S.C.R. THE REKRARIA COTTON MILLS LTD. v. THE STATE OF BOMBAY. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VrVIAN BosE and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.] Essential Supplies Act (XXIV of 1946), ss. 7, 9–Notification requiring manufacturers to submit tru,e and accurate information– "Delivery", meaning of-Possession of del credere (JJJent-Whether possession uf seller-Delivery to such (JJJent, effect of-Penal statutes -Liberal constrnction.
A Government Notification issued under the Essential Sup- plies Act, 1946, required every manufacturer to submit "true and accurate information relating to his undertakings'' and a note on the printed form stated that "by 'delivered' or 'delivery' is meant physical deli very of cloth in bales and pieces but not cloth which, though paid for, is still in the physical possession of the seller." The appellant Mills were manufacture"s of cloth and D.K. & Co. were their sole del credere selling agents who guaranteed payment to the appellant of the price of all sales made and, on the other side, guaranteed delivery <<l.J;.b.e purchasers with whom they dealt direct. One D.:11. informed1'!1o \fills as the agent of an up-country quota-holder that be had been authorised by the latter to take deli- very of 13 bales and on this account paid Rs. 14,000 to D.K. & Co. D.K. & Co. wrote to the Mills that they bad received payment. The ;\fills despatched the goods to D.M. but meanwhile the quota- holder had changed his agent and D.M. refused to take delivery. The Mills credited the money which had been received from D.M. to D.K. & Co. and advised D. K. & Co. to keep the goods in a certain godown till the question of delivery was settled. In a return submitted under the Essential Supplies Act, 1946, these 13 bales ivere shown as "delivered" to D. K. & Co.
The appellants were prosecuted and convicted on the ground that physical deli· very was not given to D.K. & Co. and ohe return was not there- fore true and accurate : Held, that, as the goods had left the Mill premises, the price had been paid and the property in them bad passed and as they were in a godown under the control of D. K. & Co., D. K. & Co. were in the circumstances, the persons to whom the goods were actually delivered and the conviction was illegal.
A del creclere agent is an agent of the seller only np to a -point. Beyond that he is either a principal or an agent of the buyer. In a penal statute it is the duty of the Court to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad an<l liberal sense.
March 30 i'il~PREME COURT REPORTS [1953] CRBHNAI, APPELLATE ,JURISDICTION: Criminal Th r /.,'e J.:~a ri'r1 Gofton .11il!s Ltd. Appeal No. 61 of 1952. Appeal by special leave granted by the Supreme
Court on the 10th September, 1951, from the Judg- ment and Order dated the .5th March, 1951, of the High Court of .Judicature a.t Bombay (Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 394 of 1950 aris-
ing out of the Judgment and OrrlPr dated the 29th May, 1950, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Second Court, Mazagaon, Bombay, in Cases Nos. 630/P and li35 /P of 1949. v.
The State of Bombay. 111. P. Amin (R . .!. Kolah, with him) for appel- lants Nos. l, 2 and 4 … A. K. Jluthuswmni for appellant No. 3. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus
A. ]V[ ehta, with him) for the respondent. 1953. March 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-The appellants have been convicted under sections 7 and 9 of the Essential Supplies Act (No.
XXIV of 1946) on two counts. The first appellant is a registered joint stock company, the Seksaria Mills Ltd. It was fined Rs. 10,000 on each of the two counts, that is to say, a total fine of Rs. 20,000, and this
was upheld in appeal. The second appellant is the Director of the Mills. He was sentenced to two months' rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 2,00,000 on each count. In appeal the sentence of imprisonment
was set aside and the fine reduced to Rs. 10,000 on each count. The third appellant is the General Manager of the Mills. He was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 2,000 on each count. This has been upheld. The
fourth appellant is the Sales Manager of the Mills. He was sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 on each count. In appeal the sentence of imprisonment was upheld but the fine was
reduced to Rs. 10,000 on each count. The substantive sentences are to run concurrently. S.C.R. A Goverqment of India Notification dated 2nd February, 1946, required every manufacturer to
b 't "t d · f t' 1 t' t h' The !:iekMria su m1 . rue, an accurate ill orma :10!1 re a mg o is Cotton Mill, Ltd. undertakmgs ' to the Textile Commrns10ner C.S.T. Sec- v. tion at Bombay. In compliance with this Order the
The State of first appellant submitted a return, signed by the third Bontbay. appellant, on 10th March, 1947. This return is Exhi- bit A-1. It showed that 13 bales of cloth (20 half
bales and 3 full bales) were delivered to Messrs. Dwar- kadas Khetan & Company of Bombay during the month of February, 1947, on behalf of the quota- holder Shroe Kishan & Company. Another return of
the same date (Exhibit A-2), also relating to the month of February, 1947, showed that 6 bales were delivered to the same Dwarkadas Khetan & Com- pany on behalf of another quota-holder Beharilal
Hairathi. A note on the back of each printed form states — " By ' delivered ' or ' delivery ' is meant physical delivery of cloth in bales or in pieces but not cloth which though paid for is still in the physical posses-
sion of the seller." The offence charged is that this information is not true and accurate. The case for tho prosecution is that the bales remained in the physical possession of the
first appellant at all material times and were not physically delivered to Messrs. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company. Before us the learned i'.lolicitor-General added that even if there was physical delivery to Dwarkadas
Khetan that did not comply with the requirements of the form because the form requires information regard- ing physical delivery to the quota-holder or his agent and as Dwarkadas Khetan was not the agent of the
quota-holder, the .statement is inaccurate and mis- leading. The learned Presidency Magistrate who tried the case, and also the High Court on appeal, hold that the proRecution have established their cas0 and so have
convicted and upheld the convietions respectively. BoscJ. ll953J The business procedure of the first. appellant is explained by Dwarkadas Khetan. His firm, Dwark11- The S eksaria d
JTh & C h fi ,,.11 Ltd as ·'- etan ompany, are t e rst a ppe ant s ottonJ.ui v. sole sellmg agents. They are del credere agents 1'hc Stntcof and guarantee payment to the first appellant of all Bombay.
saks made· and, on the other side, guarantee delivery BoseJ. to the purch~isers with whou1 they deal direct. It is necessary at this stage to understand that because of various orders and rules made under the Essential
Supplies Act the first appellant could only sell to specified quota-holders and only up to the limits of their quotas. The two quota-holders which concern us are Shree Kishan & Company and Beharilal Bairathi.
The first appellant's selling procedure is this. When goods are ready for sale, it sends Dwarkadas Khetan & Company in duplicate a, " ready sale note ". These notes contain particulars about the bales and the
persons to whom they are to be delivered. Upon receipt of this Dwarkadas & Company contact the quota- holders or their agents. The next step is for the quota-holder to pay Dwarka-
das & Company the price of the goods specified in the "ready sale note". Upon receipt of the money, one of the two notes is handed over to the quota-holder or his agent and he is given a receipt for the money paid. At
the same time Dwarkada.s & Company send the first appellant an "advice slip " telling it that the money has been received and asking it to prepare a delivery order. The first appella.nt then debits Dwarkadas &
Company with the price and not the purchaser. For payment it looks to Dwarkadas & Company. Upon receipt of this advice slip the first appellant's office prepares tho delivery order and delivers the
goods to the party concerned. The person receiving the goods then signs the deli very order in token of receipt and the signed order is sent to Dwai·kadas & Company who, after making the necessary entries in their books,
return the order to the Mills office. It will be seen that the first appellant has no direct dealings with the purchaser. It acts through Dwarka- das & Company in every case. S.C.R.
SUPRE~iE CODHT REPOHTS It will now b,e necessary to trace the history of the two consignments relating to the 13 bales and the 6 bales separately. We will deal with the 13 bales first.
The 8eksariu ('otton .1..ltills Ltd. The quota-holder in respect of the 13 bales was Shree Kishan & Company. This firm was an up-country firm and so it was necessary for it to appoint a local agent
in Bombay for making payments and receiving deli- very. There was some confusion about the agent so appointed ; at first one Dharsi Moolji was appointed and then P. C. Vora. The letter informing the first
appellant that Dharsi Moolji bad been appointed is not on record but we were told at the Bar that it is not disputed that the letter is dated 7th February, 194 7. In any case, Dharsi Moolji wrote to the
first appellant on 20th February, 1947, saying that he had been authorised to take delivery of the January quota on behalf of Messrs. Shree Kishan & Company and on 21st February, 1947, he paid Dwarka-
das Khetan & Company a sum of Rs. 14,000 for this quota. A receipt and an entry in Dwarkadas' books evidence the payment. The same day Dwarkadas Khetan wrote to the first appellant telling it that his firm had received payment
in advance from Shree Kishan & ('ompany and that the 13 bales should be sent to "our godown ", Whether the "our " refers to Dwarkadas' godown or to a godown jointly shared between Dwarkadas and
the first appellant is not clear. The learned High Court Judges hold that the godown belonged to the first appellant, but that, in our opinion, is not very material for reasons we shall give later.
On receipt of this "advice slip" the first appellant prepared what it has called a " ready sale note " on the same day, 21st February, 1947, authorising the purchaser to take delivery within a week. Dharsi
Moolji was named as the Commission Agent. (The man now entered is Prataprai Chunilal, that is, P. C. Vora, but the original name was Dharsi l\foolji. The change was made for reasons which will presently appear).
v. The State of Boil/bay. Bo8eJ. SVPitEM.E COURT REPORTS [1953] 19JJ In pursuance of all this, the first appellant despatch- ed the 13 bales on 28th February, 1947, and sent them The Seharia t Dh
· u l" · B t · th h"l th t Cotton Mills Ltd. o ars1 lvJ.OO JI. u m e meanw 1 e o er even s v. had taken place. One P. C. Vora wrote to the first The State of appellant on 17th February, 1947, and said that he Bombay.
had been authorised to take possession of these 13 bales. Bose J, \Vhat had happened in the meanwhile was that the quota-holder Shree Kishan & Company had changed its local agent. Accordingly, when the goods reached
Dharsi l\ioolji he refused to take delivery. The selling agent Dwarkadas th\)reupon telephoned the first appellant. He explained that he h.ad actually received the money for the bales from Dharsi l\ioolji a,nd had
not received anything from P. C. Vora and so could not deliver the goods to the latter and equally could not accept money from P. C. Vora until the matter had been straightened out with Dharsi Moolji. The
first appellant thereupon told Dwarkadas to keep the goods in the Dady Seth godown. On the same day, apparently before all this occmred, the first appellant credited Dwarkadas Khetan with the monev he
had received from Dharsi Moolji on accom~t of the 13 bales, less Dwarkadas' commission. In other words, this adjustment in the accounts was the equivalent of payment for the 13 bales by Dwar-
kadas Khetan to the first appellant on account of the purchaser Shree Kislmn & Company. It will be remembered that Dwarkadas Khetan & Company were the sole soiling agents and they alone were responsible
to the l\fills for orders which were placed through them. The muddle between Dharsi .iVIoolji and P. C. Vora was cleared up between 3rd l\farch, 1947, and 14th March, 1947. On 3rd March, 1947, Dwarkadas
Khetan returned the Rs. 14-,000 which Dharsi Moolji had paid and on 14th l\farch, 1947, al·ccpted the money from P. C. Yorn. The alteration in the "ready sale note" of 21st February, 1947, was presumably
made because of these facts. Four davs later, Dwar- kadas Khetan delivered the goods to P. C. Vora. (There was no need to make any alterations in the first 8.C.R. appellant's account books because Dwarkadas was
responsible for the price whatever happened between him and Dharsi and alw because in any event the Go~~:, s:i~;;;r~d. goods were sold to Shree Kishan: the only query at that v. time was who was his agent to accept delivery for him).
'l'he State of The return with which we are concerned was made on 10th March, 1947. It will be seen from the above that the position at that date was as follows: ( l) the selling agent had informed the first appellant that he
had effected a sale, (2) the selling agent had paid the first appellant for the goods, (3) specific bales had been set aside and appropriated to the sale and consequent- ly the property in the goods had passed,
(4) the goods had actually left the Mills' premises, and (5) they were in the Dady Seth godown under the control of Dwarkadas Khetan. vVe say the goods were under the control of Dwarka-
das Khetan for three reasons~ ( 1) as shown above, the property in the goods had passed and so the first app~lant no longer had title to them, (2) Dwarkadas says that until he received the money for them from
P. C. Vora he would have refused to deliver them, (3) being a del credere agent he would have been within his rights (a) to refuse delivery to anybody till he was paid and (li) to deliver them despite anything the first
appellant might say once he received his money; also because Dwarkadas' Mehtaji says- "If the goods are not accepted by the merchants or their agents, the same arc sent to ns and we keep them
in the godown." Bearing these facts in mind, we will now examine the offending document. It is a printed form. The heading is- – "Manufacturer's Returns showing details of delivery
to quota-holders or others of civil cloth." Then there is a note as follows : "IMPORTANT :-This form should be completed in accordance with the instructions printed overleaf …………….. giving full details relating to the previo11& month."
Bambay. ]Jose J. (1953] 1.9.;., Under that is the following- The Seksarin "~11 stocks pledged/hypoth~cated.b:;: mar:ufactu- Cotton Mills Ltd. rers with banks or others shall be mcluded m this state- ment."
The State ~f The only column in the printed form which could be Bombay. related to this is column 3 headed" Full name and ad- Bo" J. dress of person to whom delivered." On the back there
i\re the following instructions:- " II. The word ' others ' in the heading of the form includes artificers who are privileged to purehase cloth under General Permission No. TCS 42 /1, dated
10th August, 1944, and any person to whom deliveries are made under any other General or Special Permis- sion or Order of the Textile Commissioner. The name of artificers or any other persons shall be men-
tioned in column 3 and B,gainst their names, number and date of General or 8pecial Permission shall be men- tioned in column 2. III. By 'delivered' or 'delivery' is meilnt physical
delivery of cloth in bales or in pieces but not cloth which, though paid for, is still in the physical possession of the seller. " The form was filled in as follows : In the column
headed "Full name and address of quota-holder" the name of Shree Kishan & Company is entered. In the column headed " Full name and address of person to whom delivered " the name of Dwarkadils Khetan &
Company is entered. The question we have to decide ·is whether these two entries are inaccurate. Dealing first with the learned Solicitor-General's argument regarding the construction of the words used
in the form, we are of opinion that it cannot be accept- ed. The second clause of the portion marked "Import- ant" towards the head of the form states that all stocks pledged or hypothecated with banks or others
must also be included, and Instruction No. II on the back directs that the names of "any other person" must be entered in column 3 and that the number and date of the General or Special Permission must be set
out in column 2. Whether this means that goods S.C.R. cannot be pledged without permission or that only goods allotted to quota-holders can be pledged we do t k b h l h h The Scksaria
no n.ow, ut w atever 1t means, it is c ear t at t eoottonMills Ltd. entry m column 3 is not intended to be confined to v. quota-holders or their agents but means what it says, The State of
namely the person to whom physical delivery of the Bombay. goods has been made whoever he may be. Bo8e .!. The only question therefore is whether there was physical delivery to Dwarkadas Khetan. In one
sense, there can be no doubt about that. The goods left the Mills' premises, the property in them had passed and when Dharsi Moolji refused to receive them they were handed over to Dwarkadas Khetan
and not taken back to the Mills. Dwarkadas Khetan asked the Mills what he should do with them, and in the end he placed them in the Dady Seth godown. In any ordinary understanding of the term it would be
clear that the goods had been phy:1ictdly delivered to Dwarkadas Khetan. But the learned High Court Judges do not appear to have concerned themselves with the question of actual physical possession because
they say:- "It would not be true to say, and the record amply bears it out, that this godown belonged to Dwarkadas Khetan. Even if Dwarkadas Khetan had control over the godown, the control was exercised on behalf of and
as the agent of the Mills." Therefore, the test of the sort of possession which they had in mind was not the control over the goods. But that has always been regarded as one of the tests
of physical or de facto possession. Lancelot Hall distinguishing between possession in law and posses- sion in fact says that "possession in the popular sense denotes a state of fact of exclusive physical
control". See his treatise on Possessory Liens in English Law, page 2. See also Pollock and Wright in their Essay on Possession in the Common Law, page 119. Drawing the same distinction they s~y that
"physical possession" may be generally described by stating that JO~ SUPHENIE COURT REPORTS [1953] J9.jS "when a person is in such a relation to a thing Tl -;:;- . that, so far as rogardB the thing, he can assume, exer-
" """""a l I ~r · d 00110,, Mills Ltd. cise or resume rnanua cont!'o OJ 1,t al p.easure, an so v. far as regards other persons, the thing is under the pro- ne State ~r tection of his personal presence, or in or on a house or Bombay.
land occitpied by him, or in some receptacle belonging to him and under his control." Bosf J. This would seem exactly to meet the case of Dwar- kadas Khetan. Possession is an ambiguous term. The law books
divide its concept into two broad categories, (i) physi- cal possession or possession in fact and (2) legal posses- sion which need not coincide with possession in fact. The offending form with which we are concerned draws
the same broad line. But even on the factual side of the border niceties creep in and so the possession of a servant is called custody rather than possession. But what of an agent? If a man lives abroad over a period
of years and leaves his house and furniture in charge of an agent who has the keys of the house and immedi- ate access to and physical control over the furniture, it would be difficult to say that the agent was not in
physical possession. It is true the legal possession would continue to reside in the owner but the actual physical possession would surely be that of the agent. And so with a del credere agent, because such a person
is the agent of the seller only up to a point. Beyond that he is either a principal or an agent of the buyer. This distinction was discussed by one of us in the Xagpur High Comt in Kalyandi K uwa1;ji v. Tirlcaram
Sheolal(1) and was accepted by the Madras High Court in Kandula Radhakrishna Rao v. The Province of M a.dras('). But we need not go into all this. Here is an Order which is to affect the business of hundreds of persons,
many of whom are small petty merchants and traders, the sort of men who would not have lawyers constant- ly at their elbow ;· and even if they did, the more learned their advisers were in the law the more puzzled
(1) A.LR. 1938 Nag. 254. (2) (1952) I Al.L.J, 494. s.c.R. Sl'.PREME COURT REPORTS they would pe as to what advice to give, for it is not 1953. till one is learned in the law that wbtleties of thought
and bewilderment arise at the meaning of plain English The Seksaria d h. h d" f Jl' GottonMillsLtd. wor s w 1c any or mary man o average mte 1gence, not versed in the law, would have no difficulty in
The s~~te of understanding. In a penal statute of this kind it is our Bomhay. duty to interpret words of ambiguous meaning in a broad and liberal sense so that they will not become
Bose J. traps for honest, unlei1rned (in the law) and unwary men. lf there is honest and snbstantial compliance with an array of puzzling directions, that should be enough even if on some hypercritical view of the law
other ingenious meanings can be devised. In our opi- nion, Dwarkadas Khetan could, in the circumstances given above, be described, without any straining of language, as the person to whom the goods were actu-
ally delivered. It follows the conviction on this count cannot stand. We would like to add that in any event, even if ultra technical notions regarding the concept of possession were to be incorporated into the case, it would be
wrong to say that there had been anything beyond a technical and unintentional breach of the law. The facts are truly and accurately given according to the popular and natural meaning of the words used;
nothing was hidden. The goods did reach the quota- holder in the end, or rather his proper agent, and we cannot see what anyone could stand to gain in an un- authorised way over the very natural mistake which
occurred owing to what seems to have been a time-lag in the consequences of a change of agency. So, even if there was a technical breach of the law, it was not one which called for the severe strictures which are to be
found in the trial court's judgment and certainly not for the savage sentences which the learned Magistrate imposed. In the High Court also we feel a nominal fine would have met the ends of justice even on the view
the learned ,Judges took of the law. The charge on the second count relating to the 6 bales is a similar one and the fauts follow the same pattern. They have been detailed in the High C:ourfs
SUPREME COURT HEi'ORTS [i953] judgment, so it is not necessary to do m9re than out- 'l'I s k . line them here. The quota-holder here is Beharilal 0ou:: .:ii·~:'l:d. Bairathi. In this case also, Dharsi Moolji paid Dwarka- v.
das Khetan for the goods and the Mills sent the bales 'I!lw•Stato of to Dharsi Moolji for delivery in the same truck as the Bombay. 13 bales. Dharsi Moolji refused to accept these bales
Bose J. April 10 also, so they were deposited in the Dady Seth godown along with the other thirteen. Dwarkadas Khetan & Company has been entered as the person to whom deli- very was made. For the reasons given above, we hold
that this was a true and accurate return. The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence in each of the four cases is set aside. The fines, if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed.
Agent for appellants Nos. 1, 2 & 4: Rajirider Narain. Agent for appellant No. 3: Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha. BASIR-UL-HUQ AND O'fHERS v. THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL.
NUR-UL-HUDA v. THE STATE OF 'WEST BENGAL. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, VIVIAN BosE and JAGANNADHA DAS JJ.] Criminal Procedure Gode, 1898, ss. 190, 195-Indian Penal Gode, 1860, ss. 182, 297, 500-Report to police all'9ing X had killed his 11iother-Trespass ivith police on
cremation ground-Report fo11nd false-Oornplaint by X for trespass and defrin.ation-Main- tainability-Jurisdiction to take counizance of ofjence-Whether barred by s. 195, Criminal Procedure Gode.