V. LAXMINARASAMMA versus A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS.

4. The Special Court has also framed regulations in c exercise of its power conferred upon it under sub-section (SA) of Section of the Act, inter alia, providing for : 1. Place of sitting of the Special Courts (Regulation 4) 2. Sitting hours of the Special Court (Regulation 5) 3. Working hours of the office of the Special Court (Regulation 6) 4. Scrutiny of the application (Regulation 8) 5. Weekly and daily cause list (Regulation (11) 6. Documents to accompany summons to the respondent (Regulation 12) Chapter Ill of the Regulations provide for the powers and …. F functions of the officers of the Court. The Regulations furthermore provide for the matters relating to proceedings before the Special Court, inspection of documents by strangers, inspection of the records, production of records in the custody of a court, production of records in the custody of public officer G other than a court, etc.

5. The Act indisputably confers a wide jurisdiction upon the Special Court and the Special Tribunal. The Tribunal or the Special Courts are high powered ones. For all intent and purport, the Tribunal and Special Courts are substitutes for the V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] ;–f civil court and the appellate authority. Statements of objects and reasons for enacting the said Act clearly establish that the said Act was enacted to achieve a special purpose; the 'object' being to prohibit land grabbing resulting in breakage of public law and order. The Act brings within it umbrage not only 'grabbing of lands' of Government or local authorities but also statutory authorities and private persons. It aims at those persons who form a distinct class. The Special Courts have both civil and criminal jurisdiction. The provisions of Code of Civil Procedure c and Code of Criminal are ordinarily applicable subject, of course, to the provisions to the contrary. It also safeguards the interest of the notices from vexatious or frivolous litigations. Before taking cognizance of a case, a report of the revenue 'A authorities are required to be obtained. In the event a suo motu D action is to be taken, the proceeds are required to be heard. A legal fiction is created that it would be civil court and/or court of sessions and would otherwise have the same power as civil court or the court of sessions as provided for in the Code of Civil procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure, the Act provides for transfer of cases to the Tribunals in relation to the matters pending before any court. of law relating to land grabbing. The Act also contains a non-obstante clause.

6. The Special Courts and Tribunals, indisputably are entitled to determine any question or issue including the question of title or possession in the proceedings initiated before it. Special Courts am:t the Tribunal not only have trappings of a court but also of a civil court and, thus, are entitled to determine complicated questions of title.

7. Would the question of adverse possession be beyond the purview of its jurisdiction is the question. There appears to be an apparent conflict in the decision in Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) and N. Srinivasa Rao (supra). Whereas in the former, the defence of adverse possession had specifically A been gone into holding that the appellant therein had acquired '"-"' indefeasible title by adverse possession, opining: "17. It is pertinent to note that mere allegation of an act of land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court. In both Section 7(1) and Section 8(1) of the Act the phrase "any alleged act of land grabbing" is employed and not "act of land grabbing". It appears to us that it is designedly done by the legislature to obviate the difficulty of duplication of trial once in the courts under the c Act and over again in the ordinary civil court. The purpose of the Act is to identify cases involving allegation of land grabbing for speedy enquiry and trial. The courts under the Act are nonetheless civil courts which follow the Code of Civil Procedure and are competent to grant the same reliefs which can be obtained from ordinary civil courts." It was furthermore observed: "A combined reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the civil court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under the Civil Courts Act is ousted and the Act which is special law will prevail and as such the Special Court will have jurisdiction in respect of the matters dealt with thereunder. (See: Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Coop. Housing • … Society Ltd.)" p: In N. Srinivas Rao (supra), another Division Bench, however, unfortunately, without noticing Kanda Lakshamana Bapuji (supra), despite holding that there was no actual dispossession, opined : " … In our view, in a proceeding before the Special Court the only issue which fell for decision is whether there has been an act of land grabbing as alleged and who is the guilty party. The Special Court has no jurisdiction to decide questions relating to acquisition of title by adverse possession in a proceeding under the Act as the same V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] …. ,..,. _, would fall within the domain of the civil courts. The learned Special Judge apparently travelled beyond the jurisdiction vested in him under the 1982 Act in deciding that even if the provisions of Section 47 of the Act were a bar to transfer without the sanction of the T ahsildar, the occupants of the land had perfected their title thereto by way of adverse possession."

8. We may, however, notice that another Bench of this Court in A.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Sadatul/ah & Ors. [(2007) 6 sec 566] despite noticing both the decisions did not c enter into the larger question and in the peculiar facts and attending circumstances thought it appropriate that the finding as to adverse possession be set aside by granting liberty to all or any of the respondents to take appropriate proceedings 'J., by approaching a competent civil court, if they claim title on the basis of adverse possession.

9. Mr. M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the Tribunal being not a Court and as the protections afforded to a defendant in a civil suit have been taken away by reason of the provisions of the said Act, they require strict construction. Jurisdiction of the Civil Court having been expressly ousted and in any event, the Tribunal and/or special court being not an alternative efficacious complicated question in regard to adverse possession, it was urged, must be held to be beyond the purview of the Tribunal.

10. Mr. Anoop G. Chaudhary, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would contend that the said Act being a special law having been enacted to deal with special circumstances and providing for a high powered tribunal, it must be held to have the jurisdiction … -f to deal with a question of adverse possession. Acquisition of an indefeasible title by adverse possession, the learned counsel would submit, also being a question of title, there is absolutely no reason as to why special court and/or tribunal can be said to be having no jurisdiction in relation thereto.

11. The validity of the Act is not in question. We have, ~. – therefore, no other option but to proceed on the basis that the same is constitutional. In view of the question referred to before us, we are also not called upon to decide the larger question as to whether by reason of the provisions of the Act, the B jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted.

12. We have noticed the provisions of the Act. The Act jDrovides for inbuilt safeguards for the defendants. The Special Court or the Tribunal derives jurisdiction of a case only in the c event it is satisfied with regard to the existence of the jurisdictional facts viz. activities of land grabbing. Notices are issued by the Tribunal only on arriving at a prima facie satisfaction. Hearing of the noticee is mandatory in the event a suo motu action under the Act is to be taken. A report of the revenue officer who is man on the spot is required to be ,.._ ' D obtained.

13. Rules and Regulations framed under the Act provide for a detailed procedure. The Tribunal or the Special Court, thus, cannot act in an arbitrary or capricious fashion. The provisions E of the Act provide for adequate remedy in case an application is found to be vexatious or frivolous although it exercises a very wide jurisdiction both under Civil as also Criminal law. The Tribunal is a high powered one. It can execute its own decrees. The provisions of the Act, as noticed herein before, contain non- F obstante clause in terms whereof the provisions thereof prevail over not only Code of Civil Procedure but also AP. Civil Court's Act. 14. 'Civil Court' is defined under the AP. Civil Courts Act. Tribunals and/or Special Courts by reason of a legal fiction G created are both Civil Court as also the Court of Sessions. Legal fiction created under the Act is of wide amplitude. [See Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay [AIR 1951 SC 469]; and Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2006) 3 SCC 620]. 15. The Tribunal and/or Special Court are ordinarily V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] _.-1 required to follow the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and Code of Criminal Procedure. Being a 'court', the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would also be applicable. It is true that burden of proof is on the noticee being an alleged land grabber, but the same by itself would not mean that it is an interim Tribunal vis-a-vis the civil court. Enactment of such a B provision, moreover, was within the competence of the Legislature. Only because burden of proof is on the noticee, -I the same would not mean that he has been deprived of his right to defend himself in the proceedings. Burden of proof is in the realm of procedural law. By reason of such a provision, c substantive right of the parties on an immovable property is not taken away. Jurisdiction is exercised by the Tribunal and/or Special Court upon arriving at a satisfaction in regard to existence of jurisdictional fact. Even in terms of Article 65 of , .._ the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 in the event, the plaintiff proves his title, the burden of proof would be on the defendant to show that he has acquired title by adverse possession. {See Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam and Ors. [(2001) 14 sec 308]. 16. The defendant in all circumstances, therefore, would be entitled to prove that he is lawfully entitled to possess the land. No law says that if a new forum is created by a special statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the civil court becomes barred, the Tribunal constituted thereunder must be a substitute for a civil court, not only with regard to all its powers but also with all its deficiencies. If the Special Act satisfies substantive due process, in our opinion, the same would satisfy the legal requirements. 17. Acquisition of an indefeasible title by prescription is a creation of statute. Se·:ton 27 of the Limitation Act provides for extinction of a title of the owner of the land and vesting thereof in a person who has acquired the same by adverse possession. The plea of adverse possession, however, must expressly be raised and established. [2009) 3 S.C.R. 18. The question referred to before us has been gone into by a Bench of this Court in Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Manda/ Revenue Officer and Ors~ [(2007) 11 SCC 714), wherein this Court took into consideration the earlier decisions of this Court including Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) and N. Srinivasa B Rao (supra) and Mohd. Sadatullah (supra) as also State of AP. v. Pramee/a Modi [(2006) 13 SCC 147). c In Mahalaxmi Motors (supra), it was held: "36. We are bound by the decision of the larger Bench in this case (sic for coordinate bench). The Special Court exercises a jurisdiction of the civil court, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure being applicable. If it is a civil court, all questions relating to title and possession can be gone into. The proceeding can be initiated in terms of Section 4 of the said Act against a person who continues to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or any private person. If and when a proceeding is initiated under the said Act, the proceedee not only can raise jurisdictional questions but can also raise questions relating to his title and possession. It is, therefore, difficult to comprehend as to how the Special Court would be debarred from determining the questions raised by the parties thereto." It was opined : "40. The Tribunal being possessed of extensive jurisdiction, subject of course to fulfilment of the conditions precedent, for initiation of the proceeding, was entitled to go into all issues. We have furthermore to bear in mind that the definition of "land grabber" is not only restricted to the party to the proceeding, but also includes his predecessor-in-interest. Once the land is held to be a government land, the logical corollary thereto would be that +— V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. YADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] subject to the law of limitation and prescription, the State would not lose the said right to the opposite party. 41. It may be true that absence of lawful entitlement by itself may not be sufficient to pass a judgment and decree in favour of the State and against the land grabber, but also it must be shown that he had taken illegal possession thereof. 42. The Bench in Kanda Lakshmana Bapuji has applied both the broader and narrow meanings of the said expression. It would not, however, mean that all the tests c laid down therein are required to be satisfied in their letter and spirit. What is necessary to be proved is the substance of the allegation. The proof of intention on the part of a person being his state of mind, the ingredients of the provisions must be considered keeping in view ·the D materials on records as also circumstances attending thereto. What would be germane for lawful entitlement to remain in possession would be that if the proceedee proves that he had bona fide claim over the land, in which event, it would be for him to establish the same. 43. In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji this Court has categorically held that the requisite intention can be inferred by necessary implication from the averments made in the petition, the written statement and the depositions of witnesses, like any other fact. The question which must, therefore, have to be posed and answered having regard to the claim of the land grabber would be that, if on the face of his claim it would appear that he not only had no title, but claimed his possession only on the basis thereof, tre same must be held to be illegal. The G question in regard to lawful entitlement of the proceedee, therefore, for invoking the charging section plays an important and significant role. 44. We would like to add that the person's purported belief H c that he is legally entitled to hold the land and his possession is not otherwise illegal must also be judged not only from the point of time when he entered into the possession or when he had acquired the purported title but also from the point of view as to whether by reason of determination of such a question by a competent court of law, he has been found to have no title and consequently continuance of his possession becomes illegal. If the proceedee against whom a proceeding has been initiated under the provisions of the said Act is entitled to raise the question of adverse possession, which being based on knowledge of a lawful title and declaration of the hostile title on the part of the person in possession, there does not appear to be any reason as to why knowledge of defect in his title and consequently his possession becoming unlawful to his own knowledge would not come within the purview of the term "land grabbing" as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act. The provisions of the Act must be construed so as to enable the tribunal to give effect thereto. It cannot be construed in a pedantic manner which if taken to its logical corollary would make the provisions wholly unworkable. Only because a person has entered into possession of a land on the basis of a purported registered sale deed, the same by itself, in our considered opinion, would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that he had not entered over the land unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily. 45. For determination of such an issue, the Special Court will be entitled to take into consideration not only the rival claims of the parties, but also the earlier round of litigation, if any, and subsequent conduct of the proceedee himself." 19. We agree with the legal principles laid down in the said decision and are of the considered view that the Tribunal/ Special Court constituted under the Act has the requisite jurisdiction to go into the question of adverse possession. V. LAXMINARASAMMA v. A. 'f'ADAIAH (DEAD) & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 20. We are not oblivious of a decision of this Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thumma/a Krishna Rao and Anr. [(1982) 2 sec 134] wherein it was held that a question of title could not properly be decided in a summary enquiry contemplated by Sections 6 and 7 of the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905. In that case, the principal question, which arose for consideration, was as to whether the property in question was in possession of the family of one Habibuddin for a long time and, thus, the same had not vested in the Government by reason of a land acquisition proceeding initiated for acquisition of the land for Osmania University. In that case, c Osmania University filed a suit for possession which was dismissed on the premise that Habibuddin had perfected his title by adverse possession. Thereafter Osmania University requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to take steps for summary eviction of the persons who are not in authorized occupation of the said plots. The observations made therein must be held to have been made in the aforementioned factual matrix. 21. It is one thing to say that a summary proceeding cannot be resorted to when a noticee resists a bona fide dispute involving complicated questions of title and his right to remain in possession of the land but it is another thing to say that although a Special Court and/or a Tribunal which has all the powers of a civil court would not be entitled to enter into such a contention. Krishna Rao (supra), therefore, in our opinion has no application to the facts of the present case. 22. We, therefore, are of the opinion that Konda Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) lays down the correct law and N. Srinivasa Rao (supra) does not. The reference is answered accordingly. The merit of the matter may now be determined by an appropriate Bench. G.N. Reference answered.