THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, AYURVEDIC AND UNANI TIBIA COLLEGE, DELHI versus THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER

OtttHtr 23. 156 BUPREiltE COC'RT RElQRTS [19f~] SUPP. t'- T~E BOARD OF TRUSTEES, A YURVEDIC AND UNANI TIBIA COLLEGE, DELHI ti. THE STATE OF DELHI AND ANOTHER (B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR,

N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.) Registered Society-Wliether a corporation-Stat. enactment dia.o/ving suclo aocir.ty and aelting up corporati-On in ita place- Co11.sti1utionaliry of-Tibbia College Act, 1962 (Delhi 6 of 1962). -R•giarered Societies Act, 1860 (21of1860), s.. 6,6,7,!3,14- Uot'trn'™11t

of Part 0 Stat.a Act, 1961 J49 of /9fil), s.~O­ Co111litution of b1dia, Ar~. U, 19(1)( ), JI and Srnmlh Scl.edule, List 1 E11try 44, ,Liat JI Entry 32, Li81 Ill Entries JO and !!8.

The Board of Trusteu, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbia College, Delhi wa• registered under the Societie9 Registration Act, 1860. It ran the Tibbia College, Delhi and an attached ho>tel and managed the Hindustani Dawakhana. The Delhi

State Legislature passed the Tibbia College Act, 1952, which dissolved the Board, incorporated a new Board and vested all the property and all the rights, powers and privileges of the old Board in the new Board. The petitioners challenged the validity of the Act on the grounds: (i) that the old Board was a corporation whose objects were not confined to Delhi and legiJlation with regard to it would fall under Entry 44 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and as such the State Legislature was not competent to pa" the impugned

Act, (ii) that the setting up of a new Board as a corporation wa• beyond the powen of the State Legislature, (iii) that the Act violated Arts. 14,19 and 31 of the Constitution, (iv) that the Act could not override the Societies Registration .Act, 1860 which was> Central Act, and (v) that the legblature a<:ted mala fiM in passing the impugned Act.

Held, (per Sinha, C. J., Das, Sarkar and AyyaMpr,lJ.) that the State Legislature was compelent to enact the impugned Act. On ~tration under the Socie~ies ~egis- tration Act the old Board dtd not become a corporation 1n the 11ense of bei1111 incorporated within the meaninp; ofBntry 44 of Li1t I; it continued to be an unincorporated IOCiety though under the provisions of the Socictiea Registration Act it had certain privikgcs analogous to those of corporations. The

provisions in the impugned Act relating to the dissolution of the old Board fell within the second part of Entry 32 of List II which included unincorporated societies. Though the impugned Act while creating the

new Board gave it a corporate status, it confined its po1rers-and duties to institutions II (1) in Delhi and limited its rights, powers and privileges to the purposes for which it was created. The pr-0visions of the

impugned Act relating to the incorporation of the new Board fell within the first part of Entry 32 of List II. Taff Valt Railway v. .A.malgamakd Society of Railway Servants, (1900) A.O. 426 and Bo11Aor v. Musicians' Union, L.R. 1956 A.C. !04, referred to.

Krishnan v. Sundaram, (1940) 43 Bom. L.R. 562, Boppana Ru,,,.inamma v. Maganti Vt11kata Ramadas, A.l.R. 1940 Mad. 946, M . .A.. Nullflitr v. Official Assignee, Madras, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 875 and Satyavart Sidhantalanl:ar v. Tht

Arya Samaj, Bombay, (1945) 48 Born. I .. R. 541, distinguished. The Stroanl8 of India Society, Poona v. Tht Charity Commissioner of Bombay, (1960) 63 Bom. L.R. 379, approved. Htld, further, that the impugned Act did not violate

Arts. 14,19 or 31. The petitioner had failed to show that there were other institutions similarly situated as the petitioner and that the petitioner had been picked out for unequal treat- ment. Since the transfer of management was made by a valid law there was no question of violation of Art. 31 (I); and since the impugned Act did not provide for compulsory acquisition of property Art.

31 (2), as it stood at the relevant time, had no application. Neither the dissolved Board nor its members had any right to hold the property of the dissolved Board and there was no infringement af Art. 19(l}(f) involved in the Act vesting the property in the new Board. Under the Societies Registration Act, the members of a society did not acquire any beneficial interest on the dissolution of the society; the only right which they had was to determine as to which other society the property should be given to for management.

This was not a right to property within the meaning of Art. 19(l}(f) and the taking away of such a right by the impugned Act did not violate Art. 19( I) (f}. Ohiranjit Lal Ohowdhuri v. Tht Union of India, [1950]

S.C.R. 869, relied on. Mate of WEBI Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, {1954] S.C.R. 587 and Dwarkadas 8hrini111U1 v. 'l'ke Sholapur Spinning and Wea,ing Oo., Ltd. (1954] S.C.R. 674, distinguished.

Held, further, that there was no question of conflict bet- ween a law made by Parliament and a law made by the State Legislature as the Societies Registration Act, 1860, was not a law made by Parliamen1. The State Legislature had the power either to amend the Societies Registratimt Act in rcsp«:t of un- incorporated societies, or to make a law relating to a corpora- tion provided its activities were confined to Delhi. The·Di!lh. State Legislature did not transgress·any af its limitMIC>As·in 1'fl

Tlu.l1Hdllf r_,_, Ayurr.iie ••••/. u…,.; r;n. c.11., ••. D,J/ri Thr &1"'6 •I D1hi 1"1 'l'lw Boni of T nutm, A.1"'..& and Unani Tibia Colkt•. D1/M v. Th< 81011 of D1/hi S. K. Das J.

enacting the impugned Act and no que.iion of mola jidu of the legislature arose. K.C. Gajapati .Varriyn Deo v. The State of Orissa, [1654] S.C.R. l. relied on. Per, Mudholkar, J., Though the old Board could not be

regarded as a corporation as the Societies Registration Act does not provide for incorporation, it passessed some of the attri- butes of a corporation and it was a 'near corporation' or a 1qua'ii corporation'. It was a legal entity. The second part of Entry 32 of List II did not permit a law to be made which took away from an existing legal catity its powers such as tho;e conferred by the Societies Registration Act and which destroyed the

lr!(lll entity. The impugned Act could not be supported under the first part of Entry 32 of List II as the objects of the Board were not limited to the Delhi State. But Entries IO and 28

of List III permitted the State Legislature to make a law di!S<Uv1ng a charitahle trust and transferring its property, rights etc. to another institution and the i1npugned :\ct could

be sustained und'Cr these Entries. Serr'(lnt• of IndifJ Soci'1y, Poona v. The Charity Comm;.,. 1ioner of Bombay, (I 960) 63 Born. L. R. 397, The Taff V nl• Rrzilu,'(1y Co. r. Th, Amalgamated Snriety nf Railuuz.y 1i)eria11t", [IYOI] A.C. 426 and Bon«or '" Mu.<ioian.•' Union, [19j6] A.C. 104, referred to.

0RIOP-'IAJ. JURISDJCTJO:S: Petition No. 96 of 1955. Petition und<>r Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Purushottam Tricumdas, J. B. Dad11chauf,

R11vindra Narain and 0. C. Mathur, for tho petitioner. C. K. DaphtanJ, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and T.M. Sen, for the respondent8. 1961. October 23. The Judgment of Sinha,

C. J., Das, Sarkar and Ayyangar, JJ., was deliver- ed by Das, J. Mudholkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment. S. K. DAS, J.-This is a writ petition on behalf of two petitioners. The first petitioner

is the Board of TruHtees, Ayurvedic and Unani 'fibbia College, Delhi, through Hakim Mohammed Jamil Khan, stated to be its properly elected Secretary. The Becond petitiJner is Hakim

(1) S.C.R. l\:lohammad Jamil Khan himself, who states tbat he is still one of the trustees or members of the said Board. The petition was initially filed on behalf of the first petitioner. Subsequ 0 ntly, an amend-

ment petition was moved which was allowed by us. As a result of the amendments allowed petitipner No. 2 was added as one of the petitioners, and certain new grounds of attack were added in para.

14 of the petition. To these grounds we shall advert later. The short facts giving rise to the petition are these. One Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan was a physician (of Unani medicine) of all-India repute.

He lived in Delhi and started a pharmaceutical institute in the town known as Hindustani Dawa· khana in the year 1903. He also established a medical college known as the Tibbia College. He dfod in the year 1927.

But before his de1tth, in the year 1911, he along with certain other persons formed a society styled Anjuman-i-Tibbia and had it registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Act XXI of 1860).

Tho name of the society was changed in 1915, and it bemme known as the Board of Trustees, Ayur- vedic and UQani Tibbia College, Delhi. For convenience we shall refer to it .as the Board.

The Board ran the Tibbia College' and an attached hostel. The pharmaceutical institute was also managed by it, though at one stage petitioner No. 2 claimed the institute as his private property.

Certain rules and regulations were made for the functioning of the Board, which were amended from time to time. The main objeets of. the Board were thus stated in the rules :- (a) to establish colleges for the purpose

of imparting higher education in the Unani and Ayurvi;idic systems of medicine to the inhabitants of India; (b) to improve the indigenous systems of medicine on scientific lines and for that

JIMJ T/,,Boord•f Trustees, Ayuniedit ~d Unaai Tibia College, Delhi v The Stote of Delhi S.K. D., J. TJ,, 8-'•f f'nutu1, A;11Tw/k and u 1l41li rthia Coilt11, Dtllti n. Stau of V.lhi

S. A.DosJ, purpose to establish one or more phanna.ceuti- cal institutes ( dawakhanas); and ( c) to h!\ve medical books compiled and tr1mslatf'd and to adopt other means which might enbanoe the popularity of those systems

and add to the information of the people in general on hygiene etc .. The maximum number of mt>mbers (callrd trustees in the ruks) was ~5 to be elected from a.II the then Provinoes of India. It was stated in

r. 5 that one-third of the membt•rs of the Board should be Hakima and V aid8. The financial yt>ar of the Board was to be from April 1 to March 31 of each year, snd the annual au bscription to be

paid by a member of the Board was fixed at Rs. J 2/- per annum payable in advance before April 30 of each year. Rule 6 laid down the circtJmstances in which the office of a mem her

should he deemed to be vacant, and one of such ciicumstances was the failure of a member to pay his annual sub8cription before the date fixed for such p!\yment. There were also rules regard-

ing (a) power of in~pection of the co liege, hoste 1 etc., ( b) ordinary meetings of the Board of Trustct•s and (c) matters which could be dealt with by the Boa.rd and its sub-committees. It is not necci:•ary

to state these rulea in detail. Rule 13 provided for the formation of a Managing Committee con- sisting of nine mem hers and six officials for a period of three years and the functions of the

Managing Committt>e were also prescribed in the rules. The office-bearers of the Board and the Managing Committee were to be the same and consisted of ( i) a President, (ii) a Senior Vice.

President, (iii) a Junior Vice-President, (iv) a Secretary, ( v) a Financial Secretary, and (vi) a Joint Secretary. It was la.id down in r. 26 that the offioe, bearers of the Board were to be elected

for three years by the members. Thr rules also la.id down the powers and duties of the President, (1) S.C.R. Secretary, Financial Secretary and Joint Secretary. One of the rules said that the office of the Secre-

tary of the Board shall, as far as possible, vest in the lineal descendants of Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan. Hakim Moh'l.mmad Jamil Khan, son of Hakim Mohammad Ajmal Khan and peti· tioner no. 2 before us, was the first Secretary of

the Board. In the year 1948 Shri Rameshwar Dayal, the then Collector of Delhi, and Dr. Yudhvir Singh the then President of the Delhi Municipal Com· mittee, and certain other persons were eleoted

as members of the Board. Dr. Yudhvir Singh was elected President and one Shri Mool Chand Gagerna was appointed Joint Secretary: Soon after the elections in 1948, a struggle ensued

between different ~oups of members for obtaining control of the Board and the college, and for posseBBion of the Hindustani Dawakhana. Certain criminal proceedinjls followed. On October 18, 1949, a suit

was brought in the court of the senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Secretary and 31 members of the Board. In. that suit an application was ma.de

for the appointment of a receiver and on October 19, 1949, the Subordinate Judge appointed two local advocates as joint receivers with plenary powers. These receivers took poBBession of the

Dawakhana and the college between October 19 and 23, 1949. When the suit was still pending, the Delhi State Legislature passed an Act called the Tibbia College Act, 1952 (Delhi Act No. 5 of 1952), herein·

after referred to as the impugned Act. This Act. came into force on October 10, 1952. The constitu· tional validity of the Act is the principal question for decision on . this writ petition and we shall

presently refer to the provisions thereof. We may only state here that by s. 9 of the impugned Act, the Board stood diBBolved and all property, movable and immovable, and all right.a, powel'B and privileges

JIMJ l'MB..n of T"""''• A"'"""" ond Unani Tibia c.u., •• Dtlii v. Tiii Stall of 1" S.K.DosJ. J96J T,,;a-d of T nutus, .A_,.,.,& •ti Unani Tibi1' <AU.gt, DllJU v. T Ill St.z. of Dtllzi

S. I(. D .. J. 162 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. of the Board vested in a new Board constituted under the Act. This new Board is called the Tibia. College Board 1md we shall refer to it as the new

Board. After tho passing of the impugned Act, the suit instituted before the Subordinate Judge, Delhi was withdrawn. On t.he withdrawal of the suit, an application was made for making over

possession of the properties to tho new Board. That application was allowed in spite of the objection of petitioner no. I. Petitioner no. I unsuccessfully moved the High Court of Punjab against that

order. Thereafter, petitioner no. I moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ restraining the State of Delhi and the newly constituted Board under the impugned Act, the

State from enforcing th9 provisions of the impugned Act and the new Board from exercising any func- tions thereunder. The respondents to the petition raised a. number of preliminary objections, and on

December 13, 1954, the writ petition was withdrawn. This was followed by some amendments of the rules of the Board and it is stated on behalf of the petitioners that a fresh election was held in accor-

dance with the amended rul011 on January 6, 1955. On January 11, 1955, the Managing Committee passed a. resolution authorising the Secretary to institute a proceeding in this Court to enforce the

funds.mental rights of petitioner no. I. The prE>sent petition was then filed on Mnrch 14, 1955, in pur- suance of tha.t resolution. The petition wa.s subse- quently a.mended in the manner already indicated

Ly us. The Sta.to of Delhi a.nd the new Boa.rd are the respondents to the prcl!<'nt petition. The lea.med Advocate for the petitioners has challenged the validity of the Act on two ma.in

grounds. Bia first ground ia that the Delhi Stato Legislature ha.d no legi~lative power or competence to enact the impugned Act, which must on that ground be declared invalid and inoperative. The

second ground proceeds on the footing that assuming (1) S.C.R. the Delhi State Legislature had power to enact the impugned Act, the Act is bad because its several provisions violate the fundamental rights guaran-

teed to the petitioners under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Two subsidiary points have also been urged before us, one to the effect that the Delhi State Legislature could not by the impugned

Act over-ride the provisions 1 of the Societies Registration .Act, 1860 which is a Central Act, and the other to the effect that the Delhi State Legisla- ture acted mala fide in passing the impugned Act.

We shall presently deal with these arguments in the order in which we have stated them. It is necessary to state here, howtiver, that a preliminary objection similar to the one urged against the'

·previous petition was also urged in respect of the present petition. The learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the respondents has urged that by reason of the failure of the members to pay

the annual sub8cription in time, all of them ceased to be members in 1950-1951; therefore, the elections held in 1955 were of no effect there being no one competent to elect; and the Board as a Board

ceased to exi3t before 1955 and neither petitioner no. 1 nor petitioner no. 2 could maintain the present writ petition. Some of the affidavits made on behalf of the parties containlng averments with

regard to the payment or non-payment of subscrip- tion particularly in the years 1949-50 and 1950-51 were read, and Ex. B series which were the cash books of the years 1951 to 1954 were also placed

before us. On one side there is the averment on behalf of the respondents that no subscriptions were paid before the due date for the years 1949-50 and 1950-51 by any of the members. As against this,

it is stated on behalf of the petitioners that petitioner no. 2 and some of the other members paid their subsc~iption to the Financial Secretary for the years 1949-50 and 1950-51. An affidavit

made by the then Financial Secretary was also placed before us. From a pemHal of the affidavits 1951 – TluBoar4"" T mtees, A.J117Wdic and Unani Tibia Col/111, D1lhi v. PIN Slal1 of D1llii

S.K. D.,J, 1~1 71wB..,'•f Tnui.u,~ '°" U_,; Tobi• O>U.g1, IH/Jti and the documente filed it appeared to us that the question being one of disputed facts could not be 1a.tisfactorily decided on the materials placed before

us. We, therefore, thought it proper and convenient to consider the legal points urged as regards the constitutional validity of the impugned Act and of 'l'M St.u of D.W S.K. DosJ.

the action taken thereon. Now, we take up the first argument advanced on behalf of the .petitioners. This argument has been put in the following way. The State of Delhi became a Part C State on the coming into force of

the Constitution of India.. Under Art. 239 of the Constitution as itthen stood, a Part C State was to , be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thought fit, through a Chief Corr.miss·

ioner or a Lieutenant-Governor to be appointed by him or through the Government of a neighbouring State. .Article 240 of the Constitution enabled Parliament by law to create or continue for any

Part C State a body, whether nominated, elected or partly nominated and partly elected, to fun<'tion as a Legislature for the State. By virtue of the power conferred by Art. 240, Parliament enacted the

Government of Part C States Act, 1951 (Central Act 49 of 1951 ), by which a Legislative Assembly was constituted for some of the Part C States including one for Delhi. Section 21 of the said Act laid down

the extent of legislative power of the Legislative Assembly. This section said . inter alia that the Legislative Assembly of a Part C State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State with

respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List (List II) or in the Concurrent List (List ill). There was an exception provided with regard to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Delhi

in respect of public order, police etc., which is not relevant for our purpOBe. Section 22 said that if any provision of a law made by the Legislative .Aseembly of a Part C State was repugnant to any

provision of a law made by Parliament, then the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislative Asst-mbly of the State, shall prevail and the law made by the

Legislative Assembly of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. There is an Explanation to the section which is not 'relevant for our purpose and need not be read. The point

which the learned Advoeate for the petitioners has emphasised is that under s. 21 aforesaid, the extent of the legislative power of the Delhi State Legis- lature was limited to the making of laws for the

whole or a,ny part of the Delhi State with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State Lis~ or in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Now, item 32 of the State

List (List U) is in these terms: "32. In corporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities, un-ineor- porated trading, literary, scientific, religious

and other societies and associations; co-opera· tive societies." Items 43 and 44 of the Union List (List I) are in these terms: "43. Incorporation, regulation and win- ding up of corporations, including banking,

insurance and financial corporations but not including co-operative societies. 44. Incorporation, regulation and wind- ing up of corporations, whether trading or not, with object.a not confined to one State,

but not including universities." The argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioners is this. The old Board which was re- gistered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is petitioner no. 1 before us, was a corporation,

whose objects were not confined to the State of Delhi. Therefore, any legislation with regard to it would fall under item 44 of List 1 and not under Tiu Board of Trustees, A,yurvedic

ond Unani Tihia College, Delhi Thi State of Delhi S.K.Da..J. 1P61 11't BatUdof Tnutus, Aµt-tdic and U""11i Tibia Col,,,,, Dtllii TM Stat, of Delhi S. IC DGJ J. item 32 of List II. This argument consists of two

parts-first, tha.t the old Boa.rd was a cnrpuration, and, secondly, that its objects were not. confined to one State. The learned Advocate m;;vs that that being the position, the Delhi State ]j,~islaturc ha<l

no legislative competence to make the impugned legislation which went b~yond the cxlcnt of its legislative power w1<lcr s. 21 of Act 40 uf HJ51. It is worthy of note here that if the Board wore not

a corporation, then the impugned legislation would not fa.II under item 44 of List I at all; alternatively, if the Boa.rd were a. curporati•_in but its objects were confined to only one Stak, viz. th.: ~tatc of

Delhi, then again item 44 would not be attracted. On behalf of the respondents there is a threefold reply to the argument stated above: firsLly, that the Board was not a corporation; secondly, its

objects did not extrmd beyond the ~tale of Delhi; and thirdly, the impugned lcgidL>tion is support,iblc under item I I of List II rclatiniz to "E<luca.tion" and item 28 of the Concurrent List (List III) relating to

"Charities and ~haritable institution". The first and foremost question i • whether the old Board was a corporation in the legal Bense of that word. What is a Corporation? Corpora-

tions may he <lividL'<l into two main classeH, namely, corporations a.ggrr,gatc and corporations sole. We arc not concerned in the present case with corpo- ration solP. "A Corprm•tion aggrcgaui bas been

defined a.a a collection of individual,; united into one body under a. special denomination, having perpetual succe&1ion under an artificial form, and vested by the policy of the la.w with the capacity of

acting in several respects a.s an individual, parti- cularly of ta.king and granting property, of contmct- ing obligations and of suing a.nd being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities

in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, moro or leBB extensive, according to the design of its institution, or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its croation or at l\ny subsequent

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS period of its existence". (Halabury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 9, p&ge 4.) A corporation aggregate has therefore only one capacity, namely, its

corporate capacity. A corporation aggregate may be a trading corporation or a non-trading corporation. The usual examples of a trading corporation are (1) charter companies, (2) companies incorporated

by special acts of parliament, (3) companies regis- tered under the Companies Act, etc. Non-trading corporations are illustrated by ( 1) municipal cor- porations, (2) district boards, (3) benevolent insti-

tutions, (4) universities etc. An essential element in the legal conception of a corporation is that its identity is continuous, that· is, that the original member or memberR and his or their successors are

one. In law the individual corporators, or members, of which it is composed are something wholly rlilfe. rent from the corporation itself; for a corporation is a legal persona just as much as an individual.

Thus, it has been held that a name is essential to a corporation; that a corporation aggregate can, as a general rule, only act or expreSB its will by deed under its common seal; that at the present day in

England a corporation is created by one or other of two methods, namely, by Royal Charter of incorporation from the Crown or by the autho- rity of Parliament that is to say, by or by virtue of

statute. There is authority of long standing for saying that the e880nce of a corporation consists in (!)lawful authority of incorporation, (2) the persons to be incorporated, (3) a name by which the per-

sons are incorporated, (4) a place, and (5) words sufficient in law to show incorporation. No parti- cular words are necessary for the creation of a cor- poration; any expreSBion showing an intention to

incorporate will be sufficient. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has referred us to various provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and has contended that the I!JdI

The Board of T rustns, AywD1dic and U""1ri TiMa Coll1p, Delhi v. The State of D1lhi S.Ir. D.,J. 1(;61 '1'/u B°"'d of Tnutus, A._,urz:ttii' nJ Und&i Tibia C.U111, Drlhi 1M Sw. •f Dtlhi

B. Jr. D"' J. 168 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [l!J62J SUPP. result of these provisions wa.a to make tlic :Board a corporation on registl'ation. It _is ncccssa.ry now to rea.d some of the provisions of that Act. The

Act is entitled an Act for the registration of lite- rary, scientific and charitable societies a.nd the preamble states tha.t it wa.s enacted for improving tho legal condition of societies established for the

promotion of literature, science, or the fine a.rte, or for the diffusion of useful kno" ledge etc., or for charitable purposes. Section l of the Act states that any seven or more persona associated for :my

literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose as is described in e. :W of the Act may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of allllociation a.n<l filing

the same with the Registrar of ,Joint-stock Companies form them- selves into a. society under the Act. Section 2 lays down that the memorandum of association shall contain and one of the particulars it must contain

is "the objects of the society''. Section 3 dsals with regi,iitration and the fees payable therefor. Sections 5 and 6 a.re important for our purpose and should be read in full. "5. The property, movable and immovable,

belonging to a society registered under this Aot, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested, for the time being, in the gover- ning body of such society, and in all procee-

dinga, civil and criminal, may be described &11 the property of the governing body of such society by their proper title. "6. Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the prcsi·

dent, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, a.s shall be determined by the rull'll and regulations of the society, and, ill default of such determination, in the name of suoh person as shall be appointed bv tho

governing body for the ocCDsion : Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary of the trustees thereof,

if on an application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nomina- ted to be the defendant." Section 7 provides for non-abatement of suits or proceedings and the continua.nee of such suits or

proceedings in the name of or against the successor of the person by or against whom the suit was brought. Section 8 says that if a judgment is re- covered against a person or officer named on behalf

of the society, such judgment shall not be put in foroe against the property, movable or immovable, or against the body of such person or officer, but against the property of the society. Section IO

provid\ls that in certain circu.msta.nces mentioned therein a member of the· society may be sued by the society; but if the defendant shall be sucJessful in any such suit brought at the instance of the

society and shall be adjudged to recover his costs, he may elect to proceed to recover the same from the officer in whose name the suit was· brought, or from the society. Sections 13 and 14 provide for

dissolution of societies and the consequences of such dissolution. These provisions have also an important bearing on the questions before us and are quoted in full. "13. Any number not.less than three-fifths

of the members of any society may determine that it shall be dissolved, and thereupon it ahall be dissolved forthwith, or at the time then agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be ta.ken for the disposal and settlement

of the property of the society, its claims and liabilities, a.ooording to the rules of the said society applicable thereto, if any, and, if not then as the governing body shall find expe-

dient, provided that, in the event of any 191<1 The B1wd of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani 'l'ibia College, Delhi v. The State of Delhi S. K. Das J. Ifl'JI Th. B-dof 1"nutu1, Ayu•vtilic

and VNJJ1i T ibi1J Coll1~1, Dtlhi v. Th. S.a11 of Dtlhi S. Jr. flu J. dispute arising among the said governing body or the members of the soeiety, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the principal

court of Original civil juriR<li..t inn of tho dis- trict in which the chief lmilding of the society is ~ituat<J, and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite:

Provided that no society shall be diSBol- ved unless three-fifths of the members shall have cxpr!'BBed a wish for such dissolution by their vote~ delivered in person, or by proxy,

at a general meeting convened for the pur- pose: Provided that whenever any Government is a member of, or a contributor to, or other- wise interested in any society registered un-

der this Act, such society shall not be dissol- ved, without tho consent of the Government of the state of registration. 14. If upon the dissolution of any society registered under this Act there shall remain,

after the l!Stisfaction of all its debts and liabilities, any property whatsoever, the same shall not be paid to or distributed among tho members of the said society or any of them,

but shall be given to some ot,her society, to be determined by tho votes of not less than throo- fifths of the members present personally or by proxy at the time of the diMolution, or, in

default thereof, hy such Court as aforesaid: Provided, however, that this clause ~hall not apply to any society which shall have been founded or established by the contribu- tions of shareholders in the nature of a Joint-

stock Company." Now, the question before us iii-regard being had to the aforesaid provisions-was the Board a corporation? Our conclusion is that it was not. The most important point to be noticed in this

connection is that in the various provisions of the (1) S.C.R. Societies Registration Act, 1860, there are no aufficient words to indicate an intention to incorpo- rate , on the contrary, the provisions show that

th.ere was a.n absence of such intention. Section 2 no doubt provides for a name as also for the objects of the society. Section 5, however states that the property belonging to the society, if not vested in

trustees, shall be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the society and in all proceedings, civil and criminal, the property will be described as the property of the governing body. The section

talks of property belonging f,o the society; but the property is vested in the trustees or in the governing body for the time being. Tlle expression "property belonging to the society" does not give the society

a corporate status in the matter of holding or acquiring property, it merely describes the property which vests in the trustees or governing body for the time being. Section 6 gives the society the

right to sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman etc. and s. 7 provides that no suit or proceeding in a civil court shall abate by reason of the death etc.' of the person by or against whom the

suit has been brought. Section 8 again says that any judgment obtained in & suit brought by or against the society shall b!l enforced against it. It has been submitted before us that ss. 6, 7 a.nd 8

clothe the society with a legal personality and a perpetual succession; and s. 10 enables the members of the society to be sued as stra.ngers, in certain circumstances, by the society, and the costs

awarded to the defendant in such a suit may be recovered, at his election, from the officer in whose na.me the snit was brought. Dealing with very similar provisions (ss. 7, 8 and 9) of the English

Trade Union Act, 1871 (34 and 35 Viet, o. 31) Lord Lindley said in the celebrated case of Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants ('). (I) (1901] A. C. 426. TM Board of

Trwtus, AyurvedU .tuI Unani Tibia College, D1lhi y, The Stat1 of Delhi S.K.DasJ. TJo. Boa-« •f 'l'rwtu•, A.JUrt-edi.c tttrtl f./nmri 1·thi• Colu11, D1/lti y, Tiu Buu of Ddhi S. Ir. DuJ.

"The Act does not in express terms say what use is to be ma.de of tho name under which the trade union is registered and by which it is known. But a trade union which is registered under the Act must hive a name

…… It may acquire property, but, not being incorporated, recourse is had to the old well- known machinery of trustees for acquiring and holding such property, and for suing and

being sued in respect of it (88. 7, 8, !l). The The property so held is, however, the property of the union; the union is the beneficial owner . …… The Act appears to me to indicate with

sufficient clearness that tho registered name is one which may be used to denote the union as an unincorporated society in legal proceed· ings as well a.s for businoSB and other purposes. ,,

In •Trade Union La.w' by N. A. Citrine (1950 edn.) to which the l~rned Advocate for the petitioners ha.s referred, it is stated at p. 143 : "The object of this section (s. 9) was to

provide a method of enabling legal prooeedings to be brought in respect of the property of a registered trade union. Since the legislature had no intention of giving such unions corporate status with power to hold property

and to sue and be sued in their registered names, it was nooeBBary to provide for the vesting of their property in trustees and to permit them to bring or defend legal proceed- ings in respect of that property on the union's

behalf. 8ection 8 of this Act, having provided for the vesting of the union's property in its trustees, the present section supplements that soction by empowering the trustees to bring

or defend, on the union's behalf, civil or criminal proceedings concerning its property." In Bonaor v. M'U8icia118' Union( 1) the position (I) (L. R.) 1956 A. C. Jo+. (1) S.C.R. of a registered trade union in England came under

consideration of the House of Lords in :an appeal from the Court of Appeal. On a review of earlier decisions including the decision in Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servant-'('),

Lord Macdermott, Lord KE•i1h of Avonholm and Lord Somervell of Harrow held that a registered · trade union was not a juristic person distinguishable at any moment of time from the members of which

it was composed. After referrin<:?; to the various provisions of the Trade Union Act, 1871 and some of the earlier decisicns bearing on the question Lord MacDermott said : "I base this opinion primarily on the

statutes. The more closely they are examined the clearer it seems to be that the legislature, though minded to bestow upon registered unions some of the gifts and attributes of legal

personality, had no intention of doing more and was, indeed, averse to the idea of going the whole length and making those unions new creatures, distinct in law from their membership, and

fundamentally different from the "combination" of persons which the definition requires all trade unions to be." Lord Morton of Henryton and Lord Porter, who expressed the minority view, held that a registered

trade union though not an incorporated body, was yet capable of entering into contracts and of being sued as a legal entity, distinct from its individual members. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that

provisions similar to the provisions of ss. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 were · held not to show any intention to incorporate; on the contrary, the very resort to the machinery of

trustees or the governing body for the time being acquiring and holding the property showed that there was no intention to incorporate the society or (lJ [1901] A. C. 426. Th.Botndof

Trustees, AyurueJic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. The Stale of Del Iii 8. }(,Das J. Illlll 71>1 Bo<ud of Tnultts, Ayurrtdic ad Utfalli Tibia Colle11, D1Uti Tk Sta11 of DtlAi S. K. Dtu J.

174 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [l962J SUPP. union so 611 to give it a corporate oapacity for the purpose of holding a.nd aoGuiring property. It appears to us that the legal position is exactly the

same with regard to the provisions in Bti. 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. They do not show any intention to incorporate, though they confer certain privileges on a registered society,

which would be wholly unnecessary if the registered society were a corporation. Sections 13 and 14 do not carry the matter any further in favour of the petitioners. Section 13 provides

for dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs. It says in effect that on diSBolution of . a. society neccBSary steps sha.11 be taken for the disposa.l a.nd settlement of the pro-

perty of the sooiety, its claims and liabilities, according to the rules of the society; if there bo no rules, then· as the govering body shall find it ex- pedient provided that in the event of any dispute

arising among the said governing body or the members of the ea.id society, the adjustment of the affairs shall be referred to tho Court. Hert> again the govering body is given a. legal power somewhat

distinct from that of the society itself; because under s.16 the governing body shllll be the gover- nors, council, directors, committee, trustees or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the

society the management of its a.lfairs is entrusted. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the provisions afroesaid rlo not establish the main eSBential characteristic of a. corporation aggre-

gate, namely, that of an intention to incorporate the society. WI'< may further observe that the scheme and provisions of the Societie,s Registration Act,1860 are very simila.r to those of the Friendly Societies

Act, 1896 (59 and 6') Viet. c. 25), as amended in certain respects by subsequent enactments. It is appropriate to quot.fl here what Dennis Lloyd has said in his 'Law relating to U nincorporatcd ASBooia-

tion' (1938 edn.) at page 59 in respect of the (1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOuRT REPORTS provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896 as modified by subsequent enactments. He has said : "The modern legislation still maintains

the , policy of the older Aots in withholding corporate status from friendly societies. Re- gistration does not result in incorporation, but merely entitles the society so registered to

enjoy the privileges conferred by the Act. These privileges are of considerable import- ance and certain of them go a long way to- wards giving registered societies …… a status

in many respects analogous tQ a corporation strictly so-called, but without being technically incorporated. Thus something in the nature of perpetual succession is conceded by the provi-

sion that the society's property is to vest in the trustees for the time being of the so· ciety for the use and benefit of the society and its members and of all persons claiming through the members according to the society's

rules, and further (and this is the most note- worthy provision) that the property shall pass to succeeding trustees without assignment or transfer. In the same way, though th!l society,

being unincorporated, is unable to sue and be sued in its own name, it is given the statutory privilegA of suing and being sued in the name of its trustees." We think that these observations made with regard

to similar provisions of the Friendly Societies Act, correctly and fuccinctly summarise the legal position in respect of the several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Those provisions undoubted-

ly give certain privileges to a society registered under that Act and the privileges are of consider- able importance and some of those privileges are analogous to the privileges enjoyed by a corpora-

tion, but there is r<'ally no incorporation in the sense in which that word is legally understood. Tiu Board 4/ Trust11s. A.yurvedit and Ur1cni Titia Colltg~, lJtlhl v. The State of Delhi

s. K. l),a J. 1Hl Th.B-doj T r-.,Uts. Atuu:tdir. and U1W1I Tibia Co/1111, Dtll i The Sla11 of D1/hi S. If. Das J, 176 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [11162] SOPP. On behalf of the petitionel'8 relia.nce hae been

placed on tho decision in Krishnan v. 8undaram (') where Kania., J., (as he then was) said : "The position of a society regist.ered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is like that of a club or a joint stock compa.ny."

There was no discussion of the question of incorpora- tion, and the decision cr.nnot be accepted as autho- ritatively laying down that a. society registered under tho Societies Registration, Act is a corporation.

Thero was a similar observation without any dis· cu8sion in Boppana Rulcminamma v. M aganli V enkata Rumwl<1s (')and N. A. Nannier v. Officia/, A88ignee, 11/ adra8 ('). There is, however, a fa.irlv full discUB-

eion of the question in Satyavart Sidhantalankar v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay (') where Bhagwati, J., held that a society registered under the Societies, Registration Act, 1860 was a legal entity apart

from the members constituting it, and it can suo and be sued in its own name. The queation which fell for decision in that case was not whether a society registered under the Societies Registration Act was

'incorporate<!' as that term is legally understood. The question there was whether such a society could sue or be sued except in tho manner provided by ss. 6 and 7. It was held that it could and the

reason given was thus expressed by the learned Judge: "I am of opinion that the provisions con- tained in ss. 6, 7 and 8 of the Societies Registra- tion Act are not inconsistent with the user of

the regist.ered name of the society in connection with legal prCJceedings. As Lord Lindley observed in Taff Vale Ilailway Company's case (supra), "I do not say that the use of the

name is compulsory but it is at 168.llt permiBBive." If this is the true legal position of a society registered under the Societies Registration (I) 11°40)43Bom.L.R.~!. (1) A.J.R.194f!Mad.!149.

(S) A. I. R. 1951 Mad. IITS. (4) (194S) 48 Bom. I.. R. '41. (I) S.C.R. Act, the objection ..•… that the plaintiffs and the defendants are one and the same and that the suit as framed is not maintainable by

reason of the society being the plaintiffs as well as the defendants disappears. The plain- tiffs are suing on behalf of themselves and a.II the members of the society. The first defendant

is the president of the society and represents the society. As I have already observed "the society on its registration with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies becomes a. legal en-

tity apart from its members; it would be therefore idle to contend that the society are the plaintiffs as well as the first defendant in this action .. , It is unnecessary for us to consider the correctness

or otherwise of the reason 1!iven; it is sufficient for us to state that we do not think that the decision proceeds on the footing that a society registered underthe Societies Registration Act isa corporation

in the sense of being incorporated as.that term is legally understood, but if it does, we are unable to accept it as correct." The precise question which has arisen before ~s arose in Sen;ants of India Society, POQfla v. The

Charity Commissioner of Bombay (1). The facts of that case were these. The "Servants of India Society" was an institution which was registered under the Soci£ties Registration· Act, 1860. It

owned considerable movable and immovable property both in the. State c,f Bombay as well as in other parts of India. The State of Bombay issued a notification under s. l (4) of the

Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (Born. Act XXIX of 1950) which applied the provisions of that Act to a society formed for religious or charitable purposes and re11-ietered under the Societies Registration Act.

An application was made under s.18(1) of the Bom· bay Public Trusts Act, 1950 for registration of the Servants of India Society. During an enquiry into (I) (1960) 63 Bom. L. R. 379,

TheBoara of Trusttes, A;urvtt!ic and U12ani Tibia College. Delhi Th< Slate of D<lhi S.K. DasJ. '1'Jir Board of T nt,tur, Ayuri-tdie an,/ U'l'l!li 'Tibia Colltgt, Dtlhi v. J7i~ S1at1 of Drlhi

S.K.D1S1·l. 178 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP. that application an objection was taken that the SP.rvants of India Society having been registered under the Societies R~gistration Act was a corpora.

tion and had objects also outside the Bombay State and therefore, a legiAlation purporting to regulate the activities of such a society fell in entry 44 of List I and consequently the State Legislature had

no power to make any law to regulate the affairs of such a society. This objection wa.s dealt with first by the Assistant Charity Commissioner and then th" Charity Commissioner; thereafter, an "PPlie&-

tion was made under s. 72 of the Bombay Public TruRts Act, 1950 to the Court of the Distriot Judge, Poona. Tl:ien the matter was taken to the High Court on appeal from the dMision of the District

Judge. Tho appeal came up for hearing before our learned brother Mudholkar, J. (who was then a ,Judge of the Bombay High Court) and Patel, J. After referring to several decisions including the

decision of Bhagwati, J. in Satyavart Sid1'antalankar v. The Arya Samaj, Bombay(') our learned brother held that the Servants of India Society registered under the Societies Registration Act was a legal

entity and a qua.si.corporation. He further held that entry 44 in List I and the first part of entry :J2 in List II relating to 'Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations' mus~ be given a

liberal construction and quasi.corporations would come under tho!e entries. Blllling himself on a parity of rea.soning relating to entry 7 in List III which related to 'Contracts', ho said that if quaei-

contracts would come under entry 7, quasi-corpora- tion~ must also come under entries 43 and 44 of List I and the first part of entry 32 of List Il. Mr. Justice Patel took a different view. He said:

"A reference to entry 32 of the State List shows that "incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I (Union List, entries 43 and (ll (!!MS) 48 Bom. L. R. 341.

. … 44), and universities" are excepted from the Union List. Further "unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, religious and other socie- ties and associations" and "co-operative

secieties" are also excepted from the Union List. The emphasis would appear to be on the word "unincorporated'' used in connection with "trading, literary, scientific, religious and

other societies and associations".· If an association or society is unincorporated, then it may not fall within the Union List. The question, therefore, that is pertinent to be decided is not whether or not an association

-0r a society is a legal entity or a quasi-corpora- tion, but whetht>r it is incorporated orunin- corporated. If this is borne in mind, then it is amply clear that entries 43 and 44 of the

Union List would cover only those societies and associations which are incorporated; and those which may have legal entity but which are not incorpor~ted will not fall within the Union List."

The matter was then referred to· a third Judge (Gokhale, J.) who thus expre8aed his view: "In my judgment, societies registered under the Societies Registration Act are neither corporations nor quasi-corporations,

but are unincorporated societies contemplated under the second part of entry 32 of the State List." Mr. Justice Gokhale also expressed the view that when considering the ambit of an express legislative

power in relation to an unspecified residuary power, a. broad interpretation must be given to the former; the case, however, is different where under the Constitution there are two · complementary powers

each exp:ressed in precise and definite terms and in such a case there is no1 justification for giving a broader interpretation •to one power rather than to th& other. We find oureelve1 in agreement with

The Board of Trustees, Ayurwdic and Unani I ibia Colk11, D1lhi v. Tk State of Delhi S. K.DasJ. 1:1111 TMBoa•aof T nutt~I, "'"'°'& tllld Urratti Ti6ia CA/ltgt, D1lhi TJ,. Si.It of D•llti

S. /C DOJ J. 180 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. this view. It seems clear to us that entries 43 and 44 of List I when they talk of 'incorporation, regula- tion and winding up of corporatioll!!' relate to such

legal entities as have been incorporated and are corporations in the full sense of the term. Similarly, the firat pa.rt of entry 32 of List II when it talks of "incorporation, regulation and winding up of

corporations'" relates to such legal entities as are incorporated. Tliis is furt!ier clarified by the second part of entry 32 which talks of "unincorporated trading. literary, scientific,

religious and other societies and association". In entry 32 there is a dichotomy in the two parts thereof: the first pa.rt relates to incorporated societies which are corpora- tions in the true sense of that term, and the second

pa.rt relates to unincorporated societies. The juxta- position is between incorporated !IOcietics and unincorporated societies and there can be no doubt as to which of the two parts in which a society

registered under the Societies Registration Aot, 1860 will fall, be it called a quasi-corporation or by any other name. A society registered under the Societies Registration Act may have characteristios

which are analogous to some of the characteristics of a. corporation; yet it is not incorporated and remains an unincorporated society. As soon as it is held that it is an unincorporated society, it muet

come under the second part of entry 32 of List II. In this view of the matter it is unnecesaa.ry to decide the further questions as to (I) whether the objects of the old Boa.rd extended beyond the State

of Delhi, and (2) if other entries such as entry 11 of List II and entry 28 of List III can support the impugned legislation. We may, however, observe that if we had come to a diff.,rent conclusion on the

question whether the old Board was a. corporation or not and it became neoe.esa.ry to decide question no. (I) above, we might have heM that in view of the rules governing the old Board, its objeota were

not confined to t lie State of Delhi only in the sense Ol s.c.R. that it would not have been ultra 1Jires of the old Board to have started colleges etc., outside the State of Delhi. We should, however, add that the

activities of the old Board did not, as a matter of fact, extend beyond the State of Delhi on the date when the impugned Act was enacted. There ia another aspect of the question which

has to be considered here. Section 3 of the impu- gned Act is in these terms: "3. (1) With effect from such date as the Chief Com.missioner may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint. (hereinafter re-

ferred to in this Act as "the appointed day"), the entire management and control of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, now vested in the Boa.rd of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi,

shall be vested in a Board to be called "the Tibbia. College Board". (2) The Board shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be

sued.'' Sub-section (2) of s. 3 says in express terms that the new Board constituted under the impugned Act is given a corporate status; in other words, the new Board is a corporation in the full sense of the

term. Does the impugned legislation still come within entry 32 qf List II ? We think it does and for these reasons. We have held that the old Board was not a corporation, even though it wa11

registered under the Societies Registration Act. When, therefore, the Delhi State Legislature passed a law dissolving the old Board, it was really deal- ing with an unincorporated society or association.

By the impugned legislation, however, it gave the new Board a corporate status, but at the same time so delimited the powers and duties of the new Board as to confine them to the State of Delhi

T Ire Boa•d of Trwttes, Ayurv1tlii and Unani Tiiia College, Delhi v. The Stau of Delhi S. IC. D., J. Tiu BOtJrti of T rwtus, Ayurvedic and UMni Tibia Colltg•, D1ll1i v. Tiu Stai. of Delhi

S. If. Das J. only. The impugned Act is entitled an "Act to provide for transfer of the management of the Ayurvedie and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, founded by the late Hakim Ajmal Khan from its present

trustees to a Board." In other words, the Act deals only with the college in Delhi and the pharmaceu- tical institute attached to it. .-3cction 7 which gives the powers and duties of the new Board is in thcso

terms: "7. The Boa.rd shall exercise the following powers and perform the following duties, namely:- ( a) to maintain tho Ayurvcdic and lJna.ni Tibbi CoUoge, Delhi with a. view to impart

higher education to men and women in the Ayurvedic and Unani Systems of Medicine and to promote and condnet research in the same; (b} to maintain and improve the Hindus- tani Dawa Kha.na. and Ra.sa.ya.na.sha.la.;

(c) to provide for studies to e1nble incor- poration, where necessary of the principle of the modern system of medicine and surgery in order to help the scheme of studies for the Ayurvedic and Unani systems according to

the exigencies of time;– (d) to help produce and publish books in order to facilitate the carrying out of the object.a specified in the clauses (a) to (c); (e) to receive gifts, donations or bene-

factions from Government and to receive be- quests, donations and transfer of movable or immovable properties from trustees, doners or transferors, as the case may be; (f) to deal with any property belonging

to or vested in the Boa.rd in such manner as the Board may deem fit for advancing the object.a specified in clauB<'8 (n) to (dl; (1) S.C.R. (g) to do au sucn things as may be neces·

sary incidental or conducive to the attainment of all or any of the subjects specified in clauses (a) to (d)." Unlike the rules governing the old Board which en· a bled it to establish colleges outside Delhi for the

purpose of imparting higher education in the Unani and Ayurvedic systems of medicine, s. 7 gives the new Board powers and duties with regard to the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College at Delhi and

the pharma.ceutical institute and laboratory attached to it. This is made further clear by the definition of the word 'Board' in s. 2, incorporation section, namely, s. 3, constitution of the Board

as laid down in s. 4, and the sections relating to the power of the Chief Commissioner to supersede the Board, to make rules to carry out the objects of the Act and the power of the Board to make

regulations not inconsistent with the Act for carry- ing out the purposes thereof. None of the provi· sions of the impugned legislation excepting s. 9 to which we shall presently refer give the new Board

any powers or duties other than those connected with the college, attached pharmaceutical institute and laboratory, all situate in the Sta.te of Delhi. We now come to s. 9 which is in these terms:

"9. (1) As from the appointed day, the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, a society registered under the provisions of the Regis· tration of Societies Act, 1860, on the 12th

day of August, 1911, by the name Anjuman-i -Tibbia whose purpose, constitution and name was amended on 25th November, 1915, shall stand dissolved and all property, movable and immovable, and all rights, powers and privi-

leges of the said society which immediately before the appointed day belonged to or were vested in the said society shall vest in the Th.e Board of TJ'usfees, A;yurvedic and Unani Tibia

College, Delhi y, The State of Delhi S.K. Da.J. 19GJ 'flit n,,.uf uj T n11tr~s •. 1;-urt't'die attd L!11'l11i Tibia Collt_!tt, Delhi v. '[ht Statt of Dtlhi S. IC Dai J. IS4 SUPREME COl'RT REPORTs [l!JG2j SUPP.

Board and shall lie applied for the purposes for which the Roan) is eo;istitule<l. (2) .\s from the <1ppointc<l clay all <lcbts <111cl lialiilities of the 8aid HO<;ictv ~hall stn,n<l

t ran~forre<l a.nd <ttta<;hcd to tho Boar<l and thcrl'after lie dis<;harged and satisfictl hy the Board. (:I) ,\ny will, dcccl or other document wi1e· thcr ma<I<- or cxcc11t<!<l before or after the com-

mencement of thiH Act, which contains any be- quests gifts, or trust in favour of the said Hociety shall, as from the appointed day. be construed a11 if the Board were thncin name<l

instead of tho said Society." It 110 doubt says that all rights, po\\"<•rs am.I privi- leges which immediately before the appointc<l day I cluugcd tu or wcro vested in the ol<l Board shall

vci;t in the new Board; but it adds that those rights, ]JOWer8 an<l privileges shall Le applicable for the purposes for which the new Board is constituted. We must, therefore, reads. 9 as being subject to

the provisions of s. 7 of the Act. In tums s. 9 says that the rights, powers and privileges of the old Board .•hall be available t,o tlte new Board and Bhall be applied /01' the purposes for which the new Board iB

conatituted. The words un<ler-Jined are important, an<l show clearly enough that the right, powers an<l privileges of the old Board arc available to the new for a limited purpose only, namely, for the

purposes for which tho new lloar<l is «.onstituted. If the purposes for which tho uew lloar<l is constituto<l are confined to the institutions in Delhi, then obviously the objects for which the new Huard

is incorporated <lo not extencl beyond the State of Delhi. The conclusions at which we have 1urivcd may now be summarised &R followa: (1) On registration under tho Registration Act,

the old Board Societies <litl not (1) S.C.R. become a corporation in the sense of being incorporated within the meaning entry of List I ; it remained and continued to be an unincorporated society though under the

several provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 it had certain privileges, some of the privileges being analogous to those of corporation; (2) the impugned legislation while creating the

new Board has given it a corporate status, but has confined its powers and duties to the college, pharmaceutical institute and laboratory in Delhi and while giving the new Board rights, powers and

privileges of the old Board has limited them to such purposes for which the new Board is constituted; ( 3) the impugned legislation, therefore, falls under entry 32 of List II; so far as the dissolu-

tion of the old Board is concerned, under the second part of the entry and so far as incorporation of the new Board is concerned, under its first part. That being the position, the impugned legis-

lation was well within the legislative competenoo and power of the Delhi State Legislature. We must, therefore, overrule the first ground of attack urged on behalf of the petitioners.

We now proceed to a consideration of the second ground of attack. So far as the alleged violation of Art. 14 is concerned, the petitioners have stated in their petition : "'!'here are various other institutions …

where there have been actual allegations of mismanagement but the State has picked out the petitionAr. Aosuming, without admitting, that there has been mismanagement by the petitioner of its affairs, there is

not the slightest suggestion in the whole Act that it is promulgated on the ground of any mis- management on the part of the petitioner . .. . .. . .. . .. . The said Act is an arbitrary piece

of legislation and there is no reasonable Tile Boord of T rutttees, A,JU,.ueii.c anti VMni Tihi11 Colleg11, Dellai v. Thi Slate of Delhi S.K. DasJ. Tiu Ikard of 1"rwltt1, Ayutttdic

an• UMlli ·ribia C-Olltzt, Dtlhi v. Tiu Stou of Dtlhi S. Ii. D., J. classification whatsoever on which it can be supported." To this the reply of the respondents is that the old Board was grossly misman~ging it.a affairs

they said. "Before the said Act was passed, there was a great deal of discontent among the ~tudents of the said institution and also the general public and there was strong agitation

against gross mismanagement by the trustees of the said Board. That owing to the gross mismanagement of the Board's affairs by the trustees the situation had so deteriorated that early in

there were constant students' strikes, defalcation of funds and frequent interruption in work and studies of the institution." In our view the petitioners have not ma.de out any basis for the contention that (') there

were other institutions similarly situated, and (2) petitioner No. I was picked out for unequal treat- ment. Tho names of no other institutions similar- ly situated have been disclosed. In the first Shola-

pur case Chiranjit Lal Chowdhw·i v. The Uni<m of India(') it was held by a majority of Judges of this Court that even one corporation, (in our case one society) or a group of persons can be taken

as a class by itself for the purpose of legislation, provided it exhibits some exceptional features which arc not possessed by others. "The courts should prinUJ f acie lean in favour. of constitutionality and should sup-

port the legislation if it is possible to do so on any reasonable ground, and it is for the party who attacks the validity of the legisla- tion to place all materials before the court

which would go to show th11t the selection is arbitrary and unsupportable. Throwing out of vague hints that there may be other (I) [1950] S. C.R. 869, ~I~. 9lf. .._ (1) S.C.R. instances of similar nature is not enough for

this purpose". (per Mukherjea, J. at pp. 913-914 of the report. These observations apply with equal force to the present case and we are unable to sustain the contention of the petitioners that any

right under Art. 14 of the Constitution has been violated. As to Art. 31 of the Constitution it seems clear to us that cl. (2) of the said Article as it stood at the rel<want time ha.s no application.

The impu- gned legislation does not relate to nor does it provide for, compulsory acquisition of property for a public purpose. The impugned legislation provided for the transfer of the management of the

Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi, from the old Board to a new Board and for that pur- pose the old Board was dissolved and a new Board was created with certain rights, powers and pri-

vileges to be applied for the exercise of powers and performance of duties as laid down ins. 7 of'the Act. Such legislation does not fall under Art. 31(2) and cannot be judged by the tests laid down there-

in. As to cl. (1) of Art. 31 there is no, question of any violation of that clause if the law by which the transference of management has been made is valid law. We have already held that the impugned

legislation was well within the legislative compe- tence of the Delhi State Legislature. Now the question is-is the impugnl'd legislation bad on the ground that it violates the right of the petitioners

under Art. 19( l )( f)? The property for the protection of which Art. 19(l)(f) is invoked belonged either to the . Board or to the members composing the Board at the date of the dissolution. In either event, on

the terms of s. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the property was to be deemed to be vested in the governing body of the Board. There could be no doubt that if the Board was dissolved by

Th• Board of Trruttes, Ayur~tlic ani Unani Tiri• Colt.1e, Delhi v. Tkd State of Delhi S. IC. D.s J. IHI n,,soar••f ·1 TuJletJ, Ay1,,11et/i1 •n.J l.'1141fi 'Tiii• Collttr. Drllu v.

1·1u Sl•lt of Dt!hi S. K. Dos J. Sill'H.EME COURT REPoRTS (1962) SUPP. competent legislative action, am! iu view of our conclusions on the first point raised it must be held that thiH had taken place, the Board would cease to

exist and having ceased to exist cann0t obviously lay any claim to the property. This however may not be sufficient to negative the contention urged before us by the petitioners. If the legal owne1"8hip

of the property by the Board or the vesting of it in the governing body was merely a method or mechanism permitted by the law whereby the members exorcised their rights quoad tho property,

the dissolution of the Board and with it of the governing body thereof would merely result in the emergence of the right of the members to that property. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain

the precise rights the members of the Board possess· cd to see whether the changes effected by the impugned Act amount to an infringement of their rights within the meaning of Art. 19(l)(f). During

tho subsisten<',e of the society, the right of the members was to ensure that the property was utilised for the charitable objects set out in the memorandum and these did not include any beneficial enjoyment.

Nor did the members of tho society acquire any beneficial interest on the dissolution of the society; for s. 14 of the Act, quoted earlier, expres~ly nega· tived the right of tho mem hers to any distribution

of the assets of the dissolved body. In such an event the property had to he given over to some other society, i.e., for being mnnaged by some other charitable organisation and to be utilised for like

purposes, and the only right of tho members was to determine the society t.o whom the funds or property might be transferred and this had to be done by not less than three-fifths of the members present at the

meeting for the purpose and, in default of such determination, by the civil court. The effect of the impugned legislation is to vary or affect this privi- lege of the mem~•rs and to vest the property in a ;.

new body created by it enjoined to administer it so ai; to serve the same purposes as the dissolved (1) S.C.R. society. The only question is whether the right to determine the body which shall administer the

funds or property of the dissolved · society which they had under the pre-existing Jaw is a right to 'acquire, hold and dispose of property' withi,n the meaning of Art. l 9( I)( f), and if so whether the

legislation is not saved by Art. 19(5). We are clearly of the opinion that that right is not a right of property within the meaning of Art. 19( I )(f). In the context in which the words 'to dispose of' occur in

Art. 19(l)(f), they denote that kind of property whioh a citizen has a right to hold-the ri~ht to dispose of being part of or being incidental to the right to hold. Where however the citizen has no

right to hold the property, for on the terms of' s. 14 of the Societies Registration Act the members have no right to 'hold' the property of the disolved society, there is, in our opinion, no infringement of

any right to property within the meaning of Art. 19( I )(f). In this view, the question as to whether the impugned enactment satisfies the requirements of Art. 19(5) does not fall to be determined.

The two decisions on which the learned Advo- oate for the petitioners has relied are the State of Wut Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose (1) and Dwarkada8 Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning. & Weaving Oo.

Ltd.('). We do not think that these decisions have any applioa.tion in the present case. In the State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose(') this Court was considering a piece of legislation which affected

the right of the first respondent therein who had purchased a pa.rticular touzi at a revenue sale. As such purchaser he acquired under s. 37 of the Benge.I Revenue Sales Act, 1859, the right "to avoid and

awiul all under-tenures and forthwith to eject all under-tenant" with certain exceptions. In exercise of that right the respondent gave notices of ejeot- ment and brought a suit in 1946 to evict certain

tenants. The suit was decreed. When the appeal (I) [1954] S.C.ll. 587. (2) [J954] '!l. c. ll. 674, 1H1 n.B-dof T ru.sttu, A piitdie """ u..,,; r;n. Colkp, Delhi Tit. SJ.11 ef D1/hi

S. K. D•s J. T1u s.,,., •f Tnu tis, Ay.,o,die •4 U1101'.i Tihia Col/it•. D1lhi v. Tiu Stat1 of Dtilii B. K. Du J. 190 SUPREME OOURT REPOR~ (1962) SuPP. was pending, a new legislation was made which

took a.way the right of the first respondent which he had obtained by a decree of a court of law. In these circumstances it was held that the right of the first respondent under Art. 19(l)(f) was violated.

The facts of that case were wholly dissimilar and the respondent's right there did not depend on his being a. member of a society. In the second Shola- pur ease Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Stwlapur Spin-

ning &: Weaving Go. Ltd.(•) a Controller was appointed by Government to supervise the a.ff'airs of the mills of a certain company under the Essential Supplies Emergency Powt>rs Act, 1946. The ControllPr made

certain requisitions which the Directors refused to comply with. The Govemor·General then made an Ordinance which was followed by an Act. Under the provisions of the Ordina.nce the Central Govern-

ment d~legated all its powers to the Government of Bombay. The Government of Bombay then appointed certain Directors to take over the assets and management of the mills. These new Directors pa.seed a. resolution making

a call of Rs. 50/- on each of the preference shares payable at the time stated in the resolution. The appellent in that case was a preference shareholder who was called upon to pay Rs. 1,62,000/- in pur-

suaTJcc of the resolution aforesaid on the preference shares where which he held. The appellant then bro- ught a suit challenging the validity of the Ordinance and out of that suit appeal to this Court arose. It

was held by this Court that the impugned Ordinan- ce and the Act replacing it authorised in effect a deprivation of the property of the company with- in the meaning of Art. 31 without compenra.tion

and violated the fundament~I right of the appella- nt therein as a preference shareholder, who was oalled Up<.•n to pay the moneys unpaid on his shares. The point to be notioed a.s distinl!IJ.ishing that

oase from the case under our consideration is this (IJ (11154]5. C. ll. 6H. (1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., which was the company in that case, had not been dis-

solved or brought to an end by the impugned Ordinance or the Act replacing it and the appellant in that case · continued to be a preference · share- holder; not only did he continue to be a pret'erence

shareholder but he was called upon to pay the moneys unpaid on his shares. It is obvious, there- fore, that the appellant was entitled to complain that by the impugned Ordina.nce he was being

deprived of his property without fulfilling the requirements of Art. 31 of the Constitution. The position in the case under our consideration is, as pointed out already, entirely different.

In our view the impugned legislation does not violate any fundamental right of the petitioners under Arts. 14, 19 or 31 of the Constitution. This disposes of the two ma.in grounds on which

the legislation in question has been impugned. We now turn to the two subsidiary points. It has been argued that some of the provisions of the impugned Act are in conflict with the provisions

of the Societies Registration Act 1860 ; therefore under s. 22 of the ·Government of part C States Act, 1951 the provisions of the impugned Act, in so far as they are repugnant to tl\.e provisions of the

Societies Registration Act, 1860, must be held to be void.· The simple answer to this argument is thats. 22, to which we had earlier referred in the course of this judgment, has no application. Sec-

tion 22 provides for inconsistency between laws made by Parliament (in the sense in which the word 'Parliament' is used in the Constitution of India) and laws made by the Legislative Assembly

of a Part C State. The Societies Registration Act 1860 was not a law made by Parliament; the~efore s. 22 has no application in the present case. We have already held, for reasons earlier

given, that the Delhi State Legislature had legis- lative competence or power either to amend the The Board of Trustees, Ay11rvedic and Unani Tibia Co/left, Delhi v. The State of Dtlhi

S. K. D1.J. Jiil TluB-'•f TnuUu, Apr.Ji: ""' u-; T~c r..,1u1,, Drllti Tltt 81411 •f Delhi 8. IC. Das J. Societies Registration Act, 1860 in respect of unincorporated societies, or to make a law for a

particular unincorporated society, and even to create a new corporate body provided its objects were confined to the State of Delhi. In effect the impugned legislation provides for a disolution

or the old Board which waa an unincorporated society and for the creation of a new corporate body for the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibbi College, Delhi. In this view of the

matter, no question of any conflict with the Societies Registration Act, 1860 arises in this C&le. It has also bet>n argued that the impugned legislation is a piece of oolourable legislation beoo.use

the Delhi State Legislature acted mala fide in enacting it. This argument is completely answe- red by what this Court said in K. C. Gajapathi Narayan Dw v. The State of Oriasa ('). Thia Court

said: "It may be made clear at the outset that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona /ides or mala /ides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolyes itself into the

question of competency of a particular Legis- lature to enact a particn\ar law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it tO" act a.re

really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the legislature lacb competency, the question motives does not arise at all ………. If the constitution of a. State distributes the legis-

lative powers amongst different bodies, which have to a.ct within their respective spheres marked out by apecific legislativt> entries, or if there are limitations on the legislative

authority in the shape or fundamental rights, questions do ariae aa to whether the legis- lature in a particular case has or has not, in (I) [1954) S.C.R. I, 10. 11. (l) S.C.R. respect to the subject-matter of the statute

or in the method of enacting it, transgressed the limits of its constitutional powers. Such transgression may be pa.tent, manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of

cases that the expression "colourable legis- lation" has been applied Jin certain judicial pronouncements. The idea conveyed by the expression is that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported

to act within the limit~ of its powers, yet in _substance and in reality it transgressed these powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise."

From what we have said earlier it should be manifestly clea.r that the Delhi State Legislature did not transgress any of the limitations placed on it, when it enacted the impugned legislation. There

being no transgress whatsoever, the further ques- tion of the transgression being veiled by a disguise or pretence does not really arise. Nor is it necessary for us to enquire into the motives which

led the Delhi State Legislature to enact the impu- gned legislation. In the affida.vi.ts filed on behalf of the respondents enough materials have been placed to show why the Delhi State Legislature

considered it necessary to dissolve the old Board and transfer the management of the college to a new Board. This was a matter for the Legis- lature to consider and not for this Court to investi-

gate. In the result we hold that there is no merit in the petition whioh is accordingly dismissed with costs. MUDHOLKAR, J.-While I agree with my brother Da• J., that the petition be dismissed I

would like to say a few words. This petition under ~· 32 of thti Constitution haa been preferred by Th.Board of Trustees, Apwdie and Unani Tibia Collete, Delhi Th. Sta« of Dtlhi S.K. DasJ.

Mo4Mlkar J. Tho B""d of Trusl/11, Ayurtitdic Unani Tibia Colftgt. Dtlhi v. Tht Stott of Dtlhi Afudho/km J. 194 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP. the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedio and Unani Tibia

College, through its Secretary, Hakim Mohammad Jamil Khan. B.v Act 5 of 1952 called thfl Tibia College Act, 19.52 the erstwhile Delhi State Legislative Assembly dissolved the Board of Trustees of the

Ayurvcdic and Unani Tibia College, incorporated a Roard called 'Tibia1Col!ege Board' and transferr· ed to that Board all the property, rights, powers and privileges of the Board of Trustees of the

Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College as also the management and control of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College to the aforesaid Board. The reason for doing so would appear from the State-

ment of objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which are as follows : "This Bill seeks to take powers for transferring the management of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi, from its present trustees to a Board

under the control of the Delhi State Government. The College has been grossly mismanaged for some time past with the result that its reputation is very low today. In early 1949, the situation deteriorat-

ed to such an extent that there were students strikes, defalcation of funds and frequent interrup- tions in scholastiC work. The Collector, Delhi made an interim prayer to the Civil Court for the

appointment of receivers. This prayer was granted ~.nd three receivers appointed by the Civil Court are at present in charge of the properties and management of the institution. This arrangement,

which is good so far as it goes, is inevitably tempor- ary and inadequate, and it seems desirable to provide by legislation for the control and manage- ment of the College and the properties attached

thereto.'' (Statement of Objects and Reasons published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, s. 2, July 18, 1952). The petitioner's complaint is tha,t its property has been taken may without componsation and

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS handed over to a Board in contravention of Art. 31 of the Constitution and that this has been done under a law which the Delhi legislature was not

competent to make. The following four contentions were raised by Mr. Purshotta.m Trikamdas on behalf of the petitioner. II) That the Delhi Legislative Assembly was not competent to pass the impugned Act.

(2) Even assuming that it had legislative competence the Act offends Arts. 14, 19 and 31. (3) The Societies Registration Act under which the Board of Trustees were registered being a Central Act the Delhi legislative

assembly had no power to over-ride it. (4) The law was enacted by the legisla- ture mala. /ide. I will confine my observations mainly to the first and third points because, it is only with regard

to them that my view is somewhat different from that taken by my learned brother. The respondents point out that the petitioner Board having been registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. is nothing more than an

unincorporated society and that the ;Delhi State legislature was competent to enact a law affecting it under the latter part of Entry 32 of List II which runs thus: " …………………. unincorporated trading,

literary, scientific, religious and other societ- ies and associations; co-operative societies". According, however, to Mr. Purshottam, after the BOl}rd of Trustees was registered as a Society

under the Societies Registration Aot it blossomed into a corporation and since admittedly its objects extend beyond the limits of the Delhi State th., State Assembly could not make any law affecting

The Board of Trusle1s, Ayurwdie and Un~ni Tibia College, Delhi T7ie St.ie of Delhi M udho/kar J, !961 TM Bo<nd of Trusltts, A)1ln11dic and UncnJ Tibia Colltgt, Dtlhi v. 11it Stu/t of D1tl1i

Mudl1o:J.:ar J, SUPREML COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. it. Thi.a contention has been negatived by my learn. ed brother. An alternati\•c contention was also raised on b..Jialf of the petitioner on the basis of

certain decisions and my opinic•n in Servants of India Society, l'omw v. 'l'he Charity Commi&Bioner of liombay e) to the effect that upon registration the Board Lecamo at least a quasi-corporation.

This contention has also been negatived by my ll'arncd brother. If, as tbe petitioner S.'\YH the Board, after registro ti on undu the Societies H.Pgistration Act, I 8fl0 was transformed into a corporation the Delhi

LPgislative assembly could not make a law with rcspr:ct tu it under Entry 32 because though under the firRt part thereof it can make a law affecting corporations, its powers Cll!lnot reach a corporation,

the objects of which extend beyond the limits of the Delhi State. But as mv learned brother baa pointed out. and with which I respPctfully agree, the essence of a corporation is its 'incorporation'

and as the Societies Registration Act does not provide for incorporation the petitioner cannot be regarded as a corporation. It is true that even though it possesses some of the attributes of a cor-

poration it is not a corporation but in my view it ia a 'near corporation' or a'quasi-corporation'. This is what I have held in the Sermnls of India Society's case(') and I adhere to that view. There, relying

on some Indian decision and the decision in The 'l'nff I' ale Rni/?my Co. v. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Sen·ant.~('l, I held that such a society is a legal entity and that a State legislature cannot

make 1my law affer.ting it under the second part oC Entry 32 of Li>t JI. Th" question whether a re- gistered society which enjoyed more or less the same powers as those under the Societies Registra-

tion Act is a legal entity fell for consideration by the House of Lords in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union(•) and there Lords Morton and Parker held that (I) (1960, 63 Born. L.R. 379, 381.

(2) [1901] A.C. 426. (3) [1956] A. C. 104. (1) S.C.R. such a society is a legal entity though not a. corpo· ration and thus accepted the position that there is a.n intermediate semi-corporation status.

Lord Keith held that such a society is both a legal entity and association of individuals, that is, it is a quasi-corporation to the extent recognized by the governing statute and a voluntary association for

other purposes. Lords McDermott and Somervell, however, did not accept the position that there is any intermediate semi-corporate status at all. With respect, I think that the view taken by the

majority has much to commend itself. That this is the better view is the opinion of Prof. Dennis Lloyd (vide 1956 M. L. R. at p. 360) and of Dr. Glanville Willia.ms (vide Salmond's Jurisprudence,

1957 ed. p. 356). I have not come across a contrary opinion· in any recent treatise or article. Now, under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which was enacted by the Governor General

in Council upon registration a society is entitled to sue and ca.n be sued in the name of its President, Secretary etc., as shall he determined by its rules or by its governing body. A suit by or against the

society would not abate by reason of the death of the person through whom or against whom the suit had been brought. A judgment obtained against a person sued as representing a society shall not be

enforced against him but against the. property of the 1ooiety. The society can sue any of its members for arrear of subscription, damages etc. It can also enter into contra.eta as an entity. Upon dis-

solution, its property cannot be distributed amongst its members but must go to some other sooiety. All these are the characteristics of a separate legal entity such as a corporation. If the law confers

on a body all the normal powers of a legit! person it will be a corporation in all but name. A regis- tered society, however, cannot hold property and tv that extent it must be treated as a voluntary

The Boarr/ of Trusties, Ayurvedic and Untmi Tibia College, Delhi y: The State of Delhi M udholkar J. Tly Board of TrUJUtJ, AJU1vttlic tsnd Unani -ribia Colltge, D1/hi Thi Siau of Delhi

M udMIJ;,,, J • l9S SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS (Ig62) SUPP. association, made up of its constituents. Therefore, it can be regarded as a. quasi-corporation or, in the words of Lords Morton and Porter, a "near-corpo-

ration". Now, a quasi-corporation or a near corporation-whatever we may call itr-being a legal entity at least for some purposes is not a mere soci11ty made up of its constituents.

Tho question, therefore, must be considered whether the latttir pa.rt of Entry 32 confers power on the State legislature to le~islate about 'legal entities.' Let us consider the scope of the latter

part of Entry 32. It permits the making of laws concerning societies and associations which are not incorporated. This would imply that thereunder the legislature cannot provide for the 'incorpora-

tion' of a society or association. Ono of tho main results of incorpor·1tion is to confer upon the thing incorporated the status of a separate legal entity. Even so, under this Entry the legislature has a.

wide discretion in the matter of conferral of powers upon a. society. Hut can it confer such powers on it as would alter its character a.s a. society and convert it into a legal entity, may be only f.1r certain

purposes? By its very definition a society is a voluntary association and can have no existence separate from its constituents. It is thus not a separate legal entity in any sense and for any

purpose. That Entry makes it clear by using the word 'uninoorporated', that the power conferred by it is confined to such societies and associations only. 1"herefore, in my judgment the Entry does

not permit of any law being made which confers on a 1100iety such powers as would constitute it into a legal entity. A fortiorari, it does not permit a law to be made which takes away from

11. society already existing and which is a legal entity any of the powers of that legal entity, such as those con- ferred by the Societies Registration Act, 1860, much less can it destroy that entity. For doing so it

will have to take the aid of other entries, if any, which permit legiijlation concerning !<>gal en tit irs. t (l)S.C.R. The Board, as already stated, was registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. That was

a law made by the Indian legislature under 24 & 25 Viet. ch. 67 passed in the year 1860. That law conferred the power to make laws for the whole of British India on the Governor-General-in-CounPil

the ambit of whose power is set out in s. 22 which runs thus: "'!'he Governor General in Council shall have Power at Meetings for the Purpose of making Laws and Regulations as aforesaid,

and subject to the Provisions herein contained, to make Laws and Regulations for repealing, amending, or altering any Laws or Regulations whatever,now in force or hereafter to be in force

the Indian Territories now under the Dominion of Her Majesty, and to make Laws and Regu- lations for all Persons, Whether British or Native, Foreigners or others, and for all Courts of Justice whatever, and for all Places

and Things whatever within the said Terri- tories, and for all Servants of the Government of India within the Uominions of Princes and States in Alliance with Her Majesty; and the

Laws and Regulations so to be made by the Governor General in Council shall control and supersede and Laws and Regulations in any- wise repugnant thereto which shall have been made prior thereto by the Governors of the

Presidencies of Fort Saint George and Bombay respectively in Council, or the Governor or Lieutenant Governor in Uounoil of any Presi- dency or other territory for which a Council may be appointed, with Power to make Laws

and Regulations, under and by virtue of this Aot: Provided always, that the said Governor General in Council shall not have the power of making any Laws or Regulations which shall repeal or in any way a:tfect any of the

Provisions of thil! Act: The Board of Trustees, Ayurvei:lic – and Unani Tibia· Colkgt, Delhi v. The Stale of Delhi M udholkar J. ThrBoadof Trwtees, AflD'1Jtdic ad UfllJlli Tibia Co/Irv, Delhi

T/,, St41t of Dr/hi MuJiw/k#r J. Or any of the Provisions of the Acts of the Third itnd l<'ourth Years of King William the Fourth, Chapter Eighty-five and the Sixteenth and Seventeenth

Yea.rs of Her Majesty, Chapter Ninety-five, and of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Years of Hor Majesty, Chapter Seventy-seven, which after tho paBBing of this Act shidl remain in force:

Or any Provisions of the Act of the Twenty-first and Twonty-second Years of Hor Majesty, Chapter One Hundred and Six entitl- ed An Act for the better Government of India; or of the Act of the Twenty-second and

Twenty-third years of Her Majesty, Chapter Forty-one, to amend the same: Or of any Act enabling the Secretary of State in Council to raise Money in the United Kingdom for the Government of India: Or of the Acts for

punishing Mutiny and Desertion in Her Majesty's Army or in Her Majesty's Indian Forces respectively; hut subject to the Provi- sion e;ontained in the Act of tho Third and Fourth Years of King William the Fourth,

Chapter Eighty-five, Section Seventy-three, respecting the Indian Articles of War: Or any Provisions of any Act paBSed in this present SeBBion of Parliament, or here- after to be passed, in anywise affecting Her

Majesty's India.n Territories, or the Inhabitant8 thereof: Or which may affect the Authority of Parliament, or the Constitution and Rights of the East India Company, or any Part of the

unwritten Laws or Constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain a.nd Ireland, where- on may depend in any Degree the Allegiance of any Person to the Crown of the United Kingdom, or the Sovereignty or Dominion of

the Crown over any Part of the said Terri- tories." (l) S.C.R. This clearly shows that the Governor General in Council was unhampered in the matter of making laws by any legislative lists and thus

enjoyed plenary powers to make any klnd of law on every conceivable topic whioh did not fall 'Yit~in the excepted categories. Within the sphere of .bis powers the Governor General in Council was and

could consequently make a law conferring upon a society such powers as could transform it into a legal entity either for all purposes or only some. If he chose to confer all the powers of a corporation

upon a registered society, that society would become a corporation in all but a name. The position of the State legislature in the matter of making laws is not the same as .that of

the Governor General in Council under the statute of 1860. For, though it enjoys no less plenary powers than the Governor General in Council, its spheres of legislation are restricted by the legisla-

tive lists and it cannot overstep them by doing something directly which is patently outside Lists II and III. The only entry in List II on which reliance was placed on behalf of the respondents as conferr-

ing power on th'e Delhi legislature to make the impugned law is the latter part of Entry 32, List II. That entry speaks of societies, that is, of asso- ciations of individuals as distinct from' a legal

entity, from that which has a separate legal exis- tence. Ail association has no such separate exis· tence, that is, none apart from its members. That entry, therefore, cculd not furnish the Delhi legis.

lature with the power to. make a law affecting a separate legal entity such as the petitioner. Section 9 of the impugned Act dissolved the petitioner, a legal entity and transfers its property, rights

etc., to a corporation cre.ited by it. Thus it deals with a legal entity and the rights of that entity. This is wholly outside the ambit of the latter part of Entry 32. It would have bOOD

lHl TluB-d•f Trustees, A)'&1n11dit .nd UM.JO 7';6;. C.ll•I'• Ddlti v. Tiu 8ta11 of D•lhi M """""'1r J, Jllfl ·r1u Bo.rd •f T nultts, A_1111l'tiic and UU11i Ti1'i• Col/ere. Delhi Tht Bi.te of Del/ii

lluiMl/w J. 202 f:>UPltEME COURT REPORTS (1962) SUPP. possible for the state legislature to resort to the first part of that Entry had the object of the society been limited to the Delhi state but, as already

stated, the objects extent beyond. the Delhi State. The reason why I think it would have been pos· sible is that the entry is not restricted to 'incorpo- ration' of a corporation but deals also with the

regulation or winding up of a corporation-which would include a qu&ai-corpora.tion or any other fictitious legal porson, and further because the ell8ence of winding up ca.n be no different from that

of dissolution. No doubt, ours is a. federal constitution and the legislative fields of Parliament and of the state logisla.turee a.re demarcated, In addition wo have a concurrent field in wl:ich Parliament's legisla.tivo

power is exercisable and, subject to certain con di· tions, also that of the state legislatures. But even so, there is a certain amount of overlapping in the entries in the three lists pertaining to these throe

legislative fields. Therefore, when a. law is challenged on the ground of legislative competence what one h&a to ascertain is its pith and substance. It is well aettlod that if in pith and substance it is

found that tho legislature could make that law under a particular entry, the mere fa.ct that it incidentally trenches upou somo othor ontry, not pertaining to the legislation, it cannot be struck

down as being beyond the compotcnco of the legislature which made it. For finding out its pith and substance, let us examine the Act. It is comprised of 16 sections. Section 3 deals with the incorporation of the Tibia

College Board and transferring to it the manage- ment and control of the Tibia College vested in the petitioner-board. Section 9 deals with the dissolu· tion and transfer of property of the Board of

Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College Delhi to the Tibia College Board and the remaining sections deal with incidental matters suoh as tll s.c.R. definitions, constitution of the Board, powers of

the Board and so on. One of the conclusions rea.ohed by my leamed brother is that so far ac the diuJolution of the old Board is concerned the impugned law falls under the second part of Entry 32 and so far u the incorpo-

ration of the new Board is concernEld under its first part. It may be that a legislature may eeek to derive its powers to enact a law oonoerning different topics from various entries in its legisla-

tive List. But this aspect of & legislature's power has no significance when, in a divided jurisdiction its law is challenged on the ground of encrouchment on a field not open to it. The question which would

then ariee for consideration would be 'what is the pith and substance of the law?' The degree of encroachment made by it on another field would be a guide for ascertaining its pith and substance.

Here the impugned Act is aimed at dissolving the petitioner-Boa.rd and transferring &II its property, rights etc. No doubt, the transfer is to be in favour of a corporation created by the Ac~. No

doubt also, that most of the provisions of th" Act, apart from ss. 3 and 9, deal exclu1ively with matters pertaining to the newly created entity. But looking to the preamble a& well as ss. 3 and 9

of the Act, the creation of "' new Board and its incorporation is not the pith and substance of the Act. The sole reason for its creation is to transfer to it what was, till then, with the petitioner-Board.

The new Board was thus to serve only a conse- quentia J purpose and its incorporation cannot be said to be the pith and substance of the impugned Act. The activitie:; of the petitioner were not con-

fined to the state of Delhi. That Act cannot, there fore, be sustained by reference to the first part of Entry 32. The pith and substance of the law being the dissolution of the petitioner Board, a legal

entity, and transference of its property and rights to someone else, it cannot be sustained by reference to the power conferred by the latter part o( Entry 32. I#t Tiu BHTI ef T nulus. .4. .JWV'i"re

.. 1u-i Title C.lle11, Dllhi v. Thi St<11 •/ Dtllri NlliAl/ka .T, llill Tiol lJfHUd of Ttust1ts, Ayurl:1tlic a11i Uttani Tihi1 Cill111, Dtlhi TIM Stot< of Delhi M aJ/iolJ.<r J. 204 SUPREMli: COURT Rli:PORTS [1962] SUPP.

.!<'or sustaining the law the learned Solicitor General had placed relience al.so on Entries IO and 28 of List II I. What we have to see, therefore, is whethrr the impugned law could be made by the

Delhi legislature under these entril's . It is not disputed that the Petitioner-Board is a trustee. It is also clear from the objects with which the trust was established, (which have been

set out in the judgment of my learned brother) that it was for a charita hie purpose. The petitioner is, therefore, a charitable trust and the object of the law is to dissolve it and transfer its property etc.

Entries 10 and 28 of List III run thus: Entry 10: "Trust and Trustees". Entry 28: "Charities and charitable in.stitutions, charitable and religious endowments and religious institutions".

The entries are not limited to trusts or charitable institutions which are 'uninoorporated societies' as is the latter part of Entry 32 of List II. Entry 10 clearly permits a law being made with regard to

a trust or trustee which is a separate legal entity. Similarly Entry 32 permits a law to be made affect- ing charities and charitable institutions of every kind, whether consisting of voluntary associations

of individuals or having a corporate or semi- corporate character. l<'or, institutions may have a corporate or a l!tlmi-corporate character as for instance Hindu religious endowments and these are

plainly included in the Iatt.er Entry. The Delhi legislature had, therefore, competence to make a law dissolving a charitable trust and transferring its property, rights etc., to another institution.

'l'he aforese.id two entries permit making a law of this kind. No doubt these · entries are in the concurrent field but since the impugned Act was reserved for the assent of the President and was

assented to by him on September 12, 1952, it (1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS cannot be called in question on the ground of repug- nancy with an 'existing law' or a law made by Parliament.

I agree with the view taken by my learned brother on the second and the fourth points· 'urged by Mr. Purshottam and have nothing to add. As regards the third point the•argurnent on

behalf of the petitioner is that's. 22 of,the Govern- ment of Part C States Act, 1951 (which created a legislature for the Delhi State, t.hen a Part C State) precluded the Delhi legislature from enacting a law

repugnant to an Act of Parliament and that as the impugned Act contains provisions which are repugnant to those of the Societies Regi~tration Art 1860, it is ultra vires. Apart from the fact that

what s. 22 prohibits is a repugnancy with a law made by Parliament itself-the Societies Registration Act is not one of such laws-the argument does not really arise upon the view I have taken. The

petitioner-Board upon Registration under that Act became a quasi-corporation a.nd thus a separate legal entity. Even though it owed its existence to the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, the

Delhi legislature was free to deal with it under its powers under List III bec!l.use by doing so it did not enaot a law repugnant to ~he .provisions of the Societies Registration Act. That Act still retains its

full force and rigour apd is unaffected by the impu· gned Act. The petitioner-Board may, by operation of the impugned law, not be able to exercise any of its powers under the Societies Registration Act but

that would be not because the provisions of that law are abrogated in any sense but because the petitioner-Board has ceased to exist as a legal entity. The argument must,.therefore, be rejected.

The petition ia, therefore, diamiSBed with cost8. Petition dismiased. –"– IP61 'Ile IJ041d of Trustttr, .A)'flTlJtdk and Uru.ni Tlbia Collett, Delhi v. The St.le of D1:hi Mudholkor J.