Paragraph numbers below are the court’s original numbering, recovered from the source text.
22. The contention of the appellant has been noticed in Paragraph No.10 of the judgment, which is to the following effect:- “10. The learned counsel on behalf of the appellant contended that if Sections 31 and 32-F are read together, then the tenant is not required to give any notice to the landlord because neither Narmadabai nor her successor-in-interest ever gave any notice to the tenant under Section 31 of the Act. Counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that Section 32-F is a complete section in itself and the provision of the earlier sections cannot influence or have overriding effect. He therefore contended that whatever be the right of the landlord under Section 31, the same gets separated by virtue of the provisions of Section 32-F. This contention was negated by the counsel for the appellant arguing that Section 32-F cannot be said to have overriding effect on all the earlier sections.”
23. This Court held that tenant was under legal obligation or statutory duty to give notice of his intention to purchase the land as required under Section 32F. In Paragraph No. 13, following has been stated:- VASANT GANPAT PADAVE (D) BY LRS. v. ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] “13. In our view, the High Court correctly pointed out that the provisions of Section 32-F are independent in nature and are separate from the provisions under Section 31 of the Act. The exception mentioned under Section 32-F(1) to sub-section (2) is limited to the sections referred to in it i.e. from Sections 32 to 32- E (both inclusive) and Sections 32-G to 32-R (both inclusive). Further the expression “Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections” under sub-section (1) of Section 32-F is of paramount importance. Considering the fact that Section 31 is not included in the sections mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 32-F, and the expression “Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections” under sub-section (1) of Section 32-F, we are of the view that the right given to the landlord under Section 31 has nothing to do with the right given to the tenant under Section 32-F for purchasing the land and consequently it has to be held that the appellant in this case was under a legal obligation or statutory duty to give notice of his intention to purchase the land as required under Section 32-F.”
24. The submission of the appellant that she could not serve a notice since she was not sure of the title of the disputed land was also not accepted by this Court. Following was observed by this Court in Paragraph No.18:- “18. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has argued before us that the appellant could not serve a notice to the landowner since he was not sure about the title of the disputed land owing to a dispute between the two sons of late Smt Narmadabai who were claiming the title of the disputed land. We cannot accept this contention of the appellant. The order passed by the Tahsildar, Kavathe Mahankal, lays down the fact that Shri Ramchandra, Respondent 2 in this case, had produced a certified copy of the judgment and order dated 28-4-1966, passed by the Senior Joint Civil Judge in Miscellaneous Application No. 25 of 1965 in which it has been declared that Shri Ramchandra is the owner of the disputed land on the basis of the will executed by his mother late Smt Narmadabai. The appellant also in his deposition admitted that: “The owner of the said land was Smt Narmadabai Bhau Sutar. Narmadabai died before 10/12 years. Ramchandra Bhau Sutar filed suit on the basis of the will, and got transferred the land of Narmadabai in his name.”
25. The ratio of the above noted judgments can be restated in following words:- (i) For a landlord suffering from a disability on the Tillers Day i.e. 01.04.1957, the deemed purchase shall be suspended. (ii) Landlord suffering from a disability has a right under Section 31(3) of the Act to give notice of termination of tenancy and file an application for possession. (iii) Under Section 31(3), a minor, within one year from date on which he attains majoriy; a successor-in-title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist; and landlord within one year from the date on which his/her mental or physical disability ceases to exist can also give an application for termination of tenancy and possession. (iv) Under Section 32F tenant has right to purchase where landlord was minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability within one year from the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under Section 31. (v) The tenant, in event, does not exercise his right of purchase within the period as prescribed under Section 32F(1)(a), his/her right to purchase shall be lost.
26. In the present case, it is undisputed fact that landlady died on 07.05.1999 and within one year thereafter her successor-in-title did not exercise his right under Section 31(3) and thereafter within one year tenant has not given any intimation for purchase as contemplated by Section 32(F). The question to be answered is as to whether in the above facts, Sub-Divisional Officer, Revenue Tribunal as well as the High Court were right in their conclusion that right of the tenant, i.e. the appellant has lost, he having not issued any intimation for purchase of the land within one year from expiry of the period as contemplated under Section 31(3). VASANT GANPAT PADAVE (D) BY LRS. v. ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
27. The ratio of this Court as noticed above especially in judgments of this Court in Appa Narsappa Magdum (supra), Sudam Ganpat Kutwal(supra) and Tukaram Maruti Chavan (supra) clearly support the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the appellants having not exercised their right to purchase under Section 32F(1) read with (1A) within the time prescribed the right of purchase of the tenant is lost. But there is one aspect of the matter which needs to be noted and has not been considered in the above judgments rendered by two- Judge Benches of this Court which we shall notice hereinafter.
28. The 1948 Act was amended by Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Laws (Amendment) Act, 1969. Section 32F was also amended by the above Amendment Act, 1969. It is useful to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons which led to amendment in Section 32 of the Act. L.A. Bill No. LXII of 1969 was introduced in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly on 18th August, 1969. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill are relevant for the present case which are to the following effect: “STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS. It has come to the notice of Government that a number of tenants in the Bombay area and the Vidarbha region of the State, failed to acquire ownership right in the lands held by them on account of their being dispossessed from the land otherwise than in the manner laid down in the relevant tenancy law. It is, therefore, expedient to amend the tenancy laws in force in these regions for safe-guarding the interest of these dispossessed tenants. It is also noticed that a large number of tenants in the Bombay area of the State holding land from landlords who were minors have lost right to purchase land for their failure to give intimation within the period laid down in sub-section (IA) of section 32, It is, therefore, necessary to give these tenants a fresh opportunity to purchase land. Section 32F is, therefore, being suitably amended for that purpose. As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court of India, in Civil appeals Nos. 312(N) and 313(N) of 1966 from the judgement of the High Court of Gujarat regarding jurisdiction of Civil Court in certain matters, it has also become necessary to suitably amend certain sections of the tenancy laws in force in the three regions of the State. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects.”
29. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it is noticed that a large number of tenants in the Bombay area of the State holding lands from landlords who were minors have lost right to purchase land for their failure to give intimation within the period laid down in sub-section (1A) of Section 32. The above reason lead to the amendment. By Amendment Act, 1969 in Section 32F sub-section (1) in clause (a) following words were added: “and for enabling the tenant to exercise the right of purchase, the landlord shall send an intimation to the tenant of the fact that he has attained majority, before the expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31”
30. The above amendment caste a statutory obligation on a landlord who has attained the majority to send intimation to the tenant. The above amendment was made to enable the tenant to exercise the right of purchase which was the object and purpose of the amendment.
31. Section 31(3) enumerates three categories of landlord who suffers from one or other disabilities due to which the right of purchase of tenant has been suspended on Tillers Day. The three categories of landlord have been empowered to give notice of termination of tenancy. Section 31(3) for ready reference is reproduced again: “Section 31(3) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to mental or physical disability then such notice may be given [and an application for possession under section 29 may be made,]–– (i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority; (ii) by the successor-in-title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist; (iii) within one year from the date on which mental or physical disability ceases to exist; and (iv) * * * * * * * *
32. Amendment in Section 32(1)F(a) added by Act No.49 of 1969 expressly covered a case of landlord who was minor and has attained majority. Intimation by a minor landlord who has attained majority has VASANT GANPAT PADAVE (D) BY LRS. v. ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] been made a statutory obligation of the landlord so that tenant may exercise his right of purchase. The other two categories which are a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability have not been expressly included in the amendment incorporated in Act 49 of 1969. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment given in 1969 as well as the express provisions of such amendment are for the purposes and object to enable the tenant to exercise right of purchase. When for one category of landlord i.e. minor it is mandated that he will intimate the tenant after he attained the majority so that tenant may be enabled to exercise the right of purchase, we are of the view that the same object has to be read in two other categories of landlord that is the successor- in-title of a widow and a landlord whose mental or physical disability has been ceased. When the legislative object is to facilitate a tenant of a disabled landlord after cessation of disability to exercise right of purchase, the same benefit needs to be extended to other two categories of disabled landlord. We do not find any distinction in three categories of disabled landlord nor tenant of a landlord who was a minor can be put on any higher footing as compared to other landlords suffering from the above two disabilities. The question may be asked that amendment only expressly included the landlord who has attained majority to send intimation and the legislature consciously did not include the other two categories of landlord i.e. successor-in-interest of a widow and landlord of a mental and physical disability ceases to exist. The Objects and Reasons and express amendment made by Act 49 of 1969 were with a view to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase. The said legislative intendment is to be extended to all tenants of landlords who were suffering from disability on the Tillers Day, whether successor-in-title of a widow or a landlord whose mental or physical disability ceases. All the three categories of tenants should be extended the same benefit and provision should be interpreted so that all tenants may be enabled to exercise their right of purchase effectively and in real sense.
33. As in the present case tenant’s case is that he was unaware of the death of the landlady since for the last several years she was living in Bombay, the date of knowledge of death of the landlady cannot be said to be a irrelevant factor and unless the tenant is aware of the death of landlady or in case of landlord suffering from physical or mental disability, how he will exercise his right of purchase is an important question. The 1948 Act and the Amendments made by 1969 Act were with intent to facilitate tenants to exercise their right. The Amendments by Act 15 of 1957 was agrarian reform making tillers of the soil the owners of the land which was done to achieve the object of making all tillers of the soil as owners of the land. While interpreting the provisions of Section 32F, 1A as well as Section 31(3) the purpose and object of the 1948 Act, amendments made therein from time to time cannot be lost sight.
34. When Section 32F of Act 1948 gives right to purchase to a tenant whose landlord was suffering from a disability on Tillers Day, the exercise of right to purchase by such tenant has to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the exercise of right meaningful and effective. The above said right cannot be defeated on the ground that it was not exercised within period prescribed when the tenant is unaware as to when the period has begun.
35. The period prescribed for exercising the right to purchase is not a period of limitation but a reasonable period prescribed for the exercise of a right. The knowledge of cessation of disability of landlord by the tenant can only be commencement of period prescribed.
36. When a statute gives a right to a tenant, statute needs to be interpreted in a manner so as to make the right workable, effective and meaningful. Such right cannot be defeated unless it is proved that tenant even after knowing that disability has ceased does not exercise his right within the period prescribed.
37. A two-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Appa Narsappa Magdum (supra) has expressly rejected the submission that tenant had no intimation of the death of landlady. Further judgments of this Court in Sudam Ganpat Kutwal (supra) and Tukaram Maruti Chavan(supra) also laid down the same ratio. The judgments in the above three cases were rendered by the two-Judge Benches in which cases the amendments made by Act 49 of 1969 were neither raised or considered. We, thus, are of the view that the ratio laid down in the above cases needs to be reconsidered and explained in view of the object and purpose for which amendments were made in Section 32F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969 as noticed above. We, thus, refer following questions for consideration of a larger Bench: (1) Whether the object and purpose of amendment made in Section 32F(1)(a) by Act 49 of 1969 is also relevant and applicable for exercise of right to purchase by a tenant of VASANT GANPAT PADAVE (D) BY LRS. v. ANANT MAHADEV SAWANT (D) THR. LRS. [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.] landlord who was widow or suffering from mental and physical disability on Tillers Day ? (2) Whether the successor-in-interest of a widow is also obliged to send an intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase. (3) In the event the answer to above question (1) or (2) is in affirmative, whether decision of this Court in Appa Narsappa Magdum, Sudam Ganpat Kutwal and Tukaram Maruti Chavan (supra) needs reconsideration and explanation.
38. Let the papers be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench. In the meantime, we direct that the parties shall maintain the status quo. Ankit Gyan Matters referred to larger Bench. END OF 2018 *******