Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
15. In regard to the several decisions cited by Dr. Pandey, Mr. Jha submitted that the principles laid down therein were never in question, but the same had only limited application as far as the facts of the present case are concerned.
16. As will be evident from the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, and, particularly, those advanced by Dr. Pandey, the differences between the provisions of Section 498-A IPC and 306 IPC, in the light of Section 107 IPC and Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, assumes importance. That there is sufficient evidence to bring C home a charge under Section 498-A IPC, is not seriously disputed. What is urged in all earnestness on b• •1alf of the Petitioner is that in the absence of any intention to instigate Hirabai into committing suicide by his actions, which may at best amount to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC, D the provisions of Section 107 !PC and Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act were not attracted to the facts of the case.
17. In order to appreciate the legal conundrum which has been presented by the facts of this case, the provisions of E Section 306 and 107 IPC, as also Section 498-A thereof, are extracted hereinbelow, along with the provisions of Section 113- A of the Evidence Act : "Section 306. Abetment of suicide. – If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." "107 Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing of a thing, who First.- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that THANU RAM v. STATE OF M.P. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] 721 conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.-lntentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.- A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful conceal-ment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." "498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty- Whoever, being the husband or o the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." "113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a. married women.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by c her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume. having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation – For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498- A of the Indian Panel Code (45 of 1860)."
18. Section 107 IPC clearly defines abetment to .nean that a person abets the doing of a thing who instigates a person to do that thing. The question with which we are confronted is D whether them is sufficient evidence on record to indicate that by any of the acts of cruelty attributed to the Petitioner, there was an intention to instigate Hirabai into committing suicide. There is no getting away from the fact that Hirabai committed suicide in the 4th year of her marriage when she was six E months' pregnant. Ordinarily, a woman in an advanced stage of pregnancy would not commit suicide even when treated with cruelty. It is only in extreme circumstances that a woman may decide to take her life and that of her unborn child when she reaches a point of no return and is in a mental state to take F her own life. In the instant case, we have the dying declaration of the victim Hirabai, which we are inclined to rely upon, notwithstanding the objections raised by Dr. Pandey regarding its veracity.
We see no reason to disbelieve either P.W.9, J.R. Lahre, Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate, or P.W.11, Dr. G K. Vinay Kumar, who attended to Hirabai in the hospital. As is well-established, a dying declaration has to be treated with caution, since the accused does not get a chance to cross- examine the victim. In this case, however, there is no ambiguity or irregularity as far as the dying declaration is concerned and it has been stated in clear and simple language that the victim THANU RAM v. STATE OF M.P. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] 723 had been treated with both mental and physical cruelty and the victim has stated quite candidly how she poured kerosene on her body and set herself on fire. The evidence of P.W.13, Uttam Kumar, the younger brother of the deceased, corroborates the story of the prosecution as to the manner in which Hirabai was treated by the Petitioner, which triggered her immediate intention to commit suicide which was the culminating point of ill-treatment meted out to her by the Petitioner and his mother.
19. In our view, the element of instigation as understood within the meaning of Section 107 IPC is duly satisfied in this case in view of the provisions of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides for a presumption to be arrived at regarding abetment of suicide by a married woman and certain criteria are also laid down therein. The first criterion is that such suicide must have been committed within 7 years from the date of the victim's marriage. Since Hirabai committed suicide in the 4th year of her marriage, such condition is duly satisfied. The second condition is that the husband or such relative of the husband had subjected the victim to cruelty which led to the commission of suicide by the victim. Section 113-A indicates that in such circumstances, the Court may presume, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. In the Explanation to Section 113-A it has also been indicated that for the purpose of the said Section, the expression "cruelty" would have the same meaning as in Section 498-A IPC. Accordingly, if the degree of cruelty is such as to warrant a conviction under Section 498-A IPC, the same may be sufficient for a presumption to be drawn under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act in harmony with the provisions of Section 107 IPC.
20. All the decisions on the point cited by Dr. Pandey, deal with the differences in relation to the provisions of Section 498- A and Section 306 IPC, except in Sushi/ Kumar Sharma's case (supra), where the provisions of Section 498-A IPC had SUPl~EME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 12 S.C.R. A been considered in the context of Section 304-B IPC. In that context, it was sought to be explained that the big difference between Section 306 IPC and 498-A IPC is that of intention. The provisions of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act or its impact on an offence under Section 498-A IPC or Section B 306 IPC vis-a-vis Section 107 IPC was not considered in any of these decisions.
21. In our view, it is the said provision which makes all the difference as far as the present case is concerned. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act establishes a link between an C offence under Section 498-A IPC, 107 IPC and 306 IPC, thereby permitting the Court to presume the commission of an offence under section 107 I PC on the basis of evidence adduced to prove an offence under Section 498-A IPC. As mentioned hereinbefore, the evidence of P.Ws.2, 3, 7, 9, 11 D and 13 is sufficient to establish the prosecution case against the Petitioner under Section 498-A IPC and Section 306 IPC.
22. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court or the Trial Court. The E Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. B.B.B. SLP dismissed.