, the Districts or Tehsils for any purposes means Districts or Tehsils, as the case may be, as notified by the Government from time to time under Section 5 of the said Act. It was maintained that in the year 1949 the General Department of Prime Minister's Secretariat had issued_ an order bearing No. 667-C of 1949 Whereby District Rajouri was constituted comprising Tehsil Rampur-Rajouri and Nowshera with its Head Quarters at Rajouri and, therefore, it is wrong to contend that District Poonch, as mentioned in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, includes Rajouri. The learned counsel for the State contended that as on the date of the election in the instant case, c District Rajouri was a separate District and distinct from Poonch District and, therefore, the benefit of the reserved seat that is provided under Section 50(3) of the Constitution would not be available to the residents of District Rajouri. The learned counsel stressed that the High Court by its impugned judgment has correctly appreciated the facts as well as rightly interpreted the law and, therefore, the said judgment should not be interfered with by this Court.
10. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and in great detail. This Court has also taken into E consideration the documents forming part of the appeal as well as relevant provisions of law to which attention of the Court was drawn by the learned counsel for the parties and the authorities cited at the Bar.
11. Before proceeding to consider the submissions advanced at the Bar it would be relevant to note that the learned counsel for the appellant conceded that the appellant was not claiming recrimination. It means that the appellant has given up his prayer to declare that the respondent NO. 1 was not qualified to be elected as member of the Legislative Council. The G concession made by the learned counsel for the appellant was in view of the fact that this point was not raised by the appellant herein before the High Court.
12. Another relevant fact, which requires to be noticed, is H that the learned counsel for the appellant agreed that the Poonch TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.] District stands divided for the purpose of law and order, revenue and for Assembly constituencies. However, he emphasized that for the purpose bf the Legislative Council, there was no division of Poonch District. This Court finds that the latter argument, if accepted, would lead to absurd results. It may be mentioned that it was averred by the respondent No. 1 in his petition before s the High Court that right from the elections in the year 1967 till date no resident of District Rajouri was elected as a member of Legislative Council for the seat reserved for residents of District Poonch. In fact, an averment was made that the respondent No. 3 herein, i.e., the Returning Officer in 2005 c elections was also the Returning Officer in 1999 elections and he had rejected the nomination paper of a resident of Rajouri – as being not eligible. This Court finds that that the Returning Officer was given a reward within one week of rejection of nomination papers of a resident of Rajouri District and the extension of one year in service was granted to him. Therefore, this Court finds some force in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and learned counsel for the State Government that the Government and Election Commission had always interpreted the word "Poonch District" under the proviso to Section 50(3) of the Constitution to mean as Revenue District of Poonch and Rajouri was not considered to be part of District Poonch. This Court finds that the above- stated averments could not be demonstrated to be untrue. The .. past history does not support the case of the appellant that though for all practical purposes including for the purpose of Assembly election, District Poonch was divided, it stood integrated for the purpose of election to Legislative Council.
13. In view of the rival submissions advanced at\the Bar, the question which arises for determination of the Court is G whether the expression "Poonch District" used in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution of Jammu and_ Kashmir, 1957, reserving a seat in the Legislative Council for ·the resident of Poonch District means Poonch District as it existed on March 24, 2005 when the election notification was . H published or it includes Rajouri also. Another question which arises for consideration by the Court is whether the District Hajouri was ever constituted and notified under the law as a part of Poonch District prior to or on the date of commencement of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 1957.
14. It is well settled that the words of a statute should be first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences should be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. If the language used has a natural meaning, normally the Court cannot-depart from that meaning~,·>···"' unless reading the statute as a whole, the context directs the· Court not to do so. In the construction of the statutes their words are normally interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense. Of course, the context in which they occur and the object of the statute has to be kept in mind while adopting ordinary grammatical sense of the word. It is often said that the golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. Parliament should prima facie be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament or Constitution. The drafting of statutes, so important to a people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless the Courts seek, whenever possible, to apply the golden rule of construction, that is to read the statutory language grammatically and terminologically in the ordinary and primary sense, which it bears in its context without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament should also be credited with good sense that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage.
15. If the expression "Poonch District", appearing in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, is interpreted in its ordinary and grammatical meaning, it means District Poonch as was constituted at the time when election notification was published. If an ordinary meaning of the TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.] expression "Poonch District" is accepted, it would mean the geographical area of District Poonch as it existed on the date of notification issued for holding elections. io the year 2005. The word 'resident of Poonch District' in its ordinary sense would mean a resident of Poon ch District and resident of Rajouri cannot . be regarded as resident of Poon ch District. If the framers of the Constitution had intended to give representation by reservation to the residents of Poonch as well as of Rajouri, nothing prevented them from defining the territories of District Poonch as inclusive of Rajouri. In the absence of such definition, the expression "Poonch District" must be understood in its natural, c ordinary or popular meaning. It is an admitted position that as per the definition of the term "District" mentioned in the provisions of Revenue Department Reorganization Act, 2008, the word "District" means a "Revenue District" and if this interpretation is adopted, it becomes at once clear that the expression "District Poonch" appearing in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, does not include Rajouri. ·
16. Even historically this Court finds that Rajouri was never part of Poonch District either before or after the commencement of the Constitution. There was no Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir in the year 1949, but what was applicable and prevalent was J&K Constitution Act of SVT 1996 (year equivalent to 1939 AD). Under the said Act Prime Minister was head of the State. The General Department of Prime Minister's Secretariat issued an order No. 667-C of 1949 dated August 20, 1949 mentioning that Reasi District comprising Tehsil Reasi and Rampur-Rajouri be abolished and instead a new District to be known as District Rajouri comprising Tehsils Rampur-Rajouri and Nowshera be formed as a temporary measure with Head Quarters at Rajouri. It may be stated that Tehsil Rampur-Rajouri is the present Tehsil . G of Rajouri which earlier used to be known and called as Rampur- Rajourl. After publication of above mentioned order dated August 20, 1949, the Government formed and constituted a new District known as District Rajouri with Head Quarters at Rajo1;1ri comprising Tehsil Rajouri and reconstituted Tehsil of Nowshera, by issuing an order under Section 5 of the Jam mu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, 1996 (Samvat). Again, an order No. 1451- C of 1950 dated December 11, 1950 was issued mentioning that the Head Quarters of District Magistrate and Waz;jr Rajouri and Poonch and Superintendent of Police, Rajouri be located B at Poonch and that of Assistant Superintendent of Police at Rajouri. A conjoint and meaningful reading of above mentioned notifications/orders makes it abundantly clear that though District Rajouri stood constituted as an independent District, its Head Quarters for District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner was c located at Poonch, which was also the Head Quarters of District Poonch. Thus for administrative and revenue purposes District Rajouri was administrated by District Administration Head Quarters located at District Poonch. This Court finds that under these circumstances, the High Court had recorded a finding that D since there was no separate and independent District Administration provided for District Rajouri and District Rajouri as well as District Poonch continued to be administered by joint District Administration from Poonch, both the Distric;ts for the purpose of administration were being referred to as one District, E namely, Rajoliri-Poonch District. It is pertinent to note that the record does not indicate that any such district known as Rajoari- Poonch District was ever formed by the Administration. The record also shows that this position continued up to the year 1957, when the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution was brought into force with effect from January 26, 1957. What is relevant to notice is that the General Department of the State issued Government Order No. 137-C of 1967 dated September 30, 1967 splitting Poonch District into two Districts, i.e., (1) Poonch District comprising Haveli and Mendhar Tehsils with Head Quarters at Poonch and (2) Rajouri District comprising Rajouri G and Nowshera Tehsils with Head Quarters at Rajouri, in the interest of revenue and law and order. By the said order Tehsils Rajouri and Nowshera which were excluded from the Poonch District, constituted a separate district known as District Rajouri. It is worthwhile to note that the Revenue Department of the State H issued notification SRO 444 dated October 21, 1967 under TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.] Section 5 of the Jam mu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act, SVT 1996-, directing that the territorial limits of Tehsil Rajouri and Nowshera shall be excluded from the existing Poonch-Rajouri District and shall constitute a separate District to be known as District Rajouri. If one reads the above mentioned two orders, a glaring fact, which cannot be ignored, becomes evident is that though no fresh notification under Section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Revenue Act for creation of the D'istrict Rajouri as an independent District was required, yet the same was issued again to emphasis that Tehsil Rajouri and Nowshera excluded from administratively known as Poonch-Rajouri District c . and constituted into a separate District known as District Rajouri. Though in the above mentioned two orders, this Court finds, a ·reference to Poonch-Rajouri District, in fact, there was no district formed or constituted, which was known as Poonch-Rajouri , Oistrict and probably all the confusion has arisen only because of reference of a district known as Poonch-Rajouri District in the above mentioned two orders.
17. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that if the expression "Resident of District Poonch", appearing in the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, is interpreted to mean a resident of District Poonch and does not include resident of Rajouri, would have adverse effect on the interpretation to be put to the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the Constitution, in which reference is made to Kargil and Leh, is found by this Court to be an argument in terrorem and cannot be accepted.
18. The argument that the interpretation canvassed by the respondent No. 1, if accepted by the Court, would have effect on the interpretation of the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 50 of the Constitution, is no ground to place an incorrect interpretation on the proviso to sub-Section (3) ofSection 50 of the Constitution. In Indian Overseas Bank vs. 1.0.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and another [2004) 4 SCC 245], the contractor, who was running canteen, was removed and the Indian Overseas Bank ('1.0.B.' for short) agreed for floating a cooperative society to run the canteen. The Central Office of 1.0.B. agreed to provide all infrastructural facilities. The staff required was employed by promoters, who were administering ~he crnteen. The canteen was successfully being run by the Central Office from the amounts realized from day-to-day ·· B receipts. However, the canteen was not able to meet its financial requirements and was closed. Consequently the canteen workers were thrown out of employment. At the instance of the workers' union, Government of India made two references to the Industrial Tribunal. Meanwhile, Central Office made c .arrangement with a third party for running the canteen on contractual basis. Aggrieved by this, the workers filed a complaint under Section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal held that the employees of the canteen were to be treated as workmen of IOB and entitled to same status and D facilities. The Tribunal also allowed the claim made in the complaint. On writ petitions filed by the IOB, a single Judge of the High Court set aside the Award of the Tribunal, which was subsequently restored by the Division Bench of the High Court. Before this Court the IOB expressed an apprehension that ifthe E claim of the canteen workers was upheld, the appellant Bank would also have to face similar claims from every employee of the canteens run everywhere. Negativing the said argument this Cou11 held that such an argument in terrorem cannot deprive the workers of such status if they are entitled to such status.
19. It is significant to note that a query had been made to the Election Commission of India as to whether the benefit of reservation under Section 50(3) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir can be given to a resident of Rajouri. To this, the Election Commission of India had responded vide G communication dated March 30, 2005 clarifying that the Poonch District referred to in Section 50(3) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, would include District Rajouri, which was a part of undivided Poonch District at the time of commencement of the Jammu and Kashmir State. It is argued on behalf of learned H counsel for the appellant that under Section 138 of the TASSADIQ HUSSAIN v. MOHD. RASHID QURESHI AND ORS. [J.M. PANCHAL, J.] Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Election Commission ,of India has power to superintend and control elections held in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, therefore, the view taken by the Election Commission of India in its communication dated March 30, 2005 is binding and should be accepted by this Court. It is true that under Section 138 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the superintendence, direction and control of elections to either House of the State Leg isl a tu re held under the Constitution ves~in the Election Commission of India. However, in exercise of powers under Section 138 of the Constitution, the Election Commission of India cannot define boundaries of the constituencies or territorial limits either of State Legislature or of Legislative Council. After analyzing the different provisions of the Constitution of India and role expected to be played by the Election Commission of India, this Court in Laxmi Kant Bajpai vs. Haji Yaqoob and others (supra), has ruled that the Election Commission of India has no power to change the boundaries or areas or extend the boundaries or areas of any constituency. May be, the view taken by the Election Commission of India can be taken into consideration by the Court of Law while interpreting the provisions of proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution. However, the power to superintend, direct and control elections does not make the clarification binding either on the State Government or the persons contesting the elections and voters. It is certainly not binding on this Court. Having taken into consideration the view expressed by the Election Commission of India in its communication dated March 36, 2005, this Court finds it difficult to agree with the view expressed therein. The clarification issued by the Election Commission of India is not only contrary to historical background of the two districts concerned, but is also plainly against the well-settled principles of interpretation of statute.
20. The last plea that the burElen–to.prove that the expression "Resident of Poonch District" does not include a resident of Rajouri is on the respondent No. 1, who has filed c A petition challenging the election of the appellant as a Member_ of the Legislative Council and as the said burden was not discharged, the petition should have been dismissed, has no substance at all.
21. A glance at the impugned order makes it evident that both the parties had accepted before the High Court that this was purely a legal issue to be decided on the interpretation of· the provisions of the Constitution. In such circumstances question of burden of proof never arose before the High Court. This Court finds that it was the specific case of the appellant that the C expression "a resident of District Poonch" includes a resident of District Rajouri and, therefore, the appellant, if advised, could have brought the evidence on record to substantiate the said plea. The fact remains that no material was brought on record of the case by the appellant to indicate, even remotely, that a D resident of Rajouri is called or known as resident of Poonch District for the purposes of the proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution. Under the circumstances, this Cour1 is of the view that the High Court was justified in not · dismissing the petition filed by the respondent No. 1, questioning E the E~lection of the appellant as a Member of the Legislative Council on the ground that the respondent No. 1 had failed to discharge the burden of proof.
22. For the reasons mentioned above, this Court does not find any substance in the appeal. The conclusion drawn by the F High Court in the impughed judgment that the expression "a resident of Poonch District" in the -proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 50 of the Constitution, does not include a resident of Rajouri is just and no ground is made out to interfere with the same in the instant appeal. Therefore, the appeal, which lacks G merit, deserves to be dismissed.
23. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. B.B.B. Appeal dismissed.