Bhoju Mantlal v. Dlbnath Bhagat Subba f?a1J J. crucial circumstances make the two cases entirely dis- similar and therefore the said judgment of this court is not of any help in construing the document in
question. On a consideration of the cumulative effect of the terms of the document in the context of the surrounding circumstances we hold that the document in question is not a mortgage but a sale
with the condition of repurchase. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court is correct. The appeal fails and as the advocate for the res- pondent is not present in Court it is dismissed with-
out costs. Appeal dismissed. THE AHMEDABAD MFG. & CALICO PRINTING CO., LTD. v. S. C. MEHTA, INCOME-TAX OFFICER AND ANOTHER (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and RAGHUBAR DAYAL, lJ.)
Income Tax-Rectification-Retrospective operation of atatule-Rebate granted on undistributed profiM-Subaequent declaration of dividend8 on such profits-Recall of rebate and re- computation of aaaeaament-Finance Act, 1966 (18 of 1966),
ss. 19, 28-lndian Income-ta:t Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), 8. 36 (10). Sub-section (10) of s. 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which was brought into force on April I, 1956, provided that where in any of the assessment years 1948-49 to 1955-56, a rebate of income-tax was allowed to a company "and sub-
2 S.C.R. sequently the amount <;>n which the rebate of income-tax was allowed ………. is availed of by the company, wholly or portly for declaring dividends in any year", the amount shall be deemed to have been made the subject of incorrect relief, and the Income-tax Officer shall recompute the tax payable by the company by reducing the rebate originally allowed.
For the assessment year 1952-53, the account year being the calendar year 1951, the appellant company was 1ssessed to income-tax and super·tax on a total income of Rs. 1,02,07,8081- and was allowed a rebate of one anna per rupee on the undistributed profits of Rs. 36,62,776/- under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1952. For the assessment year 1953-54 the appellant was assessed to a Joss of Rs. 5,98,363/- on April 17, 1954. On April 20, 1954, the appellant declared a dividend of Rs. 19,32,000/- out of the undistributed profits of the calendar year 1951 on which a rebate had been allowed. On March 18, 1958, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice
caJling upon the appellant company to show cause why action under s. 35 ( 10) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 should not be taken against it by withdrawing the rebate allowed on the sum of Rs. 19,32,000/-. The appellant claimed that sub- section (10) of s. 35 was not applicable as the amount on
which the rebate was granted was availed of for declaring dividends before the sub-section had come into force. Held (per Sarkar, Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal, JJ., Das and Kapur, JJ., di.•.,eniing), that sub-section (10) of s. 35 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was intended to have a retrospective operation and was applicable to the present case, Per Das and Kapur, JJ.,-(1) Sub-section (10) ofs. 35
which created a legal fiction was clearly prospective and show- ed that \\·hat was correct at the time when the rebate was granted was rendered incorrect on the happening of the crucial event after the coming into force of the sub-section.
(2) The principle in Income-tax Officer v, 8. K. Habibu- llah, [1962] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 716, that a statute which is not declaratory of a pre .. existing law nor a matter relating to procedure but affects vested rights, cannot be given a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary, and even in construing a section which is to a certain extent
retrospective, the line is reached at which the words of the section cease to be plain, is applir.able to the present case. Ah .. tdabad Mjg. & C•li(o Printing Co. 1 v. S.C. M1/ata, Income·
Ta.Op Jhnudabad Mfg. llf Ca/i,eo Ptinting eo., Ltd. S. C. M1hta, lnmn~- Ta.< Ojfim Per Sarkar;J-The language used in sub-ss. (5) and (IO) is wholly different and I111·mnr-fa1· OjficPr v. S. K. Habihul/ah, (1962] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 71G, is distinguishable.
Per, Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal, fl.- (1) Under s. 35 (I 0) the only condition was that the declaration of the dividends must be after the grant of the rebate. Though the section came into force from April 1,
1956, it was to be used retrospectively to recall rebate on amounts which the law deemed to have been subject of an incon-ect relief; and though the recalling of the rebate was after the enactment of the section, the Co'1ditions for the exercise of the power may be before or after the commencement of the section.
(2) Income-tax Officer v. S. K. Habibullah, [1962] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 716 and Second Additional Income-tax Ojfker v. Atm.ala Nagamj, L 1962] 46, L T. R. 609, may have to be reconsidered on sorr~e future occassion.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil appeal No. 139 of l 9(i2. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated November 6, 1958, of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1806 of 1958.
R. J. Kolah, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. C. Mathu.r and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the re- spondents. 1962. November 14. Thcfolfowingjudgments
were delivered. The judgment of S. K. Das and J. L. Kapur, JJ., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. The judgment of M. Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal, JJ., was delivered by M. Hidayatullah, J. A. K.
Sarkar. J., delivered a separate judgment. Du, J. S. K. DAS, J.-This appeal on a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Bombay raises a question of interpretation of sub-s. (IO) of s. 35 of
the Indian .Income-tax Act, l 922. This sub-sec~OQ 2 S.C.R. is one of a group of sub-sections substituted or insert- ed in the said section by s. 19 of the Finance Act, (Act 18 of 1956). By s. 28 of the said
Finance Act, sub-s. (10) of s. 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, came into force on April l, 1956. The short question before us is, whether on its true cons· truction, sub-s. (10) of s. 35 applies in a case where a
companv declares dividends by availing itself wholly or partly of the amount on which a rebate of income- tax was earlier allowed to it under clause (i) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the relevant
Schedules to the Finance Acts, when such dividends were declared prior to the coming into force of the sub-section, that is, prior to Aprill, 1956. Ahtnedab4d Mft• ll1 Cal i&o Printint
Co., ltd. v. S.0. Meltla, fa&omt· Tax Offim The facts which have given rise to the appeal are these. The Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co., Ltd., is the appellant before us.
The appellant company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1866, and has its office at Ahmedabad. It carries on the business of manu- facturing and selling cotton piece goods and chemicals.
For the assessment year 1952-53, the corresponding account year being the calendar year 1951, the appel· !ant was assessed to income-tax and super-tax on a total income of Rs. l,02, 79,808/- and was allowed a
rebate of one anna per rupee on the undistributed profits of Rs. 36,62, 776/- under the first proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the first Schedule to the Finance Act, 1952. The amount of rebate allowed
was Rs. 2,28,924/-. For the assessment year 1953·54, the corresponding account year being the calendar year 1952, the appellant showed a book profit of Rs. 45,67,966/·, but was assessed
to a loss of Rs. 5,98,353/· on April 17, 1954. For the said calendar year 1952, the appellant declared a dividend of Rs. 19,32,000/- on April 20, 1954. This dividend came out of the undistributed profits of the calendar
year 1951 on which the appellant had been allowed a rebate. Das, J. Ahmtdabad Mfg. & C.iti'o Printifi.lf C:n., Lid. v. fl.C. Mehta, lncarnt- Tax Offi"' Das, J. On March 18, 1958, the Income-tax Officer,
Special Circle, Ahmr.rhhad, respondent No. 1 before us, issued a notice lo the appellant calling upon the latter to show cause why action under sub·s. (10) of s. 35 should not be taken against the appellant by
withdrawing the rebate allowed on the sum of Rs. 19,32,000/·. The appellant raised some objec- tions, one of which was that sub-s. (10) of s. 35 did not apply to his case. The Income·tax Officer, how-
ever, held that sub-s. (10) of s. 35 applied and accord- ingly directed that the rebate allowed on the sum of Rs. 19,32.000/· should be withdrawn, by recompu- ting the tax pavable by the appellant.
He ordered the issue of a demand notice for a sum of Rs. 1,20, 750/· which was the rebate allowed on Rs. 19,32,000/ ·. The Income-tax Officer passed this order on March 27, 1958. Being aggrieved by that order, .the appellant
moved the High Court of Bombay by a writ petition filed on June 26, 1958. The main ground taken by the appellant was that sub·s, (10) of s. 35 did not apply to a case where dividend was declared, as in
this case, before the coming into force of sub-s. (IO) of s. 35. The High Court rejected this contention and dismissed the writ petition. The appellant then obtained certificate of fitness and has preferred the
present appral in pursuance of that certificate. We may now read some of the provisions of s. 35 in so far as they are relevant for our purpose- "S. 35( l) The Commissioner or Appellate
Assistant Commissioner may, at any time within four years from the date of any order passed by him in appeal or, in the case of the Commi· ssioner, in revision under s. 33A and the Income.
tax Officer may, at any time within four years from the date of any assessment order or refund order passed by him on his own motion rectify 2S.C.R. any mistake apparent from the record of the
appeal, revision, assessment or refund as the case may be, and shall within the like period rectify any such mistake which has been brought to his notice by an assessee : xx (2) (3)
(4) xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx (5) Where in respect of any completed assessment of a partner in a firm it is found on the assessment or re-assessment of the firm or on any reduction or enhancement made in the
income of the firm under section 31, section 33, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or sec- tion 66A that the share of the partner in the profit or loss of the firm has not been included
in the assessment of the partner, or if included, is not correct, the inclusion of the share in the assessment or the correction thereof, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a rectification
of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of this section, and the provisions of sub-section (J) shall apply thereto accord- ingly, the period of four years referred to in
that sub-section being computed from the date of the final order passed in the case of the firm. ( 6) Where the excess profits tax or the business profits tax payable by' an assessee has
been modified in appeal, revision or any other proceeding, or where any excess profits tax or business profits tax has been assessed after the completion of the corresponding assessment for
income-tax' (whether before or after the com- .ihmti1boi Mk & C•lito Priating Co., Ltd. v. S.C. M•hta, Income· T•x Officer Das, J, A/1,,,,dahad Mfg. & C11/ico Printing Co., Ltd. C, M1hta, Income•
Tax Officer Das, J mencement of the Indian lncome·tax (Amend- ment) Act, 1953), and in consequence thereof it is necessary to re-compute the total income of the assessee chargeable to income-tax, such re-
computation shall be deemed to be a rectifica· tion of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of this section and the pro· visions of sub-section ( 1) shall apply accordingly,
the period of four years referred to in that sub- section being computed from the date of the order making or modifying the asscssmen t of such excess profits tax or business profits tax.
(7) (8) (9) xx xx xx xx xx xx (10) Where, in any of the assessments for the years beginning on the 1st day of April of the years 1948 to 1955 inclusive, a rebate of income-tax was allowed to a company on a part
of its total income under clause (i) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the relevant Sche- dules to the Finance Acts specifying the rates of tax for the relevant year, and subsequently the
amount on which the rebate of income-tax was allowed as aforesaid is availed of by the company, wholly or partly, for declaring divi- dends in any year, the amount or that part of
the amount availed of as aforesaid, as the case may be, shall, by reason of the rebate of income-tax allowed to the company and to the extent to which it has not actually been subjected to an additional
income· tax in accordance with the provisions of clause (ii) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the Schedule to the Finance Acts above referred to, be deemed to have been made
2 s.c.R. the subject of incorrect relief under this Act, and the Income-tax Officer shall recompute the tax payable by the company by reducing the rebate originally allowed, as if the computation
is a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of this section and the provisions of ~uh-section (1) shall apply accordingly, the period of four years specified
therein being reckoned from the end of the financial year in which the amount on which the rebate of income-tax was allowed as afore· said was availed of by the company wholly or partly for declaring dividends."
Speaking generally, s. 35 deals with rectification of mistakes in circumstances detailed in the various sub· sections thereof and provides for orders consequent on such rectification. Sub-section
(1) empowers the Income-tax authorities to rectify mistakes apparent from the record in respect of certain orders passed by them. It provides that the Income-tax Officer con· cerned may at any time within four years from the
date of any assessment order passed by him on his own motion rectify any mistake apparent from the record of the assessmrnt. The power of rectification may be exercised subject to two conditions : (l) that
there is a mistake apparent from the record of the assessment, and (2) that the order of rectification is made within four years from the date of the assess· ment sought to be rectified. Sub-section ( 5) deals
with inclusion or correction of the income of a partner in a firm consequent upon assessment or re-assessment of the firm of which he was a partner. Sub- section (6) deals with recomputation of total income
of an assessee in consequence of modifications made in the excess profits tax or the business profits tax payable by an assessee subsequent to an assessment made under the Income-tax Act.
These two sub· sections were considered by this court in two decisions Ah11114dad Mfl. fl Calico P1inti11g CD., Ltd. v. S.C. Mehta, Income· Tax O.fficer Da.r, J. .dAm1dabad Mfg. &
Gtl~ Printing Co., Ltd. v. S.C. M1hta, /ncom1· TaxO.ffe<r Das, J. to which we thall presently refer. They have been relied on by the appellant and have some bearing on the interpretation ofsub-s. (10) .. Sub-sections (2), (3), (4), (7), (8) and (9) are not relevant for our purpose
and need not be referred to. Now, we come to sub-s.( 10). It deals with a case where a rebate was allowed to a company on a part of its income (viz., undistributed profits) by virtue of the concessions given by the Finance Acts
of 1948 to 1955. This is clear from the first part of the sub-section. The second part states the condition in which, or rather the crucial event on the happen- ing of which, the rebate granted to a company is
deemed to have been given by a mistake apparent from the record, this condition or crucial event is the declaration of dividends by the company out of the amount in whole or part, on which rabatc was earli-
er granted to it. The third and operative part states that on the happening of the crucial event, the amou- nt on which rebate was granted and which has been subsequently utilis~d for declaring dividends shall be
deemed to have been made the subject of incorrect relief under the Act and the Income-tax Officer shall re-compute the tax payable by the company by redu- cing the rebate originally allowed as if the recomputa-
tion is a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of the section. The fourth and last part introduces a period of limitation of four vears, the four years being reckoned not from the
date of the order passed as in sub-s.(1), but from the end of the financial year in which the amount on which rebate of income-tax was allowed was availed of by the company wholly or partly for declaring di-
vidends. This, in brief, appears to be the scheme of sub-s. (10) of s. 35. Now, the argument on behalf of the appellant is this. Like sub-s. (5) of s. 35, sub-s. (10) affects a 2 S.C.R.
vested right, namely, the right to a rebate of income- tax on a part of the total income of the company under clause (1) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part 1 of the relevant Schedules to the Finance Acts
of 1948 to 1955, and the further right to declare dividends out of the undistributed profits of the pre- vious year. Under the well settled rules of statutory construction, no statute which impairs an existing
right or obligation except as regards a matter of pro- cedure, shall have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act or arises by necessary and distinct implica-
tion. Put differently, a statute is not to be construed to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary ; ………… and it is sub- mitted that "the general rule is that all statutes other
than those which are merely declaratory, or which relate only to matters of procedure or of evidence are prima facie prospective; and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless by express words
or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature" and "it is a. corollary of this general presumption against retrospection that, even when a statute is intended to be to some extent
retrospective, it is not to be construed as having a retrospective effect than its fanguage renders nece- ssary'. (Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 36. Third edition, p. 423 and p. 4261.
The argument on behalf of the appellant is that by s. 28 of the Finance Act. 1956, sub-s. (10) has undoubtedly retrospective · effect from April 1, 1956; but the language of the sub-section does not expressly, nor by
necessary implication, show that it has any greater retrospective effect. It is pointed out that, on the contrary, where the legislature wanted a particu\ar sub-section to have greater retrospective effect, it bad
said so, e. g. in sub-s. (6). It is also pointed out that sub-s. (5) of s. 35 was iriserted by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953, and by s. 1 (2) 19(;2 Ahm1dobad Mfg. & Calico Printin& Co.,
Ltd, v. S.C. Mehta, Ineom1• T.., 0.lfi<IT Das, J. Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co., Ltd. … S.C. M1/d11, lttrome· T .. Offim Das, J. of the said Act it came into force on April 1, 1952.
Where the legislature wanted to give greater retro- spective effect to particular provisions, it said so in ss. 3 (2), 7 (2) and 30 (2) of the said Act. That being the position, the argument on behalf of the
appellant is that we should not give any greater retrospective effect to sub-s. (IO) of s. 35 than what has been done by s. 28 of the Finance Act, 1956. Learned Counsel for the appellant has strongly relied
on the decision of this Court in Income-tax Officer v. S. K. HabibuUah (') wherein with regard to sub- s. ( 5) of s. 35 it was held that the sub·section was not declaratory of the pre-existing law nor a matter
relating to procedure but effected vested rights and must be dee.11ed to have come into force only from April I, 1952; therefore, the Income-tax Officer had no jurisdiction under the said sub-section to rectify
the assessment of a partner consequent on the assess- ment of the firm in cases where the firm's assessment was completed before April I, 1952. The argu- ment of the learned counsel for the appellant is that
the same principle must apply in the present case and sub-s. (10) of s. 35 does not apply to a case where dividend was declared by the company before the date of the coming into force of the sub-section,
namely, April, I, 1956. The second part of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there is no real difference in language between the two sub-sections, sub-s, (5) and sub-s. (10) of s. 35. In both cases a
rectification or correction is made by reason of a subsequent evenj:; in sub-s. ( 5) the subsequent event is the assessment of the firm which discloses the inaccuracy in the earlier assessment of a partner; in
sub-s. (I 0) the subsequent event is the declaration of dividend out of the amount on which a rebate was earlier granted. It is pointed out that in their true scope and effect, the two sub-sections stand on the
(I) [1962] Supp. 2 S. C. R. 719. ~ S.C.R. same footing. Sub-section (10) further makes it clear that by a legal fiction that which was correct atthe time when it was made is rendered incorrect
after the coming into force of the sub-section. The sub-section states clearly "shall, by reason of the rebate of Income-tax allowed to the company…… .. .. .. .. .. .. .. …….
be deemed to have been made the subject of incorrect relief under this Act, ana the Income- tax Officer shall re-compute the tax payable by the company by reducing the rebate originally allowed, .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. …. " This language, it is argued, is clearly prospective and
docs not justify the carrying of the legal fiction to a period earlier than April 1, 1056: As against these arguments, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that the language
of sub-s. (10) is different from that of sub-s. (5) and the principle laid down by this court in S. K. Habibullah's (1) cannot be applied to the present case. Alternatively, he has argued that the decision is in·
correct and should be reconsidered by us. The argument of learned counsel for the respondent is that that sub-s. (10) by necessary implication has a greater retrospective effect than what is laid down
by s. 28 of the Finance Act, 1956. He points out that the first part of the sub-section talks of the assessments made for any of the years beginning on April 1, 1948, to April 1, 1955, when a rebate of
income-tax was allowed; then the second part refers to the subsequent declaration of dividend by the company in any year. Learned counsel for the respondent has emphasised the expression "in any
year" and has submitted that this shows that the intention was to take in a declaration of dividend made even earlier than April l, 1956. A(:cording (I) it962j S11pp. 2 S.C,11.. 716,
Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co., Ltd. v. S.C. M1hla, ln«11111· T"" Officer Du, J. Alim"•"" Mf1. II! Calico Printing Co., Ltd. v. S.C. Mehta. /ncomt- Tax Officer Du, J. to him, the only effect of s. 28 of the Finance Act,
1956, is that the income-tax Officer can take action only after April 1, 1956, but the language of the sub-section does not justify the conclusion tha.t the legal fiction created by it must be restricted to the
declaration of dividends on or after April l, 1956. We have carefully considered these arguments. The language of sub-s. (10) of s. 35 is perhaps not as clear as one might wish it to be. There is no doubt,
however, that the sub·section affects vested rights and should not be given a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary. Even through the sub-section is to a certain extent retro·
spective, and s. 28 of the Finance Act, 1956, in express terms makes it retrospective from April 1, 1956, it is clear to us that there is nothing in the language of the sub-section which would justify the
inference that the legislature intended to carry the legal fiction created by the sub-section to a period earlier than the date on which the sub-section came into force. The maxim applicable in such cases is
that even in construing a section which is to a certain extent retrospective, the line is reached at which the words of th.e section cease to be plain. We are further of the opinion that when the first part of the
sub-section refers to the assessments for the years 1948 to 1955, it merely refers to the period during which the rebate provisions were in force. It is not disputed before us that the rebate provisions came
into force from the Finance Act of 1948 and ended with the Finance Act of 1955. The first part there· fore is merely a reference to the period during which the rebate provisions were in force. It is indeed true
that in the second part of the sub-section the ex- pression used is "declaring dividends in any year" and this has to be read in conjunction with the word "subsequently" which can only mean subsequent
to the allowance of the rebate, But in the very same part, it is further stated that the declaration of dividend in any year shall, by reason of the rebate be deemed to have made the amount on which the
rebate was granted, the subject of incorrect relief etc. This language which creates the legal fiction is ·clearly prospective and shows that what was correct at the time when . the rebate was granted is
rendered incorrect on the happening of the crucial event after the coming into force of the sub-section, and by the express terms of s. 28 of the Finance Act, 1956, the sub-section comes into force on April I,
1956. We are unable, therefore, to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the language of sub·s. ( 10) by necessary implication takes the legal fiction back to a period earlier than April I, 1956.
In coming to this conclusion, we have kept in mind the principle that a statute does not necessarily be- come retrospective because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedant to its
passing. Furthermore we see no reason why the princi- ple laid down in S. K. Habibullak's case (1) will not apply in the present case nor are we satisfied that that decision with regard to sub-s. ( 5) of s. 35
was incorrect. We may point out, however, that in Second Additional Income-tax Officer v. Atmala N agaraj (') this court went a step further and held that sub·s. ( 5) of s. 35 was not applicable to cases
where the assessment of the partner was completed before April I, 1952, even though the assessment of the firm was completed after April I, 1962. Learned counsel for the appellant
frankly conceded before us that he did not wish to go as far as that and contend that even in a case where a declaration of devidend was made after April 1, 1956. sub's. ( 10) would not apply; because
that would make sub-s. (10) unworkable. The 11> [t962l Supp. 2 a.a.a. 11&, (2) [1962) 46 I.T.R. 609i Ahmt<fabad Mfg. & C.ilico p,i•tin1 Co., Ltd. v. S.C. Mehta, Income. Tax Officer
Das, J. Ahrrui•bad Mfg. & Calico Printint Co., Ltd. v. S.C. Mehta, lnromt· ToxO.fficer Das, J. Sarkar decision in Second Additional Income-tax Officer v. Atnwla Nagrimj (1) may perhaps require reconsidera-
tion as to which we need not express any final opinion now; but so far as this case is concerned we see no reason why the principle in S. /(. Habibullah's case (') will not apply. The principle is simply this.
A statute which is not declaratory of a pre-existing law nor a matter relating to procedure but affects vested rights cannot be given a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary, and even
in construing a section which is to a certain extent retrospective, the line is reached at which the words of the section cease to be plain. These are well settled principles and there is no reason to doubt
their accuracy. For the reasons given above, we would allow the appeal, set aside the order and judgment of the High Court and quash the order of the Income·tax Officer dated March 27, 1958, and the
notice of demand dated March 28, 1958. The appellant will be entitled to its costs throughout. SARKAR, J.-In its assessment to income-tax for the year 1952-53, the appellant, a company, had been
granted under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1952, a rebate on a portion of its profits of the previ- ous year, that is, 1951 which it had not distributed as dividends to its shareholders. In the next assessment
year 1953·54, the appellant used a part of the afore- said undistributed profits for declaring dividends. As the law then stood, nothing could be done by the revenue authorities to withdraw the rebate earlier
granted on the ground of the profits being utilised in declaring dividends in a latter year. From April 1, 1956, however, there was a change in the law as sub· s. (10) of s. 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was
brought into force then. By an order made on March 27, 1958, under that sub-section, the terms of (I) ~1962] 46 I.T.R. 699 (2) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C ~ 71~. ' Ill ,… 2 S.C.R. which I will set out presently, the aforesaid rebate
was withdrawn and the appellant was called upon to refund it. The appellant then applied to the High Court at Bombay for a writ to quash the order of March 27, 1958, on the ground that sub·s. (10) was
not applicable to the facts of this case for reasons which I will later state. That application was dis- missed. This appeal is against this decision of the High Court at Bombay dismissing the application.
Now sub-s. (10) of s. 35 of the Income-tax Act was enacted by the Finance Act of 1956 and it was given effect from April 1, 1956. That sub-section, in so far as it is necessary to state for the purpose of
this case, provides that where in any of the assessment years 1948-49 to 1955-56, a rebate of income-tax was allowed to a company under the Finance Act prevail- ing in that year on a part of its total income "and
subsequently the amount on -which the rebate of income-tax was allowed as aforesaid is availed of by the company, wholly or partly, for declaring dividends in any year …………………………… the Income-tax Officer shall re-compute the tax payable by the com-
pany by reducing the rebate originally allowed." The sub-section in substance permits a rebate duly allow· ed in any year before it came into force to be with- drawn if. "subsequently" the amount on which the
rebate was allowed "is availed of" "for declaring dividends in any year." The appellant contends that the sub-section does not apply unless the amount on which the rebate was granted is availed of for declaring divi-
dends after the sub-section had come into force, that is after April l, 1956, and therefore it does not apply to the present case. It is said that if it were not so, the sub-section would be given a retrospective operation
and .the ru!e is that it i~ to b.e pres1;1med that a statute dealmg with substantive rights is not to have s1.1ch Ahmtdabad Mft· li/ Calico Printine Co., Ltd. v. S.C. M1hla, ln«Jm1·
Tax Officer Sarkar, J. operation. The case of Income-tax Officer, Madras Ahmtdabatl Mk & v. S. K. !111bibullr1h (1) was cited in support of this Calico Pri•lint Co. contention. Ltd.
v. S.C. 111ehta, ''Income· Tax Officer Sarkar, J, I will assume that if the sub-section were appli- ed to a case like the present, it would affect a vested right. The rule no doubt is that a statute is presum-
ed not to do so. But this rule does not apply if the language of the statute indicates an intention to give it a retrospective operation. It seems to me that sub- s. (10) uses language which indicates sufficiently clear-
ly that it was intended to be applied where the amount on which rebate had been obtained was availed of for declaring dividends before the sub- section came into force, that is to say, to have a
retrospective operation. It says, "subsequently the amount on which the rebate of income·tax was allowed as aforesaid is availed of. …………………. . for declaring dividends in any year".
There is no doubt that the words "subsequently" and "in any year" mean in any year subsequently to the year in which the rebate was granted. They would, there- fore, clearly include a year before the sub-section
came into force. But it is said that these words should in view of the rule be read as not including a year before the sub-section came into force as they also include years subsequent to the coming into
force of the sub-section and are therefore ambiguous. I am unable to accept this contention. I find no ambiguity. If the intention was that the sub- section would apply only when the amount was
availed of for declaration of dividends after it was enacted then the words "subsequently" and "in any year" were wholly unnecessary. Without these words the sub section would have read, "and the
amount is availed of for declaring dividends." There would then be no doubt that it was intended to operate only prospectively. But the legislature used some more words. It must have done· so with
m [1962) supp. 2 s.c.R.716, 2 S.C.R. some purpose. What that purpose was if it was not to give the sub-section retrospective operation, I failed to sec. I am unable to read the words "subsequently"
and "in any year" as otiose and as indicating no different intention. Therefore, it seems to me that the language of the sub·section plainly requires it to have a retrospective operation.
The sub.section is properly applicable to this case. There is another consideration leading me to the view that the presumption against retros- pective operation does not arise here. It was said
in Pardo v. Bingham (1) that it was not an invariable rule that a statute could not have a retrospective operation unless so expressed in its very terms, and that it was necessary to look to the general scope
and purview of the statute and at the rem~dy sought to be applied and consider what was the former state of the law and what it was that the legislature contemplated. It is quite plain that in providing
for the grant of rebate on undistributed profits by the Finance Acts of 19!8 to 1955 the legislature wanted to encourage the employment of the profit made in a business in the business itself. The object presumably
was to expand the industries of the country. This involved a long term employment of the profits in the business. It could not have been the intention of the legislature to grant rebate when a company
only kept 1he profits for a short time with itself and having earned the rebate distributed the profits without the industry having had any real benefit of them. I think I should state here th?,t the
provisions for the grant of rebate did not require that dividend was not to be declared at all. The object was to encourage a reasonable division of the profits between the shareholders and the industry.
Allowance of rebate wa.s provided for on that part of the profits which was left for employment in the industry after reasonable dividends had been (I) (1869) L. R. 4 Ch. 735. Ahm1iabad Mft· &
Calico Printing Co., Ltd. v. S.C. Mehta, lncomt• Tax Officer Sarkar, J. distributed to the shareholders. The rebate was Ahm•iabad Mfg. & allowed on a graded scale depending on the amount Calico Printin1 Co.
of profits which was not distributed as dividends. Ltd. v. S.C. Mlhta, /ncome- T a, 0 .fficer Sarkar, J, Now the system of granting rebates started in 1948-49. It was stopped in 1955-56. The sub-
section was brought into force on April 1, 1956, that is, seven years after the system had first been started. The sub-section provided for withdrawal of the rebate when the amount on which it had
been granted was availed of in declaring dividends. It is fair! y clear from this that the legislature did not approve of these amounts being utilised in declaration of dividends. It is also not too much to suppose that
there had been many previous cases of such utilisation of profits for if it had not happened earlier, there is no reason to think that the legislature anticipated the evil happening in future and passed
the law to stop it. In view of the large number of years that had passed between the time when the allowance of rebate commenced and the time when the sub-section was brought into force,
it can be imagined that a very large number of cases of distribution of profits on which rebate had been allowed, had already taken place. I find it difficult to think that many cases
remained after April I, 1956, where a company which intended to utilise the amounts on which rebate had been granted in the declaration of dividends, had not already dona so. There is no dispute that by sub-s. (10) the legis-
lature intended to penalise a case where subsequent to its enactment, the amount on which rebate had been granted was utilised in declaration of dividends. Now is there any reason to think that the legislature
did not want to impose the penalty also on those who had earlier utilised the amount in declaration of dividends ? There was no special merit in these latter r 2 S.C.R. cases. And I also think that they formed the majority
of the cases. The grant of rebate having been stopped after March 31, 1956, there was n:> occasion to pro- vide for cases of such grant thereafter. All these circumstances lead me to the view that the intention
of the legislature was to penalise the cases of utilisa- tion of amounts on which rebate had been granted in payment of dividends which had happened before the sub-section came into force.
The remedy which the sub-section provided would largely fail in any other view. The general scope and purview of the sub- section and a consideration of the evil which it was intended to remedy lead me to the opinion that the
intention of the legislature clearily was that the sub- section should apply to the facts that we have in this case. As to S. K. Habibullah's case (1) I do not think that much assistance can be had from it. It applied
the rule of presumption against a statute having a retrospective operation-as to which rule, of course, there 1s no dispute-to sub-s. ( 5) of s. 35. Now cases on the construction of one statute are rarely of value
in construing another statute, for each case turns on the language with which it is concerned and statutes are not often expressed in the same language. The language used in sub-ss. ( 5) and {l 0) seems to me to
be wholly different. There is nothing in S. K. Habibullak's case (1) to indicate that in the opinion of the learned Judges deciding it there were any words which would indicate that sub-s. ( 5) was to
have a retrospective operation. In my ¥iew, sub-s. (10) contains such words. Furtherrn<fre, I do not find that the other considerations to which I have referred, arose for discussion in that case. In my view, the
two cases are entirely different. I, therefore, think that sub-s. (10) of s. 35 pro- perly applies to this case. In my view, the appeal should be dismissed with costs. (I) [1962) Supp. 2 S. C.R. 716,
Ahm1dablll Mfg. & Calico Printint Co.,· I.td. v. S.C. M1hta, Inc~ Tax Officer Sarkcr, J, Ahemdahad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co., Ltd. v. S.C. AJehta, Income- Tax Officer Ilidayatullah, J.
HIDAYATULLAH, ].-This is an appeal by an assessee with certificate under Art. 133 (i)(c) of the Constitution from the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dismissing the assessee com-
pany's petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution which challenged an order under s. 35(10) of the Income-tax Act rectifying the earlier assessment and sought a writ or writs to prohibit the Income-tax
Authorities from giving effect to that order. The assessee (The Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Printing Co. Ltd.) is a public limited company carrying on business of manufacture or
cotton piece-goods and chemicals. The year of account of the assessee company is the calendar year. In the assessment year 1952-53, corresponding to the calendar year 1951, the appellants were
assessed on January 31, 1953, on a total income of Rs. 1,02, 79,808. The assessee company was allowed a rebate of one anna per rupee amounting to Rs. 2,28,924 on the undistributed
profits of Rs. 26,62, 776 under the first proviso to Paragraph B of Pa·t I of the first Schedule to the Finance Act, 1952. For the assessment year 1953-54 (account year calendar year 1952) the books of the assessee company
showed a profit of Rs. 45,67,966. That profit be- came a loss of Rs. 5,98,353 after deductions like depreciation etc. were allowed. lnspite of there being a loss, the assessee company declared on April
20, 1953, a dividend of Rs. 19,32,000 for the year of account 1952. The Income-tax Officer, by an order dated March 18, 1958, called upon the assessee company to show cause why action under s. 35(10) of th~
Income-tax Act should not be taken to recall a pro- portionate part of the rebate because in his opinion the entire dividend of Rs. 19,32,000 came out of the undistributed profits of the calendar year 1951
on which the appellant had received a rebate. The 2 S.C.R. assessee company objected saying that the 10th sub· section of s. 35 was introduced as from April 1, 1956, and could not operate on an assessment which had
become final before April l, 1956, from which date sub-s. (10) was retrospectively applied. This objec- tion was not accepted and the Income-tax Officer held that dividend paid in the year 1952 came out
of the undistributed profits of 1951 and a tax pro- portionate to the sum of Rs. 19,32,000 amounting to Rs. 1,20, 750 was leviable. The assessee company filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
That application wa_s he,.rd along with ano~her fi!ed by the New Shorrock Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. m which the leading judgment was delivered by the High Court. Following the decision in the New Shorrock
8'PIJ. Company's case, (1) the High Court dismissed the assessee company's petition with costs. The High Court, however, certified the case as fit for appeal and hence' the present appeal.
Section 35 deals with rectification of mistakes. Prior to 1939, rectification of any mistake apparent from the record could be made within one year of the order of assessment but by the Indian Income-
tax (Amendment) Act, 1939 (7 of 1939), the period of four years was substituted for one year in the first sub-section. That sub-section omitting the provisos read at all material times as follows :-
"The Commissioner or Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, at any time within four years from the date of any order passed by him in appeal or, in the case of the Commissioner, in revision under section 33A and the Income-
tax Officer may, at any time within four years from the date of any assessment order or refund order passed by-him on his own motion rectify any mistake apparent from the record of the
appeal, revision, assessm.eµt or refund as the cas_e may be, and shall within the like period fl) (19>9] 37 I. T. R. 41. 4lunlt!ii6tiil Mfg. & ·call&O P.'inlint Co., Lid. S. C. ~hta, lncom$""
Tax Offim HidayatuUah1 J. tlwubad A(f1• & Calk• Priftting Co., Lii. v. S.C. M.Ata,_J,,_,.. Tu O#m Hiioyalul/tth, J. 114 SUPREMF. COURT REPORTS [1963] SUPP. rectify any such mistake which has been
brought to his notice by an assessee :" It must be noticed that the time limit started from the date of the order of assessment which was to be rectified. In 1953, by s. 19 of the Indian Income-tax
(Amendment) Act, 1952 (25 of 1953), sub-s. (5) (among others) was added as from April 1, 1952. That sub-section reads as follows :- "(5) Where in respect of any completed assess- ment of a partner in a firm it is found on the
assessment or re-assessment of the firm or on any reduction or enhancement made in the income of the firm under section 31, section 33, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or section
66A that the share of the partner in the profit or loss of the firm has not been included in the assessment of the partner or, if included, is not correct, the inclusion of the share in the assess-
ment or the correction thereof, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of this section, and the provisions of
sub-section (1) shall apply thereto accordingly, the period of four years referred to in that sub- section being computed from the date of the final order passed in the case of the firm."
It must be noticed that under this amendment time limit started from the date of the final order passed in the case of the firm though the rectification is to be made in the assessment of the partners of the
firm. Bys. 19 of the Finance Act, 1956, sub-s. (10) (among others) was added as from April 1, 1956. That sub-section reads as follows :- "( 10) Where in any of the assessments for the
years beginning on the lst day of April of th!! 2 S.C.R. years 1948 to 1955 inclusive, a rebate of income·tax was allowed to a company on a part of its total income under clause (i) of the
proviso to Paragraph B of Part I .of the rele- vant Schedules to the Finance Acts specifying the rates of tax for the relevant year, and subsequently the amount on which the rebate
of income-tax was allowed as aforesaid is availed of by the company, wholly or partly, for declaring dividends in any year, the amount or that part of the amount availed of as afore-
said, as the case may be, shall, by reason of the rebate of income-tax allowed to the com- pany and to the extent to which it has not actually· been subjected to an additional income-tax in accordance with the provisions
of clause (ii) of the proviso to Paragraph B of Part I of the Schedules to the Finance Acts above referred to, be deemed to have been made the subject of incorrect relief under this
Act, and the Income-tax Officer shall recom- pute the tax payable by the company by reduc- ing the rebate originally allowed, as if the recomputation is a rectification of a mistake
apparent from the record within the meaning of this section and the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply accordingly, the period of four years specified therein being reckoned from the
end of the financial year in which the amount on which rebate of income-tax was allowed as aforesaid was availed of by the company wholly or partly for declaring dividends." It will be noticed that the time limit under this
sub-section was to commence from the end of the financial year in which the dividends were declared from profits on which the rebate was earned earlier. The question in this case is whether sub-s. (10)
can apply to an •-.ment which h4d been made IH:· 1'62 illutttd4boll Mfl. I!! c.tU1Pri•IM1 Co., Ltd. v. S.C. M1lll•, 1,.com1- Ta O.f/i<n HU.J•tulloh, J. Mmedah:nl Mfg. /II Calico Printing Co.,
Ltd. S.C. Meltto. lncome- Tax Offiur Hidayatullah, J. fore sub-s. (10) came into force. The contention of the assessee company is that sub-s. (10) was given ret- rospectivity only up to April I, 1956, and the words
of that sub-section should be interpreted in such a way as to ~ive the sub-section no greater retrospectivity. According to the assessee company, the assessment for the year 1953-54 had become final on April 17, 1954,
that is to say, before the 1st day of April, 1956, from which date sub-s. (IO) was made to operate. The provisions of s. 35(10), accordinr, to the assessee company, could only be utilised if dividends were
declared after April 1, 1956, but not ifthe declaration took place earlier. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in Income-tax Officer v. Habibullah{'), and reference was also made to another
decision following Habibullahs' case,('), Second Additional Income-tax Officer v. A tmala Nagaraj.(') Our learned brother Das, J., following Habibullah's case(') has held that the contention of the
assessee company is well-founded and has expressed the opinio,n that Atmala Nagaraj's case(') may need re-consideration. He has, therefore, on;lered the reversal of the judgement and order of the High Court.
In our judl!'ement, and we say it with profound respect, this appeal must be dismissed. We are also of the opinion that both the above cases (which are of the same Divisional Bench) may have to be re-
considered hereafter. Atm'Jla Nagara.i's case(') followed Habihullah' s case.(1) The difference in the facts of the two cases was only in one respect and that was not sufficient to take Atmalrl Nagaraj's case(') out of the
ratio of the earlier decision. We shall deal with these two cases later. The Income-tax Act imposes a charge of tax for a year at a time and. that year is the year of assess- ment. . The charjl'e is in respect of a previous year
which is·conimonly known as the year of account. (l) (1~62J Supp. 2 S.C.R. 716. (2) [1962)46 J, T. R 609. i 2 S.C.R. The rate at which the tax is to be charged is enacted by an annual Finance Act for each assessment year.
The assessment year is the Financial Year. From the nature of things an amendment of the Income-tax Act, made in the middle of the assessment year, if made to operate from the beginning of the assessment
year, operates on incomes which had been earned before. Since an amendment cannot be allowed to operate from the mid-term, each such amendment is made to comprise a whole assessment year whether
it be the assessment year then running or an earlier or a later assessment year. Amendments are thus give retrospective. operation from the first day of April in the same, or a preceding, or prospective
operation for a future assessment year.. Ordinarily, the law, as it stands on the 1st of April in any assess- ment year, applies to assessments in that year but the law may expressly or by necessary implication give
itself a greater retrospective operation. The date on which the amendment comes into force is the date of the commencement of the amend' ment. It is read as amended from that date. Under
ordinary circumstances, an Act does not have retros- pective· operation on substantial rights which have become fixed before the date of the commencement of the Act. But this rule is not· unalterable. The
legislature may affect substantial rights by enacting laws which are expressly retrospective or by using language which has that necessary result. And this language may give an enaetment more retrospectivjty
than what the commencement clause gives to any of its provisions. When this happens the provisions thus made retrospective, expressly or by necessary intend- ment, operate from a date earlier than the· date of
commencement and affect rights which, but for such operation, would have continued undisturbed. It must be remembered,that. if the Income-tax Act prescribes a period . duriDg which the tax due in
.1Po2 A.h,.,dabad Mfg. & OaJico Printing Co., Lid. S.C. Mehta, lncom~ Tax Officer Hida.1a1ul.ak, J. dArlr1do6ai Mfg. (JI Calico l'riolillg C.., Lli. v. S.O. Mell ta. /11CM1· T"" Ojfeer
Hli•.J•lulloh, J. any particular assessment year may be assessed, then on the expiry of that period the Department cannot make an assessment. Where no period is prescribed the assessment can be completed at any time but·
once completed it is final. Once a final assessment has been made, it can only be reopened to rectify a mistake apparent from the record (s. 35) or to re- assess where there has been an escapement of assess-
ment of income for one reason or another .(s. 34). Both these sections which enable reopening of back assessments provide their own periods of time for action but all these periods of time, whether for the
first assessment or for rectification, or for re-assess- ment, merely create a bar when that time passes against the machinery set·up by the Income-tax Act for the assessment and levy of the tax. They do not
create an exemption in favour of the assessee or grant an absolution on the expiry of the period. The liability is not enforceable but the tax may again be- come exigible if the bar is removed and the tax·
payer is brought within the jurisdiction of the said machinery by reason of a new power. This is, of · course; subject to the condition that the Jaw must say that such JS the jurisdiction, either expressly or by
clear implication.· If the language of the law has that clear meaning, it must be given that effect and where the language expressly so declares or clearly implies it, the retrospective operation is not controlled
by the commencement clause. The amendment, with which we are concerned, was made by the Finance Act, 1956 (18of1956). By s. 2, it dealt with the year beginning on the 1st day of April, 1956, and fixed the rates of taxes for the
assessment year commencing on that date. It also amended the Income-tax Act by ss. 3 to 35. Section 28 then prescribed the dates of commencement of these sections. It read :- "28. CommencementB of amendments ro Act
11 of ·1922.-The amendments made in the 2 s.c.R. Income-tax Act by section 4 and clause (b) of section 15 shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of April 1955, and the
amendments made by section 3 to 27 inclusive shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 1956." Sub-section (10) was introduced into s. 35 of the Income-tax Act by s. 19 of this Act. If there
was nothing more in the language of the sub-section to give it operation from an ear lier date it would have operated only from 1st April, 1956, but the language of the sub-section gives it additional retros-
pectivity and says so in such clear and unambiguous language as to leave no doubt. There is no room for the application of Lord Justice Bowen's dictum in Reid v. Reid (1) that even in construing a section
which is to a certain extent retrospective, the maxim that statutes are prospective only, ought to be borne in mind as applicable whenever the line is reached at which the words of the section cease.to be plain.
The topic of s. 35 is rectification of mistakes apparent from the record. Sub-section (10) intro- duced a new basis for rectification in s. 35 which already prescribed a period of four years from the
order of assessment and the new sub-section enabled tectification to be made in new circumstances and within a new time limit. Those circumstances when analysed, furnish the key to the retrospecti vity of
the section. We shall begin by quoting only the material portion of that sub-section, which has been quoted in full earlier :- ''Where, in any of the assessments for the years beginning on the 1st day of April of the years
1948 to 1955 inclusive, a rebate of income-tax was allowed ……… and subsequently the amount on which the rebate of income-tax was (I} (1816) 31 Cb. D. 4-09. Jg62 Alom1i.W Mfl· &
Colict Pri•l1n1 Co., Lti. v. S.0. M1AI•, 111&0•1· T• OJ'tm Hiiay1tull1h, J. .Ahm1dd'd Mfi· & C•lico PTinting Ca., Lti. v. S.C. Mehta, Income~ 1-ax 0 fficer Hidayalullah, J. allowed …….. .is availed of …… : .. for declaring
dividends in any year ……… the amount …….. . shall ……… be deemed to have been made the subject of incorrect relief ……… and the Income- tax Officer shall recompute the tax …….. as if
the recomputation is a rectification of a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of this section and the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply accordingly, the period of four years ……… being reckoned from
the end of the financial year in which the amount on which rebate of income-tax was allowed …….. was availed of …….. for de- claring dividends." The purport of this new su b·section was the
recall of rebate which had been allowed in any of the assessments for the years 1-4-1948 to 31-3-1956 under certain circumstances. At the very start, the sub-section takes one to assessment years to which
s. 28 which prescribed the commencement as 1-4-1956 did not take one to. We do not accept the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee company that the mention of the years is
merely a repetition of a historical fact for ready reference. The words "in any of the assessments for the years etc." show in respect of which assessments rectification would be possible. The years are
mentioned individually by using the word "any". The law speaking in 1956 was thus speaking of all the assessment years individually going back to 1st April, 1948. The language was· clearly one of
retrospectivity and the suggestion that there is no intent behind these words and that they merely refer to a historical fact is nQt acceptable to us. This con- clusion is further fortified by the words :-
"and subsequently the amount … ., ….. is av;i,iled of ……… for declaring dividends in ariy year …. " ' ' – 2 S.C.R. SUPREME. COURT REPORTS Having mentioned the years individually in the
opening part, an event is mentioned which is sub· sequent, namely, dedaration of dividend from an amount on· which rebate was allowed. "Subse- quently" here obviously means subsequent to "any
of the assessments for the years beginning on the 1st day of April of the years 1048 to 1955 inclusive", not necessarily subsequent to . the Amending Act. The declaration of the dividends must be after the
grant of the rebate. That is the only condition and it does not import the date of commencement of the sub-section in any way. Then comes the operative part and it is this. If in the earlier assessment in any
of the years mentim;1ed a .rebate was allowed and subsequently in any ye,ar there was a declaration of dividend utilising the amount on which the rebate was given, the amount so·utilised should be deemed
to be the subject of incorrect relief. This fiction comes into force from 1-4-1956 but it is not stated that the circumstances in which_ it comes into being should also be after 1-4-1956. The sub-section no
doubtis to be t1sed from 1-4-1956 but it is to be used retrospectively to recall rebate on amounts which the law deems to have been the subject of an incorrect relief in the past. The recalling of the
rebate is after the enactment of sub-s. (10) but the conditions f9r the exercise of the power may be before or after the commencement of the sub-section. The only curb. on the exercise of the power is that
the Ihconie-tax Officer may go back a period of four years reckoned from the . end of the financial year in which. the declaration of dividend was made to the date when the action is taken.
In the present p1.se, this is so. '!'he assessee company declared. dividends in the calendar year 1952 … The assessment year was 1-4-1953 t;Q 31-3-1954. Th~ letter ¥{I"itten on M"arch 18, 1958,
asking the assessee company to show cause was Ahm1jabad Mfg .. & c~tico Pri11:iu.g Co .• Ltd. v. S.C. Mehta, lncom1- T ax Ofer H•d•;atullalt, J. A,,,,,edoi•' Mfg. & C.lict Pri•lillg C..,
v. S.C. M1Ato, '""""" TaOffe,, Hid.,.,.., … J. 122 SUPREME COURT RtPORTSJ1963] SUPP. within the four years reckoned from the. end of the financial year (31-3-1954) in which the amount on
which rebate of Income-tax was availed of for de- claring dividends. It complied with the letter of the sub-section. Since the power commenced on 1-4-1956, the utmost reach of the Income·tax Officer
would be the end of the. assessment year 1952. Any declaration of dividend after 1st day of April, 1952, out of accumulated profits of any of the years in which rebate was earned would be within time for
the recall of the rebate. But a declaration prior to 1-4-1952 would be beyond the power of the In- come-tax Officer to recall. This meaning is the only meaning which the plain words of the section
can bear. Any other meaning might make sub-s. (IO) ·unworkable because no company, with the knowledge that rebate would be recalled, would like to declare dividends after April I, 1956, out of
amounts on which rebate was earned. If the other meaning was attributed, sub-s. (IO) might well be a dead letter. The sub-section was obviously the result of noting how rebates were earned and later
were being utilized to fill the pockets of the share- holders. The amendment met this situation and did it in very clear terms. It remains to consider the decisions of this Court in Habibullah'8 case (') and Atmala Nagaraj'B
IJIJ8IJ ('l. In those two cases this Court was called upon to interpret sub-s. (5) quoted above which was introduced as from April I, 1952, by the Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953. In both the
cases there was a final assessment of the incomes of partners in registered firms. Later the assessment of the registered firms took place and it was found that the share of income of the partners was larger
than what had been assessed. Under s. 35 (1), as it stood before sub-s. ( 5) was introduced, rectification could be made in respect of a mistake apparent (I) [1962) Supp. 2 s.c.R. 716.
(2) [1962] 46 I. T. R. 609. 2 S.C.R. SUPREM;E COURT MPORTS from the record and the records of the firms could not be read with those of the partners to find an error in the latter. There was thus an impasse. It
was ruled by the Privy Council in Oommisl!ioner of Income-tax v. Khemoltand Ramdas{'), at p. 248 : " …………… when once a final assessment is arrived at, it cannot, in their
Lordships' opinion, be reopened except in circumstances detailed in section 34 and 35 of the Act …… .. . …. . . . .. and within the time limited by those acts." Therefore, unless the original s. 35 allowed such
rectification there was no help. Often the firm's final assessment dragged on for years and by the time that assessment was . done the time limited by (sub-s.l) had already run out. Parliament there-
fore stepped in with an amendment which was to commence on April 1, 1952. Two matters were provided by sub-s. (5). Firstly, the· result of the assessment of the fipn showing that the partners'
income was not properly included in their own assessments, was to be deemed to disclose an error in the record of the partners' assessment and secondly, the period of four years instead of being
.computed · from the order of assessment made against the partners as under sub-s. (lJ was to be computed from the date of the final order passed in the case of the firm. No doubt this power could be exercised from
1·4·1952 but the question that had to be considered was whether it coul,d be exercised only to reopen the ~ent of partners of a firm if, and only if, the order in the assessment of the firm was passed after
the amendment came into force. In dealing with the matter in Hambtdlah'a llll86 (') this Court referred to the finality which attaches to a final (I) (1938) L R. 85 I. A. 236, 248.
(2) (1962] 8- 21.c.R. 716. Alin111/a6atl Mfg. & Colic1 Prilltittg Co., Ltll. y, S.C. Mlhi., l•c-· Tu Offe,, 11;1a,.,,.u.n, J. Ah,,..d•bad Mft. & Calico PriritU.i C.., lid. S.C. M•hta. Incomt.
Tax Offiur 124 SUPREME COURT-REPORTS (1963] SUPP. assessment as stated by the Privy Council. This Court then referred to the date of the commencement of sub-s. (5) which was fixed
retrospectively as l ·4· 1952 and held that the sub-section could not be used to reopen assessments which had become final before the commencement of the new sub-section, contr'!8ting its language with that of sub-s. (6) which
was simultaneously introduced. In Habibullah'8 case (') the dates were :- Partners' assessment for 1946-4 7 –<lo -do- 1947·48 on on 22-2-1950 -do- Registered firms' assessment for 46-47 on 31·10-1950
-do- -do-. 1947-48 on 30· 6-1951 Sub·s. (5) to s. 35 introduced from l-4·1952 Order under s. 35 (5) on 27-3-1954 If sub-s. ( 5) could be used in this case it is plain that the four years period had not passed
between 31-10·1950 -(which was the earlier assess· ment) and 27-3-1954 when the rectification was made. No doubt the two assessments of the firm were also before 1-4-1952 but the sub-section has
nowhere said that .the power·was. only to be exer- cised if the assessment of the firm was after that date. Such a meaning is also difficult to imply. Under a fiction created after
1·4-1952 the assess- ment of the partners disclosed a mistake and if the fiction and the rest of the sub-section were to be given their full and logical effect the assessment of the partners could be reopened and rectified. But
it was held otherwise by this .court. The main reason was that. the partners' assesiiments had become final before 1-4-1952, that under.the Jaw; as it then stood,, there was no error in their .record, and
subcs,.(5) having been enacted retrospectively from ll) [1962} Sopp. 2 S. C.R. 716. 2 S.C.R. 1-4,1952 could not be given mo~e retrospectivity. Thatthe firm's assessment was also before 1-4-1952
was not given as a reason and in any event it was not very relevant. It neither added to nor detracted from the finality (such· as it was on 22-2-1952) on the Partners' assessment.
The law obviously mentioned the final order in the firm's assessment as the starting point in view of the. length of time the firm's assessments take to reach their own finality. But there was nothing to show that this
new terminus a quo musf be after 1-4-1952 before sub-s. (5) could be used. The words of the sub- section were entire! y indifferent to this aspect. In Atma!a Nagraj's case (') the assessment of the
partners (22-1-1952) was also completed before 1-4-1952 and had become final subject, however, to section 34 and 35. No doubt, the assessment of the firm was completed after 1-4-1952 but this distinc-
tion made no difference to the finality such as had been gained on 22-1-1952. We do not naturally express a final opm1on on sub-s. (5). We must leave that to a future case. We must, however, say that the two earlier cases may
have to be reconsidered on some future occasion. When the occasion comes the questions to ask would be :- 2. Did finality attach in Habibullah's case (') to the partners' assessment under the law as it
then stood from 22-2-1950 (partners' assess- ment) or from 31-10-1950 and 30-6-1951 (the firm's assessment) ? Was there no finality in so far as the partner's assessment was concerned in Atmala Nagaraj's
case (1) between 22-1-1952 (partner's assess- ment) and 1-4-1952 (the commencement of sub-s. ( 5)) ? (I) [1962] 461.T.R. 609, (2) [1962) Supp. 2 s.c.R. 716. A!inudobad Mk & CtJ/i&o Prinlirtg Co •
Lt/. v. S.C. Mthta, J,,Nmt· Tax 0.ffiUY Hidaµtul ah, J. Ah..,dabad M/1. (!I Calico Prinli11g Co., Lin. v. S.C. M1hi., ,..,_.. Tu Ojfim 3. Was the finality of the partner's assessment,
if any, controlled in the one case by the fact that the assessment of the firm was before 1-4-1952 and in the other by the fact that the assessment of the firm was after 1-4-1952?
HldaJaJ•ll•h, J. We have detailed these ciuestions because they high-light the only point of difference between the two cases. We express no opinion of these questions. In view of what we have said on the inter-
pretation of s. 35 (10) we are of opinion that the judgment of the High Court was right. We would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs. BY COURT : In accordance with the opinion
of the majority, this appeal is dismissed with costs. AppMl dismissed.