URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, JODHPUR v. GOKUL NARAIN AND ANR. APRIL 10, 1996 [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.] Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959: Sections 52 and 60. Acquisition of land-Solatium and additional amount-Not provided C for-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Provisions of-Made applicable to acquisi- tions under State Act-Held: Solatium and additional amount could not be applied to award made prior to coming into force of State Act-Such an order was a nullity—Could be assailed at any stage including at the execution or in a collateral proceedin[jDistrict Judge directed to correct decree and recom- pute liability to pay compensation-Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections D 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28.
Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 : Order 22, Rule JOA-Death of party—Legal representatives-Substitu- tion of-Application filed within 30 days from date of knowledge of death—-Counsel appearing in executing court did not intimate death to counsel appearing in Supreme Court-Held : lapse of counsel could not be construed to be knowledge of death-Hence, Special Leave Petition did not abate. Order 47-Execution of decree which was a nullity and non-set-its nullity could be assailed even at the execution stage or in a collateral proceeding.
The land of the first respondent was acquired under Section 52 of Rajasthan urban Improvement Act, 1959 and comnensation was answered. On appeal, the High Court while enhancing the compensation also G · awarded solatium, interest and adlditional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23(1A) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the meanwhile, the appellant had paid a part of the compensation amount. The respondent filed the execution petition before the District Judge for recovery of the balance amount. The appellant filed objections under Section 47 of the H Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and claimed refund of excess amount paid URBANIMPROVEMENTTRUST v. GOKULNARAIN
to the respondent. The District Judge dismissed the objections. On A revision, the High Court dismissed the claim. Aggrieved by the High Court's judgment the appellant preferred the present appeal. The Act was amended by reason of which the Central Land Acquisi- tion Act became applicable to acquisition under the Act. Section 60A of the Act made transitory provisions a1iplicable to the pending matters. Pending the special leave petition in this Court, the first respondent died. A notice was issued and when the notice was not served, the appellant was per- mitted to take dasti service and when the notice was taken, the appellant was informed that the first respondent had died. Consequently, applica- tion for substitution under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC was filed within 30 days C of the date of knowledge of death. The legal representatives of the deceased first respondent were brought on record in the executing court. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that under the Act there was provision to grant interest only; that the High Court inherently lacked jurisdiction to apply the provisions of Central LA Act to acquisition under D the Act; that the order to award solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23(1-A) of Central LA Act was a nullity; that nullity of the decree could be challenged even in execution; and that the respondent was not entitled to these additional benefits.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the application for substitution of legal representatives was barred by limitation; that the special leave petition had abated and, therefore, the appeal was not main- tainable; that the order awarding additional benefits was allowed to be- . come final; that though the High Court wrongly applied the Central LA Act, it did not lack inherent jurisdiction; that having allowed the decree to F become final it would not be open to the appellant to contend that the decree was a nullity; that Section 47, .CPC contemplated correcting the errors in execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree; and that the appellant was not entitled to raise objection to the execution of the decree which amounted to its review and did not come within the ambit of Section G 47, CPC.
Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1. Under Order 22, Rule lOA of the Code of Civil Proce- dure, 1908, whenever a pleader appearing for a party to the suit comes to H the knowledge of the death of the party, he was to 'inform about it and the court thereupon gives notice of such death to the other party and for this purpose the contract between the pleader and the ~eceased party is deemed to subsist. It would, therefore, be clear that though the legal repre- sentatives have been brought on record in the executing Court pending B proceedings in this Court, since the counsel for th~ appellant did not have the information, on coming to know of the death after dasti service was taken out, immediately application under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC came to be filed within 30 days of the date of the knowledge. Accordingly, there is no abatement of the appeal. [154-E-G]
1.2. The State is not expected to keep watch over the survival of the respondent and lapse of counsel to intimate to the counsel appearing in this Court cannot be construed to be knowledge of death. Even if it is assumed that abatement was caused, since application was filed under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC within 30 days from the date of the knowledge there D is no delay in making the application to bring the legal representatives on record in this appeal. There is, hence, no abatement by reason of the death of the respondent. The application to bring the legal representatives is accordingly ordered. [154·G-H; 155-A]
2.1. Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 does not provide for payment of solatium and additional amount. It empowers the Court to award interest @ 6% on the amount awarded from the date of taking possession. TI1e appellant having allowed the enhanced compensation, though on wrong principle, to become final, it is bound by it. The only objection raised by the appellant is as to the executability of the decree of additional benefits under Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The respondent is entitled only to the principal amount and interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. It is settled law that determination of the compensati011 under Section 23(1) of Central LA Act is towards market value of the land prevailing as on the date of the publication of the Section 4(1) notification in the Gazette. Equally, so under Section 52 of the Act. [155-H; 156-A-C]
2.2. It is settled law that payment of additional amount is inde- pendent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component H of the compensation under Section 23(1) of Central LA Act or Section 52 URBAN IMPROVEMENTTRUST v. GOKULNARAIN
of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under A Sections 23(2), 28 and 23(1-A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. The Act does not provide for payment of solatiurn and additional benefit except interest @ 6o/c per annum frorn the date of taking possession. Under the Central LA Act payment of additional amount under Section 23(1-A) and of solatium under Section 23(2) cannot be applied to the award made prior to coming into force of the amended Act. Section 60A of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything con- tained in Section 52 (1) of the Act, where any matter relating to acquisition of land is pending on the date of the commencement of the amendment such matters being conducted or action taken, shall be subject to the C provisions of the Central LA Act. [159-H; 160-A-E]
Prem Nath Kapur & Anr. v. National Fe1ti/isers C01poration of India Ltd. & Ors., [1966] 2 SCC 71; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 2 SCC 754; K.S. Pwipooman (II) v. State of Kera/a, [1995] 1 SCC 367 and D Unio11 of I11dia v. Han Kishan Klwsla, (1993] Supp. 2 SCC 149, relied on. State of Punjab v. Avtar Singh & Ors., [1995] 1 SCC 383; State of Punjab &Anr. v.Babu Singh & Ors., (1995] Supp. 2 SCC 406,Major Pakhar SinghAtwal & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1995] Supp. 2 SCC 401; Union of India v. Rangila Ram (Dead) by LRs., [1995] 5 SCC 585; Gurdial Singh & Anr. v. State of Pu11jab, (1995] 3 SCC 333, Improvement 7iust, Patiala v. Lwid Acquisition Tribunal & Ors., (1995] 3 SCC 724; Union of India & Ors. v. Pratap Kaur (Smt.) (Dead) through LRs. &Anr., [1995] 3 SCC 263; State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar, [1995] 3 SCC 316; Ishwarlal Premchand Shah & Ors. Etc. Etc. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1996] 4 SCC 174 and Umed Industries and Land Development Co. & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1995] 2 SCC 563, referred to.
3.1. The Central LA Act has no application to the lands acquired and the Act. It was amended and made applicable only to the pending proceed- ings. It would, therefore, be clear that the order awarding additional benefits G is clearly without jurisdiction and thereby it is a nullity. A decree passed by such a Court is a nullity and is non-est. Its nullity can be assailed at any stage including at the execution or in a collateral proceeding since it strikes at the very jurisdiction and authority of the Court. [160-H; 161-H] 3.2. In the instant case the findings of the District Judge and the High H Court that the appellant is not entitled to raise objection in the execution, is wrong in law. It should be considered in execution only under Section 47 CPC and not by a separate suit. The orders or th~ District Judge and the High Court stand set aside. The District Judge is directed to correct the decree accordingly and recompute the liability to' pay compensation and c
pass appropriate orders according to law. (161-H; 162-A-C] Sushi/ Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Balun (Dead) through his Ll:I'., [1990] 1 sec 193, followed. Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam & Ors., [1994]4 SCC 370, referred to.
Hirata/ Moo/chand Doshi v. Barotraman Lal Ranchhoddas, [1993] 2 sec 458, held inapplicable. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6963 of 1996. From the Judgment and Order dated 27.5.94 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B.C.R. No. 553 of 1993.
B.D. Sharma and Piyush for the Appellant. Manoj K. Das, Aruneshwar Gupta, Arvind Kumar and Mrs. Laxmi Arvind for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment dated May 27, 1994 made in Civil Revision No. 553 of 1993 by a learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur. The admitted facts are that under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (for short, the 'Act') the land of Gokul Narain, the first respondent, along with other lands G for construction of over-bridge was acquired and possession thereof was taken on June 22, 1965. The Additional Collector made .his award on June 30, 1976 awarding a sum of Rs. 70,699.82 as compensation which included value of the building also. On appeal, the district Judge by order dated January 27, 1978 enhanced the compensation to Rs. 2 per square foot. The appellant as well and the respondents carried the matter in revision to the r
URBANIMPROVEMENTTRU5f v. GOKULNARAINIK.RAMASWAMY,J.) 153 High Court. By order dated March 18, 1983 the High Court remanded the A matter to the District Judge, with certain directions, for fresh disposal thereof. The District Judge by order dated November 19, 1985 enhanced the compensation to Rs. 11.50 per square foot and on further revision and remand by the High Court by order dated December 18, 1989 also applied the provisions of the Lan.d Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central LA Act) as amended by Act 68 of 1984 and awarded solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23 (2), 28 and 23 (1-A) of the Central LA Act. In the meanwhile, the appellant had paid the compensation amount on March 7, 1977 in a sum of Rs. 1,18,760 and a further sum of Rs. 44,195.60 on May 11, 1982. The respondent claimed adjustment of the said amounts towards C interest and filed the execution for the balance amount. The High Court by order dated August 4, 1988 dismissed the revision of the respondent claiming adjustment of the amounts paid towards interest and his entitle· ment to claim the balance amount observing that the respondent is not entitled to benefit under Act 68 of 1984. The respondent filed the execution for recovery of the balance amount. The appellant filed objections under D Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) claiming that the cost of the acquired land worked out @ Rs. 11.50 per square foot to Rs. 1,19,026.22 and the cost of the building was Rs. 3,423.00. Interest payable @ 6% for period from June 22, 1965 upto July, 3, 1977, the date of deposi~ worked out to Rs. 85,981.16. The total compensation payable and interest worked out to Rs. 2,08,432.36. The balance excess amount as on that date including interest was Rs. 89,672.38. Interest on the balance principal compensation @ 6% from that date upto May 11, 1982 worked out to Rs. 90,819.12. Balance compensation amount as on May 11, 1982 and interest thereon was Rs. 90,819.12. Rs. 44,195.60 was paid on the said date. Balance amount of interest after deducting the said amount was Rs. 46,623.62. The amount paid in compliance of the order of the High Court dated December 12,1987 was Rs. 1,23,000. Therefore, the excess amount paid to the respon- dent was Rs. 76,376.38. Interest calculated @6% on the said excess amount for period from the date of the deposit till date of objections, viz., January 16, 1991 to which the appellant claims to be entitled is Rs. 14,231.46. Thus G the appellant claims that he is entitled to receive from the respondents a total refund of Rs. 90,607.84 plus interest thereon @6% from January 18, 1991 till date of decision. The District Judge by the impugned order dated April 25, 1984 had dismissed the objections. On revision, the High Court by the impugned order dismissed the claim. Thus this appeal by special H SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S [ 1996] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
leave. The Act was amended by Rajasthan Amendment Act 29 of 1987 which came into force w.e.f. August 1, 1987. By reason thereof, the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 become applicable lo acquisition under the Act from August 1, 1987. Section 60A of the Act, as inserted by the Amendment Act 29 of 1987, made transitory provision applicable to the pending matters. Pending the special, leave petition, the first respondent died on February 17, 1995. A notice was issued on January 2, 1995. When the notice was not served, the appellant was permitted to take out dasti service by order dated February 5, 1996 and when the notice was taken, C the appellant was informed that the respondent had died. Consequently, application for substitution under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC was filed on February 12, 1996. The legal representatives received the notice as per the orders of this Court dated March 18, 1996. We have heard learned counsel on both sides.
It is stated in the written arguments of the counsel for the respon- dents that the District Judge by order dated May 27, 1995 brought the legal representatives of the first respondent on record. When application came to be filed in the District Court on May 5, 1995 to the knowledge of the counsel for the appellant, it was ordered on May 27, 1995. The application for substitution is barred by limitation. The special leave petition had abated and, therefore, appeal is not maintainable. We find no force in the contention. Under Order 22, Rule lOA, CPC, whenever a pleader appear- ing for a party to the suit comes to the knowledge of the death of the party, he has to inform about it and the court thereupon gives notice of such death to the other party and for this purpose the contract between the pleader and the deceased party is deemed to subsist. It would, therefore, be clear that though the legal representatives have been brought on record in the executing Court on May 27, 1995 pending proceedings in this Court, since the counsel for the appellant did not have had the information, on coming to know of the death after dasti service was taken out, immediately G application under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC came to he filed within 30 days of the date -0f the knowledge. Accordingly, there is no abatement of the appeal. The State is not expected to keep watch over the survival of the respondent and lapse of rounsel to intimate to the counsel appearing in this Court cannot be construed to be knowledge of death. Even if it is H assumed that abatement was caused, since application was filed under URBAN IMPROVEMENfTRUST v. GOKUL NARAIN [K RAMASW AMY.J.l 155 Order 22, Rule 4, CPC within 30 days from the date of the knowledge there A is no delay in making the application to bring the legal representatives on record in this appeal. There is, hence, no abatement by reason of the death of the respondent. The application to bring the legal representatives is accordingly ordered.
It is contended by Shri Badridas Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant that the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 was extended for the acquisition of the land under the Act w.e.f. August 1, 1987. Under the Act, there is no provision for payment of solatium, interest and additional amount either under the State Land Acquisition Act, 1953 or the Central LA Act, The Act grants interest @ 6%. The District Judge, therefore, was wrong in applying the provisions of the Central LA Act as amended by Act c
68 of 1984. The District Judge, inherently lacked jurisdiction to apply the provisions of Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The order dated December 18, 1989 is a nullity to award solatium, interest and additional amount_ under Sections 23 (2), 28 and 23 (1-A) of the Central LA Act as amended by Act D 68 of 1984. Nullity of the decree can be raised even in execution. The objection, therefore, was accordingly raised. The respondent is not entitled to claim these additional benefits except the principal amount @ Rs. 11.50 per square foot and interest @ 6%. The District Judge as well as the High Court, are, therefore, wrong in law in dismissing the objections. Shri Arvind Kumar, Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the order awarding additional benefits under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23 (1-A) of the Central LA Act as amended by Act 68of1984 was allowed to become final. The Court, though wrongly, applied the Amendment Act, it did not lack inherent jurisdiction. Therefore, having allowed the decree to become final, it would not be open to the respondent to contend that the decree is a nullity. It is further contended that Section 47, CPC contemplates correcting the errors in execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The modification sought by way of objections amounts to review of the decree which has become final. Therefore, it does not come G within the ambit of Section 47, CPC. The question, therefore, is : whether the District Judge and the High Court were right in concluding that the appellant was not entitled to raise the objections to the execution of the decree? The admitted position is that the Act does not provide for payment of solatium and additional amount. It empowers the Court to award interest @.6% on the amount awarded from the date of taking possession. H A The appellant having allowed the enhanced compensation at Rs. 11.50 per square foot, though on wrong principle, to bec~me final, it is bound by it. The only objection raised by the appellant is as to the executability of the decree of additional benefits under Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The respondent is entitled only to the principal amount and interest @ 6% c
per annum from the date of taking possessioh, viz., June 22, 1965. The amounts claimed and paid have already been specified and hence need no reiteration. It is settled law by catena of decisions of this Court that determination of the compensation under Sectipn 23 (1) of the Central LA Act is towards market value of the land prevailing as on the date of the publication of the Section 4(1) notification in the Gazette. Equally, so under Section 52 of the Act.
In Prem Nath Kapur&Anr. v. National Fertilisers C01poration of India Ltd. & Ors. , [1996] 2 SCC 71 a three-Judge Bench of this Court had considered the scope of power to award additional benefits under Section D 23(2), 28 and 23(1-A) of the Central LA Act and of the jurisdiction of the court to decide as to when they are to be awarded; on what items interest and solatium is claimable and upto what date. Equally, of the power to adjust the amount towards interest was consiqered. The facts in that case were that the notification under Section 4(1) was published on February 5, 1973. On October 5, 1975, the Collector made his award. On January 24, 1980 the reference Court enhanced the compensation. The Higb Court dismissed the revision on May 23, 1983. When an application was made later, the High Court awarded damages for severance and on further application it awarded so!atium, interest and additional amount under the Amended Central LA Act. In execution, the respondent raised the objec- tion as to the executability of the decree of the enhanced solatium, interest and additicfoal amount. The executing Court overruled the objections. The High Court allowed the revision. The appellant had computed the total liability deducting the amount paid towards interest and additional amount payable including interest on solatium, solatium and interest on additional G amount under Section 23(1-A) and interest! till the date of satisfaction under Order 21, Rule 1 CPC and laid execution for the balance amount with interest. The appellant had raised objeetions which were rejected by the executing Court. In the revision, the HisJi Court set aside the order and directed to compute the principal amount, adjust the amounts H deposited towards principal amount and to proceed with the execution of URBANIMPROVEMENTTRUST "· GOKULNARAIN[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 157
the balance amount. When the special leave petition was filed, another A Bench of this Court suo motu issued notice as to why the additional benefits ordered under Sections 23 (2), 28 and 23 (1-A) as well-as damages for severance and additional benefits thereon should not be set aside. When the maller came up on reference before a three-Judge Bench, this Court had held that payment of solatium under Section 23(2) and addition- al amount under Section 23(1-A) are "in addition to" the compensation determined under Section 23(1). Payment of interest under Section 28 is on the excess amount or part thereof awarded on reference under Section 26 or on appeal under Section 54. The award of each component is independent, after determination of market value under Section 23(1). The Court gets jurisdiction to award additional benefits under Sections 23 (2), 28 and 23 (1-A) only when the Court enhances the compensation and is not independent of the power under section 23(1). IL was held that the claimants were not entitled to solatium under Section 23(2), interest under Section 28 and additional amount under Section 23(1-A). The liability to c
pay interest subsists till date of deposit of the amount into Court. There is D no liability to pay interest on solatium; or solatium and interest on addi- tional amount under Section 23(1-A) which cannot be calculated and claimed in execution. The claimant cannot adjust the amount deposited and received towards principal amount as against interest. The doctrine of Section 60 of the Contract Act is inapplicable to the execution of the award under the Act. Therefore, the claimant cannot appropriate the amounts paid for compensation towards interest.
In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] .2 SCC 754, a Constitution Bench of this Court had held that the claimant is not entitled to the benefit of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 in the pending appeals to pay enhanced solatium and interest covered by transitory Section 30 of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. It would be applicable only when the proceedings are pending either before the reference Court or the Land Acquisition Officer. In KS. Pmipooman (II) v. State of Kera/a, [1995] 1 SCC 367 another Constitution Bench per majority had held that the claimant is not entitled G to additi9nal amount when the award was made or possession taken before the artlendment Act was introduced. Since both the events had occured prior to the introduction of Amendment Act 68 of 1984, the claimant was not entitled to additional amount. That ratio is being followed in catena of decisions of this Court subsequently including Prem Nath Kapur's case (supra).
c In State of Punjab & Anr. v. Jagir Singh & Ors., [1995] Supp. 4 SCC 626 the Additional District Judge had enhanced the ~ompensation on March 2, 1978. When the State had gone in appeal, while dismissing the State appeal the High Court granted benefits of the enhanced solatium, interest and additional amount under Section 23(2), 28 and 23 (1-A). Objections were raised in execution. When it was rejected, this Court had held that the High Court had no power to award the statutory benefits. It was, therefore, held that the award of the High Court of the additional benefits was without jurisdiction. This ratio is an authority for proposition that though the High Court has power under Section 54 to entertain appeal, it lacks jurisdiction to award independently additional benefits under the Amendment Act, when it confirms the award of the reference Court. In State of Punjab v. Avtar Singh & Ors., [1995] 1 SCC 383 after the disposal of the appeal by the High Court on November 11, 1982, an application came to be made under sections 151 and 152 CPC after the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 came into force. Upon that the High Court on D July 22, 1986, had granted the benefits under Act 68 of 1984. On appeal, this Court had held that high Court had no power to award the additional benefits. The same view was reiterated in State of Punjab & Anr. v. Babu Singh & Ors., [1995] Supp. 2 SCC 406; Major Pakhar Singh Atwa/ & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., [1995] Supp 2 SCC 401; Union of India v. Rangila Ram (Dead) by Lrs., [1995] 5 SCC 585; Gurdial Singh o;f: Anr. v. State of Punjab, [1995] 3 SCC 333 and Improvement Tmst, Patiala v. Land Acquisi- tion Tribunal & Ors. [1995] 3 SCC 724.
In Union of India & Ors. v. Pratap Kaur (Smt.) (Dead) through LRs. & Anr., (1995] 3 SCC 263, the facts were that the High Court had disposed of the appeals under Section 54 of the Central LA Act wpich became final. Thereafter, miscellaneous applications were filed before the Additional District Judge to redetermine the compensation. He enhanced the com- pensation on redetermination applying the principle of belting. When the order came to be questioned, the High Court dismissed the revision. On appeal, this Court had held that District Court had no jurisdiction under G Section 13-A of the Central LA Act as it was neither a, clerical error nor an arithmetical mistake. The order was held to be without jurisdiction. The Court gets jurisdiction only on a valid reference made under Section 18. This case is an authority for the proposition that Court has no inherent or independent power to determine compensation except on a reference under Sectipn 18 and so District Judge has no inherent jurisdiction or URBANIMPROVEMEl>'TTRUST v. GOKULNARAIN[K.RAM'ASWAMY,J.) 159 authority to award compensation under the guise of correcting the award A or decree under section 13A.
In State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawn Hatkar, [1995] 3 SCC 316, after the decree of the enhanced compensation became final, on an ap- plication filed, the Civil Judge awarded the additional benefits under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 and the High Court dismissed the appeal. This Court had held that the Civil Court.had no jurisdiction to amend the decree awarding additional benefits under Amendment Act, 68 of 1984. In other words, the award of additional benefits was held without jurisdiction and authority of law. In Ishwaralal Premchand Shah & Ors. Etc. Etc. v. State of Gujarat & 01~., (1996] 4 SCC 174 a contention was raised that though the parties had entered into an agreement under Section 11(2) of the Central La Act, they are entitled to the additional benefits under Sections 23(2), c
28 and 23(1-A) since those components are part of the compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer did not make an award in terms of the form prescribed which included the additional amounts. This Court has held that D payment of additional amounts is not part of the compensation. They are distinct and inqependent. On the parties having entered into an agreement under Section 11(2), they are entitled to compensation only in terms of the contract and not under the Act. In Union of India v. Hari Kishan Khosla, (1993] Supp. 2 SCC 149 a three-Judge Bench of this Court had held that payment of solatium, interest and additional amount for the properties E acquired under the Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act 1952 would not be made, since the Act does not provide for such payment. _
In Umed Industries and Land Development Co. & Ors. v. State of F Rajasthan & Ors., [ 1995] 2 SCC 563, the question arose : whether the Amendment Act G8 of 1984 would be available to the lands acquired under the Act, and Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953' It was held that by operation of Section 60A of Rajasthan Amendment Act 29 of 1987, the Central Amendment Act would be applicable only with effect from August 1, 1987. Since the proceedings were pending for de_termination of the G compensation, it was held that solatium and interest under the Amendment Act would be applicable, but the claim for additional amount under Section 23(1-A) was rejected.
It would, thus, be settled law that payment of additional amount is H independent of the compensation determined for the value of the land. c They are not part of the component of the compensation for value of the acquired land. They are in addition to and independent of the component of the compensation under Section 23(1) of Central L.A Act or Section 52 of the Act. The payment of solatium, interest and additional amount under Sections 23(2), 28 and 23(1-A) is in addition to the payment of the compensation in terms of the provisions of the Act under which the property came to be acquired. Admittedly, the Act doe~ not provide for payment of solatium and additional benefits except interest @ 6% per annum from the date of taking possession. The Amendment Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable prospectively from August 1, 1987 to the land acquired thereafter. Act 68 of 1984 would be applicable under section 60A to the pending cases as on August 1, 1987 to determination compensation. It would be seen that under the Central Amendment Act payment of additional amount under Section 23(1-A) and solatium under Section 23 D cannot be applied to the award made prior to coming into force of the Rajasthan Amendment Act 29 of 1987. Section 60A provides that not- withstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 52 of the Act, where any matter relating to acquisition of land is pending on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Ordinance, viz., August 1, 1987 such matters being conducted or action taken, shall be subject to the provisions of the Central LA Act. The District Judge was; therefore, not right in applying the Amendment Act on December 18, 1989 awarding enhanced solatium and interest and additional amount.
The question then is : whether the objections can be raised in execution? This controversy is no longer res integra. In Sushi/ Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) through his Lrs., [1990] 1 SCC 193 a three- Judge Bench of this Court was to consider whether the nullity of a decree can be raised in execution. Under the Haryana Urban (Control) of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 the building was governed by the provisions of the said Act. The Civil Court granted decree of eviction. When objection was raised in execution the executing Court rejected the same. On appeal, this Court had held that a decree passed by a Court \vilhout jurisdiction over the subject matter or on any other ground which goes to the root of its exercise of jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction, is a nullity. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is 11011 est. Its invalidity can be set up H whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for URBAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. GOKUL NARAIN [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 161 a right even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The A defect of jurisdiction strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree which cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the party. If the court has jurisdiction but there is any defect in its exercise of jurisdiction it does not go to the root of its authority. Such a defect like territorial jurisdiction could be waived by the party which could be corrected only by way of an B appeal or revision. In that case it was held that since the decree was a nullity the validity was upheld in execution .
In Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shayam & Ors'., [1994) 4 SCC 370 this Court had upheld the same objection raised under Section 47, CPC when the decree awarding allotment of land in addition to C compensation was held to be a nullity. That objection was allowed to be raised in execution and was upheld. Hirata/ Moo/chand Doshi v. Barotraman Lal Ranchhoddas, [1993) 2 SCC 458 relied on by the respon- dents is of no avail. In that case though nullity of a decree on the basis of a compromise for eviction of a tenant governed by the provisions of the D Rent Act was pressed for acceptance, this Court held that the party cannot be permitted to lead fresh evidence as to the existence of that ground for eviction. On the facts in that case, it was held that the tenant impliedly admitted existence of statutory ground for eviction. Therefore, the decree was held lo be not a nullity. As regards the nullity or lack of inherent jurisdiction, this Court observed that the decree can be said to be a nullity E if it is passed by a court having no inherent jurisdiction. Erroneous decree cannot be said to be a nullity; nor can a decree based on an error be a nullity. Nullity has to be understood in the sense that it is ultra vires the power of the Court passing the decree and not merely avoidable decree. As stated earlier, if the decree strikes at the jurisdiction of the court or the F court lacks jurisdiction it strikes at the very root of the authority to pass the order or the decree. As seen, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has no application to the land.< acquired under the Act. It was amended only w.e.f. August 1, 1987 and it was made applicable only to the pending proceedings. It would, therefore, be clear that the order awarding additional benefits is clearly without jurisdiction and thereby it is a nullity. Its nullity can be G assailed at any stage including at the execution or in a collateral proceed- ings since it strikes at the very jurisdiction and authority of the court. Under these circumstances, the District Judge and the High Court arc not right and their finding that the appellant is not entitled to raise H objection in the execution, is wrong in law. It should be considered in execution only under Section 47 CPC and not by a separate suit. The orders of the District Judge and the High Court stand set aside. The executing Court is directed to recompute the liability of the appellant to pay the compensation and interest @ 6% from the date of takil)g possession i.e., c
June 22, 1965 and order execution accordingly. In case it finds that the appellant is entitled to restitution the same would be ordered under Section 144, CPC as prayed for. The District Judge is directed to correct the decree accordingly and recompute the liability lo pay compensation in the light of the law declared above and pass appropriate order according lo law.
The appeal is allowed accordingly. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs. V.S.S. Appeal allowed.