THE STATE OF GOA & ANR. versus NAMITA TRIPATHI

21. This Court dealing with the legislative intent of the Act of 1948 in Balwant Rai Saluja & Anr. v. Air India Ltd. & Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 407 held as under:- “28. The 1948 Act is a social legislation and it provides for the health, safety, welfare, working hours, leave and other benefits for workers employed in factories and it also provides for the improvement of working conditions within the factory premises. Section 2 of the 1948 Act is the interpretation clause. Apart from others, 354 it provides the definition of “worker” under Section 2(l) of the 1948 Act, to mean a person employed, directly or through any other agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing or cleaning process.” (Emphasis supplied)

22. In S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2001) 7 SCC 659, this Court held as under:- “19. … The Factories Act, 1948 cannot but be ascribed to be a beneficial piece of legislation and the requirement of Section 61, in particular, sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 61 can be easily deciphered since the intent stands clear enough to indicate that an adult worker must know his daily placement and daily workings beforehand — this placement beforehand is the requirement of the statute in Section 63 and in the event of non-compliance, there is a liability for being prosecuted. We have in the complaint a statement that Form 14 does not stand completed. We have also in the complaint the number of working hours on a day but the requirement of Form 14, the Inspector alleges does not stand fulfilled. It is too early at this stage, however, to contend that the aforesaid statement does not stand to reason and the complaint needs to be quashed at this stage of the proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied) SOME RELEVANT PROVISIONS FROM THE ACT OF 1948:-

23. A bare perusal of the Act of 1948 would also reveal that Section 6 provided for the approval, licensing and registration of factories in accordance with the Rules made by the State Government, the obligation of the occupier to issue notice was provided under Section 7; the prescription of general duties of the occupier was provided under Section 7A; the general duties of manufacturers were provided under Section 7B; the provisions for appointment of inspectors were made under Section 8 and their powers specified in Section 9.

24. Chapter III of the Act of 1948 deals with health and obliges the factories premises to be kept clean (Section 11), disposal of wastes and effluents (Section 12), ventilation and temperature (Section 13), [2025] 3 S.C.R.  The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi regulation of dust and fume (Section 14), artificial humidification (Section 15), regulations of overcrowding in rooms (Section 16), provision for lighting (Section 17), provision for drinking water (Section 18) and provision for latrines and urinals (Section 19).

25. Chapter IV deals with safety aspects, namely, fencing of machinery (Section 21), regulation of work on or near machinery in motion (Section 22), provision with regard to employment of young persons on dangerous machines (Section 23) and so on. Apart from other salient features in Chapter IV, precautions in case of fire (Section 38), safety of buildings and machinery (Section 40), maintenance of buildings Section 40A are provided for. An exclusive Chapter IV-A deals with provisions relating to hazardous processes.

26. Chapter V deals with welfare measures for workers; Chapter VI deals with working hours of adults and provides for weekly hours (Section 51), weekly holidays (Section 52), daily hours (Section 54) and night shifts (Section 57), extra wages for overtime (Section 59) and so on. In the same Chapter, Section 62 provides for maintenance of register of adult workers.

27. Chapter VII deals with the employment of young persons; Section 67 proscribes employment of any child under the age of 14 years from working in a factory; Section 71 provides working hours for children above the age of 14 years and Section 73 provides for maintaining a register of child workers. Chapter VIII deals with annual leave with wages. Thereafter, in Chapter X dealing with penalties and procedure, general penalty for offences is provided in Section 92, which reads as under:- “92. General penalty for offences.- Save as is otherwise expressly provided in this Act and subject to the provisions of Section 93, if in, or in respect of, any factory there is any contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rules made thereunder or of any order in writing given thereunder, the occupier and manager of the factory shall each be guilty of an offence and punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees or with both, and if the contravention is continued after conviction, with a further fine which may extend to one thousand rupees for each day on which the contravention is so continued: 356 Provided that where contravention of any of the provisions of Chapter IV or any rule made thereunder or under Section 87 has resulted in an accident causing death or serious bodily injury, the fine shall not be less than twenty- five thousand rupees in the case of an accident causing death, and five thousand rupees in the case of an accident causing serious bodily injury.”

28. Section 93 deals with liability of owner of premises in certain circumstances provided therein. Section 105 provides for cognizance of offences and states that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence except on complaint by, or with the previous sanction in writing of, an inspector and Section 105(2) provides that no Court below that of a Presidency Magistrate or of a Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under this Act.

29. The above conspectus of the legal provisions, discussed hereinabove, clearly demonstrate that the Act of 1948 is a welfare statute aimed at ameliorating the conditions of the workmen employed in factories. It is a beneficial legislation intended to protect workers from occupational hazards by seeking to impose upon owners and occupiers certain obligations for protecting the workers and securing their employment in conditions conducive to their health and safety. APPLICABLE RULES OF INTERPRETATION: –

30. Acts of this nature which are social welfare legislation and intended to benefit the large community of workers ought to be interpreted in a manner to give efficacy to legislative intent. This approach has been adopted in catena of judgments by this Court. This Court in Works Manager, Central Railway Workshop, Jhansi v. Vishwanath & Ors., (1969) 3 SCC 95 held as under:- “11. The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It is probably true that all legislation in a welfare State is enacted with the object of promoting general welfare; but certain types of enactments are more responsive to some urgent social demands and also have more immediate and visible impact on social vices by operating more directly to achieve social reforms The [2025] 3 S.C.R.  The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi enactments with which we are concerned, in our view, belong to this category and, therefore, demand an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose, without doing violence to the language. The definition of “worker” in the Factories Act, therefore, does not seem to us to exclude those employees who are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall within the definition of the word “worker”. Keeping in view the duties and functions of the respondents as found by the learned Additional District Judge, we are unable to find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the word “worker”. Deletion of the word “whatsoever” on which the appellant’s counsel has placed reliance does not seem to make much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant.” (Emphasis supplied)

31. This Court in Allahabad Bank & Anr. v. All India Allahabad Bank Retired Employees Association, (2010) 2 SCC 44 held as under:- “16. We shall proceed to examine the point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. Remedial statutes, in contradistinction to penal statutes, are known as welfare, beneficent or social justice oriented legislations. Such welfare statutes always receive a liberal construction. They are required to be so construed so as to secure the relief contemplated by the statute. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that labour and welfare legislation have to be broadly and liberally construed having due regard to the directive principles of State policy. The Act with which we are concerned for the present is undoubtedly one such welfare oriented legislation meant to confer certain benefits upon the employees working in various establishments in the country.” (Emphasis supplied)

32. In Lanco Anpara Power Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2016) 10 SCC 329, this Court held as under:- 358 “44. The sentiments were echoed in Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61, in the following words: (SCC p. 66, para 20) “20. The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a beneficial legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to employees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a social security legislation and the canons of interpreting a social legislation are different from the canons of interpretation of taxation law. The courts must not countenance any subterfuge which would defeat the provisions of social legislation and the courts must even, if necessary, strain the language of the Act in order to achieve the purpose which the legislature had in placing this legislation on the statute book. The Act, therefore, must receive a liberal construction so as to promote its objects.” RULE OF ‘PLAIN MEANING’:-

33. Reverting to the statutory provisions, it is clear on a plain reading of Section 2(k) of the Act of 1948 that ‘washing or cleaning’ of any article or substance with a view to its delivery is clearly covered by the phrase “manufacturing process”. Where the words of statute are clear, the plain meaning has to be given effect. We have no doubt in our mind that the business of laundry carried on by the respondent involving cleaning and washing of clothes including dry cleaning would be squarely covered by the expression “manufacturing process”. Admittedly, they employed more than 9 workers in the centralized processing unit and also used the aid of power.

34. The plain meaning rule was explained by this Court in Jeewanlal Ltd. & Ors. v. Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act & Ors., (1984) 4 SCC 356, which reads as under:- [2025] 3 S.C.R.  The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi “11. In construing a social welfare legislation, the court should adopt a beneficent rule of construction; and if a section is capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which fulfils the policy of the Act, and is more beneficial to the persons in whose interest the Act has been passed. When, however, the language is plain and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it whatever may be the consequence, for, in that case, the words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature. When the language is explicit, its consequences are for the Legislature and not for the courts to consider. The argument of inconvenience and hardship is a dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure and there are two methods of construction. In their anxiety to advance beneficent purpose of legislation, the courts must not yield to the temptation of seeking ambiguity when there is none.” (Emphasis supplied) APPLICATION OF THE MISCHIEF RULE:-

35. To reinforce our holding, we may usefully refer to the definition of “manufacturing process” as was defined in the Factories Act of 1934 under Section 2(g) thereof which reads as follows. “2(g) “manufacturing process” means any process- (i) for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing or packing, or otherwise treating any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) for pumping oil, water or sewage, or (iii) for generating, transforming or transmitting power.”

36. It is very clear that Section 2(g) of the 1934 Act did not have the words ‘washing, cleaning’ and they have been specifically brought in the Act of 1948 with a clear object of bringing into the fold of the Act undertakings excluded from the scope of the 1934 Act as discussed in the Statement of Objects and Reasons set out hereinabove. 360

37. Dealing with the mischief rule, this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1 held as under:- “66. For a proper examination of these issues, a reference to Section 10 which provides for prohibition of employment of contract labour and clauses (b), (c), (e), (g) and (i) of Section 2(1) of the CLRA Act which define the terms “contract labour”, “contractor”, “establishment”, “principal employer” and “workman” respectively will be apposite. To interpret these and other relevant provisions of the CLRA Act, to which reference will be made presently, we may, with advantage, refer to Craies on Statute Law [ 6th Edn., by S.G.G. Edgar, p. 96] quoting the following observation of Lindley, M.R. in Mayfair Property Co., Re [(1898) 2 Ch 28, 35 in regard to the rule in Heydon’s case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] : “In order to properly interpret any statute it is as necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported Heydon’s case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] to consider how the law stood when the statute to be construed was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief.” (Emphasis supplied) ERROR IN EXTRAPOLATING THE MEANING FROM THE CENTRAL EXCISE ACT:-

38. The reasoning of the High Court that a transformation has to ensue and the new article must come into being and that it should be commercially known as another and different article is a totally erroneous finding. The High Court has clearly ignored the plain language of the Section and has been completely oblivious about the welfare nature of the Statute. The High Court has extrapolated the definition of “manufacture” as is in vogue in the Central Excise Act 1944. Under the Central Excise Act of 1944, a statute traceable to the definition of “manufacture” in Section 2(f) reads as under: [2025] 3 S.C.R.  The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi “(f) “manufacture” includes any process— (i) incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product; (ii) which is specified in relation to any goods in the Section or Chapter Notes of the Fourth Schedule as amounting to manufacture; or (iii) which, in relation to the goods specified in the Third Schedule, involves packing or repacking of such goods in a unit container or labelling or re-labelling of containers including the declaration or alteration of retail sale price on it or adoption of any other treatment on the goods to render the product marketable to the consumer; and the word “manufacture” shall be construed accordingly and shall include not only a person who employs hired labour in the production or manufacture of excisable goods, but also any person who engages in their production or manufacture on his own account;” The High Court has been carried away by the interpretation given by courts while interpreting the Central Excise Act.

39. Dealing with the features of manufacture under the Central Excise Act, 1944, this Court in Crane Betel Nut Powder Works vs. Commr. of Customs & Central Excise, Tirupathi & Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 155 observed as under:- “31. In our view, the process of manufacture employed by the appellant Company did not change the nature of the end product, which in the words of the Tribunal, was that in the end product the “betel nut remains a betel nut”. The said observation of the Tribunal depicts the status of the product prior to manufacture and thereafter. In those circumstances, the views expressed in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. [AIR 1963 SC 791 and the passage from the American judgment (supra) become meaningful. The observation that manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture and yet every change of an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation is apposite to the situation at hand. The process involved 362 in the manufacture of sweetened betel nut pieces does not result in the manufacture of a new product as the end product continues to retain its original character though in a modified form.” [See also in this Context Kores India Ltd., Chennai v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai, (2005) 1 SCC 385 (paras 11 and 12)]

40. However, the above judgments under the Central Excise Act can have no application since the Act of 1948 defines the expression “manufacturing process” which definition is different from the one under the Central Excise Act.

41. Where a statute under consideration itself defines for the purposes of the said Act a certain phrase, a court of law is bound to apply the term as defined except in exceptional cases where the opening part of a definition, ‘anything repugnant in the subject or context’ applies. Recently, this Court in Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 181 held as under:- “49. Lord Atkinson in Corp. of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island [1921 SCC OnLine PC 75] observed: “In the construction of statutes, their words must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense, unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute, in which they occur, or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.” 50. That words in the statute are to be understood in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. This has been underscored by Justice Frankfurter, in the following opinion: “After all legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to common run of men and is therefore to be understood according to sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed [Wilma E. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 US 607 (1944)].” 51. The above pronouncements make it clear that when the words used are clear, plain and unambiguous, the courts [2025] 3 S.C.R.  The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi are duty-bound to give effect to the meaning emerging out of such plain words. The intention of the legislature must be gathered from the language used and also, the words not used. It becomes imperative to understand those words in their natural and ordinary sense, and any interpretation requiring for its support addition or substitution or rejection of words as meaningless, must ordinarily be avoided.” ACTIVITY OF THE RESPONDENT – A MANUFACTURING PROCESS:- 42. The Act of 1948 defines “manufacturing process” and we clearly find that “washing, cleaning” and the activities carried out by the respondent with a view to its use, delivery or disposal are squarely attracted. The contention of the respondent that dry cleaning does not make any product usable, saleable or worthy of transport, delivery or disposal has only to be stated to be rejected. “Manufacturing process” has been defined to mean any process for washing or cleaning with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal. The linen deposited with the launderer is, after washing and cleaning, delivered to the customer for use. The ingredients of the section are fully satisfied. There is nothing in the Act of 1948, which is repugnant in the subject or context, constraining us to jettison the definition. Hence, we reject the findings of the High Court and hold that the activity carried out which on facts is not disputed is clearly covered by the definition of “manufacturing process” under Section 2(k) which, in turn, would bring the premises in question of the respondent under the definition of “factory” under Section 2(m). If that were so, the complaint lodged against the respondent could not have been quashed. 43. The High Court has been carried away by the holding of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra). The said case has no application for the following reasons: Firstly, that case was under the Employees State Insurance Corporation Act, and that too before the definition of “manufacturing process” as defined in the Act of 1948 was incorporated in the ESIC Act. The definition under the ESIC Act prior to 1989 merely defined a “factory” under Section 2(12) in the following terms. “(12) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof- 364 (a) whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on, or (b) whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on. but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 or a railway running shed” 44. It was only with effect from 20.10.1989, Section 2(14AA) was introduced in the ESIC Act which reads as under:- “(14AA) “manufacturing process” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948;” 45. Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra) was decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Punjab and Haryana on 22.10.1981 when Section 2(14AA) was not in the statute. This is precisely why this Court in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation Vs. Triplex Dry Cleaners and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 196 held as under in Para 6 while dismissing the appeal of the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation. “6. We, however, hasten to point out that we are here concerned with the show-cause notice dated 21-1-1978. At that point of time, Section 2(14-AA) had not been inserted in the Act which defines manufacturing process as having the same meaning which is assigned to it under the Factories Act, 1948. This provision was inserted with effect from 20-10-1989. We, therefore, express no opinion with regard to the applicability of the Act to an establishment engaged in the business of dry cleaning after 20-10-1989 inasmuch as Section 2(14-AA) attracts the applicability of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 which defines manufacturing process which may conceivably include the process of repairing, washing or cleaning of any article with a view to its use. However, insofar as this appeal is concerned, inasmuch as it relates to a period prior to 20-10-1989 when there was no such [2025] 3 S.C.R.  The State of Goa & Anr. v. Namita Tripathi definition of manufacturing process applicable to the Act, it must fail and is accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.” (Emphasis supplied) This present case arises squarely under the Act of 1948 and hence with the definition of the Statute in the Act of 1948 clearly contemplating ‘washing, cleaning’ there is no scope for applying Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra). Equally the judgment in Super Cleaners Vs. Employees State Insurance Corporation, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1660, will have no application since, it stands similar to the situation in Triplex Dry Cleaners (Supra). 46. Recently in J.P. Lights India v. Regional Director E.S.I. Corporation, Bangalore, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1271, applying the amended Section 2(14 AA), this Court, while dealing with servicing of electrical goods, had the following to say. This Court, speaking through Hima Kohli J, pithily set out the statement of law as under. “7. It is apparent from a perusal of the definition of the word “Factory”, as used in the ESI Act that it means any premises including precincts wherein ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process was being carried out or ordinarily so carried out, with an exception of a mine or a railway running shed. 8. Section 2(14AA) of the ESI Act defines the expression “manufacturing process” as one, defined under the Factories Act, 1948. The said Act defines the expression “manufacturing process” under Section 2(k) that is sub- divided into six sub-heads. For the purposes of the present case, Section 2(k)(i) is relevant which makes it clear that a “manufacturing process” may include ‘any process amongst others for altering or repairing or treating/adapting any article for its use or disposal’. 9. In the instant case, the appellant-firm is in the business of selling electrical goods in a shop. Admittedly, the shop premises is used not only for selling goods, but also to service electrical goods. That being the position, it is 366 clear that the appellant-firm falls under the definition of a “Factory” and is using a “manufacturing process”, as contemplated under both the Statutes.” 47. One additional factor to be noticed in this case is that the respondent is registered as a factory under the ESIC Act for the same premises. We have, however, not gone by the mere factum of registration but have independently arrived at the above conclusion based on the interpretation of the provisions of the Act of 1948. 48. The only other argument advanced is that the order issuing process is a cryptic order and does not reflect any application of mind. We may have been inclined to consider this submission except that in view of the categorical findings rendered by us hereinabove any exercise of remitting the complaint and asking the Magistrate to exercise his powers afresh, would be futile. Hence, we have refrained from adopting that course of action. 49. For the reasons set out hereinabove, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court in Stamp Number Main No. 944 of 2020 (F) dated 06.09.2021. The consequence would be that the complaint filed by the appellants along with the order issuing process of 04.12.2019 would stand restored to file of the learned JMFC, Panaji and shall be proceeded with in accordance with law. Result of the case: Appeal allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan