Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
28. On 31 st October, 2001 the learned Single Judge decided W.P. No. 7940 of 1999 and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) to hear the appeal and pass appropriate orders. In the meanwhile, status quo was directed to be maintained.
29. Pursuant to the directions given by the learned Single Judge, the Commissioner (Appeals) heard the appeal filed by APHB. By an order dated 4 th January, 2003 the Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the view of the District Revenue Officer dated 9 th June, 1998 and dismissed the appeal. The Commissioner (Appeals) was of opinion that: (i) Only 661.04 acres of land was acquired out of the larger area in Survey No.1009; (ii) The claim made by the respondents that 11.10 acres out of Survey No.1009 was not acquired was not a belated claim; (iii) The correction sought by the respondents in their claim under Section 87 of the Act was the correction of a clerical error under paragraph 5 (d) of the Circular dated 15 th October, 1994. Proceedings before the learned Single Judge
30. Feeling aggrieved by the dismissal of its appeal by the Commissioner (Appeals), a writ petition was filed by APHB in the Andhra Pradesh High Court and that was numbered as W.P. No. 13927 of 2003.
31. A learned Single Judge of the High Court heard the writ petition and by a judgment and order dated 19 th April, 2005 allowed it and quashed the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
32. The learned Single Judge took the view that Section 87 of the Act was not applicable to the case and as such the claim made by the respondents was not maintainable. In addition, it was held that the claim made by the respondents does not fall within the category of a ‘clerical error’ and therefore the Circular dated 15 th October, 1994 was also not applicable. The learned Single Judge made a reference to the failure of the State and the respondents to produce the record prepared at the time of survey which could have shown a wrong calculation of area. In this regard it was held by the learned Single Judge as follows: “Record prepared at the time of survey is not produced to show that there is a wrong calculation of area, though the measurement on ground and record support the correct area. So, entry regarding extent of S.No.1009 cannot be said to have been made wrongly due to a clerical mistake. By arriving at the area of a particular survey number by conducting survey thereof only, several decades after settlement, and without surveying the areas in other survey numbers adjacent to that survey number, question of the original entry in the settlement register was a wrong entry as a clerical error or not cannot be determined. There is nothing on record to show that lands in adjacent survey numbers of S.No.1009 also were surveyed and as to what is the extent found in such survey, and the extent noted in the settlement register.”
33. With regard to the contention that only 661.04 acres had been acquired out of Survey No.1009, the learned Single Judge noted that a declaration had been filed by and on behalf of the respondents under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD v. AZAMUNNISA BEGUM (DIED) THRU. LRS.& ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] Holdings) Act, 1973. In that declaration there was nothing to suggest that the respondents were holding excess land which would have been so had the respondents been in possession of 11.10 acres. The learned Single Judge observed as follows:- “The contention of Mir Fazeelath Hussain Khan and his heirs that since they are in actual physical possession of the land of Acs.11=10gts in S. No. 1009, even after acquisition by the petitioner, and so they can make a claim cannot be countenanced because by the time A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (Act 1 of 1973) and the Urban Land (Ceilings and Regulation) Act, 1976, came into force Mir Fazeelath Hussain Khan, who originally filed the application before the 3 rd respondent, was alive, and had filed a declaration under the Act 1 of 1973. He showed the total area covered by S. Nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 belonging to him as Acs.1109-92 gts. That extent was deleted from his holding as it was acquired and by the order dated 09-12-1976, vide common order in C.C.Nos.156 to 159/W/75 he was held to be holding 0.4083 standard holding in excess even after deleting of an extent of Acs.1109.92 gts in S. Nos. 1009, 1043 to 1065 of Kukatpally village. If Mir Fazeelath Hussain Khan really was in possession of or was owning any extent over and above the area acquired by the petitioner either in S. No. 1009 or 1043 to 1065, he would have had to surrender that area also, because even without that area being included in his holding he was found to be holding land in excess of the ceiling area.” ……………………………………. “So, it is clear that the family of Raisyar Jung was said to be holding only land to the extent of Acs.349-63 cents in S.No.1007 but not any land in S. No. 1009. This extent of Acs.11-10 gts now said to be in the possession of unofficial respondents was not declared by them or their predecessors in the declaration under Act 1 of 1973. Had Fazeelath Hussain Khan, who filed the petition before the District Revenue Officer, or any of the unofficial respondents or their predecessors-in-title, been in possession of any extent of land in S. No. 1009 by 01.01.1975 they would have shown it in their declaration filed under Act 1 of 1973. But they did not do so. For that reason also the contention of the unofficial respondents that they are in possession of some land in S. No. 1009 and that the extent of S. No. 1009 is more than that was acquired by the petitioner cannot be believed or accepted.”
34. The learned Single Judge also dealt with the submission on behalf of the respondents that the APHB had no locus standi to question the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). It was noted that the APHB was a party to the proceedings before the Commissioner (Appeals) and therefore it was entitled to question the adverse order. Moreover, when the authorities assume jurisdiction which they do not possess under Section 87 of the Act and pass orders likely to affect the interests of the APHB, a right accrues to the APHB to question such orders passed without jurisdiction.
35. Since the learned Single Judge concluded that the orders passed by the District Revenue Officer and the Commissioner (Appeals) were without jurisdiction, there was obviously no occasion to decide the question whether the claim filed by the respondents was belated or not. Proceedings before the Division Bench
36. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge on 19 th April, 2005, writ appeals being W.A. No. 1311 of 2005 and W.A. No. 1781 of 2005 were filed by the respondents challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge. By the impugned judgment and order dated 25 th September, 2009 the writ appeals were allowed by the Division Bench and it is under these circumstances that the present appeals are before us.
37. The High Court allowed the writ appeals primarily on two submissions. It was held by the Division Bench that a report of the survey authorities had confirmed that the area of land in Survey No. 1009 was more than 661.04 acres. Admittedly, only 661.04 acres had been acquired out of Survey No. 1009. Therefore, the APHB was entitled to hold only 661.04 acres while the balance had not been acquired and therefore the ownership remained with the respondents. According to the Division Bench, there was a clerical error in the measurement area of Survey No. 1009 and therefore paragraph 5(d) of the Circular dated th October, 1994 was applicable and the authorities were entitled to correct the calculation error.
38. The second ground given by the Division Bench was with reference to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. In this context, it was held that TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD v. AZAMUNNISA BEGUM (DIED) THRU. LRS.& ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] since the respondents were not holding the land, they could not have made a declaration as envisaged under the provisions of the said Act and in any event this was hardly of any relevance since Survey No. 1009 indicates that the area of that survey number was greater than 661.04 acres. However, what is of significance is the conclusion arrived at by the Division Bench that the respondents were not in possession of 11.10 acres in Survey No. 1009. Possession of the entire Survey No. 1009 was with the APHB. Discussion
39. In our opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court has seriously erred in setting aside the order of the learned Single Judge.
40. It is quite clear to us that the APHB had acquired, in terms of the Award dated 10 th June, 1968 a couple of thousand acres of land covering a few dozen survey numbers. The entire land was acquired and in view of the large area of acquisition even if there was some error in describing the area of a particular survey number, that would be inconsequential given the overall acquisition and its purpose for a Housing Scheme under Section 22A of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act.
41. In addition, it is quite clear from the extracted passages in the Award, that the entire land in Survey No.1009 was acquired by the APHB. There cannot be any doubt in this regard, particularly since the APHB also took possession of the entire Survey No. 1009.
42. While it is correct that the respondents did submit in their claim petition under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 that 11 acres and odd had not been acquired, there was absolutely no reference to any survey number in which this 11 acres and odd was located. There was no clear identification of the land, no boundaries were mentioned nor was the land ear-marked in any manner and in fact even the exact measurement was not mentioned. It appears to us that the respondents were taking a potshot in the dark to somehow or the other retain possession of some of the acquired land.
43. If the respondents were convinced that 11 acres and odd had not been acquired by the APHB in 1968 it is not understandable why no follow up action taken by them. They had an option, perhaps, of proceeding against the APHB for being in wrongful possession of 11 acres and odd owned by the respondents and they certainly had the option of moving an application under Section 87 of the Act. The respondents took neither of these steps on an urgent basis or any other step that might have been available to them in law.
44. All that the respondents did was to wait for another 25 years and then move an application under Section 87 of the Act sometime in 1993. There was no change in the factual situation between 1968 and 1993 except construction having been made by the APHB in pursuance of its Housing Scheme. The respondents have given absolutely no explanation for filing an application under Section 87 of the Act after such an enormous lapse of time. What has been submitted is that there is no time limit for correcting a clerical error and that being so, the respondents cannot be non-suited on the ground of delay and laches.
45. We are not in agreement with the respondents on any aspect of the case. First of all we agree with the APHB that an accurate picture of the area in terms of measurement of land in Survey No. 1009 cannot be fully relied upon after several decades and after construction having been made. The records had originally indicated that Survey No. 1009 consists of 666.25 acres and we must proceed on that basis rather than assume the correctness of a measurement carried out after several decades.
46. That the unexplained delay in measurement of the area cannot be relied upon is also supported by the fact that even the revenue authorities were not quite sure about the exact area of Survey No.1009. According to the respondents, 11.10 acres had not been acquired but according to the revenue authorities the entire area of Survey No.1009 was actually 687.03 acres with the result that 20.18 had not been acquired. In view of this discrepancy, we are of opinion that surveys conducted post the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be relied upon. We have also noted that it has come on record that IDL was also in possession of some parts of Survey No. 1009. We must, therefore, accept the fact that the entire Survey No.1009 was acquired by the APHB and possession taken, regardless of its actual measurement and the alleged non-acquisition of 11.10 acres is nothing but a red herring. Consequently, the question of correcting a ‘clerical error’ with reference to Section 87 of the Act does not arise. TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD v. AZAMUNNISA BEGUM (DIED) THRU. LRS.& ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] A clerical error
47. In any event, it was contended by the respondents that a clerical error was sought to be corrected in the measurement of the area of Survey No.1009. It is not clear what the clerical error was. If the clerical error was that the area of Survey No.1009 was not 661.04 acres or 666.25 acres but actually 687.03 acres then the contention is self- defeating. This is because the area of Survey No.1009 would then have to be read as 687.03 for all purposes and not 661.04 acres. The consequence of this correction would be that the acquisition was of 687.03 acres and not of 661.04 acres.
48. That apart, the correction of the alleged clerical error does not give rise to the argument that only 661.04 acres was acquired out of 687.03 acres. If the correction gives rise to an argument or contention, then it ceases to be the correction of a clerical error but is really the correction of a substantive error, which does not come within the purview of Section 87 of the Act.
49. Be that as it may, in M/s Tata Consulting Engineers v. Workmen1 Pathak, J. adverted to a clerical error and held in paragraph 20 of the Report as follows: “The jurisdiction given to the [Industrial] Tribunal by Rule 31 [Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957] is closely circumscribed. It is only a clerical mistake or error which can be corrected, and the clerical mistake or error must arise from an accidental slip or omission in the award. An accidental slip or omission implies that something was intended and contrary to that intention what should not have been included has been included or what should have been included has been omitted. It must be a mistake or error amenable to clerical correction only. It must not be a mistake or error which calls for rectification by modification of the conscious adjudication on the issues involved.”
50. Similarly, a clerical error was discussed in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal.2 In paragraph 4 of the Report, reference was made to Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa3 and it was held as follows: 1 1980 (Supp.) SCC 627 2 (1981) 1 SCC 500 3 AIR 1966 SC 1047 “A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the court. It represents that which the court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing.”
51. More recently, in Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Gujarat4 it was held in paragraph 26 of the Report as follows: “An arithmetical mistake is a mistake in calculation, while a clerical mistake is a mistake of writing or typing error occurring due to accidental slip or omissions or error due to careless mistake or omission. In our considered opinion, substituting different lands in place of the lands which have been notified by a statutory notification under Sections 10(1), 10(3) and 10(5) [Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976] cannot and shall not be done by issuing a corrigendum unless the mandatory requirements contained in the aforementioned sections is complied with. A landholder cannot be divested from his land on the plea of clerical or arithmetical mistake liable to be corrected by issuing corrigendum.”
52. The Circular dated 15 th October, 1994 clarifies a clerical error. Some examples have been given and one clarification is to the effect that a clerical error is where the area is calculated wrongly though measurement on the ground and the records support the correct area. This clause is sought to be relied upon by the respondents. It must be appreciated in this case that there is no question of a calculation error since no arithmetical error was committed as understood by this Court. The area of Survey No.1009 was measured and it was found to be 666.25 acres (including the area acquired for Manjeera Water Works Department). The survey by the Measuring Circle Inspector, the check by the G.D. Inspector and approved by the Land Record Assistant clearly indicate this. This was sought to be ‘corrected’ by the respondents by claiming that the area of Survey No. 1009 was much more. A calculation error would be, in a situation such as the present, an error that would appear on the face of the document or the revenue records, as the case 4 (2016) 4 SCC 531 TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD v. AZAMUNNISA BEGUM (DIED) THRU. LRS.& ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] may be. If there is a need to carry out a survey and a re-survey, the error cannot by any means, be described as a clerical error.
53. What makes the situation worse insofar as the respondents are concerned is that according to them the error was to the extent of 11.10 acres but on a survey having been conducted, the error was said to be to an extent of 20.18 acres. Surely, such a discrepancy cannot be described as an accidental slip or a clerical mistake or a calculation error. It can only be described as a major error which ought to have been rectified at the appropriate time in 1968 when the Award was passed or soon thereafter. To notice and make much ado about such an error after at least 25 years cannot be understood as the correction of a clerical error.
54. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulum and Another5 to contend that the Circular dated 15 th October, 1994 is a contemporaneous exposition of the true state of affairs as understood by the revenue authorities themselves and if they believed that a ‘clerical error’ ought to be interpreted in the manner described in the Circular, that interpretation must be accepted. The following passage was referred to and relied upon: “The rule of construction by reference to contemporanea expositio is a well-established rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority, though it must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. This rule has been succinctly and felicitously expressed in Crawford on Statutory Construction, (1940 Edn.) where it is stated in para 219 that “administrative construction (i.e. contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrong before it is overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as practical construction, although non-controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight; it is highly persuasive”.
55. Similarly, reference was also made to Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd.6 The following passage was relied upon by learned counsel for the respondents. 5 AIR 1981 SC 1922 6 AIR 1979 SC 1049 “The principle of contemporanea expositio (interpreting a statute or any other document by reference to the exposition it has received from contemporary authority) can be invoked though the same will not always be decisive of the question of construction (Maxwell 12th ed. p. 268).”
56. It is no doubt true that the contemporaneous exposition of a document must carry great weight but if that exposition is not in consonance with the law laid down by the Courts, including this Court, the exposition would not be relevant. We have made a reference to several decisions which explain the meaning of a clerical error.The view expressed in the Circular dated 15 th October, 1994 particularly clause 5(d) referred to and relied upon by the respondents does not come within the four corners of the understanding of the expression clerical error by this Court if it involves a survey and a re-survey as in this case. Therefore, no reliance can be placed upon the contemporaneous exposition made by the revenue authorities in the Circular dated 15 th October, 1994.
57. We conclude that there was no clerical error in the measurement of Survey No.1009 for all intents and purposes and that in any event, the entire land in Survey No. 1009 was acquired for the Housing Scheme of the APHB. Section 87 of the Act and delay in making a claim
58. We are also not satisfied with the delay by the respondents in making a claim under Section 87 of the Act. The contention of the respondents is that since there is no time limit specified for filing a claim petition, they could have made a claim at any point of time, particularly for correcting a clerical error.
59. It is now well settled that where no time-limit is specified, whatever is required to be done should be within a reasonable period. In Collector v. P. Mangamma7 it was held in paragraphs 5 and 6 as follows: “A reasonable period would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into 7 (2003) 4 SCC 488 at page 491 TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD v. AZAMUNNISA BEGUM (DIED) THRU. LRS.& ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha8 it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied………”. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”
60. Similarly, in Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing Rao9 the exercise of revisional jurisdiction where no time- limit is specified was considered and it was held in paragraph 31 of the Report as follows: “To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.”
61. Finally in Basanti Prasad v. Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board10 it was pointed out where third party rights are likely to be affected, the courts decline to interfere but if there is a necessity to interfere then the aggrieved person should be heard on merits. 8 (1969) 2 SCC 187 9 (2015) 3 SCC 695 10 (2009) 6 SCC 791
62. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, the claim made under Section 87 of the Act was after a period of at least 25 years. This can hardly be described as a reasonable period. There is no explanation for the inordinate delay and to make matters worse, third party interests have been created through a Housing Scheme developed on the land in dispute or in any event on the surrounding land. After a further lapse of 25 years it is not possible to put the clock back, even if there is any reason to do so, which reason we cannot even visualise in this case. Locus standi
63. It was submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the APHB has no locus standi to raise any dispute with regard to the measurement of Survey No.1009. We are not at all in agreement with this submission. A tract of land measuring 11.10 acres out of Survey No.1009 was sought to be taken away from the APHB which had announced a Housing Scheme under Section 22A of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1956 and third party rights had also been created in this regard. The primary responsibility of protecting the interests of the beneficiaries of the Housing Scheme was that of the APHB and surely it cannot be said under these circumstances that the APHB had no locus standi to participate in the proceedings. In fact, even the revenue authorities recognised the locus of the APHB in the order dated 15th September, 1997. The Commissioner of Survey, Settlements and Land Records, Hyderabad directed the District Revenue Officer to take action in terms of the Circular of 15 th October, 1994 but before passing any orders under Section 87 of the Act, it was directed that the APHB should be heard. We therefore reject the contention that the APHB had no locus standi in the matter. Interference on facts
64. The final submission of learned counsel for the respondents was that the revenue authorities had come a factual conclusion in their favour and the High Court ought not to have interfered with the factual conclusions and even this Court ought not to interfere with the factual conclusions arrived at by the revenue authorities. In our opinion, the revenue authorities had completely misdirected in law in reopening a factual issue that had been settled way back in 1968 if not earlier and TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD v. AZAMUNNISA BEGUM (DIED) THRU. LRS.& ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.] there was no occasion for reopening that factual issue after a lapse of at least 25 years. That being the position, it cannot be said that the courts are precluded from interfering in a matter of determination of facts when the authorities have completely misdirected themselves in law and exercised jurisdiction which did not vest in them. We therefore also reject this submission of the respondents. Conclusion
65. To conclude, therefore, we hold that the entire Survey No. 1009 was acquired by the APHB for a Housing Scheme. No parcel of land in Survey No. 1009 was left out or not acquired. Compensation was paid for acquisition of the entire Survey No.1009. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in concluding that 20.18 acres of land in Survey No. 1009 had not been acquired.
66. We also hold that it is too simplistic on the part of the respondents to contend that land in excess of 661.04 acres in Survey No. 1009 was not acquired. This is certainly not so and the entire Survey No. 1009 was acquired. The submission in this regard is rejected.
67. We also hold that the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act was hopelessly delayed for which there is absolutely no explanation forthcoming. In addition, we hold that since third party rights have been created in the meanwhile under the Housing Scheme of the APHB and there is no way to put the clock back. The respondents ought to have been vigilant in pursuing their claim, assuming the claim was legitimate, but since they were not vigilant enough, they must suffer the consequences of their inaction.
68. We also hold that the proceedings under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling of Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 were of some consequence but since the APHB has not relied upon the proceedings under the said Act and learned counsel has only mentioned it in passing, we do not intend to base our decision on the declaration made by the respondents under the said Act.
69. We also hold that the APHB was directly and primarily affected by the claim made by the respondents under Section 87 of the Act and therefore had the locus standi to proceed before the Commissioner (Appeals), the High Court and this Court.
70. In view of the above conclusions, the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench is set aside and the appeals filed by the Telangana Housing Board are allowed. No costs. Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed. TELANGANA HOUSING BOARD v. AZAMUNNISA BEGUM (DIED) THRU. LRS.& ORS. [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]