196! se1mn1Ja, 27. TULSI RAM v. STATE OF U. P. u~.rER IMAM, K. suBBA RAo, N. R~JAGOP.4.LA AYYANGAR and J. R. MuDHOLKAR, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Conspiracy-Sanction-Letter of Under &cretary stating Governor has grrznted sanction-If sufficient- Pruumpfion as to official acta-Gheating–Dishonutly- Wro11j1- f11l gain-Whether wrongftil loss also necessary-Sentence-Red11c- tion of-Gode of G1·iminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), s. 196A-lndian Penal Code, 1860 (Act ][LV of 186~), s. J2~. The appellant• were tried and convicted for conspiracy to
cheat certain banb. The pro1ecution had put on record a letter from the Under Secretry to Government which stated that the Governor had been pleased to grant sanction for the pro1ecution of the appellants.
The sanction was not challeneed before the trial court or the High Court, but before the Supreme Court the appellants contended that no sanction as required bys. 196A, Code of Criminal Procedure was on record and that the docu- ment on record did not show on its face that the facts of the case had been considered by the Governor. The appellant further contended that for conviction for cheating the prosecution had to establish both that the appellants had caused wrongful gain to themselves and caused wrongful loss to the bank! and that as no wrongful loss to the banks had been established, the appellants could not be convicted of cheating or of con1piracy to cheat. Held, that the appellants were not entitled to raise the
question of sanction for the first time in the Supreme Court as it required for its decision investigation of facts. The document on record '\Vas an official communic.1tio11 \vhich recited the fact that the Governor had granted the sanction. A presumption
arose that the sanction had in fact been accorded. A further presumption arose that the official act of granting sanction to which reference was made in the communication had been
regularly performed. The document on record prima facie satisfied the reqtiirements of s. J 96A. He/,d, further, that to establi5h that the accused had disho~ nestly induced another to part \\'ith property \vithin the lneaning of s. 420, Indian Penal Code, it \>\'as not lle'.cessary to prove both wrc>n:ful 'a.ii' and wrongful loss.
Wrongful gain and wrongful 1 s.c.R. SUP:lt.BM:r COURT REPORTS loss were two facets of the definition of di1honesty and it was enough to establish the existence of one of them. In the present
case, the appellants had made wrongful gain to themselves by obtdning credits by unlawful means and even if no wrongful 1oss was caused to the banks, the appellants were guilty of cheating.
Sanjiv Ratanappa Ronad v. Emperor, (1932) I. L. R, LVI Bom. 488, and Kotamraju Venkatarayudu v. Emptror, (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 90, distinguished. The sentences of imprisonment imposed on four of the
appellants were reduced to the period already undergone and a fine of Rs. 3,000/- was imposed on each on the grounds that no useful purpose would be served by sending these appellants to jail after a long interval of time, that these appellants were very young at the time of the commission of the offences and that they had acted under the influence of the dominating personality of the main accused.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 62 and 63 of 1958. Appeals from the judgment and order dated April 15, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1332 and 1476 of 1954.
A. N. 1r!i1Ua, B. B. Tawakley, J. P. Goyal, A. Banerji and K. P. Gupta, for the appellants. G. C. Jlfathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondents. 1962. September 27. The Judgme.nt of the
Court was delivered by v. St•ta of ti. P. MuDHOLKAR, J.-These are appeals by a Mu.U..llm, J, certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad. They arise 0•1t of the same trial. The appellants in
both the appeals except Chandrika Singh were convicted by the Second Additional District & Sessions Judge, Kanpur, of offences under s. 4 71, Indian Penal Code read with ss. 467 and 468, I.P.C. and sentenced
variously. Tulsi Ram, Beni Gopal and Babu Lal were each convicted of offences under s. 417 read with s. 420 and Moti Lal of offences under s. 417, I.P.C. and Lachhimi Narain of offences under s. 420, I.P.C.
Separate sentences were awarded to each of them in respect of these olfences. All the six appellants T""'i n- v. Slat. of U. P. Mudlwlkar 1 J. were, in addition, convicted under s. 120 B,
I.P.C. and sentenced separately in respect of that offence. In appeal the High Court set aside the conviction and sentences passed on Tulsi Ram, Beni Gopal, Babu Lal and Moti Lal of offences under
s. 4 71 read with ss. 467 and 468, I.P.C. and also acquitted Moti Lal of the offence under s. 417, I.P.C. It, however, upheld the conviction of all the appel- lants under s. l20B, I.P.C. as well as the conviction
of Tulsi Ram, Beni Gopal and Babu Lal of offences under s. 417 read with s. 420, I.P.C. As regards Lachhimi Narain it maintained the conviction and sentences passed by the Additional Sessions Judge in all
respects and dismissed the appeal in toto. The relevant facts are as follows : The appellants, other than Chandrika Singh, are members of a Marwari trading family belonging to Rae Bareli and Chandrika Singh was their
employee. The relationship amongst Lachhimi Narain and the first four appellants in Cr!. A. 62 of 1958 would be clear from the following genealogical table: Bhairo Prasad Sri Niwas (accused)
Sagar Mal Lachhimi Beni Narain Gopal Tulsi Gobardhan- Pahlad Ram das Rai Babu Lal (Suraj Mal-minor) Nand Lal (deceased) Moti Lal Parshottamdad (died during pendency ef the case). 1 S.C.R.
It is common ground that Lachhimi Narain was the karta of the familv and the entire business of the family was done under his directions and supervision. This fact is material in view of the defence taken by
the first four appellants in Cr!. A. 62 of 1958. It is common ground that the family carried on business in the names and styles of ( l) firm Beni Gopal Mohan Lal with head office at Rae Bareli, (2)
firm Tulsi Ram Sohan Lal with head office at Lalgunj in the district of Rae Bareli, (3) firm Bhairon Prasad Srinivas with head office at Rae Bareli, (4) firm Gobardhan Das Moti Lal with head office at Madho-
ganj in the district of Partapgarh and (5) firm Sagar- mal Surajmal with head office at Unchahar in the district of Rae Bareli. Though different members of the family were shown as partners in these five firms,
one thing is not disputed and that is that the business of each and every one of these firms was being conduc- ted by and under the orders and directions of Lachhimi Narain though in point of fact he was
shown as partner along with his father Sri Niwas and brother Pahlad only in the firm of Bhairo Prasad Srinivas. It is common ground that in May, 1949, the firm Bhairo Prasad Srinivas was appointed the sole
importer of cloth for distribution amomist whole- salers in the Rae Bareli district. Prior to the ~ppoint ment of this firm as sole importer a syndic~e consist- ing of four firms of Rae Bareli was the sole importer
of cloth in that district. It would, however, appear that this syndicate failed to take delivery of large consignments of cloth with the result that the Deputy Commissioner discovered that cloth bales valued at
about Rs. 2,25,000/- were lying at the railway station and demurrage on the consignment was mounting every day. It is not disputed either that it was at the instance of the Deputy Commissioner that the firm
Bhairo Prasad Srinivas agreed to act as sole impor- ters, take delivery of the clnth and distribute it Tulsi Ram v. State of [T, P, M"dholkar, J. Tul.siRam v. State of U. P. Mudholk<Jr, J.
amongst wholesalers. They were also required to take delivery subsequently of cloth worth over Rs. 23 lakhs. This firm and one other allied firm were also importers and distributors of foodgrains and salt
in the district. Both the courts below have held that in order to obtain short term credits the appcll ants hit upon an ingenious device and succeeded in securing credits to the tune of Rs. 80 lakhs between May, HJ49, and
December, 1949. While the appellant Lachhimi Narain has throughout admitted that such a device was resorted to, the other appellants denied any know- ledge of the aforesaid device.
The particulars of the device adopted are these: A partner or an employee of one of the firms booked small consignments of say two or three bags of rape seed, poppy seed or mustard seed from various stations
in Rae Bareli and Partapgarh districts to various stations in West Bengal, including the city of Calcutta. The person concerned used to execute for- warding notes and obtain railway receipts in respect
of such consignments. These receipts were prepared by the railway authorities in triplicate, one being given to the consignor, one sent to the destinati0n station and one kept on the record of the forwarding
station. The consignor's foil of the railway receipt was then taken to Rae Bareli and there it was tampered with by altering the number of bags, the weight of the consignment and the freight charges.
All this was admittedly done by munims under the direction of Lachhimi Narain himself. These forged railway receipts were then endorsed by the consignor in favour of one or other of the firms Beni Gopal
Mohan Lal, Tulsi Ram Sohan Lal, Sagarmal Soorajmal or Bhairo Prasad Srinivas and thereafter these firms drew large sums of money commensurate with the huge quantities of goods specified in the for-
ged railway receipts and on the security of ~he~e railway receipts drew demand drafts or hundJS m 1 S.C.R. favour of variour banks and two firms in Kanpur as payees on a firm styled as Murarka Brothers, Calcutta,
as drawee. It may be mentioned that this firm was established by the family in Calcutta about a year or so before the transactions in question were entered into. After this firm was established in Calcutta
Lachhimi Narain opened an account in the name of the firm in the Calcutta Branch of the Allahabad Bank and authorised Babu Lal and Chandrika Singh, who was originally an employee of the firm
Bhairo Prasad Srinivas and was transferred to Cal- cutta, to operate on the account. The banks which discounted the hundis and the drafts were the Kanpur branches of the Bank of Bikaner, the Bank of Bihar,
the Bank of Baroda and the Central Bank of India and the firms were Matadin Bhagwandas and Nand Kishore Sitaram, both of Kanpur. These payees realised the amounts by presentation of the hundis and
railway receipts to Murarka Brothers at Calcutta. The banks obtained payment through their branches in Calcutta while the two firms obtained payments through certain banks. To enable Murarka brothers
at Calcutta to honour the hundis on presentation Lachhimi Narain and Tulsi Ram, the acquitted ac- cused Srinivas and a munim of theirs named Hanuman Prasad, who was also an accused but died during
investigation, used to get money transmitted from the firms' account in the Rae Bareli, Lucknow and Kanpur branches of the Allahabad Bank to the ac- count of Murarka Brothers at Calcutta by telegraphic
transfers. Delivery of the consignments despatched Ly the partners or the employees of th~ various famiiy. firms could obviously not be taken with the help ol forged railway receipts because had that been done
the fraud would have been immediately discovered. Instead, delivery was taken throug~ commission a_gents on indemnity bonds on the allegat10n that the railway recci pts had bj:en lost.
Such bonds were executed either by one of the p~rtners or by an. employee and after getting them verified by the stat10n masters and Tutsi Ram v. Slate of U. P. Mudholkar, J. Tutsi Ram
v. State of U. P. Mudholkar, J. goods clerks of the booking stations they were en- dorsed in favour of the consignees. It has been es- tablished by evidence–ar.d it is not disputed before
us-that these consignees in fact took delivery of the small consignments-at the special request of Lachhimi Narain, disposed of the consignments and credited the sale proceeds to the account of Bhairo
Prasad Srinivas or Murarka Brothers at Calcutta. The bulk of these forged railway receipts is not forth- coming, presumably because they have been destroyed after the hundis supported by them were honoured
and the receipts received from the banks or the firms which were payees under the hundis. It is the pro- secution case that the banks and the firms obtained discount charges of one or two annas per cent for the
a!Ilounts paid by them, although had the family firms obtained these amounts by way of loan they would have been charged interest at 6 to 9 per cent on these amounts. Towards the end of December, 1949, the Kanpur
branch of the Bank of Bikaner and the Bank of Bihar received back a number of hundis unhonoured along with corresponding forged railway receipts. The Bank of Bikaner received five hundis for an amount of
Rs. 3,52,000/- out of which hundis worth Rs. 1,82,000/- had been negotiated by the bank direct- ly with the firm Bhairo Prasad Srinivas and hundis worth Rs. 1, 70,000/- through N and Kishore Sitaram.
Six hundis were received back by the Bank of Bihar, Kanpur, valued at Rs, 1,92,000/-. These were negotiated through Matadin Bhagwandas. The bank adjusted the account by debiting Matadin
Bhagwandai; with the amount. These unpaid payees instituted inquiries from the consignees and the rail- ways and came to know that the railway receipts offered as security to them were forged. These
railway receipts have been exhibited in this case in order to. prove the charge of forgery. After the cheating practised by the family firms and forgeries committed by them came to light, Daya
Ram, P. W. 62, a partner in the firm Matadin Bhagwandas filed a complaint before the City Magistrate, Kanpur on January 4, 1950, and B. N. Kaul, Manager of the Bank of Bihar, lodged a report
at the police station, Colonelganj, Kanpur, on January 18, 1950. The appellants, except Chandrika Singh, executed a mortgage deed on January 5, 1950, in favour of the Bank of Bikaner for Rs. 3,62,000/-
which included Rs. 3,52,000/- due on unpaid hundis interest and other charges. According to the prosecu- tion, Bhairo Prasad Srinivas paid the firm Matadin Bhagwandas Rs. 1,00,000/- and that Lachhimi Narain
executed a promissory note for the balance of Rs. 92,000/- in their favour. According to the defence, however, the criminal case filed by Matadin Bh11gwandas was compounded by payment of the
amount settled between the parties and that as a result they stood acquitted of the .charge contained in the complaint of Matadin Bhagwandas. The appellant, Lachhimi Narain, has taken all
the blame upon himself. He not only admitted that he had obtained credit to the tune of Rs. 80 lakhs on the security of railway receipts in which the quantities of goods consigned had been increased, but also
admitted that he had got the quantities inflated by his munims, Raj Bahadur and Hanuman Prasad, both of whom are dead. According to him except for the complicity of the two munims the whole thing was
kept a secret from everybody else. His defence further was that he had committed no offence as he intended to pay off and did pay off the entire amount raised. The other appellants admitted that each of
them had played some part or other in these tra,JSac- tions but denied havfng been a member of the conspiracy and contended what each of them did was at the bidding of Lachhimi Narain.
TulsiR4m v. State of U. P. Mud/wlkar, J. TulsiRam v. State of U. P. Mudholkar, J. The first point raised by Mr. A. N. Mulla on behalf of the appellants was that no sanction as required by s. l 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
was on the record of the case and, therefore the entire proceedings are void ab initio. He ad~itted that there is a document on record, Ex. P 1560 which is a letter addressed by Mr. Dave, Under S~cretary
to the Government of U. P., Home Department to the District Magistrate, Kanpur informing him that the Governor has been pleased to grant sanction to the initiation of proceedings against the persons
rnehtioned in that order. But according to Mr. Mulla, this communication cannot be treated "either as a valid sanction or its equivalent". He points out that for a sanction to be valid it must be by a written
order signed by the sanctioning authority and that no one can function as a substitute for the sanctioning authority nor can oral consent, even if it was given, be deemed in law to be valid.
He further contended that the document on record does not show on its face that the facts 'of the case were considered by the Govern.or. His argument is that had the true facts 6f this case been placed before the Governor, that is,
that the firm Bhairo Prasad Srinivas never sought its appointment as sole importer of cloth for Rae Bareli district, that the firm was in fact prevailed upon by the Deputy Commissioner to take up the work and
help the Government in a critical situation, that though large credits were undoubtedly obtained by making fraudulent representations and committing forgeries it was never the intention of Lachhimi
Narain to cause loss to anyone, that in fact everyone has been paid in full, and that the prosecution was launched not at the instance of any of these persons but at the instance of the railway authorities and
that, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by launching a prosecution, sanction would not have been given. We did not permit Mr. Mulla to raise this point because it i$ not a pure question of law but requires
1 S.C.R. for its decision investigation of facts. It is not his contention that there was no sanction at all but the gravamen of his complaint is that there is no proper proof of the fact that sanction was given by the autho-
rity concerned after considering all the relevant facts and by following the procedure as laid down in Art. Hl6 of the Constitution. Had the point been raised by the appellant in the trial court, the prosecution
would have been able to lead evidence to establish that the Governor had in fact before him all the rele- vant material, lhat he cousidered the material and after considering it he accorded the sanction and that
that sanction was expressed in the manner. in which an act of the Governor is required to be expressed. Mr. Mulla, however, says that s. l 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a sort of brake on the powers
of the criminal court to enquire into the charge of conspiracy, that the court does not get jurisdiction to enquire into that charge unless the brake is removed and that it is, therefore, essential for the prosecution
to establish that the brake was removed by reason of the fact that the appropriate authority had accorded its sanction to the prosecution after complying with the provisions of law and that it was not obligatory on
the defence to raise an objection that there was no proper sanction. There would have been good deal of force in the argument of learned counsel had Ex. P. 1560 not been placed on record. Though that
document is not the original order made by the Gover- nor or even its copy, it recites a fact and that fact is that the Governor has been pleased to grant sanction to the prosecution of the appellants for certain offen-
ces as required by s. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The document is an official communica- tion emanating from the Home Dep~rcment and addressed to the District 'Magistrate at Kanpur, A
presumption would, therefore, arise that sanction to which reference has been made in the document, had in fact been accorded. Further, since the communica- tion is an official one, a presumption would also arise
Tutsi Ram v. Stute of U. P. MudlwlkcJr, J. Tutsi Ram v. State of U. P. }Judholkar, J. that the official act to which reference has been made in the document was regularly performed. In our
opinion, therefore, the document placed on record prima facie meets the requirements of s. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, it is not now open to the appellants to contend that there was
no evidence of the grant of valid sanction. We, there- fore, overrule the contention raised by learned counsel. The next point urged by Mr. Mulla is that the charge as framed jumbles up several offences and,
therefore, has led to miscarriage of justice. This also is not a point which had been taken up in the courts below. That apart, we do not think that there is any substance in this point. The objection is with respect
to the first charge which reads as follows: "That between the months of May 1949 and December 1949 both months inclusive, in the district of Rae Bareli, Pratabgarh and Kanpur, Sri Niwas, Lachhimi Narain, Tulsi Ram, Beni
Gopal, Babula!, Moti Lal, Brij Lal Coenka, Chajju Lal and Chandrika Singh agreed to do amongst themselves and the deceased Hanuman Prasad and Purshottom Dass or caused to be done illegal acts viz. the act of cheating the (1)
Bank of Bikaner, Kanpur, (2) Bank of Baroda, Kanpur (3) Bank of Bihar, Kanpur, ( 4) Central Bank of India, KaHpur, (5) M/s. Matadin Bhagwan Dass, Kanpur and (6) M/s. Nand Kishore Sitaram of Kanpur by dishonestly indu-
cing them to part with huge sums of money on the basis of hundis drawn on J\1urarka Bros., Calcutta covered with securities knowing such R/Rs. to be forged and cheated the aforesaid
Banks and Bankers by using forged documents as genuine knowing them to be forged in pur- suance of a common agreement amongst them all and thereby committed an offence punishable nnder section 120B read with sectiom 467/.168/
I S.C.R. 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the court of Sessions." It is the concluding portion of the charg::: to which learned counsel has taken objection. We do not think
that there has at all been any jumbling up of the charges. The charge is just one and that is of cor,spi- racy. A reference is made to other sections of the Code to indicate the objects of the conspiracy, that is,
to cheat and to commit forgery. The charge by refer- ring to various sections of the Indian Penal Code merely makes it clear that the object of the conspiracy was to forge railway receipts, which were valuable
securities, to commit forgeries for the purpose of cheat- ing and to use forged documents as genuine. What was meant by the charge was apparently fully under- stood by the appellants because they never complained
at the appropriate stage that they were confused or bewildered by the charge. In the circumstances, therefore, we overrule this objection also of learned counsel. Since the commission of forgeries by Lachhimi
Narain could not be denied what we have next to ascertain is whether Lachhimi Narain is guilty of cheating and if so whether s. 420, I.P.C. as held by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High
Court or under s. 417, I.P.C. as contended before us. Learned counsel points out and rightly, that for a person to be convicted under s. 420, l.P.C. it has to be established not only that he has cheated someone
but also that by doing so he has dishonestly induced the person who was cheated to deliver any property etc. A person can be said to have done a thing dis- honestly if he does so with the intention of causing
wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person. Wrongful loss is the loss by unlawful means of property to v1hich a person is entitled while wrongful gain to a person means a
gain to him by unlawful means of property to which Tutsi Ram v. State of U. P. Mudlwlkar, J. Tulsi Ram v. Slate of U. P. A1udholkar, J. the person gaining is not legally entitled. Learned
counsel contended that there has been no wrongful loss whatsoever to the banks and the two firms which discounted the hundis drawn by one or the other of the firms owned by the family. The High Court has held
that these firms did sustain a wrongful loss inasmuch as they got very meagre amounts for discounting the hundis whereas ·had the true facts been known to them they would not have discounted the hnndis though
they may have advanced loans and charged interest at between () and 9% on the amounts advanced. It was because of the fraudulent misrepresentation made to the banks and the firms that they lost what they
could have otherwise been able to obtain and thus wrongful Joss has been caused to them. Vl/e have been taken through a large number of documents on the record and it is clear from these documents that
those who discounted the hundis in question were en- titled to charge, apart from the discount charges, interest at 6 % or above in case of non-payment with- in 24 hours of presentation.
A reference to some of the exhibits 1440 to 1454 which are the debit vou- chers of the Bank of Bikaner and Exs. · 1330 to 1345 which are debit vouchers of the Bank of Bihar clearly
show that in fact interest in the case of the first Bank at 6% and in the case of the second at 9% was charg- ed, debited and realised by these banks from the firms in question for the entire period during which
the hundis though presented, remained unpaid. These documents arc only illustrative but they do indicate that in fact the banks were not deprived of interest. Learned counsel pointc.d out that the Managers and
officers of the Banks and the firms were examined and they do not say that any loss of interest was caused to them in these transactions. Mr. Mathur who ap- pears for the State, however, pointed out that in the
nature of things the lrnndis could not be presented for payment in less than ten days and in this connec- tion he referred to Exs. P. J l on and l Oiili. These arc rrcords of bills purc!J<1scd by Lhc Centrnl Bank of
I S.C.R. India, Kanpur. He referred us to the penultimate columns of these exhibits headed "date enquired on" and contended that this column contained the date of presentation. As an illustration he referred us to the
first entry dated June 10. It was the date on which the hundi was discounted by the Central Bank of India and then he said that the date in the penulti- mate column is June 20 which means that the hundi
was presented on June 20. According to him, there- fore, for this period of ten days and for 24 hours thereafter the bank would have got only the discount charges and no interest. The hundi in question was
realised on June 25 and, therefore, according to him all that the bank must have got was interest for four days. But it may be pointed out that the heading of the penultimate column has not been correctly re-
produced in the paper book. We have been referred to the original and there the heading is "Date en- quired". Bearing in mind this fact as well as the entry in the last column which is headed "non-pay-
ment advice sent" we think that what is stated in the penultimate column is not the date of presentation at all but some other date. Unfortunately there is no column in either of the documents to show the date of
presentation. Therefore; these documents do not help the State at all. Apart from that we may mention that it was for the Bank to take care to see that there was no delay jn the presentation of hundis and if they
themselves delayed they had to take the consequences. Further, we may point out that if the Bank was not able to earn interest or earn only very little interest in these transactions for as long as ten days that would
have been so in all the transactions, that is, not mere- ly. transactio;is which were supported by forged railway receipts but also transactions which were supported by genuine railway receipts.
There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of Mr. Mathur. Mr. Matltm then contends that the fact that the banks stood the risk of losing their moneys Tulsi Ram v. State of U. P.
Mudlwlkar, J. J9fj2. Tw/si Ram v. State •f U. P. Mudholkar, J. because the railway receipts which supported the bills were forged documents, wrongful loss must be deemed to have been caused to tl,te banks by the action of the
firms. There is considerable force in this argument but we do not wish to express any final opinion there· on, because. in our opinion the firms of the appellant have undoubtedly made an unlawful gain.
No doubt, Mr. Mulla contended that because the firms were able to obtain temporary credits on the basis of their hundis, it cannot be said that they have made any wrongful gain to themselves. His
contention is that the firms had good credit in'the market and for obtaining credit in the transactions in question they gave good equivalents in the shape of hundis. He also pointed out that out of the 180 odd
hundis drawn by the firms only a very few were dishonoured and that this happened only in the month of December, 1949. It was not shown, he proceeded, that Murarka Brothers on whom the hundis were
drawn were not throughout the period of nine months when the transactions were entered into, in a position to meet the hundis. Out of hundis worth Rs. 80 lakhs those worth Rs. 74 lakhs were in fact honoured and
even the remaining hundis would have been honoured but for the fact that there was slump in the market and cotton bales worth Rs. I:' lakhs belonging to the appellants were lying pledged in the godowns of the
Central Bank of India for securing an amount of Rs. 9 lakhs. Had these bales been sold in the normal course there would have been no crisis in December of the kind which occurred and led to the dishonour-
ment of certain hundis, in which the Bank of Hikaner and Matadin Bhagwand•ts were payees. Bearing in mind all these facts. learned counsel wants us to draw the inferenr.e that tlv°'. obtaining of credit was not
on 1l1e security of forged railway receipts but on the security of hundis themselves which were drawn by parties who had credit in the market and drawn on a party which has not been shown not to be possessed
1 s.c.R. of adequate funds to meet the hundis throughout the period covered by the transactions. We do not think that the argument of learned counsel has much force. B. N. Kaul, (P.W. 32), the Manager of the Kanpur
branch of the Bank of Bihar, has said that he purchased hundis because the railway receipts showed ihat the consignments were large and their value was commen- surate with the amount for which the bills had been
drawn. He added that he would not have purchased these hundis if the consignments were for very small quantities, apparently meaning thereby that if tbe value of the consignments was not commensurate with
the amount to be advanced he would not have purchased the hundis. Apart from the evidence of Kaul there is also other evidence to show that the real basis of discounting bills was not merely the
credit of the appellant or the security afforded by these bills. This evidence is in consonance with the normal banking practice of discounting hundis only when they are supported by railway receipts of
consignments despatched by the drawer to outside parties. No doubt, bills or hundis are themselves securities and taking into consideration the credit of the drawer of a hundi a bank may conceivably dis-
count such hundis but where the hundis are themselves supported by railway receipts it would be futile to say that the railway receipts were not intended by the parties to be regarded as further security for
discounting the bills. Where a consignor of goods draws a hundi for the price of the consignment on some bank or firm and supports that hundi with the railway receipt obtained by him in respect of the
consignment, the party in fact pledges the consign- ment to the bank discounting the hundi and, there- fore, in such a transaction the railway receipt cannot be regarded as :anything el~e than a security for that
transaction. If that security turns out to be worthless or practically wnrthless because the value of the consignment i~ only a fraction uf what it was represen- ted to be, the discoun'ting of the hundi by the party
Tulsa Ram v. Slall of U. P. Mudholkar, J, T~/si Ram Stat1 of U. P. Mudholkar, J. 398 SUPREME CdURT REPORTS [1963}S0PP. .drawing it must necessarily be regarded as unlawful. It would thus follow that Vie fumS in question·mad,e
a gain by obtaining credits and thfit" these creditlj were".obtained by, them by resorting to unlawful means. T!).e gain they made was, therefore, unlawf\11. Mr. Mull a contended that for an act to ·be regarded as
disliqnest it is not en?ugh to show that one· person tlecei:ved anOiher a.Pd thereby made a wrongful gain but it is fortj:i.el' nece5sary to show that as a result of the deception the other persoi:;i 'sustain~d· wrongful
loss. In support of his conl'entio'n hc'has relied upon the decision in Sanjiv Rdta.naJ?pa 'Roiiad v. -E..mpefor ('.). That :was a'.'case where thlifirst accused wlio was. a 'police ~Sub-Inspector was found to have mad.e a· false
document by· altering a certain entry made by him in his diary with a view to create evidence. It was argiied before the Court! that•in order to constitute an offence of forgery· under ·ss! 46::! .and 464 tli.e docu-
ment rriust be made dishonestly or fra~dulehtly and those words must be read in t:J:i.e sense in wliicli tliey are defined in the Indian Penal Code and ·that it was not ,enough to show that the' deception was intended
to secu,re an advantage to the deceiver. Dealing with thiS argument Baker, J,, who was one of the Judges' constituting the 'Beµch observed at p. 493 : "The definition of "dishonestly' in section 24
·of the Indian Penal Code applies only to wrong- ful gain or wrongful loss and" although.there are conflicting rulings bn the question of the defi- nition of the worc:1''fraudulently', the concensus
of opinion of this Court has been that there must be some ail vantage on the. one side with a corresponding loss" on the other." Section 463; which defines forgery, runs ~hus : 1,
"W,hoever makes ';\Ily,. false decument or part of a document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public qr to any person, or to \1) (1932) I. L. R. LVI Bom. -l88. 1 s.c:R:– St}PREME COURT REPORTS_
support any claim or title, or to cause any " person to part with property, or to enter .into 'll/'lY cxpress·or implied contract, or with intent to. •commit· fraud or that.fraud marbe co1:fnnittec;l,
commits for~ery." '.I'he intention•to·cause damage or injury to the_ public or to any person is thus, an clement which has· to P«· established· before a fabricated document can J?,c he)d.
to bc·afalse docuµient.or a. forgery. lri .view.of-the ,terms.of s. 463 .what the learned Judge has observed 'is \mderstai1dable and may be right. J:I«re, however,, we are concerned witlt the offence under s. 420, I.P .C.
which speaks of dishonest inducement as a necessary ingre9,ient·., As Baker, J., has rightly pointed out: "As dishonesty involves a wrongful gain .or , wrongful loss, obviously it does not apply to
the present case where no pecuniary question arises.'' But, in an offence, under s. 420, I.P .C., a pecuniary question necessarily ;aris~. The first. part' of s .. 464, 1.P .C. provides that .a person. is. said to make a ·false document who disbonestly or fraudulently .makes,
signs etc., a document with a particular intention ·and covers cases both of acts· which are dishonest and acts which are fraudulent. Where no pecuniary question arises the elemen~ of dishonesty need not be establish-
.ed and it would be sufficient to establish that )the act was fraudulent and, then;fore, it may be, as the learned -Judge has held, that where an act is fraudulent• the intention to cause jnjury to the person
defrauded must be established. But where the allegation is that a person has dishonestly induced another to part with property something different has to be considered and that is whether he has thereby
caused a wrongful loss to the .p,erson who parted with property or, bas' made a wrongf4l gain to hilI)self. These are the ~wo facets of the definition of Tu/si Ram v. Stal,• of U. P.
Mudholkar, J. Tutsi Rt.m v. State of U. P. Mudholkar, J. dishonesty and it is enough to establish the existence of one of them. The law does not require that both should be established. The decision relied upon by
learned counsel is, therefore, distinguishable. Learned counsel then referred to the dissenting judgment of Subrahmania Ayyar, J., in Kotarnraju Venkatarayudu v. Emperor (1) to the effect that in regard to offences
falling under s. 465 and 461 it must b.e established that the deception involved some loss or risk of loss to the individual and to the public and that it was not enough to show that the deception was intended to
secure advantage to the deceived. This decision as well as some other decisions referred to by learned counsel are therefore distinguishable for the same reason which distinguishes Sanjiv Ratanappa Ronad's
case (') from the one before us. We are, therefore, of the view that the offence of cheating has been established. The High Court has found that dishonesty has been established against Lachhimi Narain because it
was he who drew and negotiated the various hundis. According to learned counsel the prosecution has not established that the other appellants· had either drawn any hundi or discounted any hundi,
this contention, however, does not appear to be sound because there is a finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the appellant Tulsi Ram had sold to the Central Bank of India certain hundis covered by forged rail-
way receipts. He has also found that the appellant Beni Gopal had admittedly booked a consignment of two bags of rape seed from Rae Bareli to Raniganj and drawn a hundi of Rs. 40,000/- on the basis of the
railway receipt which was tampered with and subsequently got verified the stamped indemnity bond for this very consignment which was sent to the firm Chiranji Lal Ram Niwas for taking delivery. Another
consignment of two bags, this time containing poppy seeds, was booked by the firm of Beni Gopal and Beni Gopal drew a hundi for Rs. 38,000/- on Murarka (1) I 1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 90.
(2) (1932) I. L. R. LVI Bom. 488. 1 S.C.R. Brothers and sold that hundi to the Central Bank of India. This hundi was supported by a railway receipt which had been tampered with. It is on the
basis of those findings that the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted both these appellants for an offence under s. 417/420, I.P.C. The learned Addi· tional Sessions Judge has also held that the appellants,
Babu Lal and Moti Lal, were likewise guilty of offences under s. 417/420, I.P.C. The conviction and sentence passed on M oti Lal was set aside by the High Court. In our opinion the prosecution has
failed to establish that Babu Lal had either drawn or negotiated hundis supported by forged railway receipts. The material upon which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has relied and, apparently,
on which the High Court has relied, does not touch these matters at all. Whatever other part Babu Lal might have played in these transactions his actions do not bring hdme to him the charge under s. 420, I.P.C.
For this reason his conviction and sentence for the offence of cheating must be set aside and we accord- ingly do so. The High Court has affirmed the conviction of Tulsi Ram and Beni Gopal for offences under s. 417/
420, I. P. C. As already indicated there is evidence to show that both these persons had taken part either in the drawing .or in the negotiation of hundis which were supported by forged railway receipts.
The evi · dence adverted to by the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not been challenged before us. We must, therefore, confirm the conviction of the appellants, Tulsi Ram and Beni Gopal, for the offence of cheat-
ing, We would, however, like to make it clear that having found that the acts fall under s. 420, I. P. C. it was not appropriate for the High Court to affirm the conviction under "s. 417 /420", I. P. C. thus
indicating that if the offence is not one it is the other. Tulsi Ram v. Stute of U, P. Mudolkar, J. T.u!si Ram v. State of U.P. A1uJhti1km, /. The only other question which needs to be
considered is regarding conspiracy. Mr. Mulla fairly ;idmitted that in any case Lachhimi Narain cannot escape the conviction under s. 120B even if a!l the other appellants are held not to ha've been parties to
the conspiracy because two other persons were admit- tedly associated with Lachhimi Narain. These per- sons would have been made co-accused in the case but for the fact that th~y died in the meanwhile.
Regarding the other appellants before us, Mr. Mulla strongly contends that there is no evidence of conspiracy. He concedes that he cannot challenge the correctness of the findings of the Additional Ses-
sions Judge and the High Court regarding the com- mission of certain acts by the appe!lants but his contention is tha·t those acts are not sufficient to show their complicity of the other appellants in the conspi-
racy. According to him, the other appellants were made to do these acts by Lachhimi Narain and that they were not in the know of the deception which Lachhimi ~arain had systematically practised in all
the transact10ns. Wt:. cannot accept the argument. At least in so far as two of the appellants are concer- ned, Tulsi Ram and Beni Gopal, they are guilty of cheating itself. That fact coupled with the other
evidence referred to in the concluding portion of the judgment of the High Court, and the circumstances established against each of the appellants are sufficient to warrant the conclusion that they were in the know
of the conspiracy. In so far as Babu Lal is concen;ied the acts established arc: ( 1) signing four forwardmg notes; (2) presenting a cheque at the Bank of Bikane.r, Kanpur; (3) cashing a cheque; (4) paying off certam
hundis accompanied by forged railway receipts;· ~nd (5} signing 32 indemnity .bonds. The forward1.ng notes related to certain consignments on the secunty of which hundis had been discounted by certain banks, –
By presenting a cheque to the Bank of Bikaner Kanpur, and by cashing another cheque, Bahl! La. ' ,. i l S.C.R. SUPREME COURf REPORTS had operated on the bank account to which the proce-
eds of certain hundis supported by forged railway receipts had been credited. These facts, taken in conjunction with the acts of payment ofhundis accom- panied by forged railway receipts would be sufficient
to establish his connection with the conspiracy. In addition to this circumstance, he also signed or endor- sed 32 indemnity bonds on the strength of which deli- very of a large number of consignments, railway recei-
pts in respect of which had been forged, was ulti- mately taken. Similarly as regards Moti Lal the following acts have been established: ( l) signing of 23 forwarding notes in connection with consignments, the railway
receipts of which were tampered but which supported certain hundis drawn by the firm; (2) he signed or endorsed 52 indemnity bonds on the strength of which delivery was taken of the consignments, the railway
receipts in respect of which were tampered with and yet were offered as security to banks or firms which discounted hundis for the value of these consignments. These circumstances are sufficient to justify the conclu-
sion drawn by the Additional Sessions Judge and upheld by the High Court. In addition to these circumstances, we must bear in mind the fact that these four appellants arc closely related to Lachhimi
Narain, that their family business is joint and, there- fore, they have a common interest. It is inconcei- vable that they could not have been in the know of what was being d')ne by Lachhimi Narain. In the
circumstances we uphold their conviction under s. 120B, I. P. C. As regards Chandrika Singh, the matter stands on a different footing. He was origi- nally an employee of the firm Bhairo Prasad Sriniv'as
and was transferred to Calcutta when a year before the transactions in question commenced, when the firm of Murarka Brothers was established. He was in charge of paying hundis presented to
Murarka Tutsi Ram State of U. P. At11dholkar, J. Tu/Ji Ram v. Stale of U. f. M11d/Jollr.or~ J. Brothe~. The 1Iigh Court has held him to be a party to the conspiracy on the basis of the following facts:
-i-. Ht: signed the letter of authority, Ex. p-1388 dated July 22, 1948, by which Lachhimi Narain auth9rised him to opci·ate the acco- unt of Murarka Brothers in the Calcutta branch of the Allahabad Bank;' as proved
by Chandrika Chaubey, P. W. 44, and, admitted by the appellant; 2. he paid Rs. 25,000/- to the Hindustan Commercial Bank and received the hundis and railway rec";pts concerned, as admitted
by him and proved by G. N. Ghosh, P. W. 57, anJ the voucher Ex. P-1232; 3. he maclc payments to the .Bank of Bihar at Cakutla on behalf of Murarka Brothers and obtained the hundis and railway recei-
pts concerned, signing vouchers, Exs. P- 1342, l :J.1.3, 134() and 134$ to 1353 about the .same, as admitted by him; and 4-. he made similar payments to the Calcutta Branches of the.Central Bank of India, the
.Punjab National Bank and the Allahabad Bank, as a'clmitted by him and, so ('11' as the Punjab Nation.al Bank is concerned, proved by the receipt Ex. P.1375 and, so far as the Allahabad Bank is concerned,
by th~ vouchers, Exs. P.1440 to 1446 and 1448 to 1457, a~· admitted by him: The first circumstance relied upon.by the High Court is really this that he appended his specimen signatures
to the letter of authority signed by Lachhimi Narain to the Allahabad Bank Calcutta wherein he (Chand- rika Singh) was authorised to operate on the accoun of Murarka Brothers. This was done long befor
the conspiracy and, therefore, has no bearing on the question before us. The remaining three reasom would merely indicate that Chandrika Singh had paid the hundis which it was his duty to do.
It may be that along with those hundis forged railway receipts were also submitted to him but from this one circumstance it would not be legitimate to infer that he had any hand in the conspiracy.
At worst what could be said is that his suspicion could have been aroused but nothing more. Therefore, in our opinion, none of the reasons given by the High Court supports the conclusion that Chandrika Singh was a party to
the conspiracy. Our attention was, however, drawn to a further reason given by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. That reason is as follows :- "Chandrika Singh was asked to explain as to
what he did with the forged R/Rs. and why he did not take delivery on them at Calcutta when they were endorsed in favour of Murarka Brothers. To this he replied that he gave the R/Rs. of Calcutta to Calcutta Commission
agents, and he sent other R /Rs to Raj Bahadur Singh munim of Bhairo Prasad Sri Niwas. But we find {sic) is that delivery in all these cases have (sic) been taken by the Calcutta merchants
and the merchants of other West Bengal stations on indemnity bonds. No question has ever been put to any of these witnesses even suggest- ing this plea. Therefore, the explanation of
Chandrika Singh appears to be altogether false and it is evident that he destroyed the R/Rs. and did not use them as it was in his know ledge that they were forged and if he presented them
at the railway station for delivery then the Station Master would compare the number of bags in the corresponding invoices and fraud would be detected. This shows the common assent of mind of Chandrika Singh conspirator
Tutsi Ram v. Stnt1 of U. P. Mudlio/kar, J. Tulsi Ram v. Stau of U. P. .Afudholkar, J. which is usual in conspiracy for the secrecy of the crime." It seems to us that the reasoumg of the learned
Additional Sessions Judge is faulty. The reasoning is entirely based upon the assumption that the rail- way receipts which were endorsed in favour of Murarka Brothers were forged or tampered with.
It has been brought out in evidence that in point of fact the appellants, firms used to send genuine consign- ments of food grains etc. to West Bengal. The possibility of railway receipts covering such consign-
ments being endorsed in favour of Murarka Brothers has not been ruled out. The answer given by Chand- rika Singh that he gave the railway receipts to the Calcutta Commission agents may well have related to
the railway receipts in respect of the genuine consign, ments. There was, therefore, no risk as envisaged by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Chandrika Singh handing over the railway receipts of such
consignments to Commission Agents for obtaining delivery. Apart from that, bearing in mind the general outline of the device employed by the appel- lants' firms it would not be reasonable to assume that
consignments, the railVvay receipts had been tampered with were endorsed in favour of Murarka Brothers. On the whole, therefore, we think that the expla- nation given by Chandrika Singh is reasonable and
he is at least entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the circumstances, therefore, we set aside the conviction under s. 120-B, I. P. C. as well as the sentences passed on him. As regards the sentences, bearing in mind the
fact that the offences were committed 13 years ago, that the appeal was pending in the High Court for about four years and thereafter it took almost three years for the High Court to prepare the paper book,
we think that grave though the crimes of Lachhimi Narain are, we should reduce the sentence. He was 1 S.C.R. 52 years of age wh:!1 these transactions were com- menced and today he is 65 years of age. If we
affirm the sentence of imprisonment for a period of 7 years it will mean that he will be in jail till he is 72 years of age and perhaps in failing health. No actual loss has resulted to anyone by reason of the
fraud practised by him and by the family. He and other members of the family have suffered a great deal monetarily during all these years and have also suffered in their reputation. We, therefore, think
that it would be sufficient if we sentence him to imprisonment for three years and raise the fine imposed upon him by the learned Additional Sessions Judge from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- or in default
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. We modify the sentences passed on him accordingly. We would make it clear that these sentences are in respect of all the various offences of which Lachhimi Narain
has been convicted and that we are not imposing separate sentence or sentences in respect of each offence for which he has been convicted. In so far as the remaining four appellants are
concerned we think that no useful purpose would be served by sending them to jail at this distance of time. Each of them had undergone a few weeks' imprison- ment before being released on bail and in our opinion
instead of sending them to jail now to serve out the remaining sentence it would be just and fair to reduce the substanti\'e sentence of imprisonment awarded to each of them to the period already undergone and
add to it a fine of Rs. 3,000/- each or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. In doing so we have borne in mirid three circumstances, one of which we have already indi-
cated. The second is the extreme youth of these persons when the alleged transactions took place and the third is that though they knew wh:it was going wrong and hoped to benefit by it, they acted under
the influence of the dominating personality of Tulsi Ram v. State af U. P. Mudholkar, J. Tulsi Ram Stai. of U. P. Mudholkar7 J. S1ptunber, 27. Lachhimi Narain who was the lcarta of the family. We
modify the sentences accordingly. Appeals partly allowed. RADHAKISHAN v. STATE OF U. P. (S. J. IMAM, N. RAJAGCPALA AYYANGAR and j. R. MUDHOLKAR, jj.) Criminal Trial-Secreting of postal articles-Entrustment
of article, if necessary ingredient of offence-Exclusive poss.JS· sion-Articles recovered from almirah–Accused and his fa.ther both living in house-Key Produced by father-Whether accused in exclusive possession-The Post Offices Act, 1898 (VI of 1898), s. 52.
The appellant, a postman, and his father were living in the same house. Certain undelivered postal articles were re- covered from an almirah in the house, the key of which was produced by the father. The appellant was tried and convicted of an ofTcnce under s. 52 Po,t Offices Act for secreting
postal articles. The appellant contended that since it had not bcrn proved that he had been entrusted with these articles the offence under s. 52 was not made out and that he could not be held guilty of secreting as he was not in exclusive possession of these articles.
lleld, that entrustmcnt was not an essential ingredient of the ofTcnce under s. 52. Where the legislature intended to make cntrustn1ent an ingredient of the offence it had used appropriate \\'ords to n1akc it clear.
It had used no such words ins. 52. 1'o secrete means to hide. In a case like the present, the re- tention of an undelivered postal article in an almirah for an inordinately long period would be tantamount to hiding that article.
Held., further, that •he appellant was not in exclusive possession of the postal articles and no inference could be drawn