Kalyan Singh v. Stattof U.P. ijllafl J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. Nor is there any substance in the last con- tention. The orders pa.88cd under 88. 68F(2)(a) and (b) flow from the publication of the scheme duly
approved and the issue of an order, which is not quasi-judicial but administrative, by the Secretary on behalf of the Regional Transport Authority is not open to challenge. It is not the case of the
Petitioner in W. P. 20!!/u I in which alone. this contention is raised that the order unauthori8ed: what is contended iR above this contention is raised that the order is being quasi-judicial, power to make
it cannot be delegated. But for reasons already set out the order is not quMi· judicial; it is purely administrative. In our view, therefore, th& appeal and the petitions must fail, and are dismissed with costs.
THE STATE OF BOMBAY v. F. A. ABRAHAM (P. B. G.A.JENDR.AGADK.AR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. W A.NCHOO, K. C. DAS GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPA.LA AYYANGAR, JJ.) Government Seruant-0.Jficialing Po1t-ReverUd from, for
uniatis/actory work-I/ amoulll& lo p»niall,,..,.t-Re/wal by Government to furni&la reaaon of rever6icm if prot1u IAal tlu ,….,._ •icm waa tn lhe nature of pvniahment-Government of I11dia
Acl, 1936(26 Ueo. 6 Lia. 21; •· UO(J)-Conatitution of Illdia, Art. 311. The respondent who held the substantive post of lnspe~ tor of Police and had been officiating as the Deputy Superin- tendent of Police was reverted" to his original rank of lmpector without being given any opportunity of being heard in reJPCCt of the reversion.
His request to furnish him with reasona of his reversion was refu.aed. Later a Departmental enquiry was held behind his back in respect of certain allegations of mis.- conduct made agaimt him in a conidcntial communication
from the District Superintendent of Police to· the Deputy Inspector-General of Police but these allegatiom W"'..rc not proved at the enquiry. The Inspector-General of P~licc however thereafter wrote to the Government that the respon- dent's previous record was not aatilfactory and that he had ·2s.c.R.
.been promoted to .,officiate as DeJ)Uty S_uperintenrlent of Police in the expectation that he \Vould turn a new J~af )J11t the complaint made in th~ confidential m "moranrlurn \vas a cle'lr proof that the respohtj.~nr \V~ habitually rlishone"t and dfrl not deserve promotion.
As the order of reversion \Vas maintained Jjy the Government, inspite of the representati'lns 1nacle by t~c respondent, he filed a suit challenging the order. The _suit 'w.AS decreed by the Court of first instance and the decree \Va:.s affirmed by the High Court on appeal.
Held, that a person officiat,ing in a post has no righ~ to hold it for all times. A person who is given an officiating post to test his . suitability to be made permanent later, holds it on ~he implied term that he,would have to he
rev1•rted if he was found unsuitab·le. A reversion in such a case on the grc 11hd of 'unsuitability is an action· in accordance with the terdi~ on 'vhich the officiating post was being held and is nOt a reduc- tion in
rank by way of punishment to ,vhich s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, v .. ·ould be attracted. The oll~rvation in M. A. W~heed ~- State nf Madhya Pradesh, (r954) N. L. J. 305, that when a perso,1 officiating in a post is rCve,rted for unsatisfactory tvork; that reversion amounts to reduction in rank disapproved.
~he Government's rcfu~al to supply the· respond·ent, wi.th the reasons for reverting him cqill~ not prove thit.t th6 rtvers1on was by way .. of punishment. The departmental enquiry held later in this case does rot proVe ·that the respoDdent waS reverted by way of punishment. The Government had the
tight to consider the su.itability of the respondent to the post to 'l'hich he had been· appointed to officiate. ·i State of Bihar v. G~pi Kishore P~a.,ad, A. I. R. I 960 s:C. 689, referred to,
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 59 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and (focree dated March 14, lll57, 0f the Bombay High Court· at Nagpur, in first Appeal No. 7tJ of 1956.
S. Bindra and R. H. Dhehar, for the appellant. Frank Anthony, J. B. Dadachanji, 0. G. Mathur and Ravinrl,er Nara·in. for the respondent. 1961. Depemh,er 12: The Juqgment of the 9ourt was delivered by
Tks <::ta•i: oj P ..i f. 4 -1lu.,,1 "' .s1-..1-_, I' .A. Abr.M.• Sork"' J. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. SARKAR, J.-This is an appeal by the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of the High
Court at Nagpur confirming the decree of the Addi. tional District Judge, Nagpur, declaring that the order reverting the respondent from the rank of officiating Deputy Superintendent of Police to the
rank of Tnspector of Police, wa.s illegal and void, and granting certain consequential re)iPfs. The judgment of the High Court and the learned Additional District Judgo seem to us to be
clearly unHustainable. The Courts below held that the respondent had been reduced in rank in viol&· tion of the terms of s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, l!l35, which corresponds to A1t. 311
of the Ccnstitution, inasmuch as he was not given an opportunity to show ca.use against the order proposed to be made. It is not in dispute that the opportunity had not lieen given. Jn our view,
however, for reasons to be prf'sently stated, the respondent was not entitled to that opportunity. On .Tune 8, 1948, the respondent, was holding the post of Inspector in the Central Provinces and
Berar Police Service. He was appointed to offiCiate as Deputy Superintendent of Police with Pffect frbm June 9, 1948. On January 27, 1949, his R<lrvices were lent to the Hyderabad Government
i:1 connection with the police action then being taken there. On February 5, 1949, he wa.s eent back to the Central Provinces and Berar. On February 19, 1949, the Inspector fleneral of Pnlioe,
Central Provinces anrl Berar, passed an order which reads as follows : "Shri F. A. Abra.ham (respondent) Deputy l'uperintendent Police. Parbhani, is reverted to rank of Inspector."
It is this orC:er which was sought to be Impugned by the reiipOll<ient –in the suit out of which this appeal a.rises. 2 S.C.R. After the order of revernion had bern made the respondent, on February 23, I 949, a~ked for
the reason for which he was reverted. On Ma.rch 3, 1949, the Government refused to communicate the reasons to him. On May 25, 1949, a nonfidentrnl memorandum was sent by the District Suoerinten-
dent of Police, Parbhani, to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Aurangabad, in which he stated that he had conducted an inquiry into certain allegations of corruption made against the respon-
dent while he was acting in the service of the Hyderabcid Government at Parbhani and he thought that those allegations were of substance. There- upon, the Deputy InspPctor General of Police,
Aurangabad, held a departmPntal inquiry regarding these allegations and round that thev had not been proved. This inquiry had been held behind the back of the respondent. Notwithstanding this, the
order reverting the respondent was maintained. There is a letter addressed by the Insp3ctor General of Police to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, dated August 19, 1950, written
after the departmenta) inquiry wherein it is stati;d that the respondent's previom. record was not satis- factory and that he had been promoted to officiate as Deputy Superintendent of Police as the Government
wits in need 0f officers and that he had been given a chance in the expectation .that he would ~urn a new leaf but the complaint made In the confidential memorandum was a clear proof that the officer
was habitually dishonest and did not deserve pro-·. motion. The respondent made representations to the Governll'.ent to revise the order revertin~ him to the lower rank' but the Government expressed
its inability to do so. It may be stated here that on the promulgation of the Constitution the Central Provinces and Berar became the State of Madhya Pradesh in the Indian Union. In the judgment under appeal the High Court
followed its earlier decision in M.A. Waheed v. State Tht St 1~t of Bornbay v. Ff of . .fhTaham Sff.rkar J, JNI Tl. 8t•I< •f B..U'l)' P.A. Allra~- s,,,..,,J. SUPRBICE COURT REPORTS [1982) SUPP.
of Madhya Pffllif.sk (1) in which it b&d hf'en held that if a person officiatiruz i-n a higher post is r~vertecl to hit orij?ina.I poRt in the norm&! course, that is, on aotount oft he Ce!ll!&tion of the va.oancy
or his failure to acquire the required qualification, the reversion dut's not amount to a reduction in rank hut if he is reverted for unsatisfac- torv work, then the r1·version amounts to
reduction in rank. The Hi11:h rourt helrl that the Government's plea. that the respondent had been promotPd as there was dearth of officer8 was an afterthought and that the fact that the respondent
had hr1·n giYen a. chance to ofticiatt• in the higher post p1 lmr1 fnr.i{! showed that ho was fit to hold that post. The High Court also held that the Govern- ment's refusal to communicate to the respond1mt
the reaAons f'or hi~ revPrsion or to give him the report nf the inquiry, imlirated that tho Govern· ment Wall revertinl( him on the ground that his work was not satisfactory. It, thf'refon', came to
the concl11sion on the authoritv of .W. A. Waheed's OOAe (')that the respondent m·u~t he held to have rnduced in P&nk and this reduction in rank was illegal M the r<>spomknt had not bt•"n givl'n an
opport11nity to show <'ause aga.inRt it. w .. ar<> unable to agree with the ob.~ervation in Jf. A. lf aheed's r.a.~e(') that when a prrson officiatin)! in a post, is rev<>rted for unsatisfactory work, that
wversion amount~ to a rPcfoction in rank. A person offi~iating in a post. has no right to hold it for all times. He may have he<>n given th .. officiating poRt because the permanent in1'umheut wa,; not o.vailable, ha·:in)!
gone on leavo or bPing away for soml.' other reasons. \Vhen the pnman<'nt incumbPnt 'e<1mcs ha<"k, the pn~on officiating is naturally r<·Vt'rtml to his original post.. This is n(l reduction in rank for it
waH the very term on which he had bPPJI giHn the officiating post. Again, sometimes a pnson is given ill ~19541 N. I. J. ~05. 2S.C.R. an officiating post to test his suitability to be mado
permanent in it later. Here a"ain. it is an imp!i<?d term of the officiating appoi;;'tment that if he is found unsuitable, he would have to go back. If, therefore, the appropriate authorities find him un-
suitable for the higher rank and then revert him back to his original lower rank, the action taken is in accordance with the terms on which the officiatin!! post had been given. It is in no way a punishment
and is not, therefore, a reduction in rank. It has been held bv this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of Inrlia (1) that, "It is, therefore, quite clear that appointment to
a permanent post · ffi a Government service, either on probation, or on an officiating basis, is, from the very nature of such employment, itself of a very transitory character and, in the absence of
any special contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of the service, the implied term of such appointment, under the ordi- nary law of master and servant, 'is that it is terminable at any time. In short, in the
case of an appointment to a permanent post in a Government service on probation or on an officiating basis, the servant so appointed does not acquire any substantive right to the post and consequently cannot
complain, any more than a private servant employed on probation or on an officiating basis can do, if hie service is terminated at any time." The respondent had of course no right to the post
of Deputy Snperintendent of Police to which he had been given an officiating appointment and h" does not contend to the contrary. He cannot therefore, without more, eomplain if he is sent
back to his original post. This is what happened in this case even if it be taken that the respondent (I) (1958] S.C.R. 828, 842. 1he Stale of 8omha.1 F. A. Abrcrh'lm Sark1.r J. The S~t'Jte of Bombay
v. F.A. Abraham Sarkar J. SUPREME COURT' REPORTS [1962] SUPP. had been reverted to his· original rank because he was found unsuitable for the higher rank to which he had bern given an officiating appointment.
It -is however true that even an officiating person may be reverted to his original rank by way of punishment. It was therefore, observed in Dhingm'8 cn~e (')at p. 863, " Thus if the order entails or provides
for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circum-
stances may indicate that although in form the Government had purportrd to exerci8e its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of
employment or undN the rules, in truth and reality the Government has tnminated the employment as and by way of pena,lty." It is quite clear that th.;, circumstances mentioned in this observation have not occurred in the present
case. The reversion has not in any way affected · the respondent so far as his condition and pros- pect of service are concerned. He, ef course, lost the benefit of the appointment to the higher rank
but that hy itself cannot indicate tb;i.t the rever· sion was by way of punisbn. ent because he _had no right to continue in the hi~her post or to the bene- fit.s arising from it. He had been reverted in ex-
ercise of a right which the Governml'nt had under the terms of the officiating empl0ym.ent. Th« High Court s~ems to us to have been in- error in thinking that the ·Governµ1ent's refusal to supply the .res-
ponfi.,nt with the reasons why .action was ta.ken against him proved that the reversion was a reduc- tion in ·rank by way of punishm'ent; the refusal o>innot prove that. It may give r.ise to a suspicion
ab1;mt the motive which led tho Government (ii [1"581~.C.fL828.-842. 2 ·S.C.R. to take the action, but it is now firmly estab- lished that if the action is justifiable under t'he terms
of the employment, then the motive inducing the action is irrelevflnt in deciding the question whether the action had been taken by way of punishment: see Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (1)
at p. 862. It does not require to be repeated now that unless the reversion is by way of punish- ment, s, 240 (3) is not attracted. The High Court seems to have been in error also in drawing an inference from the holding of
the departmental inquiry that the respondent must have been reduced in rank by way of punish- ment. The departmental inquiry was held long after the order reverting the respo~dent bad been
passed and could not have been the occasion for the reversion of the respondent. The Govern- ment had the right to consider the suitability of the respondent to hold the position to which he had
been appointed to officiate. It was entitled for that purpose to make inquiries about his suit- ability. This is all that the Government <lid in this case. This inquiry cannot show,
whatever the findings may have been, that the reversion earlier made was by way of punishment. Mr. Anthony for the respondent referred us to State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishor Prasad (2) in
which it was observed, " But, if instead of terminating such a person's service without any enquiry, the employer chooses to hold an enquiry into his alleged miscowl net,. or ineffici<mcy,
or for or some similar reason, the termination of service i~ by way of punishment, because it puts a stigma on his compctenco and thus affect his future career." That case dealt with the discharge of a probationer
officer on the ground that he was unsuitable. The observation there made was considered by this (1) [1958] S.C.R. 828, 8{2. (2) A.J.R. 1960, S.C. G89. he Stati of Bombay F.A. Abraham
Sarkar J, JUI Tiu Stat' of Bo~ v. F . • t. A,r-aAam S•rA:ar J. Court in the later case of The State of Oria,,a v. Ram Nrirri11an [)a,, (1) where it was said, "The third proposition in the latter eai;e
referR to an enquiry into allegations of mis- conduct or inefficiencv with a view, if they were found estahlishe"d, to imposing punish rnent and not to an enquiry whether & pro- bationer should be confirmed."
We would repeat that in the present caae the en- quiry was concerned with ascertaining the euita. bility of the respondent for the higher rank and was not a punishment. At one stage Mr. Anthlfny was inclined to
argne that the enquiry was really a part of the original order of reversion and that it had been deliheratc.l>· puatpone.d so as to avoid the applica- bility of ~. 240(3) of the Government of India
Act, 1935. Xo such case is made in the plaint. Neither Wll.8 it rn&de in the Courte below nor can it be based on their findings. Such & o&se cannot now be made. We think, therefore, that the appeal mllltt
be allowed with costs throughout and we order &ccord.ingly. Appeal allowed. (I) (C.A, No. 61 of 1959, uoropor~)