Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
10. The appellants are now before this court by grant of special leave. The two provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, relevant to answer the question raised in the case are sections 31 and 34. Section 31 deals with 'form and contents of arbitral award; and in so far as relevant for the present provides as follows: "31. Form and contents of arbitral award.- (1) An arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the C members of the arbitral tribunal. (2) xxxxxxxxxxx (3) xxxxxxxxxxx (4) xxxxxxxxxxx (5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party. (6), (7), (8) xxxxxxxxxxx (emphasis added) Section 31 (1) obliges the members of the arbitral tribunal/ arbitrator to make the award in writing and to sign it and sub- section (5) then mandates that a signed copy of the award would be delivered to each party. A signed copy of the award would normally be delivered to the party by the arbitrator himself. The High Court clearly overlooked that what was required by law was the delivery of a copy of the award signed by the G members of the arbitral tribunal/ arbitrator and not any copy of the award.
11. Section 34 of the Act then provides for filing an application for setting aside an arbitral award, and sub-section [2011) 4 S.C.R. (3) of that section lays down the period of limitation for making c the application in the following terms: "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub- section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) )()()()()()()( (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) xxxxxxx'' The expression " .. party making that application had received the arbitral award .. " can not be read in isolation and it must be understood in light of what is said earlier in section 31 (5) that requires a signed copy of the award to be delivered to each party. Reading the two provisions together it is quite clear that the limitation prescribed under section 34 (3) would commence only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to the party making the application for setting it aside.
12. We are supported in our view by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC 239; in paragraph 8 of the decision it was held and observed as follows: • STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. v. ARK BUILDERS PVT. LTD. [AFTAB ALAM, J.] "8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter ·of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be "received" by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application c for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the delivery of the copy of award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings." (emphasis added)
13. The highlighted portion of the judgment extracted above, leaves no room for doubt that the period of limitation prescribed under section 34(3) of the Act would start running only from the date a signed copy of the award is delivered to/ received by the party making the application for setting it aside under section 34(1) of the Act. The legal position on the issue may be stated thus. If the law prescribes that a copy of the order/ award is to be communicated, delivered, dispatched, forwarded, rendered or sent to the parties concerned in a particular way and in case the law also sets a period of limitation for challenging the order/award in question by the aggrieved party, then the period of limitation can only commence from the date on which the order/award was A received by the party concerned in the manner prescribed by the law.
14. We may here refer to a decision of the Patna High Court in Dr. Shea Shankar Sahay v. Commissioner, Patna B Division and Ors., 1965 BLJR 78. Section 18(1) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 prescribed a period of limitation of 15 days for filing an appeal against an order of the House Controller and provided as follows: "any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of such order by him, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority" 0 It was contended on behalf of the petitioner before the High Court that the order-sheet of the House Controller was shown to the lawyer of the respondent on June 10, 1959 and therefore, that would be the starting point of limitation under section 18(1) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, E 1947. A division bench of the High Court consisting of Chief Justice V. Ramaswami (as his Lordship then was) and Justice N.L. Untwalia (as his Lordship then was) rejected the submission observing as follows: "2 …. But we shall assume that the petitioner is right in alleging that the order was shown to the lawyer on the 10th June, 1959. Even so, we are of opinion that the appeal preferred by respondent no.4 before the Collector of Shahabad was not barred by limitation. The reason is that Sec. 18(1) provides limitation of fifteen days "from the date of receipt of the order" and not from the date of communication of the order. It is significant that Sec. 14 of the Bihar House Rent Control Order, 1942, had provided that "any person aggrieved by an order of the Controller may, within fifteen days from the date on which the order is communicated to him, present an appeal in writing to • STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. v. ARK BUILDERS PVT. LTD. [AFTAB ALAM, J.] the Commissioner of the division". Sec. 18(1) of Bihar Act A Ill of 1949 is couched in different language. In our opinion, Sec. 18(1) implies that the Controller is bound, as a matter of law, to send a written copy of his order to the person aggrieved, and limitation for filing an appeal does not start unless and until the copy of the order is sent. In the present case it is not disputed that no copy of the order was sent to respondent no.4. It is true that the responderit' ·himself applied for a copy of the order on the 11th December, 1959, and obtained a copy on the 14th December, 1959. In any event, therefore, limitation will not C start running against respondent no.4 under Sec. 18(1) of the Act till the 14th December, 1959, and as the appeal was filed on the 26th December, 1959, there is no bar of limitation in this case … ." (emphasis added)
15. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Patna High Court in the case of Dr. Sheo Shankar Sahay.
16. In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in taking a contrary view. The High Court overlooked that what section 31 (5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal.
17. In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant- respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case.
18. In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments and orders passed by the Bombay High Court and the Principal District Judge, Latur. The application made by the appellants under section 34 of the Act is restored before the Principal B District Judge, Latur, who shall now proceed to hear the parties on merits and pass an order on the application in accordance with law. Since the matter is quite old, it is hoped and expected that the Principal District Judge will dispose this matter preferably within 6 months from the date of receipt of this order. c D.G. Appeal allowed.