Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
21. Consequently, the learned Single Judge in the impugned order itself concluded that the allegations in the FIR and the material on record did not disclose an offence under Section 354C of IPC. INGREDIENTS OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION ARE NOT ATTRACTED
22. Further, in order to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 of IPC, it must be shown that the person 270 charged, threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm. Except for the bald allegation that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her person or her property. The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR. Additionally, as stated above, the complainant or her associates never made a statement to substantiate her allegations. Consequently, in the present case, even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, the ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted. OFFENCE OF WRONGFUL RESTRAINT IS NOT MADE OUT
23. Section 341 of IPC provides punishment for the offence of wrongful restraint, which has been defined in Section 339 of IPC as under: “339. Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person. Exception— The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section.”
24. The ingredients essential to constitute an offence of wrongful restraint are that there should be an obstruction which prevents a person from proceeding in any direction in which the person has a right to proceed. The exception to the offence of wrongful restraint provides that no offence of wrongful restraint is committed if the person alleged of obstruction, in good faith, believes that he has a lawful right to obstruct. Therefore, the evidence required to establish the offence of wrongful restraint is that the person alleging obstruction has a right to proceed in such direction and the person obstructing has no lawful right to cause obstruction.
25. In the present case, the perusal of the FIR reveals that the alleged offences were committed when the complainant attempted to enter the property. The right of the complainant to enter the property [2025] 12 S.C.R. Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal stems from the virtue of being a purported tenant of Mr. Amalendu Biswas. However, no material has been placed on record along with the chargesheet which indicates that the complainant was a tenant in the property at any point of time. Surprisingly, the complainant has not even given a statement in pursuance to her complaint. On the contrary, the said Amalendu Biswas in his statement has stated that the complainant had come to see the property, meaning thereby that the complainant was not a tenant in the property but only a prospective tenant when the FIR was registered. Therefore, the material on record indicates that on the date of the alleged offence, the complainant had no right to enter the property. In fact, the induction of the complainant as tenant in the property would have been in violation of the injunction passed by the Trial Court.
26. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that all that the Appellant-accused did was to enforce what he bonafidely thought was his lawful right over the property in terms of the injunction order passed by the Trial Court. This Court is also of the opinion that the allegations in the FIR and the material on record at best constitute a cause of action for filing a suit for injunction and/or an application seeking modification of the interim order already in subsistence or an application for the relief of ingress and egress in the pending suit.
27. Consequently, this Court is of the view that criminal proceedings against the Appellant-accused for offences punishable under Sections 341, 354C, 506 of IPC cannot be permitted to continue. TENDENCY OF FILING CHARGESHEETS AND FRAMING CHARGES IN MATTERS WHERE NO STRONG SUSPICION IS MADE OUT CLOGS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
28. Before parting with this case, this Court would like to emphasise that where there is a pending civil dispute between the parties, the Police and the Criminal Courts must be circumspect in filing a chargesheet and framing charges respectively. In a society governed by rule of law, the decision to file a chargesheet should be based on the Investigating Officer’s determination of whether the evidence collected provides a reasonable prospect of conviction. The Police at the stage of filing of Chargesheet and the Criminal Court at the stage of framing of Charge must act as initial filters ensuring that only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to the formal trial 272 stage to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system. The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system. It forces Judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that are likely to result in an acquittal. This diverts limited judicial resources from handling stronger, more serious cases, contributing to massive case backlogs. Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge framing stage as to whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that the State should not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the right to a fair process.
29. In the present case, the Police and the Trial Court should have been cognizant that as there was a pending civil dispute with regard to the property in question as well as a prior subsisting injunction order and the complainant had refused to make any judicial statement, strong suspicion founded on legally tenable material/evidence was absent. CONCLUSION
30. Keeping in view the aforesaid, the present Appeal is allowed and the impugned Judgment and Order is set aside as well as the Appellant- accused is discharged from G.R. Case No. 223 of 2020 (arising out of Bidhannagar North Police Station FIR No. 50 of 2020). Result of the case: Appeal allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan