371 . THE STATE OF PUNJAB v. SODHI SUKHDEV SINGH (B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAB, K. SUBBA RAO a.nd K. N. WANOHoo, JJ.) Evidence – Production of documents~ "Affairs o/ State",
meaning of-Privileged documents-Scope of-Ministerial certifi- cate, if and 'when conclusive-Collateral evidence to find nature of document-Court's power-Inspection of documents-Code of Civsl Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), O; II, rr. 14, 19(z), 0. 14, r. 14-Indian Evidence Act, 187z (1 of 1872), ss. 123, 162.
The respondent who was a District and Sessions Judge in the erstwhile State of Pepsu was removed from service on April 7, 1953 by an order passed by the President of India who was then in charge of the administration of the State. A representa- tion made by the respondent on May 18, 1955, was considered by the Council of Ministers of the State as in the meantime the President's rule had come to an end, and its views wore expres- sed in the form of a Resolution dated September 28, 1955; but before taking any action it invited the advice of the Public Service Commission. On receipt of the report of the Public Service Commission, the Council of Ministers considered the matter again on March 8, 1956, and its views were recorded in the minutes of the proceedings.
On August II, 1956, the representation made by the respondent was considered over again by the Council and a final conclusion was reached in respect of it. In accordance with the said conclusion an order was
passed which was communicated to the respondent to the effect that he might be re-employed on some suitable post. On May 5, 1958, the respondent instituted a suit against the State of Punjab for a declaration that..,.the removal of his service on April 7, 1953, was illegal, and 1lled an application under 0. 14, r. 4, and 0. II, r. 14, of the Code of Civil Procedure for the production of certain documents, which included the proceedings of the Council of Ministers dated September 28, 1955. March 8, 1956, and August II, 1956, and the report of the Public Service Commission. The State objected to the production of the said documents claiming privilege under s. 123 of the Indian Evi- dence Act, 1872, and the Chief Secretary of .the State filed an affidavit giving reasons in support of the claim. The question was whether having regard to the true scope and effect of the provisions of ss. 123 and 162 of the Act the. claim of privilege raised by the State was sustainable.
Held, that the documents dated September 28, 1955, March 8, 1956, and August II, 1956, which embodied the minutes of November x5, I960 Th• Stal• of Punjab v. Sodhi S1-1Ahdev Siugh
[1961] the meetings of the Council of Ministers indicating the advice which the Council ultimately gave to the Rajpramukh, were expressly saved by Art. 163(3) of the Constitution of India and fell within the category of documents relating to "affairs of State" within the meaning of s. 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Accordingly, they were protected under s. 123, and as the head of the department, the Chief Secretary, did not give per- mission for their production, the Court cannot compel the State to produce them.
Held, further (Subba Rao, J., dissenting), that the report of the Public Service Commission being the advice tendered by it, was also protected under s. 123 of the Act. Held, also (Kapur, J., dissenting), that the words "records relating to affairs of State " in s. 123 cannot be given a wide meaning so as to take in every document pertaining to the
entire business of State, but should be confined only to such documents whose disclosure may cause injury to the public interest. The second clause of s. 162 refers to the objections both as to the production and admissibility of the document and entitles the court to take other evidence in lieu of inspection of the document in dealing with a privilege claimed or an objection raised under s. 123, to determine the validity of the objections. Case law reviewed.
Per Sinha, C. J., Gajendragadkar and Wanchoo, JJ.- Though under ss. 123 and 162 the Court cannot hold an enquiry into the possible injury to public interest which may result from the disclosure of the document in question, the matter being left for the authority concerned to decide, the Court is competent to hold a preliminary enquiry and determine the
validity of the objection to its production and that necessarily involves an enquiry into the question as to whether the docu- ment relates to affairs of State under s. 123. Where s. 123 confers wide powers on the head of the department to cla!m privilege on the ground that the disclosure may cause injury to public interest, scrupulous care must be taken to a void making a claim for such a privilege on the ground that the disclosure of the document may defeat the defence raised by the State. The apprehension that the disclosure may adversell affect the head of the department or the Minister in charge o the department or even the Government in power, or that it may provoke public criticism or censure in the Legislature, should not weigh in the mind of the head of the department and the sole test which should determine his decision is injury to public interest and nothing else.
The privilege under s. 123 should be claimed generally by the Minister in charge who is the political head of the depart- ment concerned ; if not, the Secretary of the department should make the claim, and the claim should always be made in the form of an affidavit. When the affidavit is made by the Secre- tary, the Court may, in a proper case, require an affidavit of the Minister himself. The affidavit should show that each docu- ment in question has been carefully read and considered, and the person making the affidavit is satisfied that its disclosure would lead to public'injury. If there are series of documents in- cluded in a file it should appear from the affidavit that each one of the documents, whose disclosure is objected to, bas been duly considered by the authority concerned. The affidavit should also indicate briefly within permissible limits the reason why it is arprehended that their disclosure would lead to injury to public interest.
If the affidavit produced in support of the claim for privi- lege is found to be unsatisfactory a further affidavit may be called, and in a proper case the person making the affidavit whether he is a Minister or the Secretary should be summoned to face cross-examination on the relevant points.
The provisions of 0. II, r. 19(2), of the Code of Civil Proce- dure must be read subject to s. 162 of the Indian Evidence Act and where a privilege is claimed at the stage of inspection under 0. II, r. 19(2), of the Code, the Court is precluded from inspecting the privileged document in view of s. 162 of the Act. Per Kapur, J.-The words of s. 123 of the Act are very
wide and cover all classes of documents which may fall within the phrase "affairs of State ", some noxious and others inno- cuous, and may even appear to be unduly restrictive of the rights of the litigant but if that is the law the sense of responsi- bility of the official concerned and his sense of fair play has to be trusted. Under that section discretion to produce or not to produce a document is given to the head of the department and the court has not the power to override the ministerial certifi- cate against production.
The words "or take other evidence to enable it to deter- mine on its admissibility" in s. 162 on their plain language do not apply to production and the taking of evidence must have reference to admissibility. The section does not entitle the court to take other evidence i.e., other than the document, to determine the nature of the document or the reasons impelling the head of the department to withhold the production of the document.
It is permissible for the Court to determine the collateral facts whether the' official claiming the privilege is the person mentioned in s. 123, or to require him to file a proper affidavit or even to cross-examine him on such matters which do not fall within the enquiry-as to the nature of the document or nature of the injury. He may also be cross-examined as to the existence of the practice of the department to keep documents of the class The State of
Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh z960 The Slate of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdtv Singh [1961) secret but beyond that the ministerial discretion should be accepted and it should neither be reviewed nor overruled.
Per Subba Rao, J.-(x) "'Records relating to affairs of State" in s. 123 of the Act mean documents of State whose production would endanger the public interest; documents per- taining to public security, defence and foreign relations are documents relating to affairs of State; unpublished documents relating to trading, commercial or contractual activities of the State are not, ordinarily, to be considered as documents relating to affairs of State, but.in special circumstances they may partake of that character and it is a question of fact in each case whe- ther they relate to affairs of State or not in the sense that if they are disclosed public interest would suffer.
(2) Under no circumstances can a court inspect such a docu- ment or permit giving of secondary evidence of its contents. (3) Under s. 162 the Court has overriding power to dis=- allow a claim of privilege raised by the State, but in its discre- tion, the court will exercise its power only in exceptional cir- cumstances when public interest demands. The said claim shall be made by an affidavit filed by the Minister in charge of the department concerned describing the nature of the document in general and broadly the category of public interest its non-dis- closure purports to serve. Ordinarily, the court shall accept the affidavit of a Minister. but in exceptional circumstances, when it has reason to believe that there is more than what meets the eye, it can examine the Minister and take other evidence to decide the question of privilege.
(4) The disclosure of the report of the Public Service Com- mission may expose the Government if the latter ignores a good advice, but such an exposure is certainly in public interest and in a conflict between the administration of justice and the claim of privilege by the State, the claim must be overruled.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 337 of 1960. Appeal by specie.I leave from the judgment a.nd order dated January 19, 1960, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Revision No. 596 of 1959.
N. 8. Bindra a.nd D. Gupta, for the appellant. Gapal Singh, for the respondent. H. M. Beervai, Advoca.te-General for the State of Ma.ha.ra.shtra. a.nd R. H. Dhebar, for the Intervener.
1960. November 15. The judgment of B. P. Sinha., C. J., P. B. Ga.jendra.gadka.r, J. a.nd K. N. Wa.nchoo, J. wa.s delivered by P. B. Gajendra.ga.dka.r, J. J. L. Kapur, J. a.nd K. Subba. Ra.o, J., delivered
separate judgments. -d \_ GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal raises for our r96o decision a question of law of general importance under ss. 123 and 162 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
Th~=~;~~ of (hereafter called the Act). Originally the same point v. had been raised in another civil appeal before this Sodhi Court, Civil Appeal No. 241 of 1955. The said appeal Sukhdev Singh was the result of a dispute between Dowager Lady G .
-. – Dinbai Dinshaw Petit on the one hand and the Union a;end•agadkar f. of India. and the State of Bombay on the other. Hav- ing regard to the importance of the point raised by the said appeal a Division Bench of this Court before
whom it first came for hearing directed that it should be placed for disposal before a Constitution Bench, and accordingly it was placed before us. The appel- lant and the respondent in the present appeal then
applied for permission to intervene because the same point arose for decision in this appeal as well; that is how this appeal was also placed before us to be heard after the Bombay appeal. After the Bombay appeal
was heard for some days parties to the said appeal amicably settled their dispute and a decree by consent was passed. In the result th'e point of general impor- tance raised by the said appeal fell to be considered
in the present appeal ; and so the appellant and the respondent in the said appeal asked for permission to intervene in the present appeal, and we directed that the arguments urged by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri and
Mr. Seervai, for the appellant and the State of Bom- bay respectively, should be treated as arguments urged by interveners in the present appeal. Mr. Bindra, who appears for the appellant State of Punjab in the
present appeal, and Mr; Gopal Singh who represents the respondent Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, have substanti- ally adopted the arguments urged by Mr. Seervai and Mr. Sastri respectively and have also addressed us on
the special facts in their appeal; that is how the point of law in regard to the scope and effect of ss. 123 and 162 of the Act has to be decided in the present appeal. This appeal has been brought to this Court by
special leave granted by this Court, and it arises from a suit filed by the res_pondent against the appellant on May 5, 1958. It appears that the respondent was [1961] r96o a. District and Sessions Judge in the erstwhile State of
Th• Stat• of Pepsu. He was removed from service on April 7, Punjab 1953, by a.n order passed by the President of India. v. who was then in charge of the administration of the Sodhi
said State. The respondent then ma.de a. representa.- Svkhd•• Singh tion on May 18, 1955. This representation was con- sidered by the Council of Ministers of the said State Gajendragadkar f. on September 28, 1955, because in the meantime the President's rule had come to an end and the adminis-
tration of Pepsu was entrusted to the Council of Ministers. The Council expressed its views in the form of a. Resolution on the representation of the respondent; but before taking any action it invited
the advice of the Public Service Commission. On receiving the said advice the Council again considered the said representation on March 8, 1956, and views on the merits of the representa. tion were expressed by
the Members of the Council. These were recorded in the minutes of the proceedings. Finally, on August ll, 1956, the representation was considered over again by the Council, and it reached a. final conclusion in
respect of it. In accordance with th1:1 said conclusion an order was passed which was communicated to the respondent. The order read thus : " Reference his representation dated the 18th May, 1955, against the
order of his removal from service; the State Govern- ment have ordered that he may be re-employed on some suitable post". After this order was communicated to him the respondent filed the present suit against the appellant
and claimed a. declaration, inter alia., that his removal from service on April 7, 1953, was illegal, void and inoperative and prayed for the recovery of Rs. 62,700-6-0 as arrears of his salary. The appellant
disputed the respondent's claim 011 several grounds. Issues were accordingly framed by the trial judge on January 27, 1959. Meanwhile the respondent had filed an application under 0. 14, r. 4 as well as 0. 11, r. 14
of the Civil Procedure Code for the production of documents mentioned in the list annexed to the appli- cation. The trial court issued notice against the appellant for the production of the said documents.
In reply to the notice Mr. E. N. Mangat Rai, Chief z96o Secretary of the appellant, made an affidavit claiming The Stale of privilege under s. 123 of the Act in respect of certain
Punjab documents whose production had been ordered, and v. gave reasons in support of the claim. On the same Sodhi day Mr. Mangat Rai made another affidavit in which sukhdev Singh
he gave reasons for claiming similar privilege in G . d-dk respect of certain other documents. The statements a,,,, raga ar f. made in these affidavits were challenged by the res-
pondent who submitted a counter affidavit. After the affidavits had thus been filed by the parties the trial court heard their arguments on the question of privi- lege, and on August 27, 1959, it upheld the claim of
privilege made by the appellant for the production of some documents, and accepted the reasons given by Mr. Mangat Rai in support of the said claim of pri- vilege. The respondent then moved the High Court of
Punjab under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 227 of the Constitution for the quashing of the said order. The petit.ion for revision (C. R. 596 of 1959) first came up for decision before D. K. Maha-
jan, J., at Chandigarh. The learned judge took the view that the question raised by the petition was of eonsidera.ble importance, and so he ordered that the papers should be placed before the learned Chief Justice
to enable him to direct that the matter be decided by :i larger Bench. Thereupon the petition was placed for decision before Dulat and Dua., JJ., who, after hearing the parties, reversed the order under revision
in respect of four documents, and directed that the said documents be produced by the appellant. The appellant then applied to the High Court for a certifi- cate under Art. 133 but its application was dismissed.
It then ca.me to this Court and applied for and obtain- ed special leave to challenge the validity of the order passed by the Punjab High Court ; and in the appeal the only question which has been urged before us is
that having regard to the true scope and effect of the provisions of ss. 123 and 162 of the Act the High Court was in error in refusing to uphold the cla~m of ,.s (1961] I96o privilege raised by the appellant in respect of the
documents in question. The State of Punjab The question thus posed will naturally have to be v. answered on a fair and reasonable construction of the Sodhi two statutory provisions of the Act. It has, how-
Sukhdev Singh ever, been very strenuously urged before us by Mr. Seervai that before proceeding to construe the said Gajendragadka' ]. 't • th t h C t h Jd b prov1s1ons 1 1s necessary
a t e our s ou ear in mind the historical background of the said provi- sions. His argument is that as. 123 and 162 as they were enacted in the Act in 1872 were intended to introduce in India. the English Law in regard to what
is commonly described as the Crown privilege in the same form in which it obtained in England at the material time; and so he has asked us to determine in the first instance what the true state of English
Law was in or a.bout 1872 A. D. In order to decide this question three representa- tive English decisions must be considered. In Home v. Lord F. 0. Bentinck(') the Court was dealing with
a. claim made by H who had sued the president of the enquiry for a libel alleged to be contained in the report made by him. It appears that H was a commissioned officer in the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the
said Army had directed an assemblage of commissioned military officers to hold an enquiry into the conduct of H. According to H the said report contained libellous matter, and so he had sued the president of the en-
quiry. At the trial H desired that the report submitted by the court of enquiry should be produced and this request was resisted by the defendant on the ground that the document in question was a. privileged commu-
nication. This plea was upheld. Dallas, C. J., referred to the precedents relevant to the decision of the point, and observed that the basis of the said precedents was that the disclosure would ca.use danger to the public
good. He then considered the nature of the enquiry which had been directed against H, and observed that in the course of the enquiry a. number of persons may be called before the court and may give infor-
mation as witnesses which they would not choose to (1) (1820) 2 Brod. & B. 130: 129 E. R. 907. have disclosed ; but, if the minutes of the court of en- I960 quiry are to be produced on an action brought by the
The State of party, they reveal the name of every witness and the Punjab evidence given by ea.ch. Not only this but they also v. reveal what has been said and done by each member Sodhi
of the existing court of enquiry ; and, according to Sukkdev Sing4 the learned judge, the reception of the said minutesG . d-dk 1 would tend directly to disclose that which is not per-
a;en raga ar • mitted to be disclosed; and so, independently of the character of the court the production of the report was privileged on the broad rule of public policy and convenience that matters like those covered by the
report a.re secret in their nature and involve delicate enquiry and the names of persons who ought to stand protected. The next decision to which our attention has been invited is Smith v. The East India Company (1). Io
that case the dispute with which the Court was con- cerned had a.risen with respect to a commercial tran- saction in which the East India Company had been engaged with a third party ; and privilege was claim-
ed in regard to the correspondence which had been carried on by the defendant with the Board of Control. It was held that the said correspondence was, on the ground of public policy, a privileged communication,
and so the Company were not bound to produce or set forth the contents of it in answer to a bill of dis- covery filed against them by the third party in relation to the transaction to which it referred. Lord
Lyndhurst upheld the claim of privilege not because · the correspondence purported to be confidential nor because it was official, but because of the effect of the provisions of c. 85 of Act 3 & 4 W. 4 on which the
claim of privilege was founded. It was noticed that the Company had been prohibited from carrying on any commercial transactions except for the purpose of winding up their affairs or for the purposes of the
Government of India.; and it was held that the result of the relevant provisions, and particularly of :s. 29 was that the Directors of the Ea.st India. Company were required to make communication of all their
(1) (1841) r Ph. 50: 41 E.R. (Chancery) 550. [1961) acts, transactions and correspondence of every des- I'he State of cription to the Board of Control. That is why a claim Punjab for privilege in respect of the said correspondence was
v. upheld. This decision shows that a. claim for privi- Sodhi. lege could have been made even for correspondence Sukhdev Singh which had reference to a. commercial transaction in Gaje•d•;;;,dka• J. circumstances similar· to those in that case. The la.st decision on which considerable reliance has
been placed by Mr. Se'ervai is the case Of Beatson v. Skene ('). It may incidentally be pointed out that Chief Baron Pollock's observations in this judgment are frequently cited in judicial decisions where the
question of privilege falls to b.e considered. In that case the plaintiff had been a. general who commanded a. corps of irregular troops during the war in Crimea. Complaint having been made about the insubordina-
tion of troops the corps was placed under the superior command of V. Thereupon the plaintiff resigned his command. V directed S to inspect and report upon tbe state of the corps, and referred S for information
to the defendant who was a Civil Commissioner. The defendant, in a conversation with S, made a defama- tory statement respecting the conduct of the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant
for slander. The defence set up against the plaintiff's claim was that what had passed between the defen- dant and S was a privileged communication. The jury had found a. verdict for the defendant. A new trial
was claimed by the plaintiff, inter alia, on the ground that the learned judge had declined to compel the pro- duction of certain documents. It appeared that the Secretary for War had been subpoenaed to produce
certain letters written by the plaintiff to him and also the minutes of the court of enquiry as to the conduct of S in writing the letter to V. The plea. for a new trial was rejected on the ground that the Court was of
the opinion that the non-production of the said docu- ments furnished no ground for a new trial. There was a difference of opinion among the members of the Court on the question as to whether Bramwell, J., was
justified in upholding the claim of privilege Pollock, (3) (186o) 5 H. & N. 838: 157 E.R. 1415. C. B., Bramwell, B., a.nd Wilde, B., held that the x960 claim for privilege was properly upheld, whereas
The State of Martin, B., took a. contrary view. Punjab Dealing with the claim ma.de that the production of v. the documents would be injurious to the publiQ service Sodhi Pollock, C. B., observed that the genera.I public
Suklidev Singh interest must be considered para.mount to the indivi. due.I interest of a. suitor in a Court of Justice, a.nd heGajendragadkar J. posed the question : How is this to be determined ?
Then Pollock, C. B., proceeded to observe that the question must be determined either by a. presiding judge or by the responsible servant of the Crown in whose custody the paper is; and he remarked that the
judge would be unable to determine it without ascer- taining what the document is and why the publi- cation of it would be injurious to public service-an enquiry which cannot take place in private, a.nd which
taking place in public ma.y do a.II the mischief which it is proposed to guard a.gs.inst. He further held that " the administration of justice is only a pa.rt of the general conduct of the a.ffa.irs of a.ny State or nation,
a.nd we think is (with respect to the production or non-production of a. State pa.per in a. Court of Justice) subordinate to the general welfare of the community". Martin, B., however, wa.s of the opinion tha.t whenever
the judge is satisfied tha.t the document may be made public without prejudice to the public service the judge ought to compel its production notwithstanding the reluctance of the hea.d of the department to pro-
duce it. It would thus be seen tha.t according to the majority view the question as to whether a.ny injury to public interest would be ca.used by the producti~n of the document could not he determined by the Court,
bees.use such an enquiry would tend to defeat the very purpose for which privilege is claimed, whereas, according to the minority view it wa.s for the. Court to hold a.n enquiry a.nd determine whether any injury
would follow the production of the document. Mr. Seervai contends that these decisions correctly represent the legal position in rega.rd to the Crown privilege in England in the second half of the Nine-
teenth Century, and, according to him, when the (1961] i96o Indian Evidence Act was drafted by Sir James Fitzja- mes Stephen he intended to make provisions in the The State of . h
Id Punjab ct wh1c wou correspond to the said position in the v. English Law. In other words, the argument is that Sodhi ss. 123 and 162 are intended to lay down that, when Sukhdev Singh a privilege is claimed by the State in the matter of . —
production of State documents, the total question with Ga1•ndragadkar J ·regard to the said claim falls within the discretion of the head of the department concerned, and he has to
decide in his discretion whether the document belongs to the privileged class and whether its production would cause injury to public interest. It is in the light of this background that Mr. Seervai wants us to
construe the relevant sections of the Act. In support of this argument Mr. Seervai has also referred us to the draft prepared by Sir James Fitz- james Stephen at the instance of Lord Coleridge for
adoption by the English Parliament, and has relied on Art. 112 in the said draft. Art. 112 provides, inter alia, that no one can be compelled to give evidence relating to any affairs of State, or as to official com-
munications between public officers upon public affairs, unless the officer at the head of the department con- cerned permits him to do so. It also refers to some other matters with which we are not concerned. This
part of Art. 112 as framed by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen seems to include the provisions of ss. 123 and 124 of the Act. It is significant that there is nothing in this Article whioh corresponds to s. 162 of the Act.
Mr. Seervai concedes that the draft prepared by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was not adopted by Parlia- ment, and even now there is no statutory law of evi- dence in England; even so, he contends that the
intention which Sir James Fitzjames Stephen had in drafting the relevant sections of the Indian Evidence Act must have been similar to his intention in draft- ing Art. 112, and that is another fact which we may
bear in mind in construing the relevant sections of the Act. We ought, however, to add that though Mr. Seervai elaborately argued this part of his case he fairly conceded that recourse to extrinsic aid in inter-
preting a statutory provision would be justified only within well recognised limits ; and that primarily the x96a effect of the statutory provisions must be judged on a d The Stale of
fair and reasonable construction of the wor s used by Punjab the statute itself. v. Let us now turn to s. 123. It reads thus : Sodhi "No one shall be permitted to give any eviden-
Sukhdev Singh ce derived from unpublished official records relating -dk a: • f S t 'th th fGa;endraga or j. to any aua1rs o tate, excep w1 e perm1ss10n o the officer at the head of the department concerned,
who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit." This section refers to evidence derived from unpub- lished official records which have a relation to any affairs of State, and it provides that such evidence
shall not be permitted to be given unless the head of the department concerned gives permiEJsion in that behalf. In other words, as a result of this section a document which is material and relevant is allowed
to be withheld from the Court, and that undoubtedly constitutes a very serious dep_1uture from the ordi- nary rules of evidence. It is well known that in the administration of justice it is a principle of
general application that both parties to the dis- pute must produce all the relevant and material evidence in their possession or their power which is necessary . to prove their respective contentions ;
that is why the Act has prescribet;l elaborate rules to determine relevance and has evo1ved the doctrine of onus of proof. If the onus of proof of any issue is on a party and it fails to produce such evidence, s. 114 of
the Act justifies the inference that the said evidence if produced would be against the interest of the person who withholds it. As a result of s. 123 no such infe- rence can be drawn against the State if its privilege
is upheld. That shows the nature and the extent of the departure from the ordinary rule which is autho- rised by s. 123. The principle on which this departure can be and is justified is the principle of the overriding and para.-
mount character of public interest. A valid claim for privilege ma.de under s. 123 proceeds on the basis of the theory that the production of the document in question would ca.use injury to public interest, and
[1961] '960 that, where a conflict arises between public interest Th• Slat• of and private interest, the latter must yield to the for- Punjab mer. No doubt the litigant whose claim may not suc-
v. ceed as a result of the non-production of the relevant SodM and material document may feel aggrieved by Sukhd•v Singh the result, and the Court, in reaching the said G . d-dk 1 decision, may feel dissatisfied; but that will not "1'" '°8" "' ·affect the validity of the basic principle that pub- lic good and interest must override considerations
of private good and private interest. Care has, how- ever, to be taken to see that interests other than that of the public do not masquerade in the garb of public interest and take undue ad vantage of the provisions
of s. 123. Subject to this reservation the maxim Bilus populi est supreme les which means that regard for public welfare is the highest law is the be.sis of the provisions contained in s. 123. Though s. 123 does
not expressly refer to injury to public interest that principle is obviously implicit in it and indeed is its sole foundation. Whilst we a.re discussing the be.sic principle under-
lying the provisions of s. 123, it may be pertinent to enquire whether fair and fearless administration of justice itself is not a. matter of high public impor- tance. Fair administration of justice between a.
citizen and a. citizen or between a. citizen and the State is itself a matter of great public impor- tance; much more so would the administration of justice a.s a. whole be a. matter of very high public
importance; even so, on principle, if there is a. real, not imaginary or fictitious, conflict between public interest a.n·d the interest of a.n individual in a. pending case, it may reluctantly have to be conceded that the
interest of the individual cannot prevail over the public interest. If social security and progress which are necessarily included in the concept of public good are the ideal then injury to the said idea.I must on
principle be avoided even a.t the cost of the interest of a.n individual involved in a. particular case. That is why Courts a.re and ought to be vigilant in dealing with a. claim of privilege ma.de under s. 123.
If under s. 123 a. dispute a.rises as to whether the evidence in question is derived from unpublished offi- x960 cial records that can be easily resolved; but what pre- sents considerable difficulty is a dispute as to whether
Th~:!;~~ of the evidence in question relates to any affairs of State. v. What are the affairs of State under s. 123 ? In the Sodhi latter half of the Nineteenth Century affairs of State Sukhdev Singh may have had a comparatively narrow content. Hav-
d t th t• b t 1 f GRjsndragadkar J. mg regar o e no ion a ou g51vernmenta unction.a and duties which then obtained, affairs of State would have meant matters of political or administrative
character relating, for instance, to national defence, public peace and security and good neighbourly rela. tions. Thus, if the contents of the documents were such that their disclosure would affect either the
national defence or public security or good neighbour- ly relations they could claim the character of a docu- ment relating to affairs of State. There may be another class of documents which could claim the said
privilege not by reason of their contents as such but by reason of the fa.ct that, if the said documents were disclosed, they would materially affect the freedom and candour of expression of opinion· in the determi-
nation and execution of public policies. In this class may legitimately be included notes and minutes made by the respective officers on the relevant files, opini- ons expressed, or reports ma.de, a.nd gist of official
decisions reached in the course of the determination of the said questions of policy. In the effic,ient admi- nistration of public affairs government may reason- ably treat such a class of documents as confidential
and urge that its disclosure should be prevented on the ground of possible injury to public interest. In other words, if the proper functioning of the public service would be impaired by the disclosure of any
document or class of documents such document or such class of documents may also claim the status of documents relating to public affairs. It may be that when the Act was passed the con-
cept of governmental functions and their extent was limited, and so was the concept of the words " affairs of State " correspondingly limited ; but, as is often [1961] '960 said, words are not static vehicles of ideas or con-
The State of cepts. As the content of the ideas or concepts con. Punjab veyed by respective words expands, so does the con- v. tent of the words keep pace with the said expanding Sodhi
content of the ideas or concepts, and that naturally Sukhd•v Singh tends to widen the field of public interest which the Gajend;;:;;.dkar 1 . section wants ~o protect. The inevitable c.onsequence of the change m the copcept of the functions of the
State is that the State m pursuit of its welfare activi- ties undertakes to an increasing extent activities which were formerly treated as purely commercial, and documents in relation to such commercial activi-
ties undertaken by the State in the pursuit of public policies of social welfare are also apt to claim the pri- vilege of documents relating to the affairs of State. It is in respect of such documents that we reach the
marginal line in the applica.tion of s. 123; a.nd it is precisely in determining the cla.im for privilege for such border-line ca.sea that difficulty arises. It is, however, necessary to remember tha.t where
the Legislature has advisedly refra.ined from defining the expression " affairs of State " it would be inexpe- dient for judicial decisions to a.ttempt to put the said expression into a stra.it jacket' of a definition judici-
ally evolved. The question as to whether any parti- cular document or a class of documents a.nswers the description must be determined in each ca.se on the releva.nt facts and circumstances adduced before the
Court. " Alfa.ire of State", according to Mr. Seervai, are synonymous with public business and he contends that s. 123 provides for a genera.I prohibition against the production of any document relating to public
business unless permission for its production is given by the head of the department concerned. Mr. Seer- va.i has argued that documents in regard to affairs of State constitute a genus under which there are two
species of documents, one the disclosure of w hioh will cause no injury to public interest, and the other the disclosure of which may cause injury to public interest. In the light of the consequence which may
flow from their disclosure the two species of documents can be described as innocuous and noxious respec- tively. According to Mr. Seervai the effect of s. 123 is that there is a. genera.I prohibition against the pro-
r960 duction of all documents relating to public business subject to the exception that the head of the depart- Th~;!;:~ of ment can give permission for the production of such v. documents as are innocuous and not noxious. He
Sodhi contends that it is not possible to imagine tha~ the Sukhdiv Singh section contemplates that the head of the depa.rtmentG . ld • t d d a;sndragadkar J. wou give perm1ss1on o pro uoe a noxious ocument.
It is on this interpretation of s. 123 that Mr. Seervai seeks to build up similarity between s. 123 and the English Law as it was understood in 1872. In other words, according to Mr. Seervai the jurisdiction of the
Court in dealing with a claim of privilege under s. 123 is very limited and in most of the oases, if not all, the Court would have to accept the claim without effec- tive scrutiny.
On the other hand it has been urged by Mr. Sastri that the expression "documents relating to any affairs of State " should receive a narrow construction ; and it should be confined onlv to the class of noxious
documents. Even in regard to this class the argument is that the Court should decide the character of the · document and should not hesitate to enquire, inciden- tally if necessary, whether its disclosure would lead to
injury to public interest. This contention seeks to make the jurisdiction of the Court wider and the field of discretion entrusted to the depart,ment correspon- dingly narrower. It would thus be seen that on the point in contro-
versy between the parties three views are possible. The first view is that it is the head of the department who decides to which class the document btllongs; if he comes to the conclusion that the document is inno-
cuous he will give permission to its production ; if, however, he comes to the conclusion that the docu- ment is noxious he will withhold such permission ; in any ·case the Court does not materially come into the
picture. The other view is that it is for the Court to determine the character of the ·document, and if necessary enquire into the possible consequences of its disclosure; on this view the jurisdiction of the Court
is very much wider. A third view which does not [1961) r96o accept either of the two extreme positions would be that the Court can determine the character of the Th• State of Punjab
document, and if it comes to the conclusion that the v. document belongs to the noxious class it may leave it Sodhi to the head of the department to decide whether its Sukhdev Singh production should be permitted or not ; for it, is not G . d-dk 1 the policy of s. 123 that in the case of every noxious •J•n '"1" "' ·document the head of the department must always withhold permission. In deciding the question as to
which of these three views correctly represents the true legal position under the Act it would be neces- sary to examine s. 162. Let us therefore, turn to that section. Section 162 reads thus:
"A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The
validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court. The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the docu- ment, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibi-
lity." The first clause of s. 162 requires that a witness sum- moned to produce a document must bring it to the Court and then raise an objection against either its production or its admissibiHty. It also authorises the
Court, and indeed makes it its obligation, to decide the validity of either or both of the said objections. It is significant that the objections to the production or admissibility of evidence specified in s. 162 relate
to all claims of privilege provided by the relevant sections of Chapter IX of Part III of the Act. Sec- tion 123 is only one of such privileges so that the jurisdiction given to the Court to decide the validity
of the objections covers not only the objections raised under s. 123 but all other objections as well. Take for instance the privilege claimed under s. 124 of the Act which provides that no public officer shall be compell·
ed to disclose communications made to him in official confidence when he considers that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. It is clear, and indeed I960 it is not disputed, that in dealing with an objection
Th• Stat• of against the production of a document raised under Punjab s. 124 the Court would have first to determine whether v. the communication in question has been made in Sodhi .
official confidence. If the answer to the said question Sukhdev S•nch is in the negative then the document has to be pro- Ga ·endracadhar J. duced ; if the said answer is in the affirmative then it
is for the officer concerned to decide whether the document should be disclosed or not. This illustra- tion brings out the character and the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court dealing with an
objection raised under s. 162. The second clause of s. 162 in terms refers to the objection as to the admissibility of the document. It seems to us that this clause should be construed to
refer to the objections both as to the production and the admissibility of documents; otherwise, in th~ absence of any limitation on its power the Court would be justified in exercising its authority under,
and discharging its obligation imposed by, cl. 1 of s. 162 by inspecting the document while holding an enquiry into the validity of the objection raised against its production under s. 123, and that would be
inconsistent with the material provision in cl. 2 of s. 162. That is why we hold that the second clause covers both kinds of objections. In other words, admissibility in the context refers both to production
and admissibility. It may be added that " matters of State " referred to in the second clause are identical with " affairs of State " mentioned in s. 123. Reading this clause on this assumption what is its
effect ? It empowers the Court to inspect the docu- ment while dealing with the objection; but this power cannot be exercised where the objection relates to a document having reference to matters of State and it
is raised under s. 123. In such a case the Court is empowered to take other evidence to enable it to determine the validity of the objection. Mr. Seervai contends that the first part of cl. 2 which deals with
the inspection of the document is confined to the objection relating to the production of the document, [1961] and on that basis he contends that since inspection is Th• Stat• of not permissible in regard to the document falling Punjab
under s. 123 the Court can do nothing else but record v. its approval to, and uphold the validity of, the objec- Sodhi tion raised by the head of the department. In regard SukAd•v Sinih to the objection as to the admissibility of the said .G ·ind-dk J document, however, he concedes that the Court can •J
raga ar · k h "d "f d d ta e ot er ev1 ence, 1 necessary, an then etermine its validity. According to him, such evidence would be necessary and permissible when the objection to admissibility is based for instance on want of stamp
or absence of registration. In our opinion, this con- struction thong h ingenious is not supportable on a plain and grammatical construction of the clause read as a whole; it breaks up the clause artificially which
is plainly not justified by rules of grammar. We are satisfied that the Court can take other evidence in lieu of inspection of the document in dealing with a privilege claimed or an objection raised even under
s. 123. If the privileged document cannot be inspected the Court may well take other collateral evidence to determine its character or class. In other words, the jurisdiction conferred on the Court to deal with the
validity of an objection as to the production of a docu- ment conferred by the first clause is not illusory or nominal ; it has to be exercised in cases of objections raised under s. 123 also by calling for evidence per-
missible in that behalf. It is perfectly true that in holding an enquiry into the validity of the objection under s. 123 the Court cannot permit any evidence about the contents of the document. If the document
cannot be inspected its contents cannot indirectly be proved; but that is not to say that other collateral evidence cannot be produced which may assist the Court in determining the validity of the objection.
This position would be clear if at this stage we consider the question as to how an objection against the production of document should be raised under s. 123. It is well settled and not disputed that the
privilege should not be claimed under s. 123 because it is apprehended that the document if produced would defeat the defence raised by the State. Anxiety to suppress a. dooument may be natural in a.n indi-
z96o vidua.l migant a.nd SO it is oheoked and kept under Tllo State of control by the provisions of s. 114 of the Act. Where, Punjab however, s. 123 confers wide powers on the bead of
v. the department to claim privilege on the ground that Sodhi the disolosure may oause injury to public interest Sukhdev Singh so1 r?pujous cahre m?s~ 1 be takehn to avdoidh makhingd. a Gajsndragadkar J.
c aim 1or sue a. priv1 ege on t e groun t at t e is- closure of the dooument may d'efea.t the defenoe raised by the State. It must be clearly realised that the effeot of the document on the ultimate oourse of liti-
gation or its impact on the head of the department or the Minister in oha.rge of the department, or even the government in power, has no relevance in ma.king a claim for privilege under s. 123. The apprehension
that the disclosure may· adversely a.ffeot the head of the department or the department itself or the Minis- ter or even the government, or that it may provoke public criticism or censure in the Legislature has also
no releva.noe in the matter and should not weigh in the mind of the head of the department who makes the claim. The sole a.nd the only test which should determine the decision of the hea.d of the department
is injury to publio interest a.nd nothing else. Sinoe it is not unlikely tha.t extraneous and collateral purposes may operate in the mind of the person claiming the privilege it is neoessary to la.y down certain rules in
respect of the manner in which the privilege should be claimed. We think tha.t in such ca.see the privilege should be claimed generally by the Minister in charge who is the political head of the department concern-
ed; if not, the Secretary of the department who is the departmental head should make the claim ; and the claim should a.lwa.ys be made in the form of an affida- vit. When the affidavit is made by the, Secretary the
Court may, in a proper case, require an affidavit of the Minister himself. The affidavit should show that each document in question has been carefully r~ad and considered, and the person making the affidavit is
satisfied that its disclosure would lead to public injiiry. If there are a series of documents included in a file it should appear from the affidavit that each one of the documents, whose disclosure is objected to, has been
[1961] z960 duly considered by the authority concerned. The affidavit should also indicate briefly within permis- Th• State of h h Punjab sible limits t e reason w y it is apprehended that
v. their disclosure would lead to injury to public interest. Sodhi This la.st requirement would be very important when SuAhdev Singh privilege is claimed in regard to documents which prima. fa.cie suggest that they a.re documents of a. com-
Ga;enaragadAar j. . 1 h t h 1 t• t · 1 merc1a. c a.ra.c er a. vmg re a. wn on y o commerc1a. activities of the State. If the document clearly fa.Us within the category of privileged documents no
serious dispute generally a.rises; it is only when Courts a.re dealing with marginal or border.line documents that difficulties a.re experienced in deciding whether the privilege should be upheld or not, and it is pa.rti.
cula.rly in respect of such documents that it i~ ex- pedient and desirable that the affidavit should give some indication a.bout the reasons why it is appre- hended that public interest may be injured by their
disclosure. It is conceded by Mr. Seervai that if the affidavit produced in support of the claim for privilege is found to be unsatisfactory a. further affidavit may be called, and in a. proper case the person ma.king the a.ffida. vit
whether he is a. Minister or the Secretary should be summoned to face cross-examination on the relevant points. Mr. Seerva.i, however, contends that the object of such cross-examination must be limited to
test the credibility of the witness and nothing more. We do not see why any such a. limitation should be imposed on cross-examination in such a. case. It would be open to the opponent to put such relevant
and permissible questions as he may think of to help the Court in determining whether the document be- longs to the privileged class or not. It is true that the scope of the enquiry in such a case is bound to be
narrow and restricted ; but the existence of the power in the Court to hold such an enquiry will itself act as a salutary check on the capricious exercise of the power conferred under s. 123 ; and as some of the
decisions show the existence of this power is not merely a matter of theoretical abstraction (Vide for instance, Ijjac .Ali Talukdar v. Emperor (')~ (1) J.l,.R. [1944) 1 C&I. 410.
Thus our conclusion is tha.t reading ss. 123 and 162 .r960 together the Court cannot hold an enquiry into the The state of possible injury to public interest which may result Punjab
from the disclosure of the document in question. That v. is a matter for the authority concerned to decide; but Sodhi . the Court is competent, and indeed is bound, to hold Sukhdev Sangh ahprehb" ~in~ry enq~iry andd de~ermined thhe validity ilof Gajendragadkar J. t e o Ject1ons to its pro uct10n, an t at necessar y
involves an enquiry into the question as to whether the evidence relates to an affair of State under s. 123 or not. In this enquiry the Court has to determine the character or class of the document. If it comes to the
conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs of State then it should reject the claim for privilege and direct its production. If it comes to the conclu- sion that the document relates to the affairs of State
it should leave it to the head of the department to. decide whether he should permit its production or not. We are not impressed by Mr. Seervai's argument that the Act could not have intended that the head of the
department would permit the production of a docu- ment which belongs to the noxious class. In our opinion, it is quite conceivable that even in regard to a document falling within the cla.ss of documents
relating to affail'e of State the head of the department may legitimately take the view that its disclosure would not cause injury to public interest. Take for instance the case of a document which came into exis-
tence quite some time before its production is called for in litigation; it is not unlikely that the he&d of the 4epartment may feel that though the character of the document may theoretically justify his refusing to
permit its production, at the time when its production is claimed no public injury is likely to be caused. It is also possible that the he&d of the department may feel that the injury to public interest which the dis-
closure of the document may cause is minor or insigni- ficant, indirect or remote ; and having regard to the wider extent of the direct injury to the cause of justice which may result from its non-production he may
,so [1961] 196o decide to permit its production. In exercising his discretion under s. 123 in many cases the head of the The Stale of d h f Punjab epartment may ave to weigh the pros and cons o
v. the problem and objectively determine the nature and Sodhi extent of the injury to public interest as against the Sukkdev Sinch injury to the administration of justice. That is why G . d-
we think it is not unreasonable to hold that s. 123 •Jtn ragadkar ]. gives discretion to the head of the department to permit the production of a document even though its production may theoretically lead to some kind of
injury to public interest. While construing ss. 123 and 162, it would be irrelevant to consider why the enquiry as to injury to public inti;irest should not be within the jurisdiction of the Court, for that clearly is
a matter of policy on which the Court does not and should not generally express any opinion. In this connection it is necessary to add that the nature and scope of the enquiry which, in our opinion,
it is competent to the Court to hold under s. 162 would remain substantially the same whether we accept the wider or the narrower interpretation of the expression "affairs of State". In the former case the
Court will decide whether the document falls in the class of innocuous or noxious documents; if it finds that the document belongs to the innocuous class it will direct its production; if it finds that the document
belongs to the noxious class it will leave it to the discretion of the head of the department whether to permit its production or not. Even on the narrow con- struction of the expression "affairs of State" the
Court will determine its character in the first instance; if it holds that it does not fall within the noxious class which alone is included in the relevant expression on this view an order for its production will follow; if the
finding is that it belongs to the noxious class the question about its production will be left to the discre- tion of the head of the department. We have already stated how three views are possible on this point. In
our opinion, Mr. Seervai's contention which adopts one extreme position ignores the effect of s. 162, whereas the contrary position which is also extreme in character ignores the provisions of s. 123. The view
2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT R;EPORTS which we are disposed to take about the authority z96o and jurisdiction of the Cour.t in such matters is based on a harmonious construction of s. 123 and s. 162
The State of Punjab read together; it recognises the power conferred on the v. Court by cl. (1) of s. 162, and also gives due effect to Sodhi the discretion vested in the head of the depii.rtment Suhhtlev Singh bys. 123.
It would thus be clear that in view of the provisions Ga;endragadkar f. of s. 162 the position in India in regard to the Court's power and jurisdiction is different from the position
under the English Law as it obtained in England in 1872. It may be true to say that in prohibiting the inspection of documents relating to matters of State the second clause of s. 162 is intended to repel the
minority view of Baron Martin in the case of Beat- son (1). Nevertheless the effect of the first clause of s. 162 clearly brings out the departure made by the Indian Law in one material particular, and that is the
authority given to the Court to hold a preliminary enquiry into the character of the document. That is why we think that the arguments so elaborately and ingeniously built up by Mr. Seervai on the basis of the
background of the Indian Evidence Act breaks down in the light of the provisions of s. 162. We may add that in substance and broadly stated the consensus of judicial opinion in this country is in favour of this con- clusion. (Vide: e.g., Kaliappa Udayan v. Emperor (2);
R. M. D. Ghamarbaugwala v. Y. R. Parpia (3); Gover- nor-General in Council v. H. Peer Mohd. Khuda Bux & Ors.('); The Public Prosecutor, Andhra v. Venkat,a N arasayya (5); and ljjat Ali Talukdar v. Emperor (6)).
Therefore we think it is unnecessary to refer to these decisions in detail or to examine the reasons given by them in support of the conclusion reached by them. There are, however, two decisions which have
struck a note of dissent, and so it is necessary to examine them. In W. S. Irwin v. D. J. Reid (7) it appears that the Court was incidentally dealing with (1) (186o) s H. & N. 838; 157 E. R. 1415.
(21 A.I.R. 1937 Mad •. 492. (3) A I.R. 1950 Bom. 1130. (4) A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab 228. (5) A.I.R. 1957 Andhra 486 • (6) I.l .. R. [1944] I Cal. 410. (7) (19111) I.L.R. 48 CaL 304.
(1961] r960 the scope and effect of s. 123 of the Act. In thst case the plaintiff was one of the members of the com- The State of mittee, known as the Champaran Agrarian Enquiry Punjab
d Committee, an as such member he had effected a v. Sodhi settlement between the indigo planters and the tenants Sukhdev Singh about the partial refund of tawan or remission of sarabeshi. The defendant Irwin wrote three letters to
Gajendragadkar J. the members after the settlement which taken together would import that his consent to the settle- ment was obtained by misrepresentation and all facts were not disclosed to him. Thereupon Reid filed a
suit claiming Rs. 50,000 as dam:1ges against Irwin for making the said defamatory statements which accord- ing to him greatly injured his credit and reputation and had brought him into public odium and contempt.
It appears that at the trial an attempt was made to compel the production of the minutes of the com- mittee. The said attempt failed because the Govern- ment of Bihar and Orissa claimed privilege under
s. 123. In appeal it was urged that the privilege should not have been upheld, but the appellant's plea was not accepted by the Court. "The public officer concerned", observed Mookerjee, A. C. J., "and not
the judge is to decide whether the evidence referred to shall be given or withheld. If any other view were taken the mischief intended to be avoided would take place as the judge could not determine the question
without ascertaining the contents of the document, and such enquiry, if it did take place, must, for obvious reasons take place in public". In support of this decision the learned judge referred to some Eng-
lish decisions; amongst them was the case of Beatson v. Skene('). It would be noticed that in making these incidental observations the Court has not considered the true effect of the provisions of s. 162. Indeed no
reference was made to the said section and the matter does not appear to have been seriously argued and naturally, because the point was not directly raised for decision. In this connection we ought to point out
that in a subsequent decision of the said High Court in Jjjat Ali Talukdar's IXISe (')a contrary view has been (1) (186o) 5 H. & N. 838: 157 E.R. 1415. (2) l.L.R. [1944] I Cal. 410. taken and it is the subsequent view which has prevail-
I960 ed in the Calcutta High Court thereafter. The State of In Khawaja Nazir Ahma,d v. The Crown (1) the High Punjab Court of Judicature at Lahore has held that when a v. privilege is claimed under s. 123 the Court simply
Sodhi . gives effect to the decision of the head of the depart- Sukhtlcv Singh ment by adding its own .command to it but the Court Gajendi·a;adkar J. has no power to examme the 1document in order to
verify the correctness of the allegations or the grounds on which the privilege is claimed. Abdur Rahman, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench in that case, has considered the relevant Indian and English
decisions,-and has based his conclusion substantially on the judgment of the House of .Lords in Duncan v. Gammell Laird & Co. Ltd. (2), to which we will pre- sently refer. The learned judge appears to have con-
strued s. 162 in the manner suggested by Mr. Seervai. In fact Mr. Seervai's argument was that the construc- tion placed by Abdur Rahman, J. on s. 162 had not been considered by the other Indian decisions when
they brushed aside his conclusion. "I feel convinced", said Abdur Rahman, J., "that the objection as to the production of the document, apart from its admissibi- lity (for want of registration or contravening the rule
as to when secondary evidence of a document can be admitted-if the document is merely a copy and not original) can only be decided by its inspection by the Court, followed, as it must necessarily have been, by
an order of production, although not in the sense of its contents having been disclosed to the party sum- moning the document at any rate at that stage". We have already indicated our reasons for not accepting
this artificial construction of the second clause in s. 162. This decision also has been dissented from by a E'ull Bench of the Lahore High Court in Governor- General in Council v. H. Peer Mohd. Khuda Bux &
Ors. (5) and the view taken by the :Full Bench in that case prevails in the Punjab High Court ever since. In the course of arguments before us a large number of English decisions have been cited by the learned
(1) (1945) I.L.R. 26 Lah, 219. (2) (1942] A.C. 624. (3) A.I.R. 1950 East Punjab 228. [1961] counsel appearing for both the parties. Having regard to the fact that our decision ultimately rests, as it
The Slatt of h f Punjab must, on t e construction o the relevant provisions of the Act, we do not think it necessary to refer to all the cases to which our attention was drawn; we
Suhhdev Singh propose to confine ourselves to three decisions which have made a substantial contribution to the discussion Gajendragadkar I of the problem, and which represent three distinct and different trends o~ judicial opinion on the point
with which we are dealing. v. Sodhi The first case to which we would refer is the deci- sion of the Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Australia (1). In that case the appellant had brought
an action in the Supreme Court of South Australia against the respondent State claiming damages for alleged negligence in the care of wheat placed in the control of the State under the Wheat Harvests Acts,
1915-17. Upon an order for discovery the respondent State, by an affidavit made by a civil servant, claimed privilege in respect of 1892 documents tied in three bundles, and stated to be State documents comprising
communications between officers administering the department concerned. There was exhibited to the affidavit a minute by the responsible Minister stating, inter alia, that the disclosure of the documents would
be contrary to the interests of the State and of the public. The claim for privileg«j had been upheld by the· Australian Courts but it was rejected by the Privy Council which held that the minute was inadequate to
support the claim; it was tob vague in the circums- tances of the case, and was not a statement on oath showing that the Minister had himself considered each of the documents, or indicating the nature of the
suggested injury to the interests of the public. The Privy Council, therefore, directed that the Supreme Court of South Australia should exercise its power under O. 31, r. 14, sub-r. (2), to inspect the documents,
because it thought that the said course was less likely to cause delay than an order for a further and better affidavit of documents. The litigation in that case had been preceded by another litigation, and on the
(1) [1931) A.C. 704. facts thus disclosed the Privy Council was satisfied 196o that the action in question was one of a large number Thi Slat1 of which were then pending, and against which a similar
Punjab relief was claimed, all being alike dependant for v. success upon the establishment of the same facts. Sodhi That is how full discovery by the respondent had Sukhdav Singh become "the immediately vital issue between the par- G . d-d t. ,,
a;en raga liar J. ies . Dealing with the merits of the privilege the Privy Council cited with approval Taylor's observation that "the principle of the rule is concern for public interest, and the rule will accordingly be applied no further
than the attainment of that object requires"(1). Lord Blanesburgh, who delivered the judgment of the Board observed that "it cannot be assumed that documents relating to trading, commercial or contractual activi-
ties of the State can never be claimed to be protected under this head of privilege", but he added that "the cases in which this is so must, in view of the sole object of the privilege, and especially in time of peace,
be rare indeed". Then he referred to the fact that in view of the increasing extension of State activities into the spheres of trading business and commerce, and of the claim of privilege in relation to the liabili-
ties arising therefrom which were frequently put for- ward, it is necessary for the Courts to remember that while they must duly safeguard genuine public inte- rests they must see to it that the scQpe of the admitted
privilege .is not, in such litigation, extended. The judgment then proceeds to add that in truth the fact that documents if produced might have any such effect upon the fortunes of the litigation is of itself a
compelling reason for their production-one only to be overborne by the gravest considerations of State policy or security. T4en the power of the Court to call for the production of documents for which privi-
lege was claimed was examined in the light of pre- vious decisions, and in the light of the provisions of 0. 31, r. 14, sub-r. (2). "Where, as in the present case'', it was observed, "the State is not only sued as defen-
dant under the authority of statute, but is in the suit bound to give discovery, there seems little, if any, (13) Taylor on "Evidenc;e", a. 939, [1961] i96u reason why the Court in relation to this privileged
class of its documents should have any less power than 1'he State of • h Punjab it as to mspect any other privileged class of its docu- v. ments, provided of course, that such power be exercis-
Sodhi ed so as not to destroy the protection of the privilege Sukhdev Singh in any case in which it is found to exist". The proce- dure which should be adopted in claiming the privi-
Gaiend••gadkar f· lege was then considered, and it was held that the affidavit produced, which in its sweep covered no fewer than 1892 documents in number, was of the vaguest generality and as such unsatisfactory. The
Privy Council then considered the question as to whe- ther a further opportunity should be given to the State to make a better affidavit but it thought that it would be inexpedient to adopt such a course because it
would involve further serious delay, "without, it may be, advancing any further the final solution to ths question at issue". That is why the Supreme Court was asked to exercise its power under the relevant
rule to inspect the documents and then decide whether the privilege should be upheld or not. It is significant that even when giving such a direction their Lordships took the precaution of adding that the judge, in giv-
ing his decision as to any document, will be careful to safeguard the interest of the State and will not, in any case of doubt, resolve the doubt against the State without further enquiry from the Minister. It only
remains to add that so far as Australia is concerned it does not appear that there is any statutory provision corresponding to s. 162 of the Act, and so, even after this judgment was •pronounced by the Privy Council,
Courts in India have not given effect to the operative part of the order in regard to the inspection of the document by Courts having regard to the statutory prohibition imposed by s. 162 in that behalf.
This pronouncement of the Privy Council was subsequently criticised by the House of Lords in Dun- can & Anr. v. Gammell Laird & Co. Ltd.('). It ap- pears that the submarine Thetis which had been built
up by the respondents under contract with the Admi- ralty was undergoing her submergence tests in Liver- pool Bay, and, while engaged in the operation of a (1) [1942] A.C. 624. trial drive, sank to the bottom owing to the flooding
z96o of her two foremost compartments and failed to return to the surface with the result that all who were in The State of Punjab her, except four survivors were overwhelmed. This
v. unfortunate accident gave rise to a large number of Sodhi actions against the respondents for damages for negli- · Sukhdev Singh gence. Pending the trial of the said claims the plain- G . d-dk 1 'ffi
t d di f t . 'fi d d t a;en raga ar • t1 s wan e scovery o cer am spem e ocumen s to which the defendants objected, and the objection of the defendants was supported by Mr. Alexander who
was the First Lord of the Admiralty in his affidavit made in that behalf. The documents to the productien of which an objection was thus raised included (either in original or as a copy) the contract for the hull and
machinery of the Thetis and other letters and reports. The Master before whom the objection was raised refused to order inspection. His decision was confirm- ed by Hilbery, J., sitting in Chambers, and the Court of
Appeal unanimously confirmed the judge's order. The plaintiffs, however, were given leave to appeal to the House of Lords ; that is how the matter reached the House of Lords. Viscount Simon, L. C., who pronounced a composite
judgment on behalf of himself and on behalf of Lord Thankerton, Lord Russel of Killowen and Lord Clau- son, exhaustively considered the whole law on the subject of Crown Privilege ; and in his speech he made
the categorical statement that in his opinion the Privy Council was mistaken in regarding the Austra- lian rule of procedure as having any application to the subject-matter and in ordering the inspection of the
documents which were in question before the Privy Council. Viscount Simon began his speech with the consideration of the previous decisions of the House of Lords, and held that the matter in substance was
concluded by previous authorities in favour of uphold- ing the objections. He observed that the common law principle is well established that, where the Crown is a party to a suit, discovery of documents
cannot be demanded from it as a matter of right, though in practice, for reasons of fairness and in the [1961) x960 i~terests of justice, all proper disclosure and produc- t10n would be made. As a result of the examination
The Stale of Punjab of the several decisions Viscount Simon deduced the v. principle which has to be applied in such cases in these Sodhi words: "Documents otherwise relevant and liable to
Sukhdev Singh production must not be produced if the public interest G . d dh 1 requires that they should be withheld. This test may a1en raga ar ·be found to be satisfied either (a) by having regard to the contents of the particular document, or (b) by the
fact that the document belongs to a class which, on grounds of public interest, must as a class be withheld from production". In this connection he stated that public interest may be damnified where disclosure
would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service. Then he proceeded
to examine the question as to whether when objection has been duly taken the judge should treat it as con- clusive; and his answer was that an objection validly taken to production on the ground that this would be
injurious to public interest is conclusive; but, of course, he proceeded to make pertinent observations for the guidance of those who are entrusted with the powe:r to make a claim. It would be noticed that even this
decision would not be of material assistance to us because, as we have repeatedly pointed out, our deci- sion must ultimately rest on the relevant statutory provisions contained in the Indian Evidence Act ; and
so, the conclusion that a valid certificate issued by the Minister in charge is conclusive may not be strictly applicable to a claim for privilege similarly made by a Minister in charge in India. .As we have already
indicated, the preliminary enquiry contemplated by the first clause of s. 162 has to be held by the Court, and it is after the Court has found in favour ·Of the character of the document pleaded by the State that
the occasion arises for the head of the department to exercise his discretion conferred by s. 123. Inciden- tally, we may point out that Lord Thankerton and Lord Russel of Killowen, who were parties to this
decision, were also parties to the decision of the Privy I960 Council in the case of Robinson (1). The stat6 of In regard to the decisions in the cases of Robin- Punjab son (1) f,nd Duncan (2) respectively, it may be permis-
v. sible to make one general observation. In both these Sodhi cases the nature of the documents for which privilege Sukhdev Singh was claimed, the time at which the dispute arose and G . d–dk 1 h
h d. t a;tn raga ar t e ot er surroun mg crrcums ances were very un- usual and special though in different ways, and so, as often happens, the shift in emphasis from one aspect of the same principle to another and the strong langu-
age used took colour from the nature of the special facts. Incidentally we may also add that the epilogue to the decision in Robinson's case (1) illustrates what untoward consequences may follow from an erroneous
decision or a. miscalculation as to the injury to public interest which may be caused. by disclosure.* Nearly five years after the judgment in Duncan's case (9) was pronounced, the Crown Proceedings Act
(10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44) w!Ls passed in 194 7, and the Crown Privilege recognised under the common law of England is now regulated by s. 28 of the said Act. Section 28 which deals with discovery provides in sub-
stance that subject to the rules of court in any civil proceedings there specified the Crown may be requir- ed by the Court to make discovery of documents and produce documents for inspection, and that in such
proceedings the Crown may also be required to answer interrogatories. This legislative invasion of the Crown's prerogative is, however, subject to the proviso that the said section shall be without prejudice to any
rule of law which authorises or requires the withhold- ing of any document or the refusal to ar,swer any question on the ground that the disclosure of the document or the answering of the question would be
injurious to public interest. It would be noticed that s. 28 read with the proviso confers on the Courts specified by it powers which a.re much narrower than (1) [1931] A.C. 704. (2) [1942] A.C. 624.
•For a graphic account of the aftermath of the enquiry held by the Supreme Court of South Australia, pursuant to the Pr~"Y Council's decision in Robinsons's casa (1). see "Law and Ordera" by Sir C. K. Allen, 2nd Ed., P• 374, foot-note 5a.
[1961] 196o those which a.re conferred on the Indian Courts under cl. I of s. 162 of the Act. n~;~;:~ of In the decision in Dunoon's oose (') Viscount Simon v. had assumed that H.e law as la.id down by the said
Sodhi decision was equally a. pplica.ble to Scotland. This Sukhdev Singh assumption has been seriously challenged by another h 1 decision of the Houee of Lords in Glasgow Corporation
01•ndr•c•4 "' • v. Central Land Board(•). In that case Viscount Simonds has referred to a. large number of earlier decisions dealing with the relevant law as it is admi- nistered in Scotland and commented "on the decision
in Dunoon's case (1) by saying that the observations in the said case, in so far as they relate to the law of Scot- land must be regarded as obiter dicta. "In the course of the present appeal", added Lord Simonds, "we have
had the advantage of an exhaustive examination of the relevant law from the earliest times, and it has left me in no doubt that there always has been, and is now, in the law of Scotland an inherent power of
the Court to override the Crown's objections to pro- duce documents on the ground that it would injure the public interest to do so", though he added that "very rarely in recent times has this inherent right
been exercised". Lord Radcliffe, who a.greed with the conclusion of the House with some reluctance, has ma.de strong comments on the plea. of privilege which is raised on behalf of the Crown in such matters.
Adverting to the contention that the public interest may be injured by the production of the document Lord Radcliffe observed that more than one aspect of the public interest may have to be surveyed in review-
ing the question whether a. document which would be available to a. party in a. civil suit between private parties is not to be available to the party engaged in a. suit with the Crown. According to Lord Radcliffe it
was not unreasonable to expect that the Court would be better qualified than the Minister to measure the importance of such principles in application to the particular case that is before it. It is on that assump-
tion that the Scottish La.w has reserved to the Courts the duty of making some assessment of the relative (1) [194a] A.C. 1ia4. (a) (19,,ii) Scolol.aw Tim• Reporll, 41. claims of the different aspects of public interest where
r96o production of a document is objected to by the Crown. The State of Then, in his characteristic style Lord Radcliffe has Punjab observed "I sho"Q.ld think it a very great pity indeed if
v. a power of this kind, a valuable power, came to be Sodhi regarded as a mere ghost of theory having no practi- Sukltdev Singll cal substance, and the Courts abdicated by disuse in G . nd-dk 1 the twentieth century a right of control which their aJ•
raga a• • predecessors in the earlier centuries have been insis- tent to assert". The learned law Lord has also made some strong comment on the formula which has been evolved by Viscount Simon in Duncan's case (1), and
had stated that the phrase "necessary for the proper functioning of the public service" is a familiar one, and I have a misgiving that it may become all too familiar in the future". The result of this decision
appears to be that in Scotland, where the common law doctrine of the Crown Privilege is not strictly en- forced, a. privilege can be claimed by the Minister on grounds set forth by him in his affidavit. The
certificate would be treated as very strong presump- tive evidence of the claim made but the Court would nevertheless have inherent power to override the said certificate. It is unnecessary for us to con-
sider the true nature and effect of this power because in India. in this particular matter we are governed by the provisions of s. 162 which confer power on Courts to determine the validity of the objection raised under
s. 123, and so there would be no occasion or justifica- tion to exercise any inherent power. Though we do not propose to refer to the other decisions to which our attention was invited, we may
incidentally observe that the decision in Duncan's case (1) has been followed by English Courts, but sometimes the learned judges have expressed a. sense of dissatisfaction when they are called upon to decide
an individual dispute in the a.bsense of relevant and material documents. (Vide: Ellis v. Home Office (11)). Before we part with this topic we may also indicate that it appears that in the long history of reported
judicial decisions only on three occasions the right to (1) [1942) A,C, 624. (a) [19,53) t All E. R. 149. (1961J z96o inspect documents has been either theoretically asser- ted or actually execised in England. In Hennessy v.
l'he State of h Punjab right('), Field, J., observed that e would consider v. himself entitled to examine privately the documents Sodhi to the production of which the Crown objected, and to
Sukhd .. Singh endeavour by this means and that of questions k addressed to the objector to ascertain whether the fear •;••d•agad a• f. of injury to public service was the real motive in objecting.
In point of fact, however, the learned Judge did not inspect the documents. From the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Asiatic Petroleum Go., Ltd. v. Anglo-Persian Oil Go., Ltd.('), it appears
that Scrutton, J., had inspected the documents to the production of which an objection was raised. The learned judge has, however, added that having seen the documents he thought that the government may
be right in the view that they ought not to be pro- duced to others, and that he would not take the res- ponsibility of ordering them to be produced aga.inst the wishes of the government.
In Spigelmann v. Hocker & Anr. ('), Macnaghten, J., inspected the document to the production of which an objection was raised. The result of these decisions is that in England a valid certificate issued by the Minister in
support of the privilege claimed is conclusive; while in Scotland, though it would normally be treated as such, Courts reserve to themselves an inherent right to revise or review the certificate in a proper case.
It now remains to consider whether the High Court was right in holding that the privilege claimed by the appellant in respect of the four documents in question was not justified, and that takes us to the
consideration of the relevant facts in the present appeal. The documents of which discovery and ins- pection were claimed are thus described by the res- pondent: (1) Original order passed by Pepsu Government
on September 28, 1955, on the representation dated May 18, 1955, submitted by Sodhi Sukhdev Singh; (2) Original order passed by the Pepsu Government (1) (1888) 21 Q.B. 509. (o) [1916] 1 K.B. 8z2.
(3) (1933-34) I Times L.R. 87. on March 8/9, 1956, reaffirming the decision passed r96o on September 28, 1955, referred to above ; (3) Original order passed by the Pepsu Govern- The State of
Punjab ment in their cabinet Meeting dated August 11, 1956, v. revising their previous order on the representation of Sodhi Sodhi Sukhdev Singh dated May 18, 1955; and Sukhdev Singh
(4) Report of the Public Service Commission on the representation of Sodhi Sukhdev Singh dated May Ga;endragadkar J. 18, 1955, after the Pepsu Government's decision on September 28, 1955.
In dealing with this question and in reversing the order passed by the trial court by which the privilege had been upheld, the High Court has purported to apply the definition of the expression "affairs of
State" evolved by Khosla, J., as he then was, in the case of Governor-General in Council v. H. Peer Mohd. Khuda Bux &: Ors. (1) : "It is, therefore, sufficiently clear", said the learned judge, "that the expression
"affairs of State" as used in s. 123 has a restricted meaning, and on the weight of authority, both in England and in this country, I would define "affairs of State" as matters of a public nature in which the
State is concerned, and the disclosure of which will be prejudicial to the public interest or injurious to natio- nal defence or detrimental to good diplomatic rela- tions". It is this definition which was criticised by
Mr. Seervai on the ground that it purported to des- cribe the genus, namely, affairs of State, solely by reference to the characteristics of one of its species, namely, documents whose disclosure was likely to
cause injury to public interest. Having adopted this definition the High Court proceeded to examine whe- ther any injury would result from the disclosure of the documents, and came to the conclusion that it' was
difficult to sustain the plea that the production of the documents would lead to any of the injuries specified in the definition evolved by Khosla, J. On this ground the High Court allowed the contention of the respon-
dent and directed the State to produce the documents in question. We have already held that in dealing with the (1) A.I.R. 19,so East Punjab ai8, [1961) question of privilege raised under s. 123 it is not a
part of the Court's jurisdiction to decide whether the Th• 5141' •! disclosure of the given document would lead to any Punjab v. Sodhi SuAhtlsv Singh injury to public interest; that is a matter for the head
of the department to consider aud decide. We have also held that the preliminary enquiry where the character of the documents falls to be considered is GajendragadAar J. within the jurisdiction and competence of the Court, and we have indicated how within the narrow limits
prescribed by the second clause of s. 162 such an en- quiry should be conducted. In view of this conclusion we must hold that the High Court was in error in trying to enquire into the consequences of the dis-
closure; we may add that the decision of the High Court suffers from the additional infirmity that the said enquiry has been confined only to the specified classes of injury specified by Khosla, J., in his defini-
tion which cannot be treated as exhaustive. That being so, we think the appellant is justified in com- plaining against the validity of the decision of the High Court. Let us then consider whether the documents in
question do really fall within the category of docu- ments relating to "affairs of State". Three of the documents the discovery of which the respondent claimed are described as original orders passed by the
Pepsu Cabinet on the three respective dates. It is difficult to understand what was exactly meant by describing the said documents as original orders pass- ed on those dates; but quite apart from it the very
description of the documents clearly indicates that they are documents relating to the discussions that took place amongst the members of the Council of Ministers and the provisional conclusions reached by
them in regard to the respondent's .representation from time to time. Without knowing more about the contents of the said documents it is impossible to escape the conclusion that these documents would
embody the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Ministers and would indicate the advice ·which the Council ultimately gave to the Rajpra.mukh. It is hardly necessary to recall that advice given by the
Cabinet to the Rajpramukh or the Governor is ex- I96° pressly saved by Art. 163, sub.art. (3), of the Consti- The State of tution ; and in the case of such advice no further Punjab
question need to be considered. The same observa- v. tion falls to be made in regard to the advice tendered Sodhi by the Public Service Commission to the Council of Sukhdev Singh Ministers. Indeed it is very difficult to imagine how G . a –dk advice thus tendered by the Public• Service Commis-
aJen raga ar • sion can be excluded from the protection afforded by s. 123 of the Act. Mr. Gopal Singh attempted to argue that before the final order was passed the Council of Ministers had decided to accept the respondent's
representation and to reinstate him, and that, accord- ing to him, the respondent seeks to prove by calling the two original orders. We are unable to understand this argument. Even if the Council of Ministers
had provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council from reconsider- ing the matter and coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a final decision is reached by them and
is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted upon by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent. Until the final order is thus communicated to the respondent it would be
open to the Council to consider the matter over and over again, and the fact that they reached provisional conclusions on two occasions in the past would not alter the character of the said conclusions. The said
conclusions, provisional in character, are a part of the proceedings of the Council of Ministers and no more. The report received by the Cou~cil from the Publiq Service Commission carries on its face the character
of a document the disclosure of which would lead to injury of public interest. It falls in that class of docu- ment which "on grounds of public interest must as a class be withheld from production". Therefore, in
our opinion, the conclusion appears inescapable that the documents in question are protected under s.123, and if the head of the department does not give per- mission for their production, the Court cannot compel
the appellant to produce them. We should have sz [1961] stated that the two affidavits made by the Chief Sec- retary in support of the plea of the claim of privilege The State of satisfied the requirements which we have laid down Punjab
v. in our judgment, and no comment can be effectively Sodhi made against them. The argument that in its plead- Sukhdev Singh ings the appellant accepted the description of the res- pondent that the document contained orders is hardly
Gajendragadkar J. relevant or material. 1The affidavits show what these documents purport to be and that leads to the infe- rence which irresistibly follows from the very descrip-
tion of the documents given by the respondent him- self in his application by which he called for their production and inspection. Before we part with this appeal we may incident-
ally refer to another point which was argued at some length before us by both the learned counsel for inter- veners. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri contended that the provisions of s. 162 can be invoked only where a wit-
ness has been summoned to produce a document and a privilege is claimed by him in respect of it. Accord- ing to him the said provisions cannot be invoked where the Court is called upon to decide the validity
of the claim of privilege at the stage of inspection of the documents. In other words, where the State is a party to the suit and an application for inspection of documents is made against it by its opponent, and
a claim for privilege is put forward by the State, the Court is entitled under O. 11, r. 19, sub-s. (2), to inspect the documents for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege. That is
the clear provision of 0. 11, r. 19, sub-r. (2), and the power conferred on the Court by the said provision is not subject to s. 162 of the Act. This position is seriously disputed by Mr. Seervai.
The procedural law in regard to discovery, produc- tion and inspection of documents is contained in 0. 11, rr. 12, 21. It is true that O. 11, r. 19, sub-r. (2) provides that in dealing with a claim of privilege "it
shall be lawful for the Court to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding the validity of the claim of privilege". The question is, what is the effect of this provision when it is considered along with s. 162
of the Act? Before briefly indicating our conclusion on this .1960 Point we may observe that this contention does not The State of appear to have been raised in any judicial decisions
Punjab to which our attention was drawn. Indeed it appears v. generally to have been assumed that in the matter of Sodhi deciding a claim for privilege made by the State the Sukhdev Singh
provisions of s. 162 of the Act would apply whether G . d-dk 1 the said claim is made at the earlier stage of inspec- aJrn raga ar • tion or later when evidence is formally tendered.
That, however, is another matter. It is true that s. 162 in terms refers to a witness who is summoned to produce a document and pro- vides for the procedure which should be adopted and
the powers which should be exercised in dealing with a privilege claimed by such a witness; but there is no doubt that the provisions of the Act are intended to apply to all judicial proceedings in or before any
Court; that in terms is the result of s. 1 of the Act, and the proceedings before the Court under 0. 11, r. 19, are judicial proceedings to which prima facie s. 162 would apply. Similarly, s. 4, sub-s. (1), of the Code
of Civil Procedure provides, inter alia, that in the ab- sence of any specific provisions to the contrary noth- ing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or .otherwise affect any special or local law in force; that is to say,
in the absence of any provisions to the contrary the Evidence Act would apply to all the proceedings governed by the Code. Besides, it would be very strange that a claim for privilege to which O. 11, r. 19,
sub-r. (2), refers is allowed to be raised under s .. 1~3 of the Act, whereas, the procedure prescribed by the Act in dealing with such a claim by s. 162 is inappli- cable. If s. 123 of the Act applies and a claim for
privilege can be raised under it, prima facie there is no reason whys. 162 should not likewise apply, But apart from these general considerations the relevant scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure itself
indicates that there is no substance in the argument raised by Mr. Sastri. Order 27 prescribes the proce- dure which has to be adopted where suits are filed by or against the government; a plaint or written state-.
ment proposed to be filed by the government has to be [1961) r96o signed under r. 1 by such person as the government may by general or special order appoint in that Th~;~;:~ of behalf, which means that the government can only
v. act through its agent duly appointed in that behalf. Sodhi The Minister who is the political head of the depart- Sukhdev Singh ment or the Secretary who is its administrative head is not the government; and so whenever the govern-
. a;endragadhar l · ment sues or is sued and makes its pleadings it always acts through its duly authorised agents. The scheme of the relevant rules of 0. 27 is consistent with this position.
Section 30 of the Code empowers the Court either on its own motion or on an application of a party to issue summonses to persons whose attendance is requir- ed either to give evidence or produce document, and
to order that any fact may be proved by an affidavit. Order 4, r. 5, contemplates that, at the time of issuing the summons, the Court has to determine whether the summons should be for the settlement of issues only
or for the final disposal of the suit; and the relevant form of the summons (No. 1 in First Schedule, Appen- dix B) shows that in the case of a suit against the government of a State a summons can be issued to
compel the attendance of any witness and the produc- tion of any document. This shows that where the State is a party a summons may have to be issued to its appropriate officer calling upon him to produce the
documents for inspection. The provisions of rr. 14, 15 and 16 of 0. 11 show that affidavits have to be filed by the parties, and the filing of affidavits which is permitted by 0. 19 is undoubtedly one mode of giving
evidence. Order 16, r. 1, provides for the issue of a summons to persons whose attendance is required inter alia to produce documents; and r. 21 of the said order expressly provides that where any party to a
suit is required to give evidence or to produce a docu- ment the provisions as to witnesses shall apply to him so far as are applicable. Thus there can be little doubt that where a privilege is claimed at the stage
of inspection and the Court is required to adjudicate upon its validity, the relevant provisions of the Act under which the privilege is claimed as well as the pro- · z96a visions of s. 162 which deal with the manner in which
h b d d The State of t e said privilege has to e consi ere are equa y Punjab applicable; and if the Court is precluded from inspect- v. ing the privileged document under the second clause
Sodhi of s. 162 the said prohibition would apply as much to Sukhdev Singh a privilege claimed by the State through its witness t th t . l .. 1 . .1 l l . db 't tGajend1agadkar ]. a
e r1a as a pnv1 ege s1m1 ar y c a1me y I a the stage of inspection. It is hardly necessary to point out that a contrary view would lead to this manif~stly unreasonable result that at the stage of
inspection the document can be inspected by the Court, but not at the subsequent stage of trial. In our opinion, the provisions of 0. 11, r. 19, sub-r. (2), must, therefore, be read subject to s. 162 of the Act.
The result is that the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court set aside and that of the trial court restored with costs throughout. KAPUR, J.-I have read the judgment prepared by
Kap"' J. my learned brother Gajendragadkar, J., and agree with the conclusion but in my opinion the Court cannot take other evidence in regard to the nature of document, for which privilege is claimed, and my
reasons are these: In India the law of privilege in regard to official documents is contained in s. 123 of the Indian Evi- dence Act which has to be read with s. 162 of that Act. The various kinds of privileges claimable under
the Evidence Act are contained in Chapter IX, two sections amongst these are ss. 123 and 126, the former dealing with state privilege relating to "affairs of State" and the latter with communications with a
legal adviser. Ins. 123 the opening words are "no one shall be permitted ………… " and in the latter "no barrister etc., shall at any time be permitted ……….. ". In the other sections dealing with privilege the open-
ing words are "no person shall be compelled ………. ". This difference in language indicates that the legisla- ture intended to place the privilege of the State in regard to official documents on a different footing
than the other forms of privileges mentioned in the z960 Tiie State of Punjab v. Sodhi S~khdev Singh Kapur J. [1961] Act in so far as it put a ban on the court permitting any evidence of the kind mentioned in s. 123 from
being given, so that if, unwittingly any evidence men- tioned therein was sought to be given, the court would not permit it unless the other conditions were satisfied. In s. 123 the provision is against the giving of evi-
dence which is derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State except when the head of the department concerned in his discre- tion gives permission for the evidence to be given. The
important words are "derived", "unpublished" and "affairs of State". The word "derived" means coming out of the source and therefore refers to original as well as secondary evidence of documents whether oral
or documentary. The words "unpublished official records" are not very difficult of interpretation and must depend upon the circumstances of each case. If the record is shown to have already been published,
it ceases to be an unpublished record. But the diffi- culty arises as to the meaning of the words "affairs of State", because the ban is put on evidence derived from official documents relating to affairs of State. At
the time when the Indian Evidence Act was enacted, affairs of State were confined to governmental or poli- tical activities of Government, but with the expand- ing of the activities of the State, which, because of
the changed concept of the State, comprise also socio- economic, commercial and industrial activities the words "affairs of State" must necessarily have a much wider meaning than it originally had. But the langu-
age of the sections remains the same and so also the limitation on the giving of evidence derived from such documents and therefore what was considered to be within the discretion of the head of the department
to disclose or not to disclose still remains within his discretion and merely because the scope of the words "affairs of State" had been extended, the extent of the discretion has not thereby decreased or become
limited and the words "who shall give or withhold such permission as he thinks fit" indicate that the discretion to remove the ban vests in the head of the department and no one else.
The real difficulty arises in the interpretation of the words "affairs of State". What are they? How is the meaning of the words to be determined and by whom ? When a claim is made by a proper autho-
rity in a proper form, is that conclusive of the nature of the document or has the court to proceed to determine the efficacy of the claim by taking other evidence as to its nature or the effect of its dis-
closure. It was contended that the decision, whe- ther the document belongs to the category falling within the expression "affairs of State" or not has to be of the court and not of the official mentioned in
the section. In a way that is correct because the con- duct of the trial must always remain in the hands of the court but what is implied in the contention raised was that the court must first decide whether the docu-
ment belongs to the class comprised in the expression "affairs of State" and then the official concerned may give or withhold his consent. It was also submitted that in order to enable the court to determine the
validity of the claim of privilege the official concerned, when making the claim, may have to state the nature of the document or at least the nature of the injury to the public interests or to the efficient working of the
public service, as the case may be, which the dis- closure of the document or evidence derived there- from would result in. Section 162 of the Evidence Act was relied upon in support of the above contention. That section applies
to all documents in regard to which claim of privilege of any kind may be claimable including that falling under s. 123 and therefore the language of s. 162 had necessarily to be wide. It has been described as not
being clear by Bose, J., as he then was, in Bhaiya Saheb v. Ram Nath Rampratap Bhadupote (1). The section requires a witness summoned to produce a document to bring it to the court in spite of any objec-
tion which he may take to its production or to its admissibility and the court is empowered to decide both the questions. It is the next part which is relied upon in support of the contention that the court can
(1) I.L.R. [1940] Nag. :i40, 247. The State of P1mjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur ]. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur ]. [1961] take other evidence to decide both the questions of
production and the question of admissibility. The words are "the court, if it sees fit may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admis-
sibility". It was argued that this part of the section empowered the court to take other evidence not only to decide the question of admissibility of the do cu – ment but also its production. The language of this
part of the section does not lend support to this con- tention because it gives discretion to the court to in- spect the document or take other evidence to enable it to determine the admissibility of the document. The
interposing of the words "unless it refers to matters of State", has reference to privilege under s. 123 and therefore it disentitles the court to inspect the docu- ment. The sequence envisaged by the section is that
a witness summoned to produce a document is bound to bring it to the court. He may then take objection to its production under any of the sections, viz., 121 to 131 or he may object to its admissibility and both
these objections have to be decided by the court. Then comes the second part of the section. If the document refers to "matters of State"-there is no distinction in the meaning of the word "matters" and "affairs of
State"-then the court may not inspect the document, but if the document is not of that class, then the court can inspect it and if it finds any objection to the admissibility, it may take other evidence to deter-
mine its admissibility. To take a concrete case, if a. document is produced which is compulsorily registera- ble and it is not so registered, it would not be admissi- ble in evidence under s. 49 of the Registration Act,
but evidence may be led as to its admissibility forcer- tain purposes, e.g., s. 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act. If it refers to that class of documents then the second part of s. 162 becomes applicable, i.e., the court
may inspect the document which will help it in decid- ing the question of privilege and admissibility. But if a claim is properly made by a proper official on the ground that it refers to matters of State, the court
will stay its hands and refrain from inspecting it. The words "or to take ….. .its admissibility" on their plain language do not apply to production and conse- quently the taking of evidence must have reference to
the admissibility of the document. All the High Courts in India are in accord that the court will not inspect the document if it relates to matters of State. If that is so it would be difficult to
sustain the contention that it can decide the question whether the matter relates or does not relate to affairs of State. If the original cannot be inspected, no other evidence can be produced as to its contents. The effect
of this prohibition is not only as if the document had been destroyed, but as if it never existed. If that is the position, then it becomes difficult to see how the question of its production can be decided by the court
by ta.king other evidence or how the court can decide whether a particular document falls within the prohi- bition imposed by s. 123 of the Evidence Act. In this connection the words of Lord Kinnear in The Lord
Commissioner of the Admiralty v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Go., Ltd. (1) are quite apposite. It was there said: "I think it is not improbable that even if an offi- cer of the department were examined as a witness,
we should not get further forward, because the same reasons which induced the department to say that the report itself ought not to be produced might be thought to preclude the department from giving ex-
planation required". If the court cannot inspect the document, if no secondary evidence can be given as to its contents and if the necessary materials and the circumstances which would indicate the injury to the public interests
or detriment to the proper functioning of the services Qannot be before the court it cannot be in a position to decide whether the document relates to affairs of State or not and the logical conclusion would be that
the court is debarred from overruling the discretion of the head of the department concerned, because the court cannot say whether the disclosure or no~dis closure would be detrimental or not. If, on the other
(1) (1909) s.c. 335, 343· The Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur J. The Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur j. [1961] hand, the contention is accepted that the court can
decide by taking other evidence as to whether the document relates to the affairs of State then the dis- cretion to ban its production by the head of the department must necessarily become illusory. If the
court takes upon itself the task of deciding the nature of the document, then it will be taking upon itself the very grave duty of deciding a vital question as to what are the a.ffairs of State without having the neces-
sary material before it or without knowing the exigen- cies of the public service or the effect of the disclosure of the State secret or how far the disclosure will injure the public interests and it may thus unwittingly
become the instrument of giving publicity to some- thing which the head of the department considered injurious to the public interests, the law having given to the head of the department concerned to make this
determination. No doubt the discretion is wide and covers all classes of documents which may fall within the phrase "affairs of State", some noxious and others innocuous and may even appear to be unduly restric-
tive of the rights of the litigant but if that is the law the sense of responsibility of the official concerned and his sense of fair play has to be trusted. The second part of s. 162 therefore cannot be said to permit the
taking of other evidence, i.e., other than the document to determine the question of its production when it is of the category falling under s. 123. That part does not entitle the court to determine the nature of the
document or the adequacy of the reasons which impell- ed the proper official to claim privilege. It would be relevant to quote the observations of Isaacs, J., in Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Go. v. The Common-
wealth('): "I distinctly adverted to the necessary fact thl\t the right of discovery given to the litigant for the furtherance of public justice must be subject to the still higher consideration of the general welfare that the
order to make proper discovery does not destroy the privilege of public interest, and that . the ground of public policy may intervene and prevent the injury to (1) (1913) 16 C.L.R. 178, 201.
the community which coercive disclosure might pro- duce. If that were not so, every gun in every fort and every safe in the Treasury would be open through the medium of the Court to the observation of any
plaintiff of any nationality who could make a prima facie case of the infringement to which it was rele- vant. One of the authorities to which I referred in that connection was the judgment of Turner, L. J. in
Wadeer v. East India Co., 8 D.M. & G., 182 at p. 191 and that judgment is, I think, of great value in this case also". It will be helpful to refer to the law on the subject in England as laid down in English cases because the
basis of the Indian Law is the law of that country. The question of privilege has been described by Vis- count Simon L. 0., in Duncan v. Gammell Laird & Co., Ltd. (1) as a question of high constitutional importance
because it involves a claim by the Executive Govern- ment to restrict the material which might otherwise be available for the court trying the case and this description was repeated by the House of Lords in
the Scottish case Corporation of Glasgow v. Central Land Board (2). It may be the material which a party to the litigation may desire in its own interest and without which equal justice may be prejudiced. The
question of privilege may not only -arise in cases where the State is party to the suit but may equally arise where the contestants in a suit are private par- ties and whether as a party to the suit or not the
State may decline to produce a document. In Dun- can's case(1) the privilege of the crown, though it was described as not a happy expression, was upheld on the ground that the interest of the State must not be put
in jeopardy by the production of a. document which would injure it and which is also a principle to be observed in administering justice, "quite unconnected with the interests or claims of the particular parties in
litigation and, indeed, is a rule upon which the Judge should, if necessary, insist even though no objection is taken at all." The sort of grounds to afford justifi- cation for withholding the documents were given by
Viscount Simon as follows:- ( t) (1942] A.C. 624. {2) 1956 S.C. 1 (H.L.). The Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur ]. ,_ The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdeu Singh Kapur ].
[1961] "It would not be a good ground that, if they were produced the consequences might involve the department or the government in Parliamentary dis- cussion or in public criticism, or might necessitate the
attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing duties elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production might tend to expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to
lay the department open to claims for compensation. In a word, it is not enough that the minister or the department does not want to have the document pro- duced. The minister, in deciding whether it is his duty
to object, should bear these considerations in mind, for he ought not to take the responsibility of with- holding production except in cases where the public interest would otherwise be damnified e.g. where dis-
closure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relations or where the practice of keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service."
Thus the documents, which are protected from pro- duction, are those the production of which would be prejudicial to the public interests or those which belong to that class which as a matter of practice, are
kept secret for the proper maintenance of the efficient working of the public service. Objection has been taken to the authority of this rule enunciated by Viscount Simon L. C., on the
ground that it is in serious conflict with another princi- ple that the proper administration of justice is also a matter of public interest, i. e., "fiat justitia ruat caelum" but as was said by Viscount Simonds in
Glm!gow Corporation v. Central Land Board {1), "The paramountcy of the public interest has been recog- nized and preserved". This principle, which was re- enunciated by Viscount Simon, L. C., had been the
law of England for over a century before Duncan' a caae ('). In Earl v. Vaaa (') it was held that public officers are not entitled or compellable to produce written communications made by them officially rela-
tive to the character and conduct of a party applying (1) 1956 S.C. 1 (H.L.). (2) [19-12] A.C. 624. (3) (1822) 1 Sh. Sc. App. 229· for a. public office when the production is demanded
i96o in an action for damages against the writer. Lord 230 b d The State of Eldon, L. c., at P· 0 serve :- Punjab "I apprehend, in all cases in which it has been v. held, upon the principle of public policy, that you
Sodhi shall not be compellable to give evidence of, or produce · Sukhdev Singh such instruments-that is, wherever it is held you are not on grounds of public policy, to produce them-you
Kapur f. cannot produce them and that it is the duty of the judge to say you shall not produce them …… " Lord Eldon referred with approval to the decision in Home v. Lord William Bentinck (1) which was of the
year 1820. The principle there laid down was that production of instruments and papers must be shut out if it wa.s against public policy. At p. 919 the learned Chief Justice said:-
"It seems therefore that the reception of the minutes would tend directly to disclose that which is not permitted to be disclosed; and therefore, indepen- dently of the character of the court, I should say, on
the broad rule of public policy and convenience that these matters, secret in their nature, and involving delicate enquiry and the names of persons, stand pro- tected". The injury to public service was recognized in
Beatson v. Skene (9) where Pollock, C. R, said: "It appears to us, therefore, that the question, whether the production of the documents would be injurious to the public service, must be determined,
not by the Judge but by the head of the department having the custody of the papers; and if he is in attendance and states that in his opinion the produc- tion of the document would be injurious to the
public service, we think the Judge ought not to com- pel the production of it. The administration of jus- tice is only a part of the general conduct of the affairs of any State or Nation, and we think is (with respect
to the production or non-production of a State paper in a Court of Justice) subordinate to the general wel- fare of the community. If indeed, the head of the (1) (1820) 2 Brod. & B. 130:.n9 E.R. 907.
(2) (1860) s H. & N. 838: 157 E.R. 1415. The Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapu• ]. [1961] department does not attend personally to say that the production will be injurious but sends the documents
to be produced or not as the Judge may think proper, or as was the case in Dickson v. The Earl of Wilton beford Lord Campbell (reported in Foster and Finla- son's N. P. Rep., p. 425), where a subordiuate was sent
with the document with iustructions to object but nothing more, the case may be different." Martin B. did not entire'ly agree with the view of the other three learned Barons and he was of the opinion
that if the document could be produced without pre- judice to public service he ought to compel its pro- d.uction notwithstanding the reluctance of the head of the department to produce it. It was pointed out by
Pollock, C. B., that this might apply to extreme cases and "extreme cases throw little light on the practical rules of life". In Smith v. East India Oompany(1) which related to a commercial transaction as to the liability to pay
freight a similar privilege was upheld. It was argued that communications between officials and communi- cations between Directors and Board of Control were official correspondence and were privileged.
On appeal the Lord Chancellor held that in order that superintendence and control should be exercised effectively and for the benefit of the public it was necessary that unreserved communication should take
place between the East India Company and the Board of Control. In Homer v. Ashford(') which was of the year 1825, Best, C. J ., said:- "The first object of the law is to promote pub-
lic interest; the second to preserve the rights of in- dividuals". In this connection it may not be out of place to recall the striking language of Knight Bruce, V. C., quoted at p. 401 of Macintosh v. Dun (5) iu the judgment of
Lord Macnaughten:- "Truth like other good things, may be loved un- wisely-may be pursued too keenly-may cost too (1) (1841) I Ph. 50: 41 E.R. 550. (2) (1825) 3 Bing. 32'; 130 E.R. 537, 539·
(3) (1908) A. C. 390. much". And then he points out that the meanness and the mischief of prying into things which are regarded as confidential, with all the attending con- sequences, are "too great to pay for truth itself."
Thus the law as stated in these old English cases shows that what was injurious to the public interest or prejudicial to the proper functioning of the' public services was not to be disclosed and if the objection
was based on these grounds it must prevail. As to who was to determine this, the judge or the official, Pollock C. B. decided in favour of the official because the enquiry could not be held in private and if it was
held in public the mischief would have been done. Beatson v. Skene (1). It was with this background of the sta.te of the English law that Sir James Fitzjames Stephen drafted the law of evidence which was enacted into the
Indian Evidence Act (Act l of 1872). Scrutton, J., in Asiatic Petroleum Company Ltd. v. Anglo-Persian Oil Company Ltd. (2) which was a case between private parties inspected the document to
the production of which objection was taken, and having seen it he said that he would not take the responsibility of ordering it to be produced against the wishes of the Government. When the matter
was ta.ken in. appeal, Swinfen Eady, L. J., was of the opinion that the rule wa~ not confined to documents of political or administrative character. The foundation of the rule was that the information
cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interest and not that the document was confidential or official, and that if the production ·would be injuri- ous to the public service, the general public interest
must be considered paramount to the individual interest of the suitor. This was a. document which was written by the defendants, who owned a pipeline from Persia to their refinery in the Persian Gulf, to
their agents in Persia which contained confidential information from the Board of Admiralty. The Scottish cases have also upheld the privilege of the Crown in regard to production although it has
(1) (186o) $ H • .t N. 838; 157 E.R. 1415. (2) (1916] I K. 8. 8a2. The Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapu, ]. The State of Punjab v. SodAi Sukhdeu Singh Kapur ]. [1961] been stated that the inherent power of the court to
itself see the document and to override but not to review the certificate of the official of the department concerned has always exis,ted in Scottish courts. In Dunwn' s c,ase (1) Viscount Simon, L. C., quoted with
approval the observation of Lord Dunedin, the Lord President in the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty v. The Aberdeen Steam Trawling &: Fishing Co., Ltd. ('). That was ·a case where a Government department
objected to the production of the document on the ground that the production would be prejudicial to public services and it was held that the view of the government department was final and the court- will
refuse production even in action in which the Govern- ment department was a party. The objection there was ta.ken on an affidavit. At p. 340, the Lord Pre- sident (Dunedin) said:-
"lt seems to me that if a public department comes forward and says that the production of a document is detrimental to the public service, it is a very strong step indeed for the Court to overrule that statement
by the department. The Lord Ordinary has thought that it is better that he should determine the question. I do not there agree with him, because the question of whether the publication of a document is or is not
detrimental to the public service depends so much upon the various points of view from which it may be regarded, and I do not think that the Court is in pos- session of these various points of view. In other
words, I thin)!: that, sitting as Judges without other assistance, we might think that something was innocuous, which the better informed ::ifficials of the public department might think was noxious. Hence,
I think the question is really one for the department, and not for your Lordships". And Lord Kinnear agreed with Lord Dunedin and at p. 343 said:- "! agree that we cannot take out of the hands of
the Department the decision of what is or what is not detrimental to the public service. There are only two possible courses. We must either say that it is a good • (1) [194•) A.C. 6•4·
(') (1gog) S.C. 3:S.S. 3of3• …. ground of objection or we.must overrule it altogether. I do not think that we should decide whether it would be detrimental to the public service or not; and I
agree with what both your Lordships have said as to the position of the Court in reference to that question. We do not know the conditions under which the' pro- duction of the document would or would not be
injurious to the public service. I think it is not impro- bable that even if an officer of the Department were examined as a witness we should not get further for- ward, because the same' reasons which induced the
Department to say that the report itself ought not to be produced might be thought to preclude the Depart- ment from giving the explanations required. A depart- ment of Government, to which the exigencies of the
public service are known as they cannot be known to the Court, must, in my judgment, determine a. ques- tion of this kind for itself, and therefore I agree we ought not to grant the diligence."
In a later Scottish case Henderson v. M'Gown (1) where in a suit between private parties income-tax returns were sought to be produced, the court held that it had the power, in the exercise of its discretion, to order
production of documents in the custody of a public department in spite of its objection but in the circum- stances it did not 'order production as it was unneces- sary. Lord Johnston said at p. 826:-'-
"That is not to say that the court never can and never will overrule such a statement but merely that it would be a very strong step, and therefore a step for which the Court would require very grave justifica-
tion. The Admiralty and the War Office are charged with the duty of providing for the safety of the realm, and, if either say that the production of a document in their hands would be prejudicial to the public
interest, I think that we should naturally implicitly accept the statement. But there are distinctions bet- ween public departments. The interest of such a department as the Inland Revenue is that the public
should be able to rely on all returns to them and (1) (1916) S.C. S:n. The Slate of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur]. The Slate of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [1961) communications made to them being treated as con-
fidential. This also is the public interest." The latest Scottish case relied upon is a decision of the House of Lords in Gl,asgow Corporation v. Central Land Board (1). In that case privilege was claimed by
the Central Land Board on the ground that its pro- duction would adversely affect the public inter·ests. The question for decision was whether Scottish courts were bound to give effect to the certificate of the Se-
cretary of State or whether the court had an inherent jurisdiction not to review the certificate but to override it. The House of Lords was of the opinion that Duncan's case(') did not affect the Law of Scotland
and the Scottish courts possessed the inherent power to override the objections of the Minister and it did not exclude the court from making an order of produc- tion but in that case the power was not exercised.
Viscount Simonds, L. C., said at p. 10 that Duncwn's case(') had settled that according to the Law of Eng- land an objection validly taken to production of docu- ments on the ground that this would be injurious to
the public interest is conclusive but to cite the case of Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty (3) as authorita- tive without regard to the earlier cases and the later case of Henderson v. M'Gown (') must give an imper-
fect view of the law of Scotland. But even in Scotland the power had been rarely, very rarely, exercised by the courts; its exercise had been refused even where the result had been the prejudice of the private indivi-
dual and the paramountcy of the public interest had been recognised and preserved. (p. 11). Lord Normand observed that for a 100 years the uniform track of authority asserted the inherent power of the court to
disregard the crown's objection but the power had been seldom exercised; only the courts had emphati- cally said that it must be used with the greatest Ca.ution and only in special circumstances. In this
connection Lord Normand said at p.16:- "It was .also a firmly established rule that the courts could not dispute the certificate and that the (1) 1956 S.C. 1 (H.L.). \3) (1909) s.c. 33'- 343·
(2) [1942) A.C. 624. (4) (1916) S.C. Sax. question whether production would be contrary to public interest was for minister or the department concerned." Lord Radcliffe in his speech said that Duncan's case(1)
ought not to be treated as a decision which affected the law of Scotland. Dealing with the case before the court and the power reserved to the court to overrule the crown objection he said at p. 18:-
"I do not understand that the existence of the power involves that in Scotland, any more than in England, it is open to the court to dispute with the minister his view that production would be contrary
to the public interest is well founded or to arrive at a view, contradictory of his that production would not in fact be at all injurious to that interest. If weight is given to the argument that the Minister in forming
his view may have before him arange of considerations that is not open to the Court and that he is not under any obligation to set out these considerations in public, I think that it must follow that the Minis-
ter's view must be accepted by the Court as incapable of being displaced in by its own opinion". The view expressed in Admiralty Commissioners v. Aberdeen(9) was dissented from. After referring to another aspect of public interest
that impartial justice should be done in the courts of law, not least between citizen and Crown, the Lord Normand observed : "If in the past the power to disregard the objec- tion has hardly ever been exercised, that has been due,
I think, to a very proper respect for the Crown's posi- tion and to a confidence that objections of this nature would not be advanced, or at any rate persisted in, unless the case was one in which production would
involve material injury to the public welfare". Thus, g,s was said by Lord Normand, there is a diffe- rence between the law of England and the law of Scotland on an important constitutional question.
But in practice the difference was little as the exercise of the inherent power by the Scottish Courts had been rare. (1) [1942] A.C. 624. (2) (1909) s.c. 335, 343. The State of Punjab
v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur]. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh /(apur ]. [1961] As the Privy Council judgment in Robinson's case (1) was from Australia it will he useful to refer to two
Australian cases:- In .Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company Limited v. The Commonwealth(') where inspection was claimed of wireless telegraphic apparatus, Isaacs, J., in his minority judgment at p. 205 enunciated the following
propositions which are relevant for the purpose of the present case :- "(l) The rule of exclusion of State secrets applies, necessarily without distinction to the facts, documents
and other objects. This was admitted by Mr. Irvine, and is established by such cases as R. v. Watson 2 Stark, 116 at p. 148; R. v. Hardy 24 St. Tri. 199, at col. 753; R. v. Watson 32 St. Tri. 1, at cols. 100-101.
(2) The rule proceeds on the same grounds whe- ther the parties called on to produce the documents, &c., are or are not parties to the suit, that is, on the grounds of the prejudice to the public interests, which
production would occasion (per Turner, L. J. in Wadeer's case S, D. M. & G., 1882; Admiralty Com- missioners v. Aberdeen Trawling Go. (1909) Sess. Ca., 335. (3) The right to protection depends upon the
"character" of the documents, &c. (ib.). (4) If the documents, &c., are prima facie private, as where they are in private hands then in the ab- sence of Ministerial claim for protection, the Court, in
case of objection by the private defendant on the ground of public policy, will ascertain their character that is, whether they are really governmental and, if they are, the next succeeding paragraph applies :
Smith v. East India Company I Ph. 50. (5) If the documents, &c., are of a political that is, a governmental "character", then even in the ab- sence of any Ministerial claim for protection, it is the
duty of the Court, on objection by private person holding them, to ascertain whether public preju- dice will or may ensue from production, and, if it appears that public policy requires confidence between
the objector and the Government, they are presumed (1) [1931] A.C. 704. (z) (,lg13) 16 C.L.R. 178,201. prima facie to be confidential: Smith v. East India Company I Ph. 50 and per Wills, J. in Hennessy v.
Wright 21Q.B.D.509, 518-519. (6) If either by proof or undisplaced presumption confidence is required, then it is a rule of law, not of discretion, that the documents shall be excluded:
Marks v. Beyfus 25 Q.B.D. 494 at pp. 498-500; Stace v Griffith L.R. 2 P. C., 420 at p. 428. · (7) If the documents, &c., are in fact "State documents'', that is, "in possession of a government
department'', and the Minister having custody of them assures the Court that public prejudice will or may ensue from production, that, in the absenc~ of what are called extreme cases and are practically
negligible, is conclusive evidence of their character, that is, that they are confidential public documents, and that such prejudice will or may ensue, and the Court must act upon it: Stace v. Griffith L.R. 2 P.C.
420 at p. 428; Beatson v. Skene 5 H. & N. 838; The Bellerophon 44 L. J. Adm. 5; Hughes v. Vargas 9 R. 661; Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XI, p. 85 ; Taylor on Evidence, 10th ed., pp. 673, 674; Powell on
Evidence, 9th ed., p. 273. Conclusiveness in such a case is not unique. Even a private claim for privilege in an ordinary affidavit of documents is (with certain exceptions immaterial here), taken as conclusive with
respect even to the grounds stated for claiming pri- vilege; See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XI, p. 61 and Morris v. Edwards 15 App. Cas. 309." The learned Judge dealing with the matter of privi-
lege in public interest and the principles based on prevention of injury to the community observed at p.203: "Such a doctrine is inherent in all systems of law; for the first requirement of every organised
society is to live, and so far as possible to live securely, ·and the next is to live with the greatest advantage to the community at large ; and to these essentials the strict administration of justice in particular cases
amongst members must yield." Thus the principle is that private inconvenience must yield to public interest; in other words Fiat justitia The Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh
Kapu• ]. z960 1.,is State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur]. [1961) ruat coelum is not always the right of a suitor because the proper maxim applicable is salus populi suprema
est lex which transcends all other considerations. The majority of the Court in that case had held that there was nothing to warrarit the conjecture that the inspection could disclose anything that could reason-
ably be called secret in any sense of the word. The matter was taken to the Privy Council but special lea\'e to appeal was refused. The Lord Chancellor there said :-(See Griffins case, 36 C.L.R. 378, 386)
"Of course the Minister's statement or certificate must be conclusive on a particular document. How can it be otherwise? …………………… If the Minister certifies quite specifically, his certificate is to be taken as conclusive. The ground on which special leave to
appeal was refused in that case appears to have been that, having regard to the form of the order, which carefully limited the right of inspection and reserved liberty to apply, it was not a convenient case in which
to raise a great question of principle." In Griffin v. The State of South Australia(') objec- tion to the production for inspection of documents was upheld on the ground that the statement of the
Attorney General for the State that their production for inspection would be prejudicial to the public inte- rest is conclusive. That was a case in which inspec- tion of documents was sought in an action brought in
the High Court of Australia by the plaintiff against the State of South Australia to recover damages for negligent storage of wheat. Knox, C. J., in the course of his judgment referred to the observations of the
Lord Chancellor in Marconi's case(') which have been quoted above. Isaacs, J., reiterated his previous opinion. Starke, J., was doubtful and he was of the opinion that there was no reason why the courts
should not use the power confided in them for dis- covery. If some real doubt was established as to the accuracy of the Minister's statement there was no reason for refusing the power in a proper case parti-
cularly when the commercial activities of the Govern- ment were becoming more and more extensive and (1) (1925) 36 C.L.R. 378. (2) (1913) 16 C.L.R. 178, 201. ~i i • the sphere of political and administrative action
correspondingly wider. He was also of the opinion that the courts should be able to fully protect the public interests and do nothing to imperil them. The learned Judge in that particular case was not fully
satisfied with the affidavit of the Minister; The matter of privilege· in Australia was taken to the Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Aus- tralia (1). This case arose out of an action similar to
Griffin's case (9) and a similar privilege was claimed. The Privy Council was of the opinion that the Minis- ter's minute was inadequate to support the claim of privilege but it had not been lost by the inefficiency
of the form in which it was claimed and the matter was a proper one for the court to exercise its power of inspection for which privilege was sought in order to determine whether their production will be pre-
judicial to public interest or to the efficient working of the public services. Lord Blanesburgh said at p. 714:- " As the protection is claimed on the broad principle of State policy and public convenience, the
papers protected, as might have been expected, have usually been public official documents of a political or administrative character. Yet the rule is not limited to these documents. Its foundation is that the infor-
mation cannot be disclosed without injury to the pub- lic interests and not that the documents are confiden- tial or official, which alone is no reason for their non- production: See Asiatic Petroleum Go. v. Anglo-Per-
sian Oil (1916) 1 K. B. 822, 829-830 and Smith v. East India Go. 1 Ph. 50." and at p. 715 it was observed:- "It must not be assumed from these observations of the Lord Justice that documents relating to the
trading, commercial or contractual activities of a State can never be claimed to be protected under this head of privilege. It is conceivable that even in con- nection with the production of such documents there
may be "some plain overruling principles of public interest concen1ed which cannot be disregarded"." (1) [1931] A,C, 1o+ (2) (1925) 36 C.L.R. 378, The State of Punjab Sodhi Sukhdev Singh
/(apur j. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdeu Singh Kapur ]. (1961] After referring to various cases that have been set out above the Privy Council was of the opinion that the court was entitled to prescribe in any particular
case the manner in which the claim of privilege should be made. It may accept unsworn testimony of the Minister in one case but in another where the circum- stances seems to be to so require call for an affidavit
from him. It may be that objection merely on ground of public policy may not be sufficient but it ought to appear that the mind of a responsible Minister had been brought to bear on the question of expediency
in the public interest of giving or refusing the infor- mation asked for. This would be a guarantee that the opinion of the Minister which the court is asked to accept is one which has not been expressed inadvi-
sedly or as a matter of mere departmental routine but is one put forward with the solemnity necessarily attaching to the sworn statements and that the privi- lege could not be asserted in relation to documents
the contents of which had already been published. In that particula'r case the Minister had merely stated that he had considered this mass of documents and not that he had read them and considered each one of
them. Lord Blanesburgh said at p. 722:- "In view specially of the fact that the documents are primarily commercial documents he should have condescended upon some explanation of the particular
and far from obvious danger or detriment to which t,he State would be exposed by their production. Above all, and especially in view of the last para- graph of the minute, the claim was one which should
have been put forward under the sanction of an oath by some responsible Minister or State official." Continuing it was observed that there may be some among the scheduled documents to which privilege
may be genuinely attached and to give inspection of which without more would destroy the protection of the privilege and therefore it would or might be con- trary to public interest to deprive the State of oppor-
tunity of regularising its claim to protection. The Board would have given this advice had it not been for the fact that it would have involved serious delay without advancing further the final solution of the
question. The case was therefore remitted to the The State of Supreme Court with a direction that it was a proper Punjab v. Sodhi one for the exercise by that court of the power of
inspecting documents. The Privy Council was care- ful to add that the Judge in giving his decision as to S 14khdev Singh any document would safeguard the interests of the J{ap .. r J.
State and would not resolve the doubt against the State without further enquiring from the Minister. In that case also the paramountcy of the consideration of public interest was recognized but as the privilege
was not properly claimed and the document related to commercial activities of the State and it would have involved unnecessary prolongation of the action the Privy Council remitted the case for the court to
exercise its power of inspection under the Rules and Orders of the court but with the further direction of safeguarding the interest of the State. In Duncan v. Gammell Laird & Co. (1), the Court of
Appeal held that the affidavit of the First Lord of Admiralty was conclusive if it stated that such pro- duction would be contrary to public interest, and the order for production was therefore refused. Du
Parcq, L. J., pointed out that the Privy Council case (Robinson's case (2)) was not the final word on the subject in regard to production. The House of Lords , in appeal did not agree with the judgment of the
Privy Council and it is significant that two of the seven Law Lords in the House of Lords were parties to the Privy Council judgment. The House of Lords held that the affidavit of the Minister was conclusive
and that inspection of a document by a court in pri- vate would be communicating with one party to the exclusion of the other and it accepted the principle that if it was prejudicial to the public interests or the
document belonged to that class of documents which are kept secret for the proper functioning of the pub. lie services the production of the document would be refused. It was recognized in that case that it is the
Judge who is in control of the trial and not the executive but the proper ruling for the judge to give (1) [1942] A.C. 624. (2) [1931] A.C. 704. The Slate of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh
Kapur ]. [1961) would be that an objection validly taken to the pro- duction on the ground of its being injurious to public interest is conclusive. The English cases which were decided after the
pronouncement of the House of Lords in Duncan's case (1) naturally followed the decision of the House of Lords. In Ellis v. Home Office (2) where a prisoner who had been attackep. in jail by another prisoner
who was a mental case asked for certain reports and privilege was claimed, the privilege was upheld but it was said that although it was essential that Govern- ment department should be entitled to claim privi-
lege against disclosure of documents on the ground of public interest the ambit of privileges should be care- fully scrutinized and each document should be exa- mined. It may be mentioned that in that case Dev-
lin, J., felt grave concern about the claim of this pri- vilege because the result was that documents were to be treated as destroyed and no secondary evidence could be led and this concern of the trial judge was
. shared by the Court of Appeal. In Broome v. Broome (3) which was a defended suit for divorce, the wife wanted certain documents of the Soldiers', Sai- lors' and Airmen's Families Association but the Secre-
tary of State issued a certificate in which he stated that the production would not be in public interest. It was held that Crown privilege from disclosure attach- ed to all documents irrespective of where they origi-
nated or in whose custody they reposed provided that they had emanated from or came into the possession of some servant of the Crown. In Auton v. Rayner & Ors. (') it was pointed out at
page 572 that the sole concern of the Minister was whether the interests of the State in the sphere for which he was responsible would be affected and there- fore the documents or evidence should be withheld
from the court. It was added that the Minister should accept and recognize that the p:roper adminis- tration of justice would be impeded or may be un- attainable if any document or any evidence was with-
held. In that case an action was brought against the (1) [1942] A.C. 624. (2) (1953] 2 All E. R. 149. (3) (1955) 1 All E.R. 201 (4) (1958) 3 All E.R. 566. —; j defendants, one of whom was a Police Officer, charg.
ing them with conspiracy to injure and defraud him, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The documents required by the plaintiff were reports made by the Police Officer to his superior officers and the
communication which passed between the Metropolitan Police Force and other police force and the Secretary of State swore an affidavit indicating that the document should be withheld from production and that he had
formed an impartial judgment that in the public inte- rest and for the proper functioning of the public ser- vices the document should be withheld. The Court of Appeal held that the determination of the Secre-
tary of State ought reasonably to be accepted and that the affidavit was, in the circumstances, conclu- sive. The law in England may thus be summed up :- (1) That a document need not be produced for ins-
pection either on discovery or at the trial when ob- jection is taken by the Minister that disclosure of the document would be contrary to public policy or detri- mental to public interest or services. This privilege
attaches irrespective of where the document originates or in whose custody it is provided it emanated from or came into possession of some servant of the crown ; (2) the privilege can be claimed or waived by the
authority of the Minister or the head of the depart- ment; (3) secondary evidence may not be given of a document for which privilege is established; (4) official correspondence per se is not privileged
on the ground of its being confidential or official nor is it a valid ground that production would involve the Government in criticism or expose want of efficiency in the administration or open up claims to compensa-
tion but the ground for privilege is that the produc- tion would be detrimental to the interest of the public or interfere· with the efficient working of the public service or it belongs to class of documents which it is
the practice of the department to keep secret; (5) the minister's objection may be conveyed by a letter or by the official who attends at a trial but The State oj Punjab v. Sotlhi
Sukhtlsv Singh Kapur ]. Tll1 Slate of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur]. [1901] the court may require an affidavit by or the attend- ance of the Minister; (6) before a privilege is claimed it is desirable
that each document should be examined by the department concerned and inspection permitted of all documents which cannot harm the public interest; (7) if a minister claims privilege the court will
accept his statement and ought not to examine the document to see if the objection is well founded; (8) public interest must not be put in jeopardy by the production of a document which could injure it
and the court should, if necessary, prohibit the pro- duction even though no objection has been taken by the Government department. It may be pointed out that the privilege was expres-
sly reserved when by the Civil Proceedings Act, 1947, the Crown was made liable to give discoverv in civil proceedings. It is no doubt true and it must be recognized that the administration of public justice is also a part of
public interest but as was pointed out by Viscount Simon L. C. in Duncan's case (1) the interest of the State is the interest of the citizen and if the former suffers the interest of the litigant also suffers and
therefore public interest transcends the individual interest of a citizen. In Duncan's case(') it was em. phasised that the Minister in deciding whether it was his duty to object should bear in mind the considera.
tions which justify withholding production, i.e., the public interest would otherwise be damnified, i.e., the disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relations or where the practice of
keeping a class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service. And that is the safeguard which both in England and India the law seems to have found sufficient for the protection
of an individual's rights. Even in Scotland where the inherent right of the courts to override official discre- tion has been recognized the occasions for the exercise of that power have indeed been rare and even in the
(1) [1942] A.C. 624. latest case Glasgow Corporation v. Land Board (1) that position was reiterated. Although the concensus of opinion in India is that under the second part of s. 162 the court will not in-
spect the document if it relates to matters of State yet there is a. track of decision which has t~ken the view that it is not for the head of the department claiming the privilege but for the court to decide
whether the document falls within the category men- tioned in s. 123. But in some other cases a different view has been taken. A reference to cases which fall on both sides of the line will be helpful.
In Irwin v. Reid (9) Mukherjea, A. C. J., held that the language of .s. 123 showed that the court cannot be invited to discuss the nature of the document and the public official concerned and not the court is to
decide whether the evidence referred to shall be given or withheld. "If a.ny other view were taken, the mis- chief intended to be averted would take place, as the judge could not determine the question without ascer-
taining the contents of the document, and such inquiry, if it did take place must, for obvious reasons, take place in public: Beatson v. Skene (3), Hennessy v. Wright (4), J ehangir v. Secretary of State (5).
The result practically is, that if the objection is raised by a proper authority the court cannot compel disclosure by primary or by secondary evidence." The Lahore High Court in Khawja Nazir Ahma.d v.
Emperor (6) held that the head of the department who is in possession of the documents is the sole judge of the fact whether the documents should be protected from production on the ground of their being related
to affairs of State and therefore though the decision would be that of the court, it would have to rule in favour of the privilege claimed by the head of the department. It wa.s also held that the interests of the
State must not be put in jeopardy by production of documents which would injure them and that was a principle to be observed in administering justice and (1) (1956) S.C. l (H. L.)
(2) (1921) I.L.R. 48 Cal. 304. (3) (186o) 5 H. & N. 838; 157 E.R. 1415. (4) (1888) 21 Q.B,D. 509. (S) (1903) 6 Bom. L.R. 131, 16o. (6) I.L.R. [1945] Lah, 219. The Stale of P1mjab v.
Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapu• ]. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur j. [1961] indeed a rule on which the judge should insist even though no objection is taken at all. In that case there
were certain confidential files of the Special Enquiry Agency containing notes, correspondence etc., relatincr to the case and containing a record of statements of various persons and a proper affidavit had been filed
by the head of the department stating that the pro- duction would be injurious to public interests. Abdul Rahman, J., said "I feel convinced in my mind that the objection as to its production apart from its ad-
missibility (e.g., for want of registration or contraven- ing the rule as to when secondary evidence of a docu- ment can be admitted-if the document is merely a copy and not original) can only be decided by its ins-
pection by the Court followed as it must necessarily have been by an order for its production, although not in the sense of its contents having been disclosed to the party summoning the document at any rate at
that stage. If the Court is debarred under the statute from inspecting it, I cannot see how the objection as to its production can otherwise be decided". In I. JJ!. Lal v. Sec-retary of State(') this privilege was upheld.
In that case it was held that s. 162 divided the privi- lege of documents into two categories. At p. 212 Abdul Rashid, J. (as he then was) observed:- "The Court can inspect documents for the pur-
pose of deciding the question of privilege only if those documents do not refer to matters of State. In other words an exception is made in respect of documents that refer to matters of State. Such documents can-
not be inspected by the Court while all other docu- ments for which privilege is claimed are open to ins- pection by the Court for the purpose of deciding the validity of the obj!lction regarding privilege."
The Bombay High Court in re Mantubhai Mehta(') in construing ss. 123, 124 and 162 has held that the officer summoned tq produce the document is bound to bring it and if he takes objection to its production
it is for the court to decide whether the objection is well founded or not but the court is not entitled to inspect it. This track of reasoning suffers from the (1) A.l.R. 1944 Lah. 209.
(•) .r.L.R. [•94S] Bom. 122. 2 s.c.R .. SUPREME COURT 'REPORTS same difficulty that has been pointed out that without looking at the document and taking into consideration the wide words of s. 123 it becomes difficult to hold
that the court can decide as to whether the document relates to "affairs of State" and whether it should or should not be produced. In that Bombay judgment the learned Judge referred to the observations of
Viscount Simon, L.C., in Duncan's case (1 ). Besides the learned Judge also referred to s. 124 the effect of which is not the same as of s. 123 of the Evidence Act. Bhagwati J. (as a Judge of the Bombay High
Court) in R.M.D. Chamarbaghwala v. Y. R. Parpia (2) held that the court cannot inspect the document in order to determine whether they are unpublished offi. cial records relating to any affairs of State, but its
jurisdiction to determine is not taken away by s. 162 and it is for the court to decide the question of pro- duction by taking all the circumstances into considera- tion barring inspection of the document. The learned
Judge mainly referred to Robinson's case (8) and it appears that the learned Judge was not satisfied as to the documents being unpublished but the criterion he laid down was that only such documents are privileg-
ed which relate to affairs of State and the disclosure of which would be detrimental to public interest. The question really is the same as to who is to decide whe- ther it is "matters" of "affairs of State".
The Calcutta High Court in a later judgment in Ijjat Ali Talukdar v. Emperor(') took a contrary view . different from its older view and held that the court is to decide whether conditions precedent to ss. 123 &
124 have been established. That was a case under the Excise Act and the Excise Commissioner was called upon to produce certain documents. The Com- missioner claimed privilege under s. 123 on the ground
that the files contained unpublished official records relating to affairs of State and Das J., as he then was, was of the opinion that the occasion for claiming pri- vilege under s. 123 arose when it was sought to give
evidence derived from unpublished official records (1) [1942] A.C. 624, (3) [1931] A.C. 704. (2) A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 230. (4) I.L.R. [1944) I Cal. 410. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdeu Singh
Kapur j. The Stale of Put1jab v. Sodhi Suhhdev Singh Kapur ]. [1961] relating to any public affairs which was a condition precedent. He then referred to s. 124 of the Evidence Act. The second pa.rt of s. 162 provided the method
or means to enable the court to decide the question,_ namely, by inspecting the document or by taking other evidence. Although the court was disentitled from inspecting the document, the duty of deciding the
question was still on the court. At p. 419 the learned Judge observed:- "ln case of documents relating to affairs of State it may be difficult for the Court to decide the question,
yet it need not be necessarily impossible for the Court to do it. Ordinarily no difficulty will arise, because heads of dep:i.rtments or public officers are not expect- ed to act capriciously and ordinarily the Court will
accept their statement. If necessary, the Court will require the officer to claim the privilege in the manner indicated in the Judgment of Lord Blanesburgh in the Australian case. If, however, the Court finds that an
over-zealous officer is capriciously putting forward a claim of privilege, the Court will decide, as best as it can, by the means available to it, whether the claim is well founded."
As has already been said above the second part does not afford the means or methods to the Court to decide the question of privilege. The only method is inspection and that is denied to the court in cases fall-
ing under s. 123. The second case which is on the other side of the line is the judgment of Bose J., as he then was, in Bhaiya Baheb v. Ramnath Rampratap Bhadupote ('). In that case the learned Judge was of the opinion
that the insertion of the words "unless it refers t!o matters of State" in the middle of the para.graph seemed to indicate that the court might not inspect the document in respect of which the privilege was
claimed until it had opportunity of determining upon its admissibility and for that purpose it could take other evidence which meant evidence other than the document produced. This line of reasoning is similar
to that adopted in Ijjat Ali's (•) case. (1) I.LR. [1940] Nag. 240, 247. (2) I.L.R. [1944] 1 Cal. 410. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosuu- tor, Andkra v. Damera Venkata Narsayya(1) was of
the opinion that when an objection under s. 123 is taken the court has no power to inspect the document but may take other evidence for the purpose of decid- ing the objection and if it comes to the conclusion
that the evidence will be derived from the unpu~lish ed records relating to the affairs of the State the objection will have to be upheld and it will be left to the head of the d~partment to give or withhold the
permission and the criterion for the head of the department was whe~her or not the disclosure would cause injury to public interest and he :was the sole judge of the matter with which the court cannot
interfere. This case does not support the contention of the respondent. The Patna High Court in Lolckuram Hariram v. The Union of India (11) held that the head of the depart- ment must first examine the document and he may
then raise an objection but he is not absolved from the obligation of appearing in court and satisfying the court that the objection taken is valid and the court ma.y require him to give an affidavit or further
questions may be put in regard to the validity of the claim but the court is not entitled to inspect the docu- ment. A. P. Srivastava, J., in Tilka &: Ors·. v. State (9) held that under s. 162 of the Evidence Act the court
may inspect a document unless it relates to affairs of State and in such a case it will have· to take other evi- dence relating to the nature of the document. The words of s. 123 are very wide; and the discre·
tion to produce or not to produce a document is given to the head of the department and the court is prohi- bited from permitting any evidence to be given which is derived from any unpublished documents relating
to affairs of State. Section 162 does not give the power to the court to call for.other evidence which will indicate the nature of the document or which will {r) I.L.R. [1957) And. Prad. 174.
(11) A.I.R. 1g6o Pat. 192. (3) A.I.R. 1g6o All. 543· The Stat• of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdov Singh I{apur ]. The Stat1 oj Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Kapur ]. Sub a Rao ]. (1961] have any reference to the reasons impelling the head
of the department to withhold the document or documents. In the very nature of things when the original cannot be looked at and no secondary evi- dence is allowable the court will only be groping in
the dark in regard to the nature of the document or the evidence. The correct way of looking at the Indian statute, therefore, is to interpret in the manner which is in accord with the English law, i.e., the court
has not the power to override ministerial certificate against production. It is permissible for the court to determine the col- lateral facts whether the official claiming the privilege
is the person mentioned in s. 123, or to require him to file proper affidavit or even to cross-examine him on such matters which do not fall within the enquiry as to the nature of the document or nature of the injury
but he may be cross-examined as to the existence of the practice of the department to keep documents of the class secret but beyond that ministerial discretion should be accepted and it should neither be reviewed
nor overruled. ]'or these reasons I concur in the decision that this appeal must be allowed. SUBB.A. R.A.o, J.-I have perused the judgments pre- pared by my learned brethren, Kapur and Gajendra-
gadkar, JJ. I agree with them in maintaining the claim of privilege in regard to the three items describ- ed as "original orders" passed by the PEPSU Govern- ment, but regret my inability to agree with them in
regard to the report of the Service Commission. This appeal raises the question of the scope and content of the law of privilege attached to affairs of State and the procedure to be followed for ascertain-
ing it. The facts are fully stated in the said judg- ments and I need not restate them; but I would prefer to give my own reasons for my conclusion. It.would be convenient at the outset to clear the
ground. The arguments at the Bar have covered a wide field, but we are not concerned here with the law of pri- vilege pertaining to the field of discovery and inspection of documents. We are called upon only to decide its
scope during the trial of a. suit when a witness, who is summoned to produce a. document, claims privilege on the ground that the document relates to affairs of State. I should not be understood to have expressed
any opinion on the difficult question whether when the defendant is a State, the Court is not entitled to inspect the documents under O. XI, rule 19(2), Code of Civil Procedure. The question falls to be considered on a true con-
struction of two of the provisions of the Indian Evi- dence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called t'h.e Act), namely, ss. 123 and 162. They read: Section 123: "No one shaU be permitted to give
any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State, except with the per- mission of the officer at the head of the department concerned, who shall give or withhold such permission
as he thinks fit.'' Section 162: "A witness summoned to produce a document :shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admis-
sibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court. The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other
evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibi- lity. If for such a purpose it is necessary to cause any document to be translated, the_ Court may, if it thinks fit, direct the translator to keep the contents secret,
unless the document is to be given in evidence; and if the interpreter disobeys such direction, he shall be held to have committed an offence under section 166 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1869)."
The relevant parts of the foregoing sections may be summarized thus: Section 123 prohibits the giving of any evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to affairs of State except with the
permission of the officer at the head of the depart- ment; whiles. 162 enjoins on a. witness summoned to produce a document to bring it to Court a.nd empowers 1·he Slate oj Punjab
v. Sodhi Sukkdev Singh Subba Rao]. Tiie State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Svbba Rao j. [1961] the Court to decide on the validity of any objection raised in respect of its production or admissibility.
The argument of the Advocate-General is that the words "affairs of State" mean "the business of State", and, therefore, evidence derived from any unpublish- ed official document relating to that business cannot
be given as evidence except with the permission of the head of the department concerned, and that the Court under s. 162 of the Act must automatically accept the affidavit filed by the head of the depart-
ment claiming such a privilege. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, defines the words "affairs of State" only to take in documents whose production would be against public interest, confines
the power of the head of a department to permit or withhold the user of such a document in evidence, and sustains the Court's power to decide the question of privilege in respect of such a document on relevant
materials without inspecting the document. The crucial words in s. 123 are, "unpublished official records relating to any affairs of State". Under that section no one shall be permitted to give any
evidence derived from such records except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned. The words "affairs of State" have not been defined. Though in s. 123 the words used are
"affairs of State", in s. 162 the words used are "mat- ters of State". There does not appear to be any prac- tical difference between the two sets of words. In Shorter Oxford Dictionary, III edition (1956), "matter"
has been defined as "a thing, affair, concern" and "affairs of State" as "public business". These Dictio- nary meanings do not help to decide the content of the said words. The content of the said words, there-
fore, can be gathered only from the history of the pro- vision. It has been acknowledged generally, with some exceptions, that the Indian Evidence Act was intended to and did in fact consolidate the English
Law of Evidence. It has also often been stated with justification that Sir James Stephen has attempted to crystallize the principles contained in Taylor's work into substantive propositions. In case of doubt or
ambiguity over the interpretation of any of the sec- tions of the Evidence Act we can with profit look to the relevant English common law for ascertaining their true meaning. In English common law the words
"affairs of State" do not appear. The basis of the doctrine of Crown privilege is the injury to the public interests. The Judicial Committee in Robinson v. St.ate of South Australia (1) says a.t p. 714,
"The principle of the rule tis concern for public interest, and the rule will accordingly be applied no further than the attainment of that object requires." The House of Lords in Duncan v. Gammell Laird,&:
Co. (11) restated the same idea. when it observed that the State -should not withhold the producticc;m of docu- ments except in cases where the public interest would otherwise be da.mnified.
The earlier decisions of . the English courts indicate that the Crown. privilege was sustained only in regard to documents pertaining to matters of administration, defence, and foreign relations whose disclosure would
be against the public interest: see .Home v. Lord F. C. Bentinck (8), Smith v. The East India Company {4) and Bwison v. Bke:ne (5). The decisions of the High Courts in India. over a
long period of time consistently gave the same mean. ing to the said words. It may also be stated that in and a.bout the time when the Evidence Act was passed, the concept of a. welfare State had not evolved in
India and as such the words "affairs of State" could not have been, at that time, intended to take in the commercial or the welfare activities of the State. But when the words a.re elastic there is no reason why
they should not ;be so construed a.s to include such activities also, provided the condition of public injury is also satisfied. It is, therefore, clear that the words "affairs of State" have acquired a. secondary meaning,
namely, those matters of State whose disclosure would cause injury to the public interest. h) [r931] A.C. 104· (2) (1942] A.C. 624 . . (3) (182012 Brod. & B. 130: 129 E.R. 907. (4) (184r) 1 Pb. 50; 41 E.R. (Chancery) 550.
(5) (I86o) SH. &. N. 838. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Subba Rao J. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Subba Rao J. [1961] The learned Advocate-General contends that this
construction, if accepted, would give a meaning to the provisions of s. 123 of the Act which would be contrary to its tenor. He classifies documents relating to "affairs of State" into noxious and innocuous docu-
ments, and contends that documents, whose disclosure would affect the public interest, are noxious docu- ments and that if the records which relate to the affairs of State mean only' noxious documents, the said
construction would bring out a result directly opposite to that contemplated by the section. When the sec- tion intends to prohibit the disclosure of noxious documents, the argument proceeds, the construction
enables their disclosure if the head of the department permits it. Shortly stated, his contention is that the expression "affairs of State", that is, business of State, is the genus and the document, the disclosure of
which is against the public interest, is the species, and that the head of the department is only empowered to permit the disclosure of documents falling outside the said species. This argument is apparently logical
and rather attractive, but it is an oversimplification of the problem and is based upon a disregard of the legislative history and the long track of decisions of this country. If accepted, it enlarges the scope of the
said privilege to such an extent that in effect and substance the control of the admissibility of docu- ments shifts from the Court to the State or its subor- dinate officers, for every document relating to the
business of State would be a privileged document un- less the head of the department in his discretion per- mits the giving of evidence derived therefrom. Nor can I accept the construction that an absolute privilege
is attached to every noxious document, i.e., to evtiry State document the disclosure of which may cause injury to the public interest. This is giving too narrow a meaning to the words "public interest". If the
non-disclosure of a particular State doc)lment is in public interest, the impartial and uneven dispensation of justice by Courts is also in public interest. They are indeed two aspects of public interest. There is no
conflict or dichotomy between the two. In particular i circumstances one aspect ma.y be paramount and in a different set of circumstances the other may be given precedence. In the last analysis, it is the question of
balancing of the two aspects having regard to the cir- cumstances of a particular case. The head of a department may as well permit the disclosure of a document even if ordinarily its disclosure affects public
interest, if in his opinion the counter-balancing cir- cumstances are in favour of disclosure rather than non-disclosure. I cannot, therefore, give a wide mean- ing to the words "records relating to affairs of State"
so as to take in every unpublished document pertain- ing to the entire business of State, but confine them only to such of the documents whose disclosure would be injurious to public interest.
The next question is, who is empowered ,to decide the said question whether a particular document re- lates to affairs of State ?-whether it is the Court or the State. That is found in s. 162 of the Act. The
learned Advocate-General contends that the first l?a.rt of s. 162 makes a distinction between the production of a document and the admissibility of a document and that the first limb of the second part of the sec-
tion provides for the production of a document and the second limb for its admissibility. He illustrates his argument thµs: privilege may be raised in respect of production of a document on the ground that it
pertains to matters of State, or on the ground that it is inadmissible for want of registration, deficiency of stamp, or similar other defects. The first clause of the second pa.rt of s. 162, the argument proceeds, enables
the Court to inspect a document when the objection is to its production unless the document refers to a matter of State, and the second clause thereof em- powers the Court to take evidence only when the
objection is not to its production but to its admissibi- lity. If this contention be accepted, it will lead to an anomaly, for grammatically construed the two limbs of the second part can be applied only to the question
of admissibility and in that event, on the hypothesis suggested by the learned counsel, the Court will be entitled to look into a document even if it relates to a The Stale of Punjab
v. Sodhi Sukhdeu Singh Subba Rao j. z960 Tlte Slate of Pu,.jab v. Sodhi Sukladev Singh Subba Rao]. [1961] matter of State if the objection is only to its produc- tion and not to its admissibility. The more reasonable
construction of the section is to give a. wider meaning to the word "admissibility" so as to comprehend both production as well as admissibility, for the question of admissibility arises only after the document is produc-
ed and a. party seeks to get it admitted in evidence. In this view, the Beoond pa.rt of s. 162 can only mean that when an objection is raised either to the produc- tion or to the admissibility of a. document, a. Court can
inspect the document and if it thinks necessary other evidence may be ta.ken to decide on the objection rais- ed. By the express terms of the section the Court is precluded from inspecting a document if it refers to
matters of State. But in other respects the jurisdic- tion of the Court to decide on the objection raised is not different from that it possesses in respect of other privileged documents.
If so understood there cannot be any ambiguity in the scope of s. 162 of the Act. It says in express terms that when an objection is raised to the production of a. document or to its admissibility, the validity of any
such objection shall be decided by the court. The second pa.rt of the section states the material on the ba.!!is of which such an objection can be decided. It can either inspect the document or take other evidence
to enable it to decide the validity of any objection raised. The only limitation in the case of a document referring to matters of State is that the court cannot inspect it. It is implicit in the limitation that in the
case of documents pertaining to matters of State the court is precluded not only from inspecting the docu- ments but also from permitting parties to adduce secondary evidence of their contents.
"The other evidence" must necessarily be de hors the contents of the documents. Even in England there is no divergence of view on the question who has to decide, when an objection to
the production of a. document is raised on the ground of privilege, the validity of the objection. In Robin- son's case('), the Judicial Committee observed atp. 716 thus: (1) [1931) A.C. 7"'1·
"The result of the discussion has been ………….. . where in effect he concludes that the Court has in those -cases always had in reserve the power to inquire into the nature of the documents for which protection
is sought, and to require some indication of. the nature of the injury to the State which would follow its pro. duction. The existence of such a. power is in no way out of harmony with the reason for the privilege pro-
vided that its exercise be carefully guarded so as not to occasion to the State the mischief which the privi- lege, where it exists, is designed to guard against." The House of Lords in Duncan's case (1), also recogniz-
ed this power though it whittled down its scope by holding that the judge had to accept automatically the affidavit filed by a minister. Viscount Simon, L. C., states at p. 642 as follows:
"Although a.n objection validly ta.ken to produc- tion, on the ground that this would be injurious to · the public interest, is conclusive, it is important to remember that the decision ruling out such docum~nts
is the decision of the judge ……………. It is the judge who is in control of the trial, not the executive, but the proper ruling for the judge to give is a.a above expressed."
On the other hand, in Scotland the inherent right of courts to overtjde official discretion is recognized. The House of Lords in Glasgow Corporation v. Larul, Board (2) gave a. clear exposition of the law of that
country. Viscount Simonds derives the principle of the court's power from the fact that the fair adminis- tration of justice between subject and subject and the Crown is a public interest of higher order and the pro-
tection is the care of the courts. Lord Radcliffe lmds it on the doctrine that the interest of the Government for which the minister should speak with authority does not exhaust the public interest, for· another
aspect of that interest is seen in the need that impar- tial justice should be. done in courts of la. w. . These judgments of the high authority also recognized the fact that it is the court that has to decide an objection
(1) [l9f2] A.C. 6z+ (2) (1956) s.c. (H.L_.) l •. The Stale of P"njab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singll St1bb1J Rao J. The Stale of Punjab , .. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Subba Rao ]. [1961] raised by the State on the ground of privilege. There
is a strong current of Indian decisions taking the same view: see Khawja Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor (1 ), re Mantubhai Mehta('), R. M. D. Chamarbaugwtila v. Y. R. Parpia ('), Lijat Ali Talulcdar v. Emperor('),
Bhaiya Saheb v. Ramnath Rampratap Bhadupote ('), Public Prosecutor, Andhra v. Damera Venkata Nara- sayya (6), Lakhuram Hariram v. The Union of India('), Tilka v. State (8). In a. few cases a. different
view is expresslld. It may, therefore, be stated with- out contradiction that the preponderance of authority is in favour of a court deciding the question of State privilege. Some objections are raised in decided cases in Eng-
land and restated in Duncan's case (9) against confer- ring such a power on courts. Apart from the fact that the statute expressly confers such a. power, there are no merits in the objections raised. The objections are:
(i) the judges are not well qualified to appreciate the highly technical matters which may arise with regard to some kinds of State secrets; (ii) if a judge is allowed to decide on evidence the question of privilege, it
may prejudice a fair trial; and (iii) it is a first princi- ple of justice that the judge should ha. ve no dealings on the matter in hand with one litigant save in the presence of and to the equal knowledge of the other.
The objections raised have no substance. The first objection, 'if accepted, disqualifies a judge from decid- ing complicated technical questions that a.rise before him. A judge is trained to look at things objectively
and can certainly decide, without inspecting the docu- ments on the material supplied whether the production of a document will affect the public interest having regard to the circumstances of each case. Nor a.re
there any merits in the second objection. In the words of Sir C. K. Allen, a. judge worthy of his office can put out of his mind all issues except those which are rais- ed and decided by the forensic process. It is common
place that a judge is trained to decide a case only on (I) I.L.R. [1945] Lah. 219. (2) I.L.R. (1945] Bom. 122. (3) A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 230. (4) I.LR. [1944] 1 Cal. 410. 15) I.L.R. [1940] Nag. 240.
(6) I.L.R. (1957] A.P. 174. \?) A.J.R, 1g6o Pat. 192. (8) A.I.R. 1g6o AIL 543" 19) [1942] A.C. 624. the admissible evidence actually adduced before him and not on any extraneous considerations. The third
objection also has no basis in fact. So long as a judge takes care to rule out any question on the contents of a document in respect whereof privilege is claimed, he can certainly dec:iide the question in the presence of
both the parties. The objections have, therefore, no substance. On the other hand, there is every reason why the duty to decide on the question of State pri- vj1ege must be left to a judge and not to the State.
That is the reason why the legislatu.re rightly confer- red that power on the court. A judge is as much a part of a department of the State as an executive offi- oer. But unlike the executive officer, a judge is train-
3d to decide cases objectively not only between indi- viduals inter se but also between the State and indivi- duals. He can, therefore, be trusted to decide impar- tially on the question whether the production of a
document in a case will affect the public interest. State documents in a. secretariat, I presume, will be looked into by many officers dealing with the said documents, sometimes from the lowest to the highest
in the department. It would be unrealistic to suggest that the disclosure of a State document to any one of those officers would not affect the public interest whereas the decision of its character by a judge would
do so. It is, therefore, the duty of the court, when- ever an objection is raised on the ground of State privilege to decide on relevant evidence whether the document relates to affairs of State.
Even if the wide construction of the words "affairs of State'', namely, business of State, be accepted, the result will not be different. The section says that no one shall be permitted to give any evidence derived
from unpublished official records relating to affairs of State, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned. The expression "affairs of State" in its ordinary significance is of the
widest amplitude and will mean the entire business of State. It takes in the routine day-to-day administra- tion and also highly ·confidential acts involving de- fence a.nd foreign relations, and a.lso in modern times
I960 The Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Subba Rao ], Th• State of Punjab v. Sodhi SuAhd~u Singh Subba Rao ]. [1961) the multifarious activities of a welfare State. The object of the section is simply to prohibit the use of
undisclosed documents of State in evidence by persons who in the course of their duties deal with or look into those documents, without the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned. The
words used in the section "as he thinks fit" confer an absolute discretion on the head of the department to give or withhold such permission. The section does not lay down that the head of the department con-
cerned should refuse permission only if the disclosure injures public interests, though ordinarily he may refuse permission on such matters affecting the State. One can visualize a situation when the officer in exer-
cise of his absolute discretion refuses to give permis- sion for the use of not only noxious documents but even of innocuous ones. The only limitation on his power is his reason and experience. The absolute dis-
cretion is capable of giving rise to mistake or even conscious abuse. The section does not really involve any doctrine of State privilege but is only a rule of commonsense and propriety. If the officer gives per-
mission, there is an end of the matter; but, if he refuses, the party affected may take out necessary summons to the State Government to produce the document. The State Government may depute one
of its officers to produce the document in court. Then only the occasion for raising the question of privilege arises and s. 162 governs that situation. An overrid- ing power in express terms is conferred on a court
under s. 162 of the. Act to decide finally on the vali- dity of the objection raised on the ground of privilege. The .court will disallow the objection if it comes to the conclusion that the document does not relate to affairs
of State or that the public interest does not compel its non-disclosure, or that the public interest served by the administration of justice in a particular case overrides all other aspects of public interest. This
conclusion flows from the fact that in the first part of s. 162 of the Act there is no limitation on the scope of the court's decision, though in the second part the mode of enquiry is hedged in by conditions. In Eng-
land, in the absence of a provision or a rule of com- mon law similar to that of s. 162, there was room for conflict of views on the scope of the court's power. On ·the other hand, in Scotland the common law
corresponding to s. 162 was invoked and the House of Lords recognized the inherent power of the Court to reject a claim of Privilege if the Court comes to a conclusion that the paramount interest of the admini-
stration of justice demands or compels such a dis- closure. Section 162 of the Act in terms confers a similar power on courts and though it may have to be used with circumspection, it is a real and effective
power. There is no conflict bet.ween s. 123 and s. 162 of the Act: the former confers a power on a head of a department to withhold permission from the stand- point of State administration, whereas s. 162 recognizes
the overriding power of a court in the interest of higher public interest to overrule the objection of pri- vilege. The next point is, what is the procedure to be foll- owed by a judge for deciding on the said objection?
When an officer of the State is summoned as a witness to produce a document, if the State seeks to take a plea of privilege then it is the duty of the minister in charge of the department concerned to file an affidavit
at the first instance. The affidavit so filed shall e.x facie show that the mii)ister concerned has read and considered each of the documents in r~spect of which the privilege is claimed. It shall also contain the
general nature of the document and the particular danger to which the State would be exposed by its production. If the court is not satisfied with the con- tents of the affidavit, to enable it to decide whether
the document in question refers to the affairs of State, it can summon the minister to appear as a witness. In effect and substance the said procedure has been sug- gested in Robinson's case(1) at p. 722. The same proce-
dure is also indicated in Duncan's case(~) at p. 638. In the second case above referred, Viscount Simon L.C. says at p. 638 thus : • (1) (1931] A.C. 104· (2) [1942] A.C. 62.f. The Stale of
Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Subba Rao ]. r960 Th• State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Sing~ Subba Rao /. (1961] "If the question arises on subpoena at the hear- ing it is not uncommon in modern practice for the
minister's objection to be conveyed to the court, at any rate in the first instance, by an official of the department who produces a certificate which the minister has signed, stating what is necessary. I see no
harm in that procedure, provided it is understood that this is only for convenience and that if the court is not satisfied by this method, it can request the minis- ter's personal attendance."
It may be suggested that this procedure may cause some inconvenience to the minister concerned. But if one realizes that every act of the exercise of the right of privilege detracts from the fair disposal of a
case before the court and that the administration of justice is also part of the general conduct of the affairs of any . State and that its impartiality and purity are as important as any other public interests,
one will also appreciate that the requirement of the personal attendance of a minister, if necessary, to support his affidavit would be to a large extent a guarantee against unjust objections that may other-
wise be raised. It is suggested that an affidavit of the head of a department, such as the Secretary, would do as well as that of a minister, but there is an essential distinction between a Secretary and a mini-
ster: the former may be frequently tempted to take the opposite view, particularly in cases where a. claim against the State seems to him to be harsh or unfair, while the latter, being the political head subject to
parliamentary control, may be expected, if he care- fully scrutinizes a particular document, not to take such objection which obstructs the ca.use of justice un- less absolutely necessary. I would, therefore, hold that
the affidavit which states that a particular document relates to affairs of State must be sworn to only by a minister in charge of the department wherefrom the document or documents a.re summoned.
The next point is, what are the well established rules which help the court to decide whether a. parti- cular document pertains to affairs of State or not? The following relevant rules may be extracted from
the decision of the Judicial Committee in Robinson's case (1): (1) the privilege is a narrow one most spar- ingly to be exercised; (2) the principle of the rule is concern for public interest and the rule will accord-
ingly be applied no further than the attainment of that object requires; (3) as the protection is claimed on the broad principle of State policy and public convenience, the papers protected, as might have been
expected, have usually been public official documents of a political or administrative character; (4) its foundation is that the information cannot be disclosed without injury to the public interests and not that the
documents are confidential ·or official, which alone is no reason for their non-production; (5) even in the case of documents relating to the trading, commercial or contractual activities of a State, it is conceivable
that there may be some plain overruling principle of public interest concerned which cannot be disregarded; though in times of peace such cases must be very rare. The House of Lords in Duncan's case (2) has laid down
the following negative and positive tests for deciding the question of privilege of the Stat('. The negative tests are: (1) it is not a sufficient ground that the docu- ments are State documents or official or marked confi-
dential; (2) it would not be a good ground that, if they were produced, the consequences might involve the department or the government in parliamentary discussion or in public criticism, or might necessitate
the attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing duties elsewhere; (3) neither would it be good ground that production might tend to ex- pose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend
to lay the department open to claims of compensation. The positive test is, where the public interest would otherwise be damnified, for example, where disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good
diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a. class of documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public service. The la.st test has given rise to mild but definite protests within the
limits of judicial propriety by the learned judges who (1) [r93r] A.C. 704• (a) [1942] A.C. 624. The Stale of Pu,.jab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh Subba Rao J. The State of Punjab v. Sodhi
Sukhdeu Singh SubUa Rao ]. [1961] had the occasion to deal with the question of privilege and to vehement protests from jurists. Sir U. K. Allen, in his book "Law and Orders" (2nd edition),
has observed at p. 384 thus: "Everybody is agreed that public security and foreign relations are necessary heads of privilege. Both are wide in scope, and it is doubtful whether any other 'head' needs to be specified ……………… It would be of great advantage if statute could put an
end to the pernicious doctrine that privilege can be claimed for classes of documents." The argument of the learned Advocate-General is based upon an apprehension, which in my view is
unfounded, that the court may always refuse the affidavit of a minister and insist on his personal atten- dance. The unpublished documents relating to defence, foreign relations and other documents of great
public importance rarely come before municipal courts. Occasionally documents of day-to-day administration \lf the State may be relevant evidence, but very often documents pertaining to mercantile or welfare activi-
ties of the f:ltate would be summoned to establish a particular claim. In the case of documents of un- doubted public importance, when the minister swears to an affidavit that in his discretion their production
is against public interest, it may reasonably be ex- pected that.the judge would accept the statement. But the real difficulty is in the case of other docu- ments, where the interests of private individuals and
the State come into conflict, the judge should be in a position' to examine the minister and others to ascer- tain by evidence collateral to the contents of the docu- ments whether the assertion of the minister is justi-
fied. The aforesaid discussion yields the following pro- positions: (1) under s. 162 of the Evidence Act the court has the overridil)g power to disallow a claim of privilege raised by the l:ltate in respect of an unpub-
lished document pertaining to matters of State; but in its discretion, the court will exercise its power only in exceptional circumstances when public interest de- mands, that is, when the public interest served by the
disclosure clearly outweighs that served by the non- disclosure. One of such instances is where the pub- lic interest served by the administration of justice in a particular case overrides all other aspects of public
interest. (2) The said claim shall be made by an affidavit filed by the minister in charge of the depart- ment concerned describing the nature of the docu- ment in general and broadly the category of public
interest its non-disclosure purports to serve. (3) Ordi- narily the court shall accept the affidavit of a minister, but in exceptional circumstances, when it has reason to believe that there is more than what meets the eye,
it can examine the minister and take other evidence to decide the question of privilege. (4) Under no circumstances can a court inspect such a document or permit giving of secondary evidence of its contents.
(5) Subject to the overriding power of the court to disallow the claim of privilege in exceptional cases, the following provide working rules of guidance for the courts in the matter of deciding the question of
privilege in regard to unpublished documents pertain- ing to matters of State: (a) "records relating to affairs of State" mean documents of State whose production would endanger the public interest; (b) documents per-
taining to public security, defence and foreign rela- tions are documents relating to affairs of State; (c) un- published documents relating to trading, commercial or contractual activities of the State are not, ordi-
narily, to be considered as documents relating to affairs of State; but in special circumstances they may partake of that character; (d) in cases of documents mentioned in (c) supra, it is a question of fact in each
case whether they relate to affairs of State or not in the sense that if they are disclosed public interest would suffer. Bearing the aforesaid principles in mind, I shall con- strue the nature of the documents in respect of which
privilege is claimed in the present appeal. The so called order of the PEPSU Government is really the minutes recorded in the course of cabinet discussions. Under Art. 163(3) of the Constitution, the question
The State of Punjab v. Sod/ii Sukhdev Singh Subba Rao j. Th• Stale of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdw Singh Subba Rao ]. [1961) whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into
in any court. In view of the constitutional protec. tion, and the reason underlying such protection, I hold that in the present case the district court was right in sustaining the claim of privilege in regard to
the said document. In regard to the report of the Service Commission, on the assumption that it is a relevant document, I cannot see how public interest suffers by its disclosure.
Service Commission is a statutory body constituted with definite powers conferred on it under the Consti- tution. Under Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution the State Public Service Commission shall be consulted on
all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of a State. This is one of the constitutional protections conferred on public servants. I cannot visualize how public interest would suffer if
the report submitted by the Service Commission to the Government is disclosed, and how the disclosure of such a report prevents the Service Commission from expressing its views on any other case in future passes
my comprehension. It may expose the Government if it ignores a good advice; but such an exposure is certainly in public interest. The Constitution does not put a seal of secrecy on the document; nor, in my
view, public interest demands such secrecy. In a con- flict between the administration of justice and the claim of privilege by the State, I have no hesitation to overrule the claim of privilege.
Before closing, I must notice one fact. In this case, the Chief Secretary filed an affidavit. But, in my view, the minister should have done it. The respon- dent did not object to this either in the district court
or in the High Court. In the circumstances, I would not reject the claim of privilege on the basis of this procedural defect. In the result, I would allow the appeal in respect of
the minutes of the cabinet and dismiss it in other respects. As the parties have succeeded and failed in part, I direct them to bear their own costs through- out. BY COURT: In accordance with the opinion of
the majority, this appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court restored with costs throughout. Appeal allowed. PANDIT JHANDU LAL & ORS.
v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. (B. P. SINHA, c. J., J. L. KAPUR, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.) Land Acquisition – Constitutional · validity of enactment-
Construction of labour colony for a company, if a public purpose- Test-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), ss. 4, 6, Part VII- Constitution of India, Arts. 31(2), 31(5)(a). The Punjab Government issued notification under ss. 4 and
6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and started proceedings for acquisition of lands for the construction of a labour colony under the Government sponsored Housing Scheme for the
workers of the Thapar Industrial Workers' Co-operative Hous- ing Society Ltd. The appellants challenged the acquisition proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground, inter alia, that the procedure prescribed by Part VII of the said Act had not been admittedly complied with. The Division Bench in affirming the order of dismissal passed by the trial Judge held that although Art. 31 of the Constitution by prohi- biting compulsory acquisition of property except for a public purpose had made Part VII of the Act redundant, the present proceedings were saved since the acquisition was for a public purpose.
Held, that the High Court was in error in holding that· the Constitution had rendered Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, redundant or null and void, although it was right in dismissing the appeal.
That Act, as an existing Act, was saved by Art. 31(5)(a) from being affected by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Acquisition of building sites for re.sidential houses for industrial Jabour is for a public purpose even apart from s. 17(2) The Stale of
Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdeu Singh Subba Rao J. ;r960 November ;r6.