2 s.c.R. VARADA BHAVANARAYANA RAO ti. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUl'TA JJ.) Estate& Land-Inam grants-" Eswte&"-Whe!her lnam
•houki relate to whale or nam•d village-Burden of proof-If on peraon who asBer!B that it i• not "E•wle"-Madra• EBtatu Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Mad. 30 of 1947), •. 1- Madra. EBlate& Land Act, 1908 (Mad. 1 of 1908) •· 3 (2)-
lndian Evidence Act, (1 of 1872), ss. 101, 102, 103. The appellant held the major portion of certain village• covered by 5 inam grant• in the District of Vishakapatnam in the State of Madras. The Inam Commissioner had granted
ftesh inam title deeds in confirmation of the original grants. The Special Officer appointed by the Madras Government under s. 2 of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 194 7, decided that the inam lands covered by the fresh inams were "Estates
withins. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 anJ recommenclrd fair and equitable rates of rent for the raiyati lands in this estate. Subsequently the Government of Madras by a notification in the Gazette fixed rates of rent in accordance with this recommendation. The
appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the consti· tution for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the State to forbear from giving effect to the notification. The High Com! held that the proper remeay of the appellant Wal by
way of a suit and dismissed the petition. The appellant thereupon filed a civil suit and the Trial Court accepted the contention of the appellant that suit land did not constitute an estate as defined iu s. 3 ( 2) ( d) of the Madras Estates
Land Act, 1903. On appeal to the High Court the decision of the Trial Court was reversed and the appeal was allowed. The present appeal has been filed on a certificate granted by the High Court.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that there was no material on ~he record to show that the. original grant was of a whole village or of a village by name, to bring the ands within tho definition of "Estate" in s. 3 (2) ( d) of tho M•n:h 25
Var.:cfa Blia~'Ollara.J•ri• Ra> State ef Ar1dhra PrM!t:f, Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. It was further contended that the burden of proving \vhcthcr the land constituted an estate lay on the State and the State had failed to discharge this burden.
The respondent~' contention \Vas that the scheme of the Explanation (1) to s. 3 (2) (d) showed that the legisla- ture intended the court 'O presume that \Vhen a grant as an inam was expressed to be of a named village the area cdvered by the grant formed an estate but that it was open to a party to rebut this presumption.
Held that the suit land docs not form a whole inam village within the meaning of the main portion of s. 3 (2) (d). It can still be an estate, ho,vevcr, if it comes within th(" explanation.
Varadaraja-Swamirari Temple v. Krislmapp7, I. L. R. (1958) Mad. 1023, approved. The present grant which wa< later confirmed by the title deed was already of a named village. It is not correct to !'ay that as soon a• it was found that the ioam grant was of a named village a rebuttable presump- tion will arise that it formed an estate.
Janakiramaraju v. Appala•wami, I. L. R. (1954) Mad. 980 and Narayana.•wami Nayrida v. Subramaniy~m, (1915) I. L. R. 39 Maj, 683, disapproved. The legislature has not created :uiy presun1ption either
way. This being the position the question of the burden of proof depends on ss. 101, 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act. Applying the principles contained in those sections the burden to prove that the suit land is noc an esrate is on the plaintiff and he having failed to discharge this burden, the appeal is dismiascd.
Diatricl Board Tanjore v. Noor Mohamwul, A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 446, distinguished. CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appea! No. 340 of 1961. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated
November :rn, l\Jl18, of the Andhra Pradesh 2 S.C.R. High Court at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No. 1228 of 1953. 'P. V. R. Tatachari and N. V. Ramadas, for the appellant. P. Rama Reddy and P. D. Menon,
for respondent No. 1. 1963. March 25. The judgment of the Court was delivered by J96J Yarada Bh:.wanarayani Rao .. .ltatt! of Andhra Pr1desh DAS GUPTA J.-ln the district of Vishakhapat-
Das Gupta I. nam in the State of Madras there is a village known by the name of Vandrada. The entire area of this village is now covered by 5 inam grants, by far the major portion being comprised in the inam held
by the appellant, Varada Bhavanarayanarao. In 1864 the loam Commissioner granted fresh inam title deeds in confirmation of the existing iuam grants, the total area of the village was recorded as 768.60
acres. Out of this 66.12 acres were unassessed poramboke; 690.13 acres of dry and wet lands were included in a title deed which is numbered 1082; 9.25 acres were included in title deeds Nos. 940 and 941;
two other title deeds Nos. 940 and 9!1 granted by the Inam Commissioner covered an area of 3.04 acres. The question in controversy in the present litigation is whether the inam created by the
original grant in confirmation of which title deed No. 1082 was issued by the Inam Commissioner forms an "estate" to which the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (Act XXX ofl947)
applies. This Act will be later referred to in this judgment as "the Reduction of Rent Act". It is necessary to mention here that s. l of this Act provides that it applies to all estates as defined in s.3
(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The relevant portion of s.3(2) of the Madras Estates Land Act runs thus:- IJ63 Vardda Rh11ra11ara)".2n'1 Rao v. Stat4 of Andf,ra Pratk.Jh
Das Gupta J. 50-1 "(d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partiuoned
among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees". Explanation (1) : Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant
shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstandin!!' that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name, which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been
reserved for communal purposes ………… " The Special Officer appointed by the Govern- ment of Madras under s.2 of the Rent Reduction Act decided that the inam lands in respect of which
title deed 1082 had been issued and which now admittedly are held in inam by the appellant formed an "estate". Accordingly the officer, acting under the Act recommended fair and equitable rates of rent
for the raiyati lands in this estate. On June 27, 1950, the Government of :\1adras published in the Gazette a notification fixing the rates of rents payable in respect of lands in the vi II age in accordance with
these recommendations. Aggrieved by this action of the Government the appellant moved the High Court of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of Jl1mdamus directing the State to forbear
from giving effect to the notification. The High Court held that the remedy of the petitioner was by way of a suit and dismissed the application, on an undertaking given by the Government that it would
waive its right to the notice under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was after this that the appellant filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam, the suit out of which this appeal
has arisen. 2 s.c.R. In his plaint the appellant averred that for the land; comprised under title deed No. 10~2, there was neither the grant of a whole village nor of a named village. It was also stated by the appellant that the
lands now covered by the single title deed of 1082 originally formed the subject·niatter of several separate grants. The plaintiff further averred that out of the lands of the village not included in any
of the earlier grants, further grants were made subse- quently which were separately confirmed and separate title deeds-Title deeds Nos. 940, 941 and Nos. 179 and 180 -were issued in respect of them.
It was mainly on the basis of these averments that the plain· tiff contended that his land~ covered by the title deed No. 1082 were not at all an estate and prayed for a declaration to this effect. 1 he State of .v'ladras was
the main defendant in the snit. and contested the plaintiff's claim. In its written statement the State pleaded that there was in respect of the suit land a single grant of a named village and that it was not
true that from out of any reserved lands further grants were made subsequently. Accordingly, it was urged that the plaintiffs contention that these lands did not form an estate should be rejected.
Similar pleas were raised also by defendants 2 to 31 who were impleaded as the tenants cultivating some of the lands covered by the title deed 1082. The Trial Court held that as the original grant
is shown by the entries in the Inam Fair Register to have been made to a number of persons and there wer.! deduction for poramboke and for personal and service inams, and further because even though the
original grant may have been under a single transact· ion the confirmation was not by one title deed, the suit lands did not constitute an estate as defined in s. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras &tates Land Act.
On appeal by the State of Madras, the High Court of Madras came to a contrary conclusion. V •rtrda Rhav1Jnaray{}.na Rao State of Andhra P"ulesh Du Gupta J. Stau of Aodlira PradeJh
Das Gupta J. t>06 The High Court pointed out that the opinion of the Trial Judge that to constitute an estate the confir· mation must be under one grant was unsupportable. In the opinion of the High Court the entries in the
Inam Fair Register showed that the grant consisted of a named village and it was the inam as granted that was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner. The High Court also expressed its view that "the
whole Inam Inquiry proceeded on the footing that it was the whole village, excepting the two minor inams, that was given in inam to Chaui Venkata· char Ju etc." The High Court accordingly allowed
the appeal and dismissed the suit with costs. Against this decision of the High Court the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiff on a certificate granted by the High Court.
In support of the appeal, Mr. Tatachari has contended that there were no materials on the record to show that the original grant was of a whole of the village or of a village by name.
His next contention is that even if it be held against his client that the original grant that was ultimately confirmed by the title deed 1082 was of a named village the burden still lay on the defendants to show further that the
portion of the village now covered by the minor grants (in respect of which title deeds Nos. 940, 941 and title deed Nos. 179 and 180 were issurd)had been granted prior to the date of that original grant.
Learned Counsel contends that the defendants have failed to discharge this burden and so the plaintiff's case that these lands do not form an estate should be accepted. The several questions of fact that arise in this
case have to be decided on the meagre evidence furnished by the. Inam Fair Regist~r of Vandrada village. For, as It usually happens m mo~t of such cases neither the original grant which was confirmed
2 s.C.R. by the title deed No. 1082 nor the originals of the other grants which were the basis of the other four title deeds are available. On an examination of the entries in the Inam Fair Register it appears that the
inam grant which was conferred in 1864 by title deed No. 1082 was originally granted by Nabob Mofuz Khan in the year 1739. The area covered by this grant was estimated to be 40 garces in the
year 1797. But a few years later-in an account of 1816-the area was calculated as 100 garces. It is not possible to say on the basis of this statement of area that the entire area of the village was included
in the original grant by the nawab. Clearly, there· fore, the suit land does not form a whole inam village within the meaning of the main portion of cl. (d) which has been set out above. It can. still
be an estate however if it comes within the Explana · tion. The effect of the Explanation was succinctly put in a full Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Varadaraja·Swamivari Temp/,e v. Krish·
nappa (1), thus : " …………………………….. Where the grant in inam was of a named village; what was granted would constitute an estate even though the grantee did not have the benefit of the
minor inams that lay within the geographical limits of that village, provided it was proved that the grant of the minor inams preceded in point of time the grant of the rest of the
village as a named village." In our opinion, the High Court was clearly right in its view that the original grant has been shown to be of a named village. Apart from the fact that the
inam itself is described in Col. 8 of the Inam Register as Vandrada Shrotriem and Agrahar of Vandrada, we get a further fact from the entries in Col. 20 that Mr. Scott's Register of 1207 Fasli shows
that the village Vandrada was originally granted in (I) f, L. R. (1958) Mad. !023. Varada Bhav1nau1yana Rao v. State of Andhra Pr,,d,sh Das GujJta J. Vt.rada Rha~tJntuay2!".a Rao v.
Sl•lt of Andhra Praduh DtJJ Gup1a J. Inam to Chatti Venkatachari and others in A.D. 1739 for subsistence. This grant which was later confirmed by the title deed No. 1082 was thus clearly
of a named village. That alone is however not sufficient to make it an estate. It must further appear that the minor inams which covered part of the village, viz., Devadayan 9.25 acres
and the personal inams for 3.04 acres had bern granted prior to the grant of the rest of the village as a named village. There is nothing on the record, however, to show the dates of the 11rants of the minor inams. It
is therefore necessary to consider the question of burden of proof. The decision of this C:iurt in Dist. Board, Tanjore v. Noor Mohd. (1), has generally been taken to lay down the law that when
the question arises in any case before the courts whether certain lands constitute an "estate" the burden of proving that they constitute an estate is upon the party who sets up that contention. On a
closer examination however it appears that this decision cannot be considered to be an authority for this proposition. The judgment of Mr. Justice Mahajan (as he then was) states "that it was con-
ceded by Mr. Somayya, the learned Counsel for the respondent that the burden of proving that certain lands constitute an 'estate' is upon the party who sets up the contention." The judgment proceeded
on the basis of this concession by Counsel and con- tains no discussion on the question and consequently no pronouncement. The other learned Judge, Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar has also stated
"that the respondent has not successfully discharged the onus that rests on him to show that Kunanjeri was an 'estate' within the meaning of the Act." His view that such onus did rest on the respondent
was also apparently based on the concession made by Counsel. It will not be proper therefore to treat the judgment of this Court in Dist. Board Tanjore cast('), (I) A.(. R. 1953 S, C. "6.
2 S.C.R. as a decision on the question of burden of proof in such cases. It is now necessary to examine the principle involved in the question. On behalf of the respon- dent State, Mr.
Ram Reddy contended that a consideration of the scheme of legislation in intro- ducing Explanation (1) to s. 3 (:!) (d) shows that the legislature intended the Court to pre1mme that
when a grant as an inam was expreasoo to be of a named village the area covered by the grant formed an estate, but that it was open to a party to rebut this presumption by showing that the excluded lands
of the village had been granted by the grantor of the major inam after the date of the major grant. It appears that long before this Explanation was added to s.3 (2) (d), the Madras High Court (Wallis
C.J. and Srinivasa Ayyangar J.) held in Narayarv1:- swami Nayadu v. Subramanyam ('). that as in all the documents the temple was described as the owner of the whole village, the burden was upon the plaintiff
to show that the grant was only of the revenue of a portion of the lands in the village and as this burden had not been discharged Vcnkatapuram Agraharam was an estate even though there were minor inams
in the village. This decision was given in 1915 and was followed in the Madras High Court till 194:3 when in Adema v. Satyadhyana Thirtha Swamivaru('), another Bench held that unless every bit of land in
the village was included in the grant, the grant could not be of the whole village and the land granted could not have formed an estate. This later view was followed the same year in Suri Red:li v. Agnihotrudu
(•). It was after this that the present Explanation 1 to s.3 (2) (d) was added by the Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act II of 1945. There was a provision by which the amendment was to be deemed
to have effect as from the date when the Madras Estates Land ( Third Amendment ) Act, 1936, br;nging in sub-cl. (d) of cl. 2 of s.3 in its (\) 11915) I.L.R. 39 Mad. 6A3. (21 [1943] 2 M.L.J. 289.
131 [1943] 2 M.L.J. 528. Varada Bii;vanaray1na n.. v. St•te of Andhr• Pr•desh Das Gupta J. V ctraJa B4ac1211Ct'Oyano Roo v. Slat~ of A.ntllrro Prad,,h Das Gupta J. present form came into force.
Mr. Ram Reddy argues that the intention of the amending Act I 945 was to restore fully the view taken in Naraya. naswami's Case ('), and that under th<' definition of an inam village as explained by the amendment a
named village would be presumed to be an inam village, and so an "estate" notwithstanding the existence of certain minor inams. The presumption could however be rebutted by showing that these
minor inam.s were created by the grantor of the major inam subsequent to the creation of the major inam. The argument is undoubtedly attractive. It also finds support from the observations of Subba Rao J.
In Janakimmaraju v. Appalaswami ('), where the learned .Judge stated that the amendment introduced by the Explanation was intended to restore the well settled law disturbed by the decision in Ademma's
case (8). There are other observations in 1he judg· ment in Janakiramaraju's case('), which appear to support even more clearly Mr. Ram Reddy's argu· ment that as soon as it was found that the inam grant
wag of a named village a rebuttable presumption will arise that it formed an estate. On closer cxamina· tion of the que~tion however we find that i1 would be reading too much into the Explanation 10 think
that the legislature wanted to create such a prrsump· tion. There are a number of reasons which make t1S hcstitate to accept the view that such a presump· tion was created. The first of these is 1hat "hen
adding the Explanation in 194ii the legislature did not think fit to make any change in s. ;!;{ of the Act, under which it shall be presumed where i1 becarrn: necessary in any suit or proceeding to determine
whether an inam village or a separated part of an inam village was or was not an es1ate within the meaning of the Act as it slood before the commence- ment of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amend men~
Act, I 936, that such village was an rslate. If when adding the Explanation to s. 3 (2) (d) in I !l4ii lh~ legislature had intended to bring into existence a (I) (1915) 1.L.R. 39 Mad. 689,
121 !.L.R. (195•; Mad 9ll0. (SJ [19i3J 2 ML J. 289. 2 S.C.R. presumption as suggested by Mr. Ram Reddy, nothing was easier than to give effect to such inten- tion by omitting from s. 23 the words "as it stood
before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, l!J3ti" or by adding express terms that "where the grant was expressed to be of a named village the presumption will be that it is an
estate until the contrary is shown". Another reason which makes it difficult for us to accept Mr. Reddy's argument is the actual lan- guage used in Explanation (1). The last portion
of the Explanation clearly indicates that the conclu- sion that the area is an "estate" can be drawn even where the whole of the village is not included in the grant, only if it appears that the portion not included
had already been gifted and was therefore lost to the tenure. The addition of the last clause in the Explanation brings out the fact that the legislature did not intend to go quite as far as the High Court
had gone in the case of 1\Tarayanaswami Nayudu ('). On a consideration of a history of the langu- age used in the Explanation and also the circum- stances in which the Explanation came to be added,
we have come to the conclusion that the legislature being wdl aware of the difficulties of proving whether the minor grants had been granted prior to or subsequent to the grant of a named village, decided
to leave the matter easy as between the contending parties and created no presumption either way. That being the position, the question on which of the contending parties the burden of proof would
lie has to be decided on the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. Section 10 I of the Evidence Act provides that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent
on the existence of facts which he asserts, must pr0ve that those facts exist. Section 102 provides (IJ (1915. J. L. R. 39 Mad. 683. Varad2 BhauanaYtJJana Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh
Das Gupta J. Var.,{a Rhovonar9am Jltio v. Statt rV ,tndhra p,.u,h D"' Gupta J, that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all
were given on either side. Section 103 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that
the burden of proof of that fact shall lie on any parti- cular person. Applying these principles, we find that the plaintiff who asks the Court for a declaration that the area covered by the title deed I 082 is not an
estate must prove that it is not an "estate." If no evidence were given on either side the plaintiff would fail. For, we have found that there i~ no presumption in law either that the area in question
is an estate or that it is not an estate. It follows from this that the plaintiff who is to prove that the suit lands do not form an estate mmt show that the minor inams were granted subsequent to the date of
the inam grant of the named village The plaintiff has clearly failed to discharge this burden. We have therefore come to the conclusion, though for reasons different from what found favour
with the Hi~h Court, that the plaintiff's suit lus been rightly dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.